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Abstract 
Recent research observed in a number of countries with developed capital markets, 
including the US and the UK, have produced inconclusive evidence on the presence 
of gains to acquiring company shareholders and indeed to the existing of net wealth 
gains. Thus, the current study aims to contribute to the debate on takeover activity by 
examining whether operational gains arise, using operating cash flow to measure 
operating performance of Malaysian companies involved in takeover activity between 
the period 1988-1992. Rather than investigating the distribution of shareholder 
wealth changes, however, the focus is whether takeover in Malaysia lead to an 
improvement in corporate performance. 
Consistent with the characteristics of private acquisitions in the sample of 97 quoted 
acquiring and 117 target companies (comprising of 113 private, 3 public listed and 1 
non-public listed), acquisitions in Malaysia appear to be non-disciplinary. Despite the 
non-disciplinary motives, the overall results reported in the current study suggest that 
acquisitions in Malaysia during the period 1988-1992 lead to operating cash flow 
improvements in the long run. The improvement in performance results from both 
increases in return on sales (operating cash flow per dollar of sales) and in asset 
turnover (sales per dollar of assets). These improvements are not achieved at the 
expense of the long-term viability of the combined firms nor does it appear to be 
driven by cost-cutting strategies. 
In addition, empirical evidence in the thesis indicates that the major source of 
operating gains is the acquisition of companies with a high overlap of product market 
relatedness. In addition acquisitions that are financed by equity produce higher 
operating gains. Acquirers who make no immediate change to the management team 
of the target company following the acquisition also achieve a greater increase in 
post acquisition performance, reinforcing the likelihood that this sample does not 
consist of disciplinary acquisitions. Further, the significant positive correlation 
between the share price market revaluation of acquiring firms around the bid period, 
the change in post acquisition operating performance and the premium paid for the 
target indicate that managers who anticipate post acquisition operating cash flow 
improvements will pay a premium to acquire the targets. The findings can also be 
viewed as evidence that cash flow data and market value data can capture real 
economic phenomena which explain a substantial proportion of the market's reaction 
to takeovers around the announcement period. 
The results demonstrate that Malaysian acquisitions do lead to improvements in 
operating performance that provide potential for benefits to both the economy as a 
whole and bidding company shareholders. However, as the majority of target 
companies in the current study were previously privately owned businesses, 
researchers and policy makers should be wary before generalising from these 
results. 
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1.1 Study Overview 
One of the issues facing developing economies is to identify the extent to 
which they should adopt market-based policies. One particular area in which this 
issue arises relates to takeover activity. Takeover activity may be perceived as one 
aspect of the market for corporate control that provides a disciplinary mechanism on 
management (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). In a less-well developed economy it may 
not be possible to follow a 'liberal' approach to takeover activity. Other policies, such 
as that of transferring a greater proportion of ownership of productive assets to the 
indigenous population (as with the bumiputra policies adopted in Malaysia) may be 
perceived as more important'. Even though corporate acquisition activity is relatively 
new in Malaysia, it is a significant aspect in the growth of business sectors and the 
development of the Malaysian economy. With an increase in the level of acquisition 
activity, corporate leaders need to be aware of the difficulties in achieving value 
maximising behaviour in corporate acquisition decisions. It is also important that 
legislators do not make hasty decisions about the need for regulation in a field which 
economic theory suggests has an important disciplinary role to play in a market- 
based economy. 
The current study aims to contribute to the debate on takeover activity by 
examining the operating performance of a sample of Malaysian companies that made 
acquisitions in the period 1988-1992. Rather than focusing on shareholder wealth 
effects, however, the focus is on changes in operating cash flow performance. The 
thesis is more concerned with identifying whether takeovers in Malaysia lead to an 
'The National Development Policy (NDP), which replaced the National Economic Policy (NEP) in 
1991, sought to raise bumiputra ownership of national wealth to 30%. 
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improvement in corporate performance rather than with identifying the distribution of 
wealth changes, if any. The main approach adopted is to analyse the operating cash 
flow performance of Malaysian companies involved in takeover activity between 
1988-1992. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
There are two research approaches normally employed in addressing the 
question of the efficiency of the takeover mechanism. One approach is to focus on 
security returns analysis and the wealth gains or losses to the various shareholder 
groups. The other approach is to focus on the profitability of companies involved, 
using accounting data. Both measures should be related to post acquisition cash 
flows, thus it might be assumed that they would lead to consistent results. However, 
previous studies that have used both measures suggest otherwise. 
Market-based studies that focused on announcement period security returns 
have found that acquisitions on average improve performance, yet the recent 
literature on post acquisition performance concludes that acquisitions reduce wealth. 
Magenheim and Mueller (1988) and Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) are among studies in 
US that reported positive returns to targets and bidders around announcement 
period. In the UK, Franks and Harris (1989) and Sudarsanam et al. (1996) are among 
studies that found acquisitions on average are value enhancing for the shareholders 
around the bid period. Most of the existing research on acquisition in Malaysia 
examines share price behaviour around acquisition announcement. Md Isa and Lim 
(1993), Mat Nor (1993) and Md Isa (1994) are among studies that found corporate 
acquisitions in Malaysia as value enhancing activities around the announcement 
period, particularly to acquired firms. Mohammad (1993), on the other hand, reported 
that Malaysian companies involved in acquisitions break even around the bid period. 
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Using the ex post analysis, event studies in the US have also produced 
contradictory results and have not conclusively determined whether takeovers 
produce economic gains in the long run. Magenheim and Mueller (1988), Lahey and 
Conn (1990), and Clark and Ofek (1994) are among studies that found negative post 
acquisition performance for the merged firms. Only Franks, Harris and Titman (1991), 
and Loderer and Martin (1992) find positive post acquisition returns. The UK findings 
has been similar in that studies carried out by Limmack (1991), Kennedy and 
Limmack (1996), Sudarsanam et al. (1996), Gregory (1997), and Baker and Limmack 
(1999) report negative long run post acquisition returns for the acquiring firms. Only 
Franks et al. (1977) find that acquiring firms in the brewing industry gain in the long 
run from acquisition, while Franks and Harris (1989) provides conflicting results 
depending on the benchmark control used. This conflict has led a number of authors 
(Healy et al, 1992, Jarrell, 1995, and Gregory, 1997) to suggest that the results may 
be a reflection of methodological errors, including the use of inappropriate control 
models, rather than the acquisition per se. This view is partly reinforced by the length 
of time over which the negative post outcome returns are observed as this appears to 
contradict the notion of an efficient securities market (Ruback, 1988). Possible 
methodological errors include the choice of inappropriate control models or some 
form of selection bias either in the control model or the sample being examined. 
Attempts to provide what are deemed to be more appropriate models by 
Franks et al. (1991), Agrawal et al. (1992) in US, Gregory (1997), Higson and Elliot 
(1998), and Baker and Limmack (1999) in UK have met with varying degrees of 
success. Agrawal et al. (1992) finds that acquisitions are followed by significant 
negative returns over a five-year period after the effective date, a result robust to 
various specifications of the returns-generating model. Gregory (1997) and Baker and 
Limmack (1999), that have used alternative controls for UK acquisitions and also 
report negative pattern of post outcome abnormal returns. 
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The alternative research approach focuses on the profitability of companies 
involved, using accounting data. Most accounting-based studies both for the UK and 
the US tend to lend support to the view that acquisitions do not result in improved 
performance and that acquisitions are non-value maximising to shareholders. 
Examples include studies by Mueller (1980), Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Clark 
and Ofek (1994), Philappatos and Baird (1996), and Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) in 
US, Singh (1971), Utton (1974), Meeks (1977), Holl and Pickering (1988), and 
Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos (1997) in the UK. However, Lorie and Halpern 
(1970), and Lev and Mendelker (1972) in US found that merging firms perform 
significantly better than non-merging firms. 
In summary, the apparently conflicting results produced both by market-based 
studies and accounting-based studies highlight a fundamentally unresolved question 
of the long term effects of acquisitions on firm performance. In the current study an 
alternative research design is adopted, that which uses cash flow analysis in 
measuring the performance of companies involved in takeover activity. The approach 
adopted is similar to that used in the studies by Healy et al. (1992,1997), Manson et 
al. (1994), Clark and Ofek (1994), Anand and Singh (1997), and Ghosh (1998). 
These latter studies provide evidence, which suggest that acquisitions create the 
opportunity for wealth increases and are economically efficient in the long run. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The main purpose of the current paper is to provide evidence as to whether 
the operating performance improves post acquisition for companies involved in 
takeover activity in one developing market, that of Malaysia during the period 1988- 
1992. The specific objectives in this thesis are as follows: 
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a) to analyse the level of pre acquisition operating performance of bidders, targets 
and their respective controls. 
b) to test if there is any improvement in the post acquisition operating 
performance five years after acquisition relative to four years pre acquisition 
operating performance 
c) to explore the sources of operating cash flow that might offer explanation for 
the changes in the performance of the combined firms after acquisition 
d) to examine the effect of bid characteristics of the companies involved in 
acquisitions on post acquisition operating performance. 
e) to test whether share price changes around the bid period and also in the post 
acquisition period is a function not only on the expectation of operating 
performance but also on the premium paid for the target. 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
Jensen (1984) argued that shareholders wealth increases in takeover 
situations are derived from improved operating performance and increased efficiency. 
As discussed in the previous section, recent research, however, has provided 
contradictory evidence on the presence of gains to bidding company shareholders 
and indeed on the existence of net wealth gains. There is, however, a fairly wide body 
of indirect evidence that takeover activity does provide a disciplinary role in market 
economies (Limmack, 2000). One possible way of reconciling the contradictory 
findings is to suggest that takeovers do indeed improve economic efficiency on 
average, but acquirers simply pay too much for the benefits. Researchers who have 
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attempted to address the question as to whether takeovers actually lead to an 
improvement in operating performance, however, have generally found little evidence 
to support this thesis. If the benefits from takeover activity are unclear in developed 
markets then there is no obvious benefit to outweigh what are perceived to be 
potentially harmful effects, including the development of monopoly power. The 
danger in this for developing markets is that politicians may favour legislation that 
inhibits not only the negative but also the positive aspects of takeover activity. From 
the regulatory viewpoint, it is therefore important that researchers establish a prima 
facie case for the presence of operating efficiencies in takeover activity. In this 
particular context it is less important to determine which group of shareholders, if any, 
benefits from improved operating performance. 
This research is also motivated by the lack of published studies conducted on 
corporate acquisition in a developing economy like Malaysia due to its short capital 
market history, coupled with an underdeveloped financial base. Earlier studies 
undertaken in the country (example Mat. Nor, 1993; Mohammad, 1993 and Md. Isa, 
1994) have employed share price data to examine the returns to shareholders around 
the bid period. The current study differs from previous studies in the following 
respects: 
a. The cash flow analysis in measuring the post acquisition performance in the 
current study has not been reported before in the published literature on 
Malaysian acquisitions 
b. It adds to the existing literature by identifying the sources of operating cash 
flow that may offer explanation to the improved post acquisition performance 
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In addition, the significance of the study may also be seen in the light of its 
contribution to knowledge in the following aspects: 
c. The cash flow analysis in the current study will contribute to the growing body 
of knowledge on corporate acquisition as an alternative in measuring post 
acquisition performance 
d. In the area of accounting policy, cash flow data can also provide a useful 
basis for financial analysis. 
e. Contribution to knowledge will also be made particularly in corporate 
acquisitions development in Malaysia since the target sample used in the 
study are those of privately held targets 
f. Findings from the study might shed some insights to academicians, corporate 
raiders and policy makers in formulating better and meaningful strategies so 
as to enhance resource allocation within the Malaysian economy. 
1.5 Research Approaches 
The current study focuses on takeovers of Malaysian companies that were 
initiated and completed during the period January 1,1988 - December 31,1992. The 
sample period selected provided a focus on recent acquisitions and also ensured that 
sufficient pre and post acquisition performance data was available. A list of takeover 
bids was individually identified from the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange's (KLSE) 
monthly Investors Digests. The list was then cross checked with the Annual 
Companies Handbook published by the KLSE and the respective companies' files in 
the KLSE to find out if the acquisition was successful. The final sample included 97 
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quoted acquiring and 117 target companies (consisting of 113 private, 3 public listed 
and 1 non-public listed targets). Financial reports on the quoted acquiring and quoted 
non-acquiring companies were obtained from the KLSE library while those on non- 
quoted target and non-quoted matched target companies were obtained either from 
the companies themselves or from the Malaysian Registrar of Companies (ROC) in 
Kuala Lumpur. 
The relatively short time frame (1988-1992) suggests that the sample firms' 
performance may be influenced by economy or industry-wide changes. In assessing 
whether a sample of firms experience any unusual changes in post acquisition 
operating cash flow, a control was provided as a benchmark against which the 
sample firms can be compared. In the current study industry-matched control 
companies were selected from the population of non-acquiring and non-target 
companies. Bidders were also matched on the basis of size. Size matching was also 
undertaken as far as possible for target although the absence of full information on all 
potential controls made this more difficult. The definition of size is based on the book 
value of total operating assets at the end of the year prior to acquisition (represented 
by share capital plus reserves plus debt, less cash and marketable securities). 
Market values were not used as few of the targets were quoted. 
The measure of cash flow is profit before tax, depreciation and interest, 
adjusted for changes in working capital. To compare performance across firms, 
operating cash flow is scaled by the book value of assets, defined as book value of 
shareholders fund and total debt less cash and marketable securities at the beginning 
of the year in question. 
A pre acquisition consolidated measure of combined bidder and target 
operating performance is constructed for each of the four years prior to takeover (-4 
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to -1). The performance of each is weighted by the book value of operating assets of 
the two sample firms at the beginning of the relevant year. The post acquisition 
operating cash flow performance is calculated using the actual values reported by the 
combined firm, deflated by the book value of operating assets (represented by equity 
capital plus reserves plus debt, less cash and short-term investments) at the 
beginning of the relevant year. 
A combined control company operating cash flow performance measure is 
then calculated for each pair of control companies in each of the four years prior to 
the bid and the five years after. For the pre acquisition period, the combined control 
company measure is weighted by the relative operating asset values of the bidder 
and target firms at the beginning of each year. The post acquisition combined control 
company cash flow performance is computed by weighting the individual company 
performance by the relative asset value of the bidder and target firms at the end of 
the year prior to the acquisition. The control adjusted operating performance is 
obtained by subtracting the relevant control company weighted measures of operating 
performance from the combined measure for the bidder and target companies. 
In addition summary statistics are constructed for each takeover individually 
by calculating the median of the control adjusted measures (APCPre; ) over the four 
years prior to acquisition and also for the median value over the five years after 
acquisition. Tests are undertaken of the difference in median control adjusted 
performance from before to after the bid. In addition the change in abnormal control 
adjusted cash flow returns is estimated using the following model. 
AP'post =a+ß APcprer + Er 
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where 
AP`0sv is the median annual control adjusted cash flow returns for pro forma company 
i for the post acquisition years 
APCpre, is the pre acquisition median for the same pro forma company. 
The intercept a represents the abnormal control adjusted cash flow returns (changes 
in performance caused by acquisition). 
The slope coefficient ß captures any correlation in cash flow returns between pre and 
posts acquisition years. 
The advantage of using a regression analysis is that it avoids making an assumption 
that the combined firms will continue their preevent period of performance relative to 
respective control companies over post acquisition period (Ghosh, 1998). 
1.6 Chapter Organisation 
This study is organised into 13 chapters. Chapter 2 of the thesis discussed the 
history and economic background of the country, the financial and capital market, the 
regulatory policies and agencies in the country and the development of acquisitions in 
Malaysia. 
The managerial economic literature has forwarded various motives to explain 
why companies make corporate acquisitions and also to predict the outcome of post 
acquisition performance. Two that have received a lot of attention are the shareholder 
wealth maximisation and management wealth maximisation theories. The traditional 
(neo-classical) theory (Manne, 1965) views corporate acquisitions as value- 
enhancing activities, that firms will make acquisitions only if the managers believe 
they will maximise shareholders wealth. An alternative motive for making acquisitions 
is the managerial motives theory (Mueller, 1969) which postulates that the takeover is 
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an attempt to maximise top management utility instead of their shareholders' value. 
Thus, Chapter 3 contains a discussion of the various motives for acquisition including 
shareholder and management wealth maximisation theories, together with a review of 
empirical studies on each. 
Chapter 4 centres on the discussion of using market-based studies in 
evaluating the impact of corporate acquisitions on shareholder wealth while Chapter 5 
focuses on accounting and cash flow-based studies. Chapter 6 contains a discussion 
of the methodology and hypotheses applied in the current study including that relating 
to the sources of acquisition related changes in cash flow performance: return on 
sales, asset turnover, capital expenditure rate, asset sales rate and cash payment for 
expenses. Changes in the operating return on sales (operating cash flow divided by 
sales) and asset turnover (sales divided by operating assets) are measures of how 
efficiently the management is using its resources to improve the firm performance. It 
is also hypothesised that there is an increase in capital expenditure rate (capital 
expenditure divided by total assets) of the combined firms 5 years after acquisition 
indicating that the firm has not sacrificed its long term investments for the sake of its 
short-term improvement. Asset sales rate (cash receipts from asset sales divided by 
total assets) is expected to increase after the acquisition due to better management 
decision in disposing poorly performing assets to improve cash flow after acquisition. 
Cash payment for expenses ratio (cash payment for expenses divided by total 
assets) is also examined to determine whether the management has made cost- 
cutting strategies to improve economic efficiency. 
The methodology used in analysing the bid characteristics is described in 
Chapter 7. Several studies (Servaes, 1991, Healy et al., 1997 and Ghosh, 1998, 
among others) have suggested that the level of post acquisition operating 
performance to the combined firms is dependent on the characteristics of the bid 
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itself. The specific bid characteristics to be analysed in the current study are the 
business relatedness, management turnover, the relative size of targets to bidders, 
the method of payment, and components of management ownership. 
Chapter 8 describes the data used in the current study relating to companies 
involved in corporate acquisitions in Malaysia between January 1,1988 and 
December 31,1992. Samples were selected from quoted acquirers and quoted and 
non-quoted acquired companies. Filtering techniques used in company selection are 
classified together with the criteria used to select the sample and control firms and to 
determine secondary data. 
The cash flow performance of acquiring and target firms are analysed in this 
study to test directly for changes in operating performance that result from 
acquisitions. Consideration is given to the performance of constituent firms prior to 
acquisition and the combined corporate entity after acquisition on determining the 
overall economic efficiency from takeovers. Chapter 9 provides the empirical results 
on the level of performance for bidders, targets and their respective controls in the pre 
acquisition period, and the changes in the post acquisition cash flow performance 
after 5 years. In addition, it is also important to identify the sources of such gains as a 
result of more effective utilisation of the combined firms' assets. Results of empirical 
tests of the impact of the characteristics of acquisitions on post acquisition operating 
performance are provided in Chapter 10. 
To test the robustness of the results in post acquisition operating cash flow 
improvement, Chapter 11 explores different measures based on measuring 
accounting performance. The first measure uses the operating cash flow return 
(operating profit before tax and extraordinary item, adjusted for depreciation, interest 
and goodwill divided by operating assets) that is similar to the definition given by 
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Healy et at. (1992,1997), Anand and Singh (1997) and Ghosh (1998). The other 
measures include return on operating cash flow net of interest (operating profit before 
tax and extraordinary item after interest and adjusted for changes in working capital 
divided by operating assets), and return on assets (net profit before tax and 
extraordinary item divided by total assets). 
Chapter 12 focuses on an examination of returns to acquiring firm 
shareholders through the use of event study methodology. The main aim of the 
chapter is to test for evidence as to whether the share price changes around the time 
of the takeover (announcement to outcome date) is a function not only on the 
expectation of operating performance but also for the premium that is paid for the 
target. The chapter also examines whether there is any correlation between the post 
acquisition share market reaction, the change in post acquisition operating cash flow 
and the premium paid for the target. 
The concluding Chapter 13 includes discussion of the study's results, its 
findings, limitations, implications and areas for further research. 
The next chapter describes the history and economic background of the 
country, the financial and capital market, the regulatory policies and agencies in the 
country, and the development of acquisitions in Malaysia. 
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Chapter 2 
The Malaysian Environment 
2.1 Chapter Description 
Acquisition activities are said to follow spurts of economic activity, thus, it is 
expected that there will be an increase in the level of acquisition activities in Malaysia 
as the country's economy is now on the path of economic recovery. The legislators 
are developing a more relaxed regulatory framework of the Malaysian capital market 
in support of the acquisition activities, but at the same time they are concerned 
whether there are any economic benefits derived from improved operating 
performance and increased efficiency brought about by the acquisition. Hostile 
takeover bids are rare in Malaysia and takeovers mainly involve the acquisitions of 
private companies and are therefore much more likely to be entering into voluntary 
combinations with their acquirer than is often the case in other countries. As such, it is 
important that legislators do not make hasty decisions about the need for regulation in 
a field which economic theory suggests has an important disciplinary role to play in a 
market-based economy. 
The current study examines the role of corporate acquisitions by analysing the 
post acquisition performance of Malaysian companies involved in acquisition activity. 
Acquisitions in Malaysia may be influenced by the history and economic background 
of the country, the financial and capital market, and the regulatory policies and 
agencies in the country. Thus, there is a need to discuss each of these factors in the 
current chapter to understand the Malaysian environment in which the acquisition 
activities are involved. The development of mergers and acquisitions in Malaysia is 
also discussed in the chapter. 
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2.2 History and Economic Background 
2.2.1 The New Economic Policy (NEP) 
In 1998 Malaysia had a total population of 21.2 million, made up of multiracial 
groups of various races, religions, creeds, customs and languages. These multiracial 
groups fall into two main categories; those with cultural affinities indigenous to the 
region, classified as the Malays or Bumiputras (literally meaning 'sons of the soil'), 
and those whose cultural affinities lie outside, classified as non-Bumiputra (consist 
primarily of Chinese, Indians and others). At present the Bumiputra constitute about 
66%, while the Chinese, Indians and other minor ethnic groups comprised of 26%, 
7% and 1%, respectively (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1998). Malaysia has an estimated 
population growth of 2.3% per annum. 
The British colonialism prior to Malaysia independence in 1957 had left a 
lasting effect in many aspects of the nation's life including its government, legal and 
economic structures. Before independence, Malaysia's economy was solely 
dependent on rubber and tin. It was the British that had brought in large number of 
Chinese and Indian labourers to work in tin mines and rubber estates respectively 
which created the multi-ethnic society that lives on until today. In addition, their policy 
of 'divide and rule' had a lasting effect on the Malaysian economic structure where the 
Ethnic-Chinese immigrants are mainly in the trading sector, the Malays in the 
agriculture sector, and the Indians in the estates (Selvaratnam, 1974). The Malays 
lived mainly in rural areas (mainly farming and fishing), while the Chinese inhabited 
the towns and controlled much of the economy, resulting in unequal distribution of 
income and wealth between races. In 1969 Bumiputras comprised 65% of the 
population (26 per cent Chinese and 9 per cent Indians) but owned a mere 2% of 
national wealth, defined as ownership of company share capital at par value 
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(Turnbull, 1989). As depicted in Table 2.1, the Malays had small share ownership and 
control of companies relative to other Malaysians and foreigners. In 1970, the 
Bumiputras owned only 2.4% of national wealth while other Malaysians and 
foreigners own 28.3% (of which Chinese owned 27.2%) and 63.4%, respectively. The 
balance of 6.0% of the national wealth was owned by the nominee companies, mainly 
trust agencies. 
Table 2.1 
Percentage distribution of share capital in limited companies 
Ownership Category 1970 1975 1980 1990 1995 1998 
1Bumiputra 2.4 9.2 12.5 20.3 20.6 19.4 
Other Malaysians 28.3 37.5 44.6 46.2 43.4 41.1 
(of which: Chinese) (27.2) (27.2) (43.6) (44.9) (40.9) (38.5) 
Foreign Residents 63.4 53.3 42.9 25.1 27.7 31.8 
Nominee Companies 6.0 --8.4 8.3 7.7 
Note': including Bumiputra interests (that is, shares held in trust by agencies for the 
Bumiputra community) 
Source: Third Malaysia Plan (1976-80); Economic Planning Unit 
Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-95); Economic Planning Unit 
Mid-term Review of Seventh Malaysia Plan (1999) 
In rectifying the problems faced by the indigenous population, the National 
Economic Policy (NEP) was incorporated in the Second Malaysia Development Plan 
(1971-75) with two broad goals: to wipe out poverty regardless of race, and to redress 
the economic imbalance between the majority Bumiputras (mostly Malays) and the 
wealthier Chinese minority, among other objectives2. The NEP sought to raise 
Bumiputra ownership of national wealth to 30%, other Malaysians to 40 per cent and 
2 Tensions between the races erupted into riots on May 13,1969, following general elections in which 
the Malay-dominated ruling coalition lost its two-thirds majority. A Chinese-based party that had won 
the 1969 constituency staged a raucous victory parade through a Malay part of town, resulting in a riot 
(Turnbull, 1989). 
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foreigners to 30 per cent by 1990 (Turnbull, 1989). Table 2.1 reveal that the 
Bumiputra ownership of share capital in the corporate sector between 1970 and 1990 
has risen ten-fold (from 2.4% to 20.3% in 1990), albeit such a figure still fall short of 
the NEP's 30% target. Since the country's economy surged by an average of more 
than 7% a year for most of the period, the Malay's advance did not come at the 
expense of other races. Chinese equity ownership displayed a significant increase 
from 27.2% in 1970 to 44.9% in 1990. The NEP had successfully reduced the 
dominance of foreign ownership and control of the economy from 63.4% in 1970 to 
25.1 % in 1990. The NEP's 30% target has yet to be met even after replacing the NEP 
with the National Development Policy (NDP) in 19913. 
2.2.2 The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
Prior to 1997 financial crisis, the nation had enjoyed rapid growth rates, 
averaging 8.5 per cent annually during the period 1987-1995°. Table 2.2 shows the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate from 1966-1998. The growth in its GDP 
was at its highest peak of 10 per cent in 1990,8.9 per cent and 8.5 per cent for 1994 
and 1995 respectively. The high growth rate was accompanied by low inflation and 
'Due to the recent economic turmoil, the Bumiputra's share stood at 19% in 1998, down from 21% in 
1995, while the Chinese share was 39%, down from 41% in 1995 (Mid-term Review of the Seventh 
Malaysia Plan, 1999, p. 84). In contrast, foreign investors made significant inroads in the ownership of 
Malaysian corporate equity growing from 27.7% in 1995 to an estimated 31.8% in 1998. The 
slowdown in economic growth has led to the relaxation of rules on foreign equity ownership of 
manufacturing and selected companies in other sectors. In areas where local companies have 
inadequate or no capital, the new rules even allow foreigners to own 100% of all manufacturing 
projects approved and implemented between July 1998 and December 2000. As noted in the Mid-term 
Review of Seventh Malaysia Plan (1999), this relaxation was clearly necessary in view of the need to 
attract more foreign direct investment as part of the strategy to revitalise the economy even though it 
may result in foreigners acquiring corporate equity exceeding the 30% originally allocated to them 
under the NEP. 
The moderation in growth of 7.8% in 1997 reflect both the dampening effect of the currency crisis on 
domestic demand as well as the effect of the adjustment measures (immediate 2% cut across the board 
in Government spending, among others) that had been put in place to pave the way for a more 
sustainable growth in economy (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1997). The effects of the economic crisis 
began to take their toll on the Malaysian economy in 1998 when GDP growth declined further to - 
8.6% in 1998 (Securities Commission, 1998). 
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low unemployment rate (2.9 per cent). Private investments and exports played a key 
role in spearheading the growth. 
The First Five-year Malaysia Development Plan launched in 1966 gave priority 
to agriculture as the mainstay of the economy. It aimed to produce near self- 
sufficiency in rice, improve rubber and oil palm production, exploit forestry and 
fisheries and encourage diversification into new crops. However, traditional reliance 
on export agriculture like rubber and palm oil, and tin mining has subjected Malaysia 
to unstable economic pressures arising from declining rubber prices, and threatened 
exhaustion of tin reserves. 
Table 2.2 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth Rate 
Malaysia 7 year plan 
Year First Second Third Fourth Firth Sixth Seventh 
1966-70 1971.75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991.95 1996- 
2000 
1 6.2 10.0 11.6 6.9 1.2 8.8 8.6 
2 1.0 9.4 7.8 5.9 5.2 8.7 7.8 
3 4.2 11.7 6.7 6.3 8.8 8.3 -8.6 
4 10.4 8.3 9.3 7.8 8.5 9.4 
5 5.0 0.8 7.8 -1.0 10 9.3 
Average 5.4 8.0 8.6 5.2 6.7 8.9 
Source: manK Negara Malaysia (yearly annual report) 
The GDP (as shown in Table 2.2 above) was -1.0 in 1985, a negative growth 
for the first time in a decade when rubber, palm oil and timber prices fell, and oil 
prices which accounted more than 20 per percent of export earnings were erratic. 
Thus, the country's transformation from an economy dependent on commodities such 
as rubber and tin into the world's 17th largest trading powerhouse, exporting a wide 
variety of manufactured goods since 1987 had contributed to its current growth. 
Malaysia's emphasis on industrialisation is depicted in Table 2.3, showing the 
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composition of the GDP based on sectors. In 1985, agriculture, forestry and fishing 
sector comprised of 20.8 per cent (40.2 per cent in 1955) of the GDP, compared to 
manufacturing 19.7 per cent (8.2 per cent in 1955). However, manufacturing has 
surpassed 30 per cent of the GDP since 1993 while the agriculture, fishing and 
forestry sectors continuously declined to 12 per cent of the GDP in 1997. 
Table 2.3 
Composition of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by industry of origin 
Sector 1985 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Agriculture, 20.8 17.2 16.0 15.7 14.3 13.2 12.7 12.5 11.6 
Forestry & 
Fishing 
Mining & 10.5 9.2 8.7 7.8 7.3 7.0 6.9 6.5 6.8 
Quarrying 
Manufacturing 19.7 28.1 29.9 29.4 30.9 32.2 32.5 33.6 32.2 
Construction 4.8 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.4 4.5 4.3 3.6 
Services 44.2 41.7 41.4 43.1 43.4 43.2 43.4 43.1 45.8 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report 1991-199B 
2.3 Development of the Capital Market s 
The structure of the Capital Market in Malaysia is as illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
Since the implementation of the industrial process, the capital market has emerged as 
a major source in financing the country's economic growth. Financing from the capital 
market account for a share of 35 per cent of total financing during the period 1990-96, 
compared with only 10 per cent during the period 1980-85, as depicted in Chart 2.1 
(Bank Negara Report, 1996). 
s The description is based on the Bank Negara Report (1993-1998), the KLSE publication, `Investing in 
the Stock Market in Malaysia' (1996), and the KLSE Companies Annual Handbook. 
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Figure 2.1 
The Malaysian Financial Markets (As at 31 December 1998) 
LABUAN OFFSHORE FINANCIAL 
SERVICES AUTHORITY 
ýiwºrýfriiiºirYºaliiilrMwiºirWStiir'ýr. ririii'. r. r. rlºýiYýYYYii 
CENTRAL BANK OF MALAYSIA 
LABUAN INTERNATIONAL 
OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTRE 
64 off shore banks 
II insurance companies 
19 insurance-related companies 
20 trust companies 
5 fund managers 
' MONEY AND FOREIGN I 
EXCHANGE 
36 commercial banks 
19 financial companies "" 
12 merchant banks "" 
8 money and foreign exchange brokers 
MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT 
SECURITIES 
13 principal dealers 
PRIVATE DEBT SECURITIES 
OPTIONS AND FUTURES 
EXCHANGES 
` SECURITIES COMMISSION 
Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange 
Kuala Lumpur Options and Financial 
Futures Exchange 
Malaysia Monetary Exchange 
STOCK EXCHANGES 
REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES ` `° 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
No. of companies: 736 
Market capitalisation: RM374.5 b 
No. of broking companies: 64 
Bumiputra Stock Exchange 
No. of companies: 5 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, 1999 
* including Bank Islam 
** money market only 
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Chart 2.1 
Net Funds Raised by the Private Sector 
Source: Bank Negara Report, 1996 
1980-85 
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The Central Bank, Bank Negara Malaysia, has always been active in 
developing the capital market. Among the development of the capital market in the 
mid-1980s was the pronounced shift from the government to the private sector as the 
main engine of growth, in particular the implementation of the privatisation 
programme. Other developments include the establishment of the Private Debt 
Securities (PDS) market in 1987, example the National Mortgage Corporation 
(Cagamas) to issue bonds, and the ability of the banking sector to participate directly 
in capital market instruments and to finance other market players6. Reflecting the 
continuing efforts of the Government to broaden the financial system, Labuan in East 
Malaysia was established as an International Offshore Financial Centre (IOFC) in 
1990'. The development of the financial futures and options market in Malaysia was 
witnessed with the establishment of The Kuala Lumpur Options and Financial 
Exchange (KLOFFE), which is within the jurisdiction of the Securities Commission 
(SC), in 1994. 
° For example, Banks are permitted to hold transferable subscription rights or warrants and stock 
options, and also allowed to convert their holding of derivative instruments as well as convertible loan 
stocks into shares within prescribed limits. 
IOFC was aimed to enhance the attractiveness of Malaysia as an investment centre and to complement 
the onshore financial system centred in Kuala Lumpur. 
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Although the development of securities industry in Malaysia can be traced to 
the 1930s, the first Malayan Stock Exchange that operated in Singapore was formed 
in 1959. The separation of Malaya and Singapore in 1963 has led the Malaysian 
Stock Exchange Limited that was incorporated in Singapore to be registered in 
Malaysia. The Stock Exchange of Malaysia was renamed the Stock Exchange of 
Malaysia and Singapore, with two trading floors, one in Kuala Lumpur and the other in 
Singapore. The formal links between the two countries were broken with the ending of 
joint currency control and stock market trading in 1973. As a result, the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange was formed in July 1973. When the Securities Industry Act (SIA) 
1973 was brought into force in 1976, a new company called the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE) took over from the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Berhad. 
However, a strong link still existed between KLSE and Stock Exchange of Singapore 
(SES) at that time as Malaysian incorporated companies were also listed and traded 
through the SES, and vice versa for Singapore incorporated companies. 
Over the years, KLSE has added a number of changes to facilitate the 
demand of the investing public. Several changes towards a more efficient stock 
exchange in line with other capital markets include the establishment of the Securities 
Clearing Automated Network Services (SCANS) in 1983; the real-time share price 
reporting system (MASA) and the Advance Warning and Surveillance Unit (AWAS) in 
1987. In 1988, the Second Board was introduced to facilitate less capitalised 
business companies (the requirements for initial public offerings of the main and 
second boards are shown in Table 2.4). 
The Computerised Order Routing and Execution (SCORE) was implemented 
in 1989 to replace the previous trading system. A full implementation of SCORE was 
made in 1992, eliminating the need for a trading floor at the Exchange's premises. In 
a related development, the KLSE implemented its scripless trading system, known as 
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the Central Depository System (CDS) in 1992. Another development of the capital 
market was the formation of the Islamic Instruments Study Group (IISG) set up in 
1994 to study Islamic capital market concepts and products based on the Syariah 
(Islamic Law). 
Table 2.4 
Requirements for Initial Public Offerings 
Main Board Second Board 
Issued and paid-up capital *Not less than Minimum of RM10 
Ordinary shares of RM1.00 RM40 million million but less 
than RM 40 million 
Profit track record 
Track record (years) 5 3 
Minimum average per year RM5 million RM2 million 
Minimum achieved per year RM2 million RM1 million 
Basis After-tax After-tax 
Profit forecast 
Minimum to be achieved RM6 million RM2.5 million 
Basis After-tax After-tax 
Business Operation 
Minimum number of years 55 
In operation 
*Prior to 1995, the minimum capital requirement was RM20 million 
Source: Securities Commission Annual Report (1995) 
A significant milestone for the KLSE came in 1990 which saw the mutual 
delisting of Singapore incorporated companies from the KLSE and vice-versa for 
Malaysian companies listed on the SES. This move heralded the growth of the KLSE 
as a stock exchange with a truly Malaysian identity, and was seen as a good strategy 
especially for the latter market to protect itself from being vulnerable to developments 
in Singapore (KLSE, 1996). 
The delisting factor, the buoyant Malaysian economy in 1990 and the 
government's incentives for foreign investments have helped in the development of 
the capital market. Table 2.5 provides a summary of KLSE selected indicators over 
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the years (1992-1998). The growth in the equity market can be seen in terms of 
market capitalisation which expanded steadily from RM248 billion or 175 per cent of 
GDP at the end of 1992 to RM806.8 billion (322.9 per cent of GDP) in 1996 (Bank 
Negara Report, 1996)8. Similarly, the number of companies listed has increased 
substantially, despite the delisting of all Singaporean incorporated companies on the 
KLSE. Compared with only 138 companies at end of 1961, there were 369 and 745 
listed companies by the end of 1992 and July 1999, respectively. The Kuala Lumpur 
Index (KLCI) also increased from 357 in 1988 to 1275 and 1238 at the end of 1993 
and 1996, respectively. 
Amidst concerned on the currency and interest rates in 1997, the Kuala 
Lumpur Index (KLCI) plunged 52.0 per cent (1996: 24.4 per cent) to finish the year at 
594.4, levels it has not seen since 1992. The broader-based Emas Index followed the 
KLCI's lead by plummeting 56.5 per cent to close at 151.21, and the Second Board 
price index crashed 71.7 per cent to finish the year at 162.93. By 12 January 1998, 
the KLCI had already fallen by 17.3 per cent from its end level of 594.44. 
8 However, the regional economic and financial turmoil precipitated in mid 1997 had caused the 































to O -e 
M Co 
1, - 
LO -- Lo M- N- N- 
M 




ti 00 `ýfi ' N- 
'V' M 
r- 
' VN N 










U) Mt Co J 
Y 
t1) O) Q) 
C) NN 









Co rn 0 Co 
tiý Co E p ANN 
COOM U 
r- r 8 
a) .. 
u3 INt N 
f- N CD N 0 
NMM pCo 
-M 
e (N Co M le 8 
e (0 U 
le c"i C: ) 
le (0 
00 O ti_ 
C'4 ci 
a) 
(01 ýt N MM0 N Ö1 
CN 
to ý 
O`'" Cd U) le Ict 
NN Co 
Ö3 








ö cd d N`n 





N ýp ýp N tt) 
`ý 
6 N- IC) 
-0 Co 
rn 
CC __ ( 0 (D 
MMN C 
NY ý 
~N O Co N lf) L() 
_ C 
Mc 
ýt cÖ NN c ä >( 
E0 W 
8 v 
09 ,2 Co 
















nö t0 ° ö 







U .0 - c9 y 2 
U 
- 
0 . . 0 ' °- : ; 
c 
Q) V*, I N 
However, the improved economic outlook on both the domestic and global 
fronts saw the KLCI ended the year 1998 only 1.4 per cent lower at 586.13 points, 
while the Emas and Second Board indices closed 2.8 per cent and 2.8 per cent lower 
at 146.94 points and 158.37 points respectively. Unlike the recession in mid-80's 
where the government was heavily indebted, it is the private sector debt that is 
crippling the economy this time around. 
The profile of securities issued in the equity market has changed as the 
economy diversified into new areas of growth and as the pace of industrialisation 
picked up. Chart 2.2 shows the capitalised value of equity market based on business 
sector. Relative to the period 1986-1989, the agriculture, and wholesale and retail 
was less significant in the period 1990-1996, while financial service, utilities and 
telecommunications companies increased in significance during the period. 
Chart 2.2 
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2.4 Regulatory Agencies on Acquisitions 
The current section focuses on the regulatory agencies on acquisitions while 
the regulatory policies are described in Section 2.5. The structure of the Malaysian 
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regulatory agencies and policies relating to acquisition activities in Malaysia is shown 
in Figure 2.2. 
Acquisition activities in Malaysia must contend with the existence of several 
authorities, some dealing with statutory provisions and many with administrative 
directives. The current statutory regime responsible in regulating takeovers and 
acquisitions in Malaysia are the Securities Commission (SC) and the Foreign 
Investment Committee (FIC). 
Figure 2.2 
Regulatory Agencies on Acquisition in Malaysia (1999) 
Parliament 
Ministry of Finance Ministry of Trade and Industry I Prime Minister's 
Department 
Bank Securities Security Company National Economic 
Ordinance Commission Industry Act Policy 
Act 1993 Act 1965 
1983 National 
Development Policy 
Bank Securities Registrar Foreign 
Negara Commission of Investment Malaysia Companies 
1 
Committee 
7 Kuala Lumpur 
Stock 
Exchange 
Banking and Malaysian USE Guidelines 
Financial Code on Listing to Mergers Institutions Takeovers and Act 1989 and Mergers Takeovers 
1998 1974 
Source: Information compiled from Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, and Securities Commission 
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Prior to the formation of the SC in 1993, the corporate planner who is involved 
in acquisitions has to be confronted with a wide array of authorities. Approval of 
acquisition proposals must be obtained from the FIC, the Capital Issues Committee 
(CIC) and the Panel of Takeovers and Mergers (the Panel). Further, the acquiring 
company has to deal with wide array of departments. The Registrar of Companies 
comes under the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and must administer both the 
Companies Act 1965 and the Securities Industries Act 1983. The FIC comes under 
the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister Department and the CIC is responsible to the 
Minister of Finance. The KLSE must be satisfied that the Listing requirements are 
complied with. If the bid relates to a financial institution, then approval must be 
obtained from the Bank Negara of Malaysia. 
Currently, the Securities Commission becomes the single authority for the 
regulation and supervision of the securities and future markets in Malaysia. As shown 
in Figure 2.2, the FIC, MITI, Bank Negara Malaysia and the Ministry of Finance are 
still involved at various stages and in several aspects in relation to takeovers and 
mergers and securities. However, all corporate proposals relating to securities or 
takeovers and mergers have to be submitted to the Securities Commission. The 
Commission acts as the one-stop agency co-ordinating and ensuring approval from 
other agencies such as the FIC, MITI and Bank Negara Malaysia before final 
approval by the Commission. Thus, applicants need no longer make multiple 
submissions to the relevant agencies. 
The next section focuses on the statutory regime regulating takeovers and 
acquisitions in Malaysia during the period of study (1988-1992), mainly the Capital 
Issues Committee (CIC) and the Foreign Investment Committee (FIC). The Securities 
Commission (SC) that was set up in 1993 is briefly discussed at the end of the 
section. 
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2.4.1 Capital Issues Committee (CIC) 
The Minister of Finance established the CIC in June 1968 to ensure an orderly 
development of the capital market in regulating the primary issue of securities by 
public limited companies and listing of securities on the stock exchange. The 
functions of the CIC became more prominent with the introduction of the Security 
Industry Act, 1983. The main function of the CIC relates to the issuance of securities 
by public listed companies°. Matters in relation to the issuance of shares, listing of 
securities, right issues, bonus issues, and takeover and mergers were submitted to 
CIC for approval. The committee is also linked to other regulatory agencies such as 
Ministry of Trade, the Bank Negara Malaysia, and the Panel of Takeover. 
2.4.2 Foreign Investment Committee 
The Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) was set up under the Economic 
Planning Unit of the Prime Minister Department in February 1974. Besides 
implementing the Government's guidelines on regulation of acquisition of assets, 
mergers or takeovers, FIC is also responsible for major issues relating to foreign 
investment. 
The members in this body comprise of the Director-General of the Economic 
Planning Unit (as Chairman), Secretary General of the Ministry of Finance, Governor 
of the Central Bank, Secretary General of MITI, Chairman of the Malaysian Industrial 
Development Authority, Director General of the Implementation and Coordination 
Unit, Secretary General of the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs, 
9 The ruling includes public limited companies incorporated outside Malaysia which intend to issue or 
offer for sale securities to the public or to list securities on KLSE. 
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Secretary General of the Ministry of Entrepreneur Development and the ROC 
(Ministry of Finance, 1996). 
The FIC published the Guidelines to be applied equally to all parties including 
both local and foreign investors in regulating the acquisition of assets, mergers and 
takeovers in Malaysia. However, its main thrust is on the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
in implementing the Government's policies on a more balanced Malaysian and 
Bumiputra participation in ownership and control of corporations. The establishment 
of FIC was a result of an economic imbalance in the country in early 70's due to high 
dominance of foreign ownership and control of the economy. In 1970, foreigners 
owned 60% of the share capital of limited companies, 75% in agriculture and 
fisheries, 72% in mining, 63% in commerce and 59% in manufacturing. Thus, FIC 
was formed to provide certain guidelines to share ownerships of local companies and 
foreign investors in the country with a distribution of at least 30% Bumiputra 
participation, 40% participation by non-Malays and 30% by foreign investors in total 
commercial and industrial activities in all categories. The investment policies in the 
country are thus designed, via a policy of company acquisitions, to attract more local 
and foreign investment in promoting a higher level of economic growth for the 
country. 
Thus, the functions of the FIC are two folds: to eradicate poverty and to 
improve the wealth imbalance of the various racial groups in Malaysia, to safeguard 
the ownership and control of Malaysian companies against foreign investors, and 
subsequently to increase the private investments of the local and foreign investors in 
the country. 
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2.4.3 Securities Commission (SC) 
The existence of a number of regulatory agencies prior to the establishment of 
the SC resulted in various administrative problems, unnecessary duplication of 
functions, bad co-ordination and waste of valuable resources (Sharif, 1993). In 
examining the efficiency of the regulatory policies in handling acquisition activities in 
1992, Mohammad (1993) found that the policies were not favourable in promoting 
acquisition activities in the country10. Barriers to acquisition activities that exist from 
regulatory policies were mainly due to high bureaucracy in government agencies and 
the approval periods for those activities. Substantial reforms to the regulatory 
framework of the Malaysian capital market were introduced with the setting up of the 
Securities Commission on 1 March 1993. Significant steps have been taken towards 
rationalisation of the regulatory structure for the securities and future industries. 
The SC either administers or is affected by the following acts: 
" Securities Commission Act 1993 (SCA) 
" Securities Industry Act 1983 (SIA) 
0 Futures Industry Act 1993 
0 Securities Industry Act (Central Depositories) Act 1991 
The SCA provided the SC with power to absorb the functions of the CIC established 
under the Securities Industry Act (SIA) 1983 and the Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers set up under the Companies Act 1965. 
10 79 financial directors or controllers (40 had acquisition experience) interviewed by Mohammad (1993) in 1992 felt that acquisition activities have to be enacted within a regulatory framework and that 
the government has to initiate the move to improve its policies and the implementation of such policies. 
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The establishment of the SC was designed to streamline the regulatory 
framework of the Malaysian capital market, which in turn may help enhance 
efficiency, professionalism and orderly development of both the securities and futures 
industries. 
2.5 Regulatory Policies on Acquisitions 
Having discussed the regulatory agencies in the previous section, the current 
section focuses on the regulatory policies adopted by the said agencies. Several 
regulations and guidelines on acquisitions have been introduced in Malaysia to 
ensure a competitive, fair and efficient business and commercial environment. Prior to 
the formation of the Securities Commission Act (SCA) 1993, takeovers and mergers 
activities were regulated by the Companies Act 1965, Security Industry Act 1973, and 
Code of Mergers and Takeovers 1987. 
The Companies Act 1965 is the principal Act for the regulation of companies 
in Malaysia. It is derived largely from legislation in the UK and Australia. The said Act 
regulates the pre-incorporation, incorporation, setting up, operations and duties of a 
company and its directors. The Registrar of companies (ROC) under the Ministry of 
Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs, is the body responsible for the registration 
and incorporation of companies. Regulations pertaining to mergers and takeovers 
were prescribed in Section 179 of the Act. In exercise of the powers conferred by 
Section 179 (3) of the Act, the Panel of Takeovers established the Malaysian Code to 
Mergers and Takeovers in April 1987. However, the Section was deleted upon 
coming into force of the Securities Commission Act on 1 March 1993. Although the 
Securities Commission Act . 1993 empowers the commission to prepare a code 
containing general principles and rule governing parties involved in acquisitions, the 
SC was still based on the Malaysian Code on Takeovers and Mergers of 1987. It was 
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only on 1 January 1999 that the SC prescribed the Malaysian Code on Takeovers 
and *Mergers 1998. 
One important statutory provision, which is often referred to in acquisition 
proposal, is Section 132G of the Companies Act. The section provides that the 
approval of the members in general meeting is required if an acquiring company 
acquire the shares or assets of another company where a shareholder or director or a 
person connected to such shareholder or director of the acquiring company has a 
substantial shareholding in the target company. The approval need not be obtained if 
the transaction or arrangement was entered into after 3 years from the period such 
shareholding was first held in the target company". Section 132 was inserted into the 
Companies Act to protect the interest of minority shareholders. 
Currently, the regulations on acquisitions in Malaysia are contained mainly in 
the Securities Commission Act (1993). Other regulatory procedures to be adhered to 
include the guidelines set by the Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) and the 
Malaysian Code on Takeovers and Mergers 1998 (the Code). For companies listed 
on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), the Listing requirements must further 
to be taken into consideration. The acquisition activities are also indirectly regulated 
by the Banking and Financial Institutions Act (1989), which is under the supervision of 
the Bank Negara Malaysia, and the guidelines of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
Malaysia (MITI). Bank Negara approval is required in any acquisition involving 
insurance companies or financial institutions. Approval from MITI is also required if 
the company being acquired is a licensed manufacturing company, that is, one that 
has been issued a manufacturing license by MITI. Section 46 of the Financial Act 
allows maximum permissible holdings in shares of licensed local institutions of ten 
uA substantial shareholding as defined in Section 69D of the Act is holding no less than 5% of the 
aggregate nominal amounts of all the voting shares in the target company. 
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(10%) percent in the case of individuals, and twenty percent (20%) in the case of a 
person other than an individual. Section 49 of the Act further notified that no person 
should enter into an agreement or arrangement under reconstruction, unless it is 
made in writing, and subject to the Ministers approval. In such circumstances, the 
Bank Negara will act as the advisor to the Minister for the reconstruction purposes. 
The next section that follows outline the regulations and guidelines on 
acquisitions currently found in Malaysia, mainly the Securities Commission Act 1993, 
Malaysian Code on Takeovers and Mergers (1998), the FIC Guidelines (1974), and 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Listing. 
2.5.1 Securities Commission Act 1993 
Securities Commission Act 1993 (SCA) came into force on 1 March 1993 for 
the purpose of establishing the Securities Commission. Issues relating to takeovers 
and mergers are contained in Section 33 and Section 34 of the Act. The SCA 1993 
empowers the commission to prepare a code containing general principles and rule 
governing parties involved in acquisitions, resulting in the operation of the Malaysian 
Code on Takeovers and Mergers 1998 on I January 1999. 
Section 33 of the SCA indicates that a transaction will be regarded as a 
takeover in Malaysia if it gives the acquiring party the right to exercise or control the 
exercise, of more than thirty-three percent (33%) of the voting rights of the company 
being acquired. The threshold point of 33% was determined to accommodate special 
issues made in compliance with 33% Bumiputra equity participation of the New 
Economic Policy (NEP). However, if the threshold point of 33 % is not met, approval 
must be obtained from FIC, MITI or Ministry of Finance (MOF). In such cases, the 
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acquiring firms are normally required to increase the Bumiputra equity in the targets 
to at least 30% in a few years once the approval is given. 
2.5.2 The Malaysian Code on Takeovers and Mergers 1998 
The Malaysian Code on Takeovers and Mergers 1998, which was prescribed 
by the Securities Commission under subsection 33A(1) of the Securities Commission 
Act 1993, came into operation on 1 January 1999, replacing the old 1987 code. Prior 
to the operation of Malaysian Code on Takeovers and Mergers 1998, SC had 
adopted most of the principles and rules governing the conduct of all persons 
involved in acquisitions from the Malaysian Code on Takeovers and Mergers 1987. 
The 1987 Code was initially enacted under Section 179 of the Companies Act 1965 
but was subsequently adopted by the SC after Section 179 of the Companies Act was 
repealed by the Securities Commission Act 1993. 
The SC felt the need to amend the old code, which was heavily based on the 
London City Code, so as to reflect the nature of the Malaysian Code as a subsidiary 
legislation, as opposed to the London Code which is based on a system of self- 
regulation (Kamaludin, 1999). The new code seeks to correct various deficiencies in 
the old 1987 code and ensure higher standards of disclosure, corporate governance 
and greater professionalism from all parties involved in mergers and acquisitions. 
Generally the Malaysian Code on Takeovers and Mergers 1998 (the Code) 
contains the general definitions of the terminology in the takeover process, and the 
general principles and rules which have a statutory backing of Section 33 of the 
Securities Commission Act (1993), and therefore constitutes as law. It has to be complied 
with by all parties concerned in an acquisition and applies to all quoted and unquoted 
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public companies as well as private companies12. The basic concept of the new Code 
essentially remains the same, to ensure the observance of good standards of corporate 
behaviour in any takeover transactions so that minority shareholders should be treated 
fairly and equally. They should be given all necessary facts to make up their minds in 
relation to an offer and should be given sufficient time to do so. The new code is also to 
ensure adequate disclosure of information by all parties connected to the bidder or the 
target. In addition, the Commission also issues rulings in the form of practice notes in the 
interpretation of the Code and lay down the practice and conduct of persons involved in 
or affected by a take-over offer, merger or compulsory acquisition. 
A mandatory general offer in the present Section 6 of the Code requires that 
whenever a shareholder sells a controlling block of shares, any other holder of shares 
in the company is entitled to have an equal opportunity to sell his shareholding on 
substantially the same terms13. The threshold of control above which the bidder 
should make available a cash alternative to any bid in Malaysia is 33 per cent as 
compared to 30 percent in UK. 
Figure 2.3 refers to the schedule of a mandatory general offer under the 
Malaysian Code 1998 where a party has triggered the Code's mandatory general 
offer obligations after acquiring a controlling block of shares in the company. An 
application is initially made to the Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) to seek its 
approval for holding more than 33% of the voting rights of the target company. 
'2 As stated in Practice Note 1.2, the Code applies to a take-over of a private company which has either 
shareholders' funds or a paid-up capital of RM 10 million or more based on the latest audited accounts, and 
where the purchase consideration is RM 20 million or more. " This provision has direct statutory force in Section 33 of the SCA. Failure of compliance may result in such persons being guilty of such an offence. 
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Figure 2.3 
Schedule of Acquisitions under the Malaysian Code on Takeovers 
and Mergers 1998 
Notice of Takeover 
Day I Announcement 
Press Notice 
Bidder company 
By Day 4 submits application 
and offer document 
to the Commission 
By Day 35 
By Day 45 
At least by 
Day 56 
By Day 81 
By Day 95 
By Day 96 






Bidders make an offer to the board of target 
company 
Section 12 (5) 
Announcement made by target company 
upon receiving the offer 
Section 13(1) 
Section 13(7) 
Boards comments Section 14(1) and 15(7) 
and Independent Last day for target recommendation to 
Advice Circular its shareholders and for response 







Offer period - Section 22(1) 
Offer remain open for at least 21 days 
Section 23(3) - last day offer can be revised 
Must be opened for at least 14 days if revised 
Last day of offer period 
Bid either fail or is declared unconditional 
as to acceptances 
Announcement of acceptances must 
be made 60 days from the date the 
offer was posted 
Section 24 (3) 
Bidder must keep offer open for acceptances 14 
days from the offer is declared unconditional 
Source: Information extracted from Malaysian Code on Takeovers and Mergers 1998 
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Since the mandatory requirement is triggered, FIC will approve the initial 
acquisition of more than 33% interest subject to a general offer being made to the 
remaining shareholders of the target company on terms no less favourable. Both the 
UK and Malaysia have a 60-day period for the offer to become unconditional as to 
acceptances following posting of the offer document. In the UK an offer document 
should be posted within 28 days of the announcement of a firm intention to make an 
offer (Sudarsanam, 1994). In Malaysia, the offer must be posted by day 35. The 
bidders must return the shares acquired under a general offer if they have not 
obtained over 50% of the target. 
The bid will fall if the bidder is not successful in obtaining more than 50% of 
the voting rights of the target company. In the event that a mandatory offer is not 
successful, the bidder will normally be barred from making a bid for a further year. 
The Code also provides for various situations under which a waiver from the 
mandatory general offer can be applied for (Practice Note 2.9). An example is where 
a waiver may be sought should the obligation for a mandatory general offer arise in a 
restructuring exercise or pursuant to an acquisition involving the issue of securities. 
2.5.3 FIC Guidelines to Takeovers and Mergers (1974) 
FIC issued the first guidelines for the regulation of acquisition of assets, 
mergers and takeovers in 1974. These guidelines were applied equally to all parties 
including both local and foreign investors with respect to acquisitions of assets, 
mergers and takeovers in Malaysia. The content of the guidelines mainly refers to the 
acquisition activities that should result in a more balanced Malaysian participation in 
ownership and control. 
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The guidelines apply to six situations involving acquisition activities in the 
country: 
a. any proposed acquisition of foreign interests of any substantial fixed assets in 
Malaysia; 
b. any proposed acquisition of assets or any interest, mergers and takeovers of 
companies and businesses in Malaysia by any means, which will result in 
ownership and control passing to foreign interests; 
c. any proposed acquisition of 15% or more of the voting power by one foreign 
interest or associated group, or by foreign interests in the aggregate of 30% or 
more of the voting power of a Malaysian company and business; 
d. control of Malaysian companies and businesses through any form of joint- 
venture agreement, management, and technical assistance agreement or 
other agreements; 
e. any merger or takeover of any company of business in Malaysia whether by 
Malaysian or foreign interest; 
f. Any other proposed acquisition of assets or interests exceeding in value the 
sum of RM5 million, whether by Malaysian or foreign interests. 
However, these guidelines are not applicable to specific projects approved by 
the government, such as the Ministries, Government Departments, Ministry of 
Finance, State Secretaries and privatisation projects. The restraints on foreign 
ownership and from the New Economic Policy will shape the behaviour of the bidders. 
However, acquisition by foreigners of assets or interest of Malaysian companies and 
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businesses that are left unregulated can accentuate the economic imbalances and 
nullify the objectives of NEP. Thus, the broad objective of the FIC Guidelines is to 
ensure that the aspirations of the Government's NEP can be realised by moving 
towards a balanced ownership and control, rather than impede the acquisition 
activities in the country. 
2.5.4 Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) Listing 
The listing requirements of the KLSE apply to all the companies listed on the 
Exchange. In relation to acquisitions, the KLSE requirements relate mainly to the 
disclosure of the proposed acquisition contained in the offer document. This is in line 
with the corporate disclosure policy, which is regarded by the KLSE as being 
essential for the conduct of a fair and orderly market, and to avoid speculative trading 
based on rumours and distant rumblings. 
2.6 Takeover and Merger Activities in Malaysia 
The Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) recorded the first acquisition activity 
in Malaysia in 1974. However, such records were made for the purpose of regulating 
the acquisition of assets, acquisition activities of companies, and data needed for 
making government strategies. The records are kept in the respective firm files 
depending on the date of submission of acquisition proposals but there has been no 
comprehensive database to capture salient features of the acquisition transactions. In 
addition, the companies involved and other information related to the acquisitions 
were not available to the public (Mohammad, 1993). 
Table 2.6 provides a summary of the acquisition activities for the years 1984- 
1990 as reported by Mohammad (1993) in an earlier study of takeover activity in 
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Malaysia14. According to Mohammad (1993), acquisition activities declined during the 
period 1985-1987 due to slow global economic movement. There was an upward 
trend of acquisition activities from 1988-1990 as a result of an economic recovery. As 
can be seen in Mohammad's (1993) study, there were more private than public 
companies involved in acquisition activities in Malaysia. 
Table 2.6 
Acquisition activities during the years 1984-1990 
Private Public 
1984 92 56 
1985 94 32 
1986 65 62 
1987 40 30 
1988 35 32 
1989 57 53 
1990 77 55 
Source: Mohammad (1993) 
Chart 2.3 depicted the number of applications to Securities Commission 
relating to various applications under the Malaysian Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
during the period 1993-9815. Acquisition activity in Malaysia appears to follow the 
growth of the economy. The number of applications in respect to takeover 
transactions related to the Code increased from 1993-1996, but decreased slightly to 
153 applications in 1997. During the economic slowdown, only 79 applications were 
received in 1998 in which 18 involved the making of general offers, a marked 
decrease of 72.7 per cent from the previous year (1997: 66)16. 
" However, Mohammad (1993) did not breakdown these companies into acquiring and target firms. 
Neither did she provide a list on these companies. 
13 Securities Commission was established on 1 March 1993. 16 As explained in the previous section, an acquirer is required to make a mandatory general offer when 
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Source: Securities Commission Annual Report 1994-1998 
Note: a. 1993 figure is for a ten-month period. 
b. A mandatory general offer occurs when an acquirer acquires more 
than 33% but less than 50% of the voting shares of target firms. 
It is also worth mentioning that in contrast to takeovers in the UK and US, 
hostile takeover bids that seek to acquire control are still rare in the Malaysian 
market. A large number of companies in Malaysia are controlled by a single 
shareholder or by a group of shareholders acting in concert. These companies 
started from a family business or are of an entrepreneurial type rather than having a 
large diversified ownership. A change of control in such entities is normally achieved 
by the controlling shareholder agreeing to sell his shareholding via private 
arrangement (SC Annual Report, 1994). Thus, there will be fewer contested 
takeovers as the control of a public company will tend to pass with the controlling 
block, and the ownership of these companies not widely dispersed. 
Thus, the existing situation explains the common occurrence of mandatory 
general offers in Malaysia to safeguard the interest of all shareholders. As mentioned 
\' ) 
42 
93 94 95 96 97 98 
Years 
earlier, the mandatory offer is required to be made where control has already 
changed through private agreement, or where the controlling shareholder is seeking 
to consolidate his control, by acquiring directly or indirectly more than 33.3 per cent of 
a company's issued capital. 
Cheong (1989) reported the existence of concentration ownership in 
Malaysian companies. She noted that more than a third of the quoted companies are 
owned by groups of local investment holding companies who each owned between 4 
and 5 other quoted companies operating in various lines of business. As an example, 
Multi-Purpose holdings Berhad (MPHB) had emerged as a major conglomerate which 
owned a significant interest in a number of public-listed company such as Malaysian 
Plantations Bhd, Bandar Raya Developments Bhd, Dunlop Estates Bhd, and Magnum 
Corporation Bhd. Through Magnum Corporation Bhd, MPHB obtained a stake in TA 
Enterprise Bhd, Leisure Management Sdn Bhd, Land and General Bhd and Pilecon 
Engineering Bhd (Malaysian Business, 1992). Lee (1992) also noted that major 
transformations to Malaysian companies were due to the NEP. For instance, business 
groups under the NEP are no longer confined to a single sector but they invest in 
divergent fields, priding themselves as builders of conglomerates with interests in a 
number of industries that may not be closely related. Examples are Antah Holdings 
Bhd, Berjaya Corporation Bhd group, Aokam Tin Bhd and Hong Leong Company 
(Malaysia) Bhd". 
In addition, Mohamad Haniffa (1999) provides evidence that interlocking 
directorships or cross-holdings of directorship, which refers to the situation where 
directors sit on more than one board, are common in the Malaysian business 
" Antah Holdings Bhd is an investment holding and management company belonging to the royal 
family of Negeri Sembilan. Berjaya Corporation Bhd principal activities consist of manufacture and 
sale of steel wires and wire ropes and investment holdings while its subsidiaries are more diversified. 
Hong Leong Bhd is also an investment company which started 55 years ago under the first generation 
Kweks who came from China. 
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environmentt8. For example, Tan Sri Nasrudin bin Mohamad who is a director of 
Amalgamated Steel Mills Bhd is also a director in Sime Darby Bhd, Hong Leong 
Industries Bhd, and Federal Flour Mills Bhd (KLSE Annual Handbook, 1990,1992). 
Having interlocking directorship might be a motive for targets to sell their business or 
firm managers might imitate the acquisition activities of those other firms to which 
they are tied through directorship (Haunschild, 1993)19. However, Mohammad (1993) 
found that interlocking of directorship among companies in Malaysia is not a factor 
motivating the targets to sell off their business. Based on questionnaires, Mohammad 
(1993) ascertained that the three most important motives that influence Malaysian 
bidders to make acquisitions are diversification, synergistic effect and horizontal 
integration while targets motive are managerial reasons and better market conditions 
or opportunities. 
Lee (1992) also noted that the manner of business expansion is also different 
under the NEP. There is a decline in growth through greenfield investment (expansion 
into vertically related fields at a relatively slow pace to allow steady consolidation) in 
favour of growth through 'financial takeovers, shifts into established and proven 
industries, rapid acquisition of franchise and marketing systems, and fast growth not 
only vertically or horizontally but also crosswise into totally unrelated areas of 
business' (Lee, 1992, p. 106). There is also the emergence of entrepreneurs who 
have specifically concentrated on exploiting political connections to achieve business 
objectives. An example of politically based entreprenuership is Multi-Purpose 
Holdings Bhd, a public listed company incorporated in 1975, that is the chief 
'a Mohamad Haniffa (1990) found that 13 (9.4%) of the 139 companies in her study had between 7-8 
of their directors having cross-holdings while the 92 (66.2%) of the companies have directors in 1-4 
other quoted companies. 
19 Haunschild (1993) provide evidence that firms with interlocking directorship make many 
acquisitions since these firms are exposed to private acquisition information (in the form of general 
acquisition know how) than firms with no ties to other firms. 
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corporate vehicle of the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA)20. The Malaysian 
Indian Congress (MIC) has produced an equivalent political-business organisation, 
Maika Holdings Bhd. Representing the interest of the ruling Malay component of the 
National Front government (UMNO) is the Fleet Group Sdn Bhd. 
Gomez and Jomo (1997) also noted that politically connected business groups 
have sprung up rapidly in the NEP period, resulting in large conglomerates which blur 
the distinction between business and politics. Although the NEP was conceived to 
advance Malay business interests, the Chinese businessmen who have close links 
with powerful Malay patrons have prospered more than those Chinese businessmen 
who have no such link (Heng, 1992, and Gomez and Jomo, 1997). The successful 
Chinese businessmen have- chosen members of the various royal families, high- 
ranking former civil servants and military personages as their Malay patrons and 
allies. For example, Tan Sri Nasruddin bin Mohamed who have served the secretary- 
general of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and Tan Sri Dato' Zain bin Hashim who 
have served as a General in the Ministry of Defence are among the directors of 
William Cheng's Amalgamated Steel Mills (KLSE Annual Companies Handbook, 
1992). 
2.7 Summary 
The chapter has looked at various factors that may have an impact on 
acquisition activities in Malaysia. These include the history and economy of the 
country, the financial and capital market, and the regulatory policies and agencies in 
20 The ruling party in Malaysia is Barisan Nasional (National Front) which is a multi-ethnic, multi-party 
coalition, comprising of United Malay's National Organisation (UMNO), the dominating party, while 
the other coalitions are MCA and MIC. 
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the country. The development of acquisition activities was also briefly mentioned in 
the chapter. 
The New Economic Policy (NEP), announced in 1970, was to achieve national 
unity. by 'eradicating poverty', irrespective of race, and by 'restructuring society' to 
achieve inter-ethnic economic parity between the predominantly Malay Bumiputras 
and the predominantly Chinese non-Bumiputras. This second prong basically 
involved affirmative action by the Malays to reduce inter-ethnic economic differences, 
especially with the Chinese community. The NEP was replaced by the National 
Development Policy (NDP) in 1991 but raising Bumiputra ownership of national 
wealth to 30% has yet to be met. However, the NEP has brought about major 
transformations to Malaysian companies. Among these are: a shift in emphasis from 
single line of business to multi-industry conglomerates, a decline of growth through 
greenfield investment in favour of growth through acquisitions, a movement from 
reliance on internally generated funds to external borrowings or sale of shares, and 
the emergence of corporations that are politically linked. 
Prior to the financial crisis in mid 1997, the buoyant economy, and political 
stability in Malaysia has witnessed the inflow of foreign funds in the country. The 
existence of foreign direct investors has in the past played a key role in transferring 
new technology and boosting productivity in the country (Heibert, 1999). The nation 
had enjoyed rapid growth rates averaging 8.5% annually during the period 1987- 
1995. The booming domestic stock market during the period 1993-1996 was the 
result of the vigorous economic growth rate, a steady inflow of foreign funds, better 
organised and improved trading facilities in the market, and the overall good 
performance of companies. Acquisition activities appear to parallel the growth of the 
economy and are boosted by notable changes in technology and economic 
infrastructure. On top of that, the establishment of the Securities Commission in 1993 
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as a single regulatory body has resulted in takeover and merger activities in the 
country being more effectively regulated and developed. Prior to the formation of SC, 
approval of acquisition proposals was required from each of the FIC, CIC and the 
Panel of Takeovers and Mergers. As a result, there was an upsurge in the number of 
takeover transactions during the strong economic growth of 1993-1996. 
The number of applications was markedly reduced during the economic crisis, 
from 153 takeover transactions in 1997 to only 79 applications in 1998. Conversely, 
the government is optimistic that Malaysia's economy has halted its downward spiral 
and now on the path of economic recovery. There are encouraging signs of 
improvement with the economy registering a lower contraction of 1.3 per cent for the 
first quarter of 1999 as compared to 10.3 per cent contraction in the last quarter of 
1998 (Mid-term Review, 1999). Among others, manufacturing output has recorded 
positive growth, international reserves have strengthened, inflation rate which 
average 5.3 percent in 1998 has declined to 2.9 per cent in May 1999, and the Kuala 
Lumpur Composite Index has rebounded from 262 on 1 September 1998 to 846 
points on 2 July 1999. The government also argued that the exchange control 
measures had minimal impact on economic activities as 'the general convertibility of 
current account transactions and the free flow of direct foreign investments and 
repatriation of interest, profits, dividends and capital are guaranteed' (MITI, 1999). 
On the basis of the above analysis, it can be surmised that Malaysia remains 
a potential growth area that could possibly attract more foreign and local investors to 
boost the country's economy. Since acquisition activities are said to follow spurts of 
economic activity, it is expected that acquisitions will be on the rise again in the near 
future. The investment policies in the country are designed, via a policy of company 
acquisitions, to attract more local and foreign investment in promoting a higher level 
of economic growth for the country. Despite the Government's policies on a more 
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balanced Malaysian and Bumiputra participation in ownership and control of 
corporations, the recent economic crisis has led to the relaxation of rules on foreign 
equity ownership of companies in Malaysia. This relaxation was clearly necessary in 
view of the need to attract more foreign direct investment as part of the strategy to 
revitalise the economy even though it may result in foreigners acquiring corporate 
equity exceeding the 30% originally allocated to them under the NEP. 
The following chapter describes the various motives for corporate acquisitions 




Motives for Acquisition Activity 
3.1 Chapter Description 
The current chapter identifies the main motives put forward to explain 
acquisition activity. The first part of the chapter begins by an examination of agency 
theory and then extends to examine various motives for acquisition including 
shareholder wealth maximisation and management wealth maximisation theories. 
These theories are used to explain why companies make corporate acquisitions and 
also to predict possible outcomes in terms of post acquisition performance. 
Disciplinary motives and the potential sources of shareholders' gains are discussed 
under shareholder wealth maximisation while those for management wealth 
maximisation include growth maximisation and diversification. 
3.2 Agency Theory 
For many years economists have been concerned with problems that arise 
when security ownership in large corporation is separated from control of the firm's 
investment and financial decisions, which is the basis of the theory of agency. The 
management of many companies is not the sole owner, but rather managers (without 
ownership shares) are agents to whom equity owners have delegated authority for 
more effective control. The agency problem arises because the agent may not always 
act in the best interests of the principal. This possibility gives rise to agency costs, 
which may include monitoring costs incurred by the principal to limit the discretionary 
behaviour of the agent, bonding costs incurred by the agent to put limits on and/or 
provide guarantees about the agent's discretionary behaviour and residual losses to 
the principal(s) resulting from the agent's discretionary behaviour. The agency 
49 
problem is particularly relevant in a large publicly held corporation where ownership 
and control are separate because it is virtually impossible for a diverse group of 
atomistic shareholders (the principals) to monitor the behaviour of the management 
(the agents). The theoretical basis of agency theory can be traced to the work of 
Coase (1937,1960), Berle and Means (1936), Manne (1965,1969), Alchian (1950), 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972), each of whom considered rather broad questions 
concerning the nature and the reasons for the existence of the corporate form of 
organisation. 
Agency theory has its roots in the study by Berle and Means (1936) which 
explicitly recognise the potential divergence of ownership and control in the 
formulation of the theory of the firm. They identified the increasing degree of 
separation between those who supply capital and those who manage it, with 
ownership of corporate wealth and control over it in different hands. Berle and Means 
(1936, p. 69) concluded that 'ownership of wealth without appreciable control and 
control of wealth without appreciable ownership appear to be the logical outcome of 
corporate development'. Within companies free from strong external market pressure, 
the separation of ownership from control of the firm's activities gives rise to incentives 
and opportunities for the agents (the managers) to direct the firm's resources away 
from owners (the shareholders) to themselves. Thus, the study by Berle and Means 
(1936) has addressed the question of whether the shareholders' benefits depend 
upon the degree to which control over the firm's activities is delegated to others. 
The potential for conflict between contracting parties also has its foundation in 
Coase's (1937,1960) work. From his viewpoint, a 'firm' represented nothing more 
than an aggregation of individuals or groups who found it cheaper to contract with one 
another within the firm because the costs of using markets were greater than the 
costs of using direct authority. The concept of the firm as a group of contracting 
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parties was stressed even more strongly in the work of Alchian and Demsetz (1972). 
In a team process, it is normally difficult to accurately measure individual effort and 
therefore to assign rewards. Further, managers have no legitimate property rights to 
the cash flows of the firm other than their explicitly stated compensation during the 
time of their contract. Thus, an incentive exists for the individuals involved to shirk, i. e. 
to act in such a way that an individual satisfaction will be increased, but at the 
expense of the owners. Shirking can take many forms, e. g., working less vigorously to 
seek out positive net present value investment opportunities, or consuming an 
excessive amount of perquisites, either of which would increase managerial 
satisfaction to the detriment of the firm's security holders. Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972) attribute the task of disciplining management primarily to the risk bearers (the 
shareholders) who are assisted to some extent by managerial labour market and by 
the possibility of outside takeover. Similarly, Jensen and Meckling (1976) have 
pointed out that the incentive for managers to shirk increases with the separation 
between those who own (shareholders) and those who control the firm (agents). They 
define an agency relationship as '.. a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their 
behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent' 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308). The shareholders are also in control of the 
management to ensure that the management does not engage in on job consumption 
in excess of their contractual contracts. 
Shareholders are best seen as contractual risk bearers who bear the residual 
risk of the organisation, and whose principal concern are that the inputs of the firm 
are combined efficiently, and that the outputs are distributed scrupulously according 
to the specifics of the contracts21. The shareholders who typically holds an investment 
_' Residual risk is the risk associated with the difference between the random cash inflows and outflows 
of the organisation (Jensen, 1984). 
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portfolio are likely to spread their wealth across many firms and not be interested in 
directly controlling the management of an individual firm. Thus, Fama (1980) and 
Williamson (1983) argue forcibly that the primary mechanism that constraints 
corporate management to be efficient and scrupulous is the managerial labour 
market, where individuals inside and outside the firm compete for management 
positions. The board of directors, composed of top management and outside 
directors, is required to oversee the corporate decision-making, and to replace 
managers or restructure the firm when it is being poorly run. However, if the board 
fails to respond to pressures for change, the market for corporate control then serves 
as a discipline of last resort, similar to that described by Jensen and Ruback (1983, p. 
5) as "the market in which alternative managerial teams compete for the rights to 
manage corporate resources - the rights to hire, fire and set the compensation of top 
level management". That is, the board of directors of the acquiring firm acquires the 
right to manage the resources of the target firm after an acquisition. Thus, it is the 
operation of this market, together with well-designed compensation contracts and the 
labour market for management, that ensures that management's interest will not 
diverge far from the shareholders' interests. 
3.3 Shareholders Wealth Maximisation 
Undoubtedly, the seminal work in the development of the corporate control 
theory mentioned above is that of Manne (1965,1969). The principal value of this 
work is the justification for the invocation of the shareholder wealth maximisation 
paradigm. It is the redeployment of management to maximise shareholders' wealth 
via dividends and increases in the market price of the company shares. Manne 
(1965) argued that if managers acted in a manner that was inconsistent with existing 
equity holders' wealth maximisation, control of the corporate assets would pass to 
others. That is, takeovers serve as an incentive device for management to perform in 
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the shareholders' interests by shifting control of an acquired firm's assets from a 
relatively inefficient management to the superior managers of the acquiring firm. A 
new management team would gain control of the corporate assets by a take-over bid 
and follow a value-maximising course of action. Along with competitive product 
markets and an efficient managerial labour market, an efficient takeover market is 
hypothesised to be one of the primary means by which corporate managers are 
induced to act in the best interests of the firm's shareholders to maximise value, that 
is, maximisation of the net present value of future cash flows. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) also state that market for corporate control provides a mechanism for 
monitoring and enforcing the wealth-maximisation objective of the firm. Thus, an 
active takeover market is an integral element of the mechanism by which assets are 
valued and society's resources are allocated, thus enhancing economic performance. 
In its purest form the market for corporate control is theorised to be one of the 
principal means by which management-shareholder conflicts are resolved. Hindley 
(1969) described the operation of the market for corporate control in the following 
manner: 
A perfectly working, frictionless market in corporate control would allocate 
managerial skills in such a way that each firm used the quality of management 
which maximised returns to owners. If the firm were controlled by a non- 
optimum grade, there would be an incentive to replace it with the optimum 
quality ... any cost of inefficient management would be borne by managers, 
not owners. (Hindley, 1969, p. 435) 
Noting that others had characterised corporate acquisitions as a civilised alternative 
to bankruptcy (Dewey, 1961), Manne (1965, p. 112) pointed out that 'the function so 
wastefully performed by bankruptcies and liquidations would be economically 
performed by acquisitions at a much earlier stage of the firm's life'. Hence, 
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acquisitions may be viewed as one of the means by which failing firms are returned to 
health, presumably by significant changes in the operating and financial policies 
pursued by firm management. Assuming no imperfections in the market and, for 
example no barriers to entry or monopoly situation, only those firms which maximise 
company performance are the survivors and those who do not will disappear or be 
taken over (Alchian, 1950, p. 213; Singh, 1971, p. 12). In other words, the takeover 
threat, that is competition in the capital market, will force managers to pursue profit 
maximisation in order to survive, whether or not they prefer other goals. Further, if the 
capital market attempts to reallocate funds to their most efficient use in a successful 
acquisition, theory predicts that successful bidders are likely to be more profitable 
than their targets. 
3.3.1 Disciplinary Motives 
The current section provides the results of previous studies in examining the 
disciplinary motives for acquisition activity in the UK and the US. 
Singh (1971) examined the characteristics of acquiring and acquired firms in 
the UK for the period 1955-1960. He found evidence that acquisitions usually involve 
the takeover of a smaller and less profitable firm by a larger and more profitable one, 
supporting the traditional economic view. However, in his later study Singh (1975) felt 
that the evidence concerning acquisitions in the 1960's did not conform to his earlier 
results. Singh (1975) reported that a significant degree of stock market discipline for 
unprofitable firms existing only for small size firms rather than the large ones, 
indicating the weakness in takeover mechanism in trying to discipline unprofitable 
firms. Most of the available evidence in the study suggested that takeovers 
themselves are not an efficient resource allocation mechanism. Thus, Singh (1975, p. 
511) concluded that '.. the takeover process may well actually encourage salaried 
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managers in large corporations to concentrate even more on size rather than 
profitability', thus giving very little support to the neoclassical theory of shareholders 
wealth maximising discussed above. The general conclusion emerging from other 
studies (example Meeks, 1977; and Cowling et al., 1980) seems to be that companies 
taken over are characterised by small size rather than low profits, and that the 
takeover mechanism does not bring about an improvement in the profitability of 
acquiring firm. 
When considering characteristics of US targets during the period 1971-1979, 
Palepu (1986) identify that poorer share price performance prior to the bid increases 
the probability of takeover for all targets. He also find that the likelihood of being taken 
over decreases with the size of the firm since the transaction costs associated with 
the absorption of the target are likely to increase with size. Palepu (1986) provides 
further evidence that target firms in US are characterised by growth resource 
imbalance in the sense that they posses lower growth, high liquidity and lower 
leverage than non-target firms (that is, lower growth, resource rich). However, Harford 
(1999) found that firms rich in cash are less likely to be taken over, indicating that 
firms with large cash stockpiles may deter takeover attempts. In addition, he also 
found that firms with good growth opportunities (measured by market to book value) 
are less likely to be targets, similar to the findings by Palepu (1986). However, 
Harford (1999) did not find size (measured by natural log of total assets a year prior to 
acquisitions) to be a contributing factor for a firm to be taken over. 
In developing a model of takeover likelihood in UK during the period 1984 to 
1991, Powell (1997) confirms the findings of earlier studies that the characteristics of 
acquired and non-acquired firms differ. Based on binomial models (treating targets as 
a single group) Powell (1997) documents that the lower the liquidity, the smaller the 
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firm size, and the larger the free cash flows, the higher the takeover likelihood'. Prior 
performance as measured by either return on capital employed or market-to-book 
ratios are not significant factors for targets to be taken over, suggesting that inefficient 
management hypothesis is not prevalent in UK targets. 
Using accounting data for a total of 282 UK firms over the period 1965-76, one 
of the main findings in the study by Holl and Pickering (1988) was that target 
companies taken over tended to be smaller, slower growing and less profitable than 
their acquirers and also in comparison with target companies not taken over. The 
result is consistent with the hypothesis that firms which do not perform well on either 
managerial or shareholder criteria will be taken over. They also found that successful 
acquiring firms tended to be those which had faster growth, higher gearing, liquidity 
and retentions, but not superior profits, than unsuccessful acquiring firms. Fast growth 
and financial strength seem to be more important influences on bidding success than 
profit orientation. In addition, they found that the post acquisition performance of the 
merged firms in successful acquisition was worse than that for the companies in 
abandoned acquisitions, consistent with the view that poor performing firms prior to 
acquisitions make bad investment decisions. Taffler and Holl (1991) did not find any 
evidence in UK that acquiring firms are more profitable than the target companies 
they are bidding for, and that acquisitions do not bring about improved financial 
performance to the merged firms. The result is inconsistent with the view that the 
takeover market acts as an efficient allocation of resources. 
Clark and Ofek (1994) document that acquiring firms are unable to 
successfully restructure distressed target firms when examining the effectiveness of 
u However, in using multinomial model (separating hostile and friendly takeovers into separate 
groups), Powell (1997) found that inefficient management is common among hostile takeovers. He document that the larger the size, the lower the liquidity, the lower the profitability and the higher the 
market-to-book ratios are characteristics of hostile targets. On the other hand, the likelihood of a friendly takeover is higher when the firm is smaller and leverage higher. 
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acquisitions in restructuring 38 US distressed firms. Although the distressed targets 
had extremely poor pre acquisition performance, Clark and Ofek (1994) find no 
indication that the acquiring firms were performing better or worse than average prior 
to the acquisition. They find only nine attempts at restructuring are successful, nine 
are marginally successful, and 20 are clear failure23. They also provide evidence that 
performance of acquiring firms that acquired distressed targets tends to decline in the 
post acquisition period, suggesting that acquiring firms are unable to successfully 
restructure targets. 
Philippatos and Baird III (1996) also provide evidence that there are no 
significant differences in pre acquisition performance between acquiring and acquired 
firms, and to their respective industries. In examining 71 mergers and tender offers in 
US for the period 1973-87, using accounting data, Philippatos and Baird (1996) 
reported that the acquiring and acquired firms' pre acquisition relative excess value 
by sales (EVS) and relative return on capital are not significantly greater than their 
respective industries24. There were also no significant differences in pre acquisition 
performance between acquiring and acquired firms, inconsistent with the view that 
target firms were taken over because they had performed poorly prior to acquisition, 
nor were the acquiring firms better than firms in the same industries or than acquired 
firms. In their study the pre acquisition performance of acquired firms seems to have 
little effect on the post acquisition value gains of the combined firms. 
' 'Successful' or `marginal' are firms that have no evidence of failure, while 'failures' are firms that have involved in bankruptcy, liquidation, or substantial write off. Z` Excess value is the difference between the firm's market value and its book value of total assets. It 
represents the capitalised value of the expected stream of future excess profit or loss arising when price differs from average cost. 
EVS = (Market Value - Book Value)/Sales Pre acquisition profitability is measured in terms of return on total capital as follows: 
ROC = (Cash flow - tax)/Total Capital 
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Evidence on the hypothesis that acquisitions act as a disciplinary mechanism 
on the management of poorly performing firms is the finding of Lang et at. (1991). 
They found that the largest increases in the combined values (abnormal returns) of 
acquirer and target occur when firms with high values of Tobin's q acquire targets 
with low values of q. Servaes (1991) also found that bidder and target returns are 
larger when the bidder is a high q firm and the target is a low q firm, vice versa. To the 
extent that q proxies for management quality, the results indicate that the market 
expects more value to be created when a firm with good management acquires a firm 
with bad management than if the opposite occurs. Similarly, Barber et al. (1995) 
found that US hostile and conglomerate acquisitions during the period 1963-1968 
were carried out to discipline or remove inefficient target managers. Targets of hostile 
acquisitions had significant low q ratios than their friendly counterparts and there is a 
strong negative relation between q ratios and conglomerates25. The results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that poorly managed firms investing in poor projects 
have lower q ratios and would be likely targets of disciplining acquisitions. 
Other evidence on the hypothesis that disciplinary mechanism is a motive for 
acquisition is claimed in a study by Kennedy and Limmack (1996)28. The hypothesis 
was tested in their study by exploring the relationship between security returns and 
CEO turnover in UK target companies within the period from 1980-198927. Bidding 
companies appear to achieve superior performance while target companies are found 
Z3 Similar to Amit, Livnat and Zarowin (1989), Barber et al. (1995) defined Q ratio as the sum of 
market value of common equity, the book value of long term debt and debt due within one year and the 
liquidating value of preferred stock divided by the book value of total assets. 
26 Previous empirical study supporting this hypothesis includes that of Mandelker (1974). In examining 
the impact of mergers on US firms during the period 1948-1967, he found that the acquired firms 
experience negative abnormal returns during the period (-35, -7), and at its lowest level in the ninth 
month preceding the merger. However, the shareholders of the acquired firms earn on average, 
abnormal returns of approximately 14% in the seventh month prior to merger. The result is consistent 
with the hypothesis that acquisitions act as a disciplinary mechanism in replacing incompetent 
management. 
27 The post of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) selected for examining turnover in the study is based on 
the grounds that this person is the director responsible for decision making in the company. 
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to achieve significantly negative returns over the five years prior to the bid. They also 
found a significant increase in CEO turnover two years after the takeover. Kennedy 
and Limmack (1996) conclude that their results are consistent with the role of 
takeovers in UK as a disciplinary mechanism on non-wealth maximising 
management. 
However, Matsusaka (1993) and Hubbard and Palia (1999) found high 
retention rates of target management by acquiring firms after acquisitions. Hubbard 
and Palia (1999) reported 0.75 of the target firm's management was retained in the 
three years after acquisition. They also found that acquisitions in their study earn 
positive abnormal returns after acquisition. Hubbard and Palia (1999) conclude that 
the high retention rate of target management indicates that disciplinary or removing 
target management is not the main reason for high bidder returns. 
In another study, Mikkelson and Partch (1997) investigate the relationship 
between managerial turnover and performance on 200 US firms during the active 
acquisition market of 1984-1988 and the less active market of 1989-1993. They 
provide evidence that a significant relation exists between management turnover and 
performance in the period of active acquisitions, but not in the less active acquisition 
period28. Furthermore, for firms in the lowest quartile of performance, 33% experience 
complete management turnover during the active period and 17% in the less active 
period. The evidence suggests 'the intensity of managerial discipline, in the form of 
board decisions to replace top management, depends on the level of activity in the 
market for corporate control' (Mikkelson and Partch, p. 207). That is, the internal 
control system does not function effectively without an active external control market. 
The results substantiate the conclusions of previous studies mentioned above that 
28 Performance is measured by pre-tax operating income before interest and depreciation scaled by 
assets. 
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acquisition activity assist corporate boards in carrying out their duty to oversee and 
discipline management. 
Further, the information that the company will be taken over may be used by 
target management to improve the performance of the company to avoid being taken 
over, termed 'kick in the pants' by Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983). In other words, the 
takeover mechanism acted as a spur for the current target management to improve 
operating performance of the company by implementing a higher-valued operating 
strategy on its own. Even if the acquisition is not successful, it is still possible for the 
market to exercise discipline over the target firm, referred to as corrective discipline 
by Taffler and Holl (1991). Limmack (1994), for example, found that those target firms 
that had improved operating performance after unsuccessful acquisitions were more 
likely to retain their increase in wealth than firms that had not improved their operating 
performance. The study by Holl and Pickering (1988) shows that there is a strong 
performance improvement by the target companies from unsuccessful acquisitions 
over the three years post acquisition period in respect to their growth rate, their 
financial strength (retention) return to shareholders and return on capital employed. 
The evidence shows that target companies in abandoned acquisitions successfully 
adopt a strategy of improving performance after an acquisition. Taffler and Holl's 
(1991) result differed to that of Holl and Pickering (1988) when they found no 
evidence to support the prediction that target companies that successfully resist a bid 
subsequently improve their financial performance. The post acquisition performance 
of both bidding and target firms in unsuccessful acquisition showed no significant 
improvement, finding no support for the hypothesis that unsuccessful targets are 
disciplined by the market. 
Further, Jensen and Warner (1988) argue that if acquisition attempts signal 
poor managerial performance, the oversight by the board of directors as internal 
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monitoring mechanism to replace top management intensifies even if the acquisition 
attempt is unsuccessful. For example, Denis and Denis (1995) found that forced 
resignations of top management are often due to acquisition-related pressures and 
lead to improvements in performance. Consistent with this view, Denis and Serano 
(1996) find that 34% of targets experience high incidence of top management 
turnover among poorly performing firms following unsuccessful acquisition between 
1983 and 1989. Those firms with disciplinary managerial turnover exhibit significant 
share price increases above its pre-contest level and improvement in operating 
performance. In contrast, firms with no top management changes do not exhibit 
shareholder wealth increases. The evidence from the above studies support the view 
that one of the motives for acquisitions is to acquire previously under-utilised 
resources (Jensen, 1986) and that the market for corporate control (as mentioned 
earlier) is an important mechanism for reallocating resources to more efficient 
corporate users. 
3.3.2 Potential Sources Of Gains From Acquisitions 
The studies discussed in Section 3.3.1 above dealt with the motives for 
acquisitions that lead to either shareholders wealth maximisation or otherwise. An 
acquisition accompanied by an increased in bidder's value would indicate the 
presence of shareholders wealth maximisation, and vice versa. While consideration 
must be given to the performance of constituent firms prior to acquisition and the 
combined corporate entity after acquisition in determining the overall economic 
efficiency from acquisitions, it is also important to identify the sources of such gains, if 
any. Thus, it is the objective of this section to describe the potential sources of gains 
from acquisitions and the related studies involved. 
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There are two broad sources of potential gains to shareholders from 
acquisitions. One is when the combination of the two firms may result in some form 
of 'synergy', that is, a combined net gain that is more than the sum of the value of the 
individual firms. This may involve a more effective utilisation of the combined 
companies' assets by implementing a higher-valued operating strategy, the benefits 
of which can be captured by the existing shareholders. Bradley et al. (1983, p. 184) 
identify that operating strategy changes after acquisition may involve 'more efficient 
management (see Section 3.3.1 above), economies of scale, improved production 
techniques, the combination of complementary resources, increased market power, 
the redeployment of assets to more profitable uses, or any number of value-creating 
mechanisms that fall under the general rubric of corporate synergy'. In general, two 
types of synergy can be distinguished: efficiency and financial gains. The other broad 
source of gain is when the managers believe that they can purchase the target firm at 
a price below the present value of its future cash flow (asymmetric information). 
The three types of gains, namely efficiency, financial and asymmetric 
information, are discussed in the next sub-sections. 
3.3.2.1 Efficiency Gains 
Firms normally accumulate the necessary resources required to compete and 
then to exploit them in product markets to generate revenue. Barney (1991, p. 101) 
defined resources as 'all assets, capabilities, organisational process, firm attributes, 
information, firm knowledge etc., controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive 
of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness'. Thus, one 
of the central concerns in assessing the consequences of acquisition is measuring 
changes in the firm's productive efficiency. The term 'efficiency' is defined by Cowling 
et. al (1980, chapter 4) as the process of turning given inputs into given outputs. It 
involves a more effective utilisation of the combined companies' assets in order to 
achieve positive net present value investments by implementing a higher-valued 
operating strategy. A coherent account of efficiency gains comes from the theory of 
corporate diversification, as discussed in the next section. Penrose (1959) developed 
a theory of internal inducement to expand and diversify in directions that use the 
existence of a 'pool of unused productive services, resources and special knowledge' 
that is created within the firm through routinisation of activities. This theory rests on 
the assumption that large business enterprises have assets of multiple uses that can 
be internalised by the firm. The 'lumpiness' of such assets induces the firm to expand 
or diversify as a means of using its resources more profitably. Although the arm's- 
length rental of the services of the assets is an alternative, acquisitions can provide 
the solution if at any time some firms find themselves either needing the services of 
such a lumpy assets or possessing one with excess capacity, provided the benefits 
obtained from acquisition is more than the premium paid for it. 
There are several potential sources of efficiency gains due to post acquisition 
improvements in operations. These gains may be classified broadly into economies of 
scale, technical and managerial skill or knowledge transfer (Porter, 1987), and asset 
restructuring. The term economies of scale implies that the individual firms are not 
operating efficiently prior to the combination because the scale of enterprise is too 
small. Thus, when the scale of common activities increases through firms combining 
in some way (for example acquisitions), there is a potential for overall costs to 
decrease leading to an improved net cash flow. By producing a higher quantity of 
outputs at a lower cost the merged firm also has the ability to under-price the 
competing firms' offers and thus increase market share. Economies of scale can arise 
in marketing, for example with advertising cost, or in research and development, and 
in distribution where fleets of vehicles or larger warehouses can bring down the cost 
per unit of transport and storage. 
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Operating economies can be gained from horizontal combinations as well as 
from vertical combinations". Horizontal and vertical integration could lead to 
economies of scale with the new combination operating fewer and more efficient 
plants. The specialised resources in related acquisition may result in increased 
efficiencies in technological or product market activities but these specific gains are 
not expected to be realised in unrelated acquisitions (Singh and Montgomery, 1987). 
Levy and Sarnat (1990) contended that operating gains could be achieved from 
horizontal and vertical acquisitions, but not from conglomerate acquisitions. By 
contrast, Weston et al. (1990) explained that economies of scale, in the form of 
generic management skills transfer, could also be achieved from unrelated 
acquisitions30. Economic gains are achieved when general management functions are 
transferred over a variety of activities, 'spreading a fixed factor over a large number of 
activities to achieve scale economies and to lower cost function for the output range' 
(Weston et al., 1990, p. 87). 
Chatterjee's (1986) study suggests that the wealth gains of unrelated targets 
are higher than that of related targets. However, most hypotheses which suggest 
opportunities for efficiency gains from conglomerate acquisitions have been 
discredited theoretically or empirically (Mueller, 1977; and Hughes et al., 1980). 
Results obtained by Palepu (1985), and Singh and Montgomery (1987) have shown 
that firms which have ventured into related businesses create higher value and have 
greater total value gains than unrelated acquisitions. In analysing the post acquisition 
performance of business units that changed ownership for 356 US manufacturing 
29 Horizontal contributions arise when the firms concerned are in the same stage of production process. 
A horizontal merger leads to control of a larger share of output in a particular market. Vertical 
contributions arise when the firms concerned are expanding backward towards the source of raw 
materials or forward in the direction of the ultimate consumers. so Generic management functions are those managers who have the experience and capability to 
perform general management functions of planning, organising, directing, and controlling. Weston et 
al. (1990) argues that generic management functions are readily transferable to all types of business firms. By contrast, specific management functions (research, manufacturing, marketing etc. ) can only be carried-over to firms in related activities. 
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firms during the period 1980-1984, Brush (1996) found market share predictions 
increase with business ownership changes31. Brush (1996) argued that the source of 
improved performance is explicitly due to the increased opportunities for each 
acquired business to share resources and activities in the acquiring firm relative to the 
selling firm. Ramaswany (1997) examined the impact of strategic similarities (market 
coverage, marketing posture, risk propensity, operational efficiency and client mix) on 
changes in post acquisition performance of US target and bidding banks for the 
period 1984-9032. He found that banks exhibiting similar strategic characteristics 
result in better performance than those involving dissimilar banks. 
There are two competing views on the overall economic impact of vertical and 
horizontal acquisitions. One is that acquisition will lead to economies of scale which 
leads to improved economic efficiency, and the other is the collusion or anti- 
competitive effect which is not favourable to customers. The coming together of two 
related firms by definition enhances concentration and eliminates competing firms. It 
was documented by Levy and Sarnat (1990) that increases in market power is 
attractive to the firm and that the higher the level of concentration, the greater is the 
level of profits. However, market power represents no efficiency gains as the wealth is 
transferred from the firm's customers to shareholders. The basic proposition of the 
collusion hypothesis is that rivals of the merging firms can expect to benefit from news 
of the horizontal acquisitions since successful collusion limits output and raises 
product prices and/or lowers factor prices, leading to market power. Even though 
Chatterjee (1986) find that collusive synergy is associated with the highest value as 
compared to financial and operational synergy, tests of the market power hypothesis, 
in general, indicate that the gains associated with acquisitions do not come from the 
31 Brush (1996) used market share as measure of performance. 32 Ramaswamy (1997) used return on assets as a measure of performance. Risk propensity is the level 
of asset risks that the bank assumes, while market emphasis include market coverage and marketing 
activity. Operational efficiency includes synergies arising from integrating operations that process 
individual financial transactions, information systems that track loans, customer data, deposits etc. 
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creation of market power'. Hughes et al. (1980) supported the belief that horizontal 
acquisition can contribute to an increase in efficiency without increasing market 
power. A study by Eckbo (1983) on horizontal acquisitions found very little evidence 
that horizontal and vertical acquisitions have collusive, anti-competitive effects. 
Similarly, Stillman (1983) argued that no anti-competitive effects were found in 
horizontal mergers, supporting the view that the purpose behind related acquisitions 
is to seek more efficient allocation of resources rather than acting on monopolistic or 
anti-competitive type of activities. 
Capron (1996) as cited in Anand and Singh (1997) also failed to find support 
the market power motive in horizontal acquisitions. Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992, 
1997) suggest that operational gains rather than increases in market power provide 
the gains to target firms' shareholders in horizontal acquisitions. In an analysis of the 
50 largest US acquisitions between 1979 and mid 1984, Healy et al. (1992) document 
significant improvements in asset productivity relative to their industries, leading to 
higher operating cash flow returnsM. Brush (1996) also highlights that increased 
opportunities to share resources and activities (operational synergy) among 
businesses of acquired firms may have contributed to post acquisition performance 
improvement of 356 US manufacturing firms in the acquisitions that occur between 
1980 and 1984. Flanagan (1996) also suggests that some level of product-market 
relatedness can boost post acquisition performance. In a study of 'purely' related and 
'purely' unrelated acquisitions for US mining and manufacturing firms between 1972- 
" Chatterjee (1986) explains collusive synergy as the ability of the firm to increase prices because of 
collusion among the industry participants. 
" The evidence on operating improvements is equally strong in Leveraged Buyouts (LBO). Palepu (1990) provides evidence that shareholders gain and that improvements occur in virtually all- 
accow Ling measures of performance over the three years surrounding the transactions. 
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90, Flanagan (1996) found that purely related acquirers achieve higher abnormal 
returns around announcement period than purely unrelated acquirers35 
.. 
Another way in which firm seeks to realise synergy through economies of 
scale is by having technical and managerial skill or knowledge transfers from one firm 
to another (Singh and Montgomery, 1987, Porter, 1987, and Ravenscraft and 
Scherer, 1987). Technical and managerial skill transfer may also be possible with 
rapidly changing technology or market conditions that are not the fault of incumbent 
managers, but to which they have difficulty in adjusting (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). 
For instance, managers may find it difficult to abandon major projects, relocate 
facilities, close or sell facilities or divisions that can no longer contribute to the 
organisation's survival. Strategies offered by management team of the bidding firms 
include 'shedding assets, improving the organisational structure and incentives, and 
changing the mix and level of investment' (Jensen, 1992, p. 657). 
One example highlighted by Jensen and Ruback (1983) on the technical and 
managerial transfer is of the oil industry. They argue that acquisition occurs in the 
1960s because the managers of the acquired companies failed to reduce their 
investments in exploration, which was called for after the decline in the expected 
future prices for oil. Jensen and Ruback (1983) relate this 'mismanagement' to the 
substantial free cash flow (as expressed earlier) in the industry. The theory predicts 
that managers who are unable or unwilling to make the cutbacks will be replaced by 
managers who will manage the firm with higher-valued strategy. 
ss Flanagan (1996) defines purely related acquisitions as those acquiring and target firms operating in 
the same SIC code at the three or four digit level prior to acquisition while purely unrelated 
acquisitions are those that do not share such code. 
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Technical and managerial skill transfer can be realised via acquisitions, by 
combining a firm that possesses excess managerial resources with a firm that is 
inefficiently managed (Weston et al., 1990, p 191). Since related acquisitions operate 
in common product markets, and top management will be familiar with the product, 
market and technical characteristics of the two firms, executives from acquired firms 
are more easily replaced by those from acquiring firms. As suggested by Shelton 
(1988), the potential for long-run value creation is greatest in related acquisitions 
where the top executives of both acquiring and target firms share similar functional 
skills and common managerial premises, and are therefore in a good position to 
develop collectively and implement programmes that use the assets of the target 
firms in new or more efficient ways. As mentioned in earlier sections, Walsh (1988), 
Walsh and Ellwood (1991), Martin and McConell (1991) and Mikkelson and Partch 
(1997) are among studies in US and Kennedy and Limmack (1996) in UK that have 
reported significant increases in turnover of top management in target companies 
following acquisition. 
Cannella and Hambrick (1993), and Krishnan et al. (1997) argued that the 
retention of the top management in unrelated acquisition seems essential since 
acquiring firms have little experience in the operation of the acquired business. The 
target's top management who are familiar with their organisation's environment is still 
needed by the acquiring firm and most likely to be retained after acquisition. In 
analysing the value consequences of acquisition on Beatrice Company, Baker (1992) 
argued that early conglomerate acquisitions in US transferred management skills but 
retained target management when they bought well-performing target firms that have 
been managed by competent managers. Matsusaka (1993) and Hubbard and Palia 
(1999) found that both related and unrelated acquisitions retained target management 
after acquisition but related acquisition retained a greater proportion of target 
management. 
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3.3.2.2 Financial Gains 
Financial gains result from the ability of bidding and target firms to take 
advantage of each other's financial positions. The motive of the acquisition is to 
capture additional investment opportunities available by lowering the cost of capital of 
the combined firm through the acquisition. There are several ways of lowering the 
cost of capital. Provided the cash flows of the two merging firms are not perfectly 
correlated (most likely in unrelated acquisitions), the risk of insolvency will be reduced 
(Lewellan, 1971). Under these circumstances, the acquiring and acquired firms act as 
co-insurers of each other's outstanding debt. In other words, the probability of default 
for each firm has been decreased because additional cash flows are now available for 
debt repayment if they are needed. The probability of bankruptcy of the combined unit 
is smaller and so the debt capacity is larger when a few individual units merge and 
operate as a single unit. This results in a windfall gain in the form of higher expected 
cash flow to lenders. Since interest expenses are tax-deductible the combined unit 
enjoys the payment of lower taxes. As such, the acquisition will effectively increase 
the debt capacity of the combined firm which, given the interest tax benefit associated 
with debt, increase its value, thereby increasing the shareholders value. 
It has been argued that the financial gains described by Lewellen (1971) 
cannot be achieved in an efficient capital market (Higgins and Schall, 1975; and 
Montgomery and Singh, 1984). In the absence of taxes and bankruptcy costs, a 
reduction in the probability of bankruptcy is insufficient to warrant an increase in 
shareholders wealth. Without any real synergies or pure financial effect, combining 
two separate cash flows that are not perfectly correlated will reduce the risk of default 
of the merging firm which in turn will increase the market value of the merging firms 
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outstanding debtI6. Since the total operating cash flows of the consolidated firm are 
the same, the increase in the market value of the outstanding debt will be 
accompanied with a reduction in the market value of the merging firms share price. 
Stapleton (1982) concludes that increasing the debt capacity of a firm as a result of 
mergers and acquisition causes a wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders, 
assuming no increase in the level of outstanding debt after merger. According to 
Higgins and Schall (1975), the value of the combined firm must remained unchanged 
in a perfect capital market. Since the residual cash flow of one firm serves to 'co- 
insure' the cash flows of the other, it is the shareholders that actually pay for any 
financial benefits of the acquisition. As a result, the authors concluded that the 
financial effects of the acquisition would result in an increase in bond prices and lower 
share prices, i. e., a wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders. 
Kim and McConnell (1977) reported an increased in post acquisition level of 
debt financing in their study, consistent with the hypothesis that if managers were 
shareholder wealth maximisers, they would act to neutralise the wealth transfer from 
shareholders to bondholders described above by issuing debt after the merger. This 
would have the effect of increasing the overall default risk of the firm and decreasing 
the value of all its outstanding debt until the firm's shareholders value are returned to 
their pre acquisition positions. 
Empirical evidence consistent with the above hypothesis can also be found in 
the work of Asquith and Kim (1982). On examining the effect of acquisition 
announcement on both the shareholders and bondholders of conglomerate 
acquisitions, Asquith and Kim (1982) found that shareholders of the target firms 
gained while on average bondholders do not earn positive or negative abnormal 
36 Pure financial effect is indicated by firms having the ability to reduce their operating risk through diversification and thus increase their leverage, resulting in additional tax benefits of interest deduction. 
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returns. They also found that abnormal gains obtained by the target firm shareholders 
do not come at the expense of the other security holders. Thus, their results are 
consistent with an efficient capital market that efficiently resolves conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and other security holders. Similarly, Choi and Phillipatos 
(1983) have supported the existence of the coinsurance effect for conglomerate 
acquisitions. They investigated the synergistic aspect of increased debt capacity due 
to merger between 1950-1973 on 81 merged firms. They showed that those firms 
which restructured their debt after acquisition to take advantage of increased post 
acquisition debt capacity obtained significantly higher wealth increases. 
In sum, Levy and Sarnat (1970,1990) showed that, under acceptable 
assumptions about financial markets, there are no economic gains for unrelated 
diversification. However, if one introduces some frictions into the financial markets, 
such as bankruptcy costs and taxes, there may be financial gains for acquisitions 
(Lewellen, 1971, Galai and Masulis, 1976, Stapleton, 1982, Asquith and Kim, 1982, 
and Choi and Philippatos, 1983). Amit and Livnat (1988) found that firms which 
implemented pure-financial diversification were characterised by lower variability of 
cash flows, i. e. lower operating risk, and were also more highly geared. The results 
substantiate the view that the greater stability of cash flows will enable the firm to 
increase leverage, thus enjoy lower tax payments due to the deduction of tax for the 
additional financing. 
Another financial motive for acquisitions in terms of complementary fit is that 
acquiring firms may have excess cash flow, but a lack of profitable investment 
opportunities. In contrast, the acquired firms may have low free cash flows and be in 
need of additional funds to finance an abundance of potentially profitable investment 
opportunities in their industries. The low free cash flows of the target firms provide 
synergistic opportunities in financing, thus add value to the shareholders. A similar 
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view has been advanced by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Smith and Kim (1991) that 
firms rich in financial slack (defined as cash, cash equivalents, and unused capacity 
to raise low-risk debt) will take over firm with investment opportunities but poor in 
financial slack without issuing risky securities37. According to Smith and Kim (1991), a 
firm with high operating cash flow relative to asset is liquid. However, whether excess 
cash is desirable depends on the investment opportunity available to the firm. Under 
the financial slack hypothesis, liquidity is valuable for financing a firm with growth 
opportunity since additional resources would reduce under-investment38. On the other 
hand, liquidity is undesirable if investment opportunities are limited. Under the free 
cash flow hypothesis, if growth opportunities are low, excess cash may lead 
managers to make over-investments and limits monitoring by the capital market. 
Thus, combining slack-poor firms with firms having free cash flow can solve potential 
resource allocation problems. Myers and Majluf (1984) hypothesis was supported by 
Bruner (1988) who also finds that successful bidders have more slack than 
unsuccessful bidders and, similarly, successful targets have less slack than 
unsuccessful targets. As mentioned in Section 3.3.1 Palepu (1986) and Powell (1997) 
finds empirical evidence that mismatch between growth and resources in a firm will 
make it more likely acquisition target. 
In addition, Smith and Kim (1991) found that announcement period returns of 
acquiring firms with free cash flow are negative, confirming Jensen's (1986) free cash 
flow theory (mentioned earlier) that acquiring firms with free cash flow tend to overpay 
for target firms. However, Smith and Kim (1991) provide evidence that total returns 
" Myers and Majluf (1984) contended that issuance of shares as a form of financing tells the market 
that the shares of bidding firm are too high and cash offers as signal of bidding firms' shares being 
undervalued. Thus, rather than issuing shares, undervalued firms lacking financial slack will sometime forgo valuable investment opportunities to avoid transferring wealth from new investors to existing 
shareholders. 
38 Slackness is relative to the available positive net present (NPV) investment opportunities. Low 
growth prospects suggest that firms have few opportunities to reinvest the excess cash in the firm's 
current line of business. 
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are most positive, at 16.88% when 'slack poor' bidders acquire high free cash flow 
targets. They also reported that returns to bidders are more positive when 'slack poor' 
bidders acquire targets with free cash flow than when free cash flow bidders acquire 
slack poor targets. The results obtained by Smith and Kim (1991) provide a resolution 
to the under/over investment problem identified above. Benefits from acquisition are 
predicted to arise from combinations involving a 'slack-poor' firm and a firm with 
excess free cash flow. It was further reported by Sudarsanam et at. (1996) that 
financial gains dominate operational gains in their study. Similarly, the positive 
coefficient of MATCASH in the study by Sudarsanam et at. (1996) affirms the 
hypothesis that combining firms with complementary fit in terms of liquidity slack and 
surplus investment opportunities increases shareholder wealth for both bidder and 
target39. 
Further, internal financing can have an advantage over issuing securities 
(external financing) when managers and shareholders have asymmetric information 
on the value of the firm's assets (Myers and Majluf, 1984). When the firm issues risky 
securities, the market believes that the firm is overvalued and that the firm is 
transferring wealth from new investors to existing shareholders. This asymmetry 
information causes new investors to prevent the wealth transfer by responding 
negatively to issue announcement. Other examples on asymmetry information will be 
discussed in Section 3.3.2.3 below. 
" Sudarsanam et al. (1996) used MATCASH as a proxy for mismatch of resources, defined as the 
mismatch between relative liquidity and relative growth opportunities of bidder and target. 
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3.3.2.3 Asymmetric Information Theory 
The information effect theory assumes that the managers of the bidding firms 
possess superior or unique information regarding the value of the target firms 
(Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). The information may be about the possible 
advantages to be derived from the acquisition of the target firm or the bidder may 
have detected that the share price of the target firm is undervalued. The bidding firm 
would thus be able to obtain assets at a discount, below the 'true value' of the target 
firm. For an acquisition to be value maximising, an acquisition will occur if the 
undervalued share prices of the target firm represents a positive net present value 
investment. 
One situation when target undervaluation may arise occurs when the share 
market underestimates the true value of the company, referred by Bradley et al. 
(1983) as 'sitting on a gold mine' hypothesis. The bidder has special information 
which might indicate that the target firm has a favourable market conditions, maybe, 
the possibility of entering into a profitable contract in the future or whether the target 
firm is about to discover oil etc. It has been argued that this hypothesis is in conflict 
with the view of an efficient capital market since the latter claims that the share 
market price fully reflects all available information (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987)40 
However, it is possible for the bidding firm to have new information about the target's 
value that has not yet reached the market or from internal information that the bidder 
possess on synergistic gains. The bidder may make a bid for the shares of the target 
at below their'true value' and this bid will signal information to other bidders (to make 
the same bids) in order to obtain the benefits about the value of the target. To 
40 An efficient market is defined as one where a share price fully incorporates all available information 
on that security and that share prices provide accurate signals for resource allocation (Fama, 1970). 
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discourage competing bids that may result in an expensive bid battle, the first bidder 
may offer a sufficiently large premium, exposing the bidder to a potential winner's- 
curse situation. 
However, the empirical evidence is not consistent with the under-valuation 
hypothesis. In examining the returns realised by shareholders of target and acquiring 
firms in unsuccessful acquisitions in US for the period 1963 - 1980, Bradley et al. 
(1983) found that there is no significant change in the shareholders wealth of the 
bidding firms in unsuccessful acquisitions. They also found that the gains obtained by 
target shareholders in an unsuccessful acquisition may only be retained if there was a 
probability that the target would be the object of subsequent, ultimately successful 
acquisitions. This evidence suggests that a control change is a necessary condition 
for target shareholders to experience permanent share price gains. Thus, Bradley et 
al. (1983) concluded that gains accrue to the target shareholders in their study relate 
to potential efficiency gains rather than the revealing of superior information regarding 
the target firm undervaluation. 
The lack of information of the true value of the target is labelled by Grossman 
and Hart (1981) as an acquisitional bid, which represents a form of market mispricing 
that is bad to the shareholders and the society at large. Under this situation, the 
acquiring firm takes over not to improve the target firm's management but because it 
possesses special information not available to other investors. They note that 
acquisitional bids simply involve a redistribution of income from the uninformed 
shareholders to the informed bidder and thus `... shareholders are unable to capture 
the true benefits of their investment' (Grossman and Hart, 1981, p. 253) which they 
otherwise would if such information could be identified. 
The next section looks at the managerial motive for making acquisitions. 
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3.4 Managerial Motives 
The managerial theory of takeovers or the management wealth maximisation 
theory predicts that corporate acquisitions are executed by bidding firm managers to 
maximise their own utility instead of their shareholders wealth (Mueller, 1969). Upon 
achieving a certain "satisfactory" level of profits, managers will attempt to maximise 
their wealth through actions which may not correspond to their shareholders interests 
(Mueller, 1969, Penrose, 1959). Jensen (1986,1992) argues that managers have 
incentives to cause their firms to grow, even if it means investing in negative 
investment projects, especially when the organisation generates substantial free cash 
flow. Free cash flow is 'cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that 
have positive net values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital' (Jensen, 
1986, p. 321). In the early stages of corporate development managers have ample 
external growth opportunities acceptance of which are in their own and the 
shareholders' best interest. As investment opportunities decline, it will be in the 
shareholders' interest to have profits paid out as dividends so that they can be 
invested elsewhere. However, managers intent on growth maximisation will tend to 
ignore this alternative and may use free cash flow to finance unprofitable ventures, 
such as value-reducing acquisitions, rather than pay it out to shareholders in either 
dividends or share repurchases. Jensen (1986) argues that cash distributions 
decrease resources under management control and potentially can expose managers 
to capital market monitoring. Managers' desire to reduce their personal undiversified 
risk or increase the scope of their authority may lead them to make investments that 
are not value increasing for shareholders. 
Similar to the argument made by Jensen (1986), Hay and Liu (1998) found 
that profit rates (gross of depreciation and interest payment but net of tax), as a proxy 
for cash flow, and valuation ratio (market valuation) are positively related to the 
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incidence of acquisitions41. The results indicate that a firm with a forecast rise in its 
cash flow is more likely to make an acquisition. In addition, debt/asset ratio is 
negatively related to acquisitions reflecting that debt interest payments absorb cash 
and leave less at the discretion of the management. Thus, the results support 
Jensen's (1986) contention that firm with excess cash which are not needed to pay 
debt interest or dividends are able to make acquisitions. 
Free cash flow theory predicts that many acquirers will tend to perform 
exceptionally well prior to acquisition. In distinguishing between firms that have good 
investment opportunities and those that do not, Lang et al. (1991) develop a measure 
of performance using Tobin's q and their results provide support for the free cash flow 
hypothesis`Z. Firms having a low Tobin's q, which might stand for poor quality of the 
bidding firm's management, are likely to reduce the bidding firm shareholders return 
in a takeover, presumably because the share market expects the poor management 
to be extended to the acquired firm. Part or all of the target's gain may also come 
from a distribution of wealth from the bidder to the target, resulting in a lower return 
for the bidders. In their study of successful acquisitions in US for the period 1968- 
1986, Lang et at. (1991) find that shareholders of poorly managed bidders (low q) 
taking over well-managed targets lose significantly more than well-managed bidders 
(high q) taking over poor-managed targets. The losses made by poor-managed 
bidders suggest that badly managed firms are unlikely to have many opportunities to 
implement value-increasing changes in the well-managed firms' operations. 
" Hay and Liu (1998) focused on the determinants of acquisition behaviour of 110 UK manufacturing 
firms during the period 1971-1989. 
'2 As defined by Tobin and Brainard (1968) and Tobin (1969), the q statistic for a firm is calculated as 
the ratio of the market value of the outstanding financial claims on the firm to the current replacement 
cost of the firm's assets. The assets would be better employed elsewhere unless they are used by a firm 
so as to create at least as much market value as the cost of producing them. Firms with q's greater than 
unity are judged as using scarce resources effectively, and those with q's less than unity as using 
resources poorly. 
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In contrast to the findings by Lang et al. (1991), Philippatos and Baird III 
(1996) provide evidence that better-performing acquiring firms do not appear to have 
made better acquisitions. In examining 71 US acquisitions completed from 1973 
through 1987, Philippatos and Baird (1996) hypothesised that if better-performing 
firms make better acquisitions, then the post acquisition performance of the combined 
firms should be positively correlated to the acquiring firms pre acquisition 
performance". They found that the change in the combined firms' excess value of 
sales (EVS) is negatively correlated to the acquiring firms' pre acquisition 
performance, indicating that better-performing firms made poorer acquisitions, and 
vice versa. The findings in their study suggest either that well-managed acquiring 
firms may undertake acquisitions to maximise management wealth or that they may 
be driven by hubris. Instead of reducing agency problems, acquisitions by better- 
performing acquiring firms may be a manifestation of the agency problem. 
In a recent study, Harford (1999) find evidence that the behaviour of cash-rich 
firms is consistent with the predictions of the free cash flow hypothesis. Using data 
from US corporations for the period 1977 to 1994, Harford (1999) found that the 
likelihood of attempting an acquisition is increasing in the cash-richness of the bidder. 
Firms are identified as cash-rich if their cash reserves (ratio of cash and short-term 
investments to sales) deviate by more than 1.5 standard errors from the cash 
reserves predicted by the cash management model in their sample". The acquisitions 
made by the cash-rich bidders are value decreasing, as evidenced in the negative 
's Post acquisition performance is defined in terms of the change in the combined firms' excess value. 
Excess value is the difference between the market value and the book value of the firm, and the change 
is measured annually from the pre acquisition period through the third year subsequent to acquisition. 
Pre acquisition performance is measured in terms of excess value and profitability and they are 
attributed as indices to the quality of managerial performance. 44 The model used to establish baseline cash holdings includes market-to-book, cash-flow volatility 
(coefficient of variation for operating cash flow), future cash-flows net-of-investment outlays, and a 
recession indicator variable. 
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share price reaction at the announcement date and the subsequent decline in the 
post acquisition operating performance of the combined firm following the bid. 
Managerial motives for acquisitions include maximising firm size and 
diversification and these factors are discussed in the next section. 
3.4.1 Growth Maximisation 
Management self-interests in a bidding firm are likely to include such factors 
as increasing their remuneration level, power, prestige, and advancement within the 
organisation and reducing the risk of losing their jobs. These goals may potentially be 
attained by maximising firm size via acquisitions (Marris, 1963,1964, and Williamson, 
1964). Marris (1964) and Wiiliamson (1964) argue that profit maximisation will be 
sacrificed if growth is made the explicit objective of the firm's management due to the 
benefit it brings (power, large remuneration, prestige etc. ). Shleifer and Vishny (1990) 
advocated that managers may undertake acquisitions of firms for the purpose of 
enabling them to extract higher compensation from their shareholders and increase 
their job security. Shleifer and Vishny (1990) showed how managers have incentive to 
invest the firms' resources in manager-specific investment, making themselves 
valuable to shareholders and costly to replace 45 
Donaldson (1984) implies that managers have incentives to expand their firms 
beyond the size that maximises shareholder wealth. In a detailed study of 12 large 
fortune 500 US firms, Donaldson (1984) concludes that managers of these firms were 
driven by the maximisation of corporate wealth rather than by maximisation of the 
's Managers invest in businesses related to their own background and experience, even when such investments are not value-maximising for the firm. 
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value of the firm". In addition, managers are likely to maximise growth through 
acquisitions since managerial compensation is often based on the rate of firm growth 
in terms of sales and assets (Murphy, 1985). Baumol (1959) postulates that 
managers maximise revenues to a minimum profit requirement, and Marris (1963) 
claimed that managers' goal is to financially sustain the growth of assets. Williamson 
(1986, p. 7) advocated a managerial utility function that featured an 'expense 
preference', that is, management have preference for certain classes of expenditure 
that result in increases in their own personal welfare, in particular, expansion of staff, 
expenditures for emoluments and funds available for discretionary investment. One 
example of such, retention of staff through promotion creates a strong organisational 
bias toward growth in order to supply the new position that such promotion-based 
reward systems require (Baker, 1986, and Donaldson, 1984). As suggested by 
Donaldson (1984), buying a growing firm creates attractive promotion opportunities 
for junior managers who need not have to compete for the limited top positions. Even 
if growth of this sort can retain required managerial talent, acquisitions can be value 
destroying if managers overpay for growing targets just to promote their staff. 
Several studies with contradicting results have been carried out to test the 
growth maximisation hypothesis on conglomerate firms". According to Mueller 
(1969), acquisitions should only occur when there is a synergistic relationship based 
on market power, managerial/technological scale of economies or managerial 
synergy between acquiring and target firms48. He stated that neither of these 
situations is easily accepted or adequately explained the rise in acquisitions between 
46 Corporate wealth is defined by Donaldson as `the aggregate purchasing power available to 
management for strategic purposes during any given planning period... this wealth consists of the 
stocks and flows of cash and cash equivalents that management can use at its discretion to implement decisions involving the control of goods and services' (Donaldson, 1984, p. 3). " Mueller (1969 p. 643) define conglomerates as `mergers between firms in unrelated or indirectly 
related industries'. 
4' Managerial synergy is when the acquiring firm managers posses superior information regarding the 
potentials of the target firms than other investors. 
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unrelated firms if the acquired firm is allowed to operate autonomously, that is, the 
target firm is being operated by the same managers that controlled it prior to 
acquisition. Later, Mueller (1977) surveyed a large number of studies which relied 
mainly on the use of accounting data. He finds no net gains to acquiring firms and 
concludes that growth maximisation rather than shareholder wealth maximisation was 
the motive for conglomerate acquisitions. 
Growth maximisation was also studied by Reid (1968). He analysed 6,174 
mergers consummated by 478 Fortune 500 firms during the period 1951- 961. He 
collected data on measures reflecting the interest of managers (the percentage 
increase in sales, assets, and employees from year to year) and those reflecting the 
interest of shareholders (the relative change in share price, earnings to assets, and 
earnings to sales ratio from year to year). His analysis showed that managerial ratios 
were significantly higher for merger active firms and that shareholders ratios were 
significantly lower. The conglomerate firms were also consistently recording larger 
increases in sales and assets than in the market price of their ordinary shares. The 
merger active firms were, therefore, more growth-oriented and less favourable 
performance than the merger inactive firms. 
Similar to the measurements employed by Reid (1968) in measuring growth 
rates, Weston and Mansinghka (1971) studied 500 firms from the Fortune 500 that 
were involved in 3 or more mergers during the period 1958-1968 and 1960-1968. The 
firms were divided into three groups, conglomerate, industrial, and non-industrial and 
non-manufacturing49. In contrast to Reid's findings, the profitability of the 
conglomerate firms in their study was below average in the late 1950's and had 
49 Weston and Mansinghka (1971, p. 921) used two criteria in selecting companies to be included as 
`conglomerate': 1) the extent to which growth was achieved from external sources, and 2) the degree of 
diversification achieved by external mergers and acquisitions. 
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improved to average levels by 1968. Analysis of these firms showed that arithmetic 
mean growth in total assets, sales, net income, earnings per share, market price was 
higher for the conglomerate firms when they were compared to non-conglomerate 
control samples, demonstrating superior performance with respect to both managerial 
and shareholders interests. Similarly, Weston et at. (1972) found that conglomerate 
firms for the period 1960-1969 were successful in improving returns. They conclude 
that their findings 'support the hypothesis of an economic rationale for well-conceived 
and efficiently-managed conglomerate firms' (Weston, et at., 1972, p. 362). Other 
studies on conglomerates are discussed in the next section. 
The size maximising hypothesis, as referred to by Malatesta (1983), predicts 
that N all bidders behave as size maximisers, acquisition prices will be bid to the point 
where acquisition attempts, on average, are negative net present value investment to 
the bidding firms. There would normally be overall economic losses whereby any 
positive gains obtained by the target firm's shareholders would be more than offset by 
a loss to bidding firm's shareholders. In studying the merging firms in the US for the 
period 1969-1974, Malatesta (1983) found that acquiring firms suffer significant 
negative cumulative abnormal dollar returns during the 5 years leading up to and 
including the approval announcement. He concludes that the evidence conflicts with 
the predictions of the investment and improved-management hypothesis, but 
consistent with the size-maximising hypothesis50. This evidence is also consistent with 
Roll's (1986) hypothesis that acquiring firm managers pay too much in bidding for 
targets (known as 'winner's curse') because they overestimate their own ability to run 
them, possibly due to excessive pride or hubris51. Hubris explains why managers 
S0 According to Malatesta (1983), under the investment hypothesis both bidding and target firms are 
assumed to maximise value. Under improved-management hypothesis, acquiring firms are assumed to be value maximising only if the target firms are assumed to be controlled by inefficient management. 31 Winner's curse is where the company, whose management has the highest expectations of the profit 
potential of the target, wins the bidding, but pays more than its profit potential justifies. Hubris is defined by Roll (1986) as the overbearing presumption that the bidders' valuations are right. 
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make bids even though past experience would suggest that bids represent positive 
valuation errors. 
The size-maximising hypothesis is supported by Firth (1991) who found that 
senior management appears to gain, not only when shareholders gain from take- 
overs, but even if acquisitions result in negative abnormal returns to the acquiring 
firm. The objective of his study is to examine the impact of acquisitions on 
shareholders and senior managers' remuneration and wealth in UK for the period 
1974-1980. By comparing the remuneration of both successful and unsuccessful 
acquiring firms, Firth (1991) found that for both groups remuneration increases 
substantially after the takeover, although the change in remuneration was small for 
the unsuccessful acquiring firm. More than two thirds of the acquiring firms were 
found in his study to suffer negative abnormal returns around the announcement 
date. Firth (1991, p. 427) concludes that 'the acquisition process leads invariably to an 
increase in managerial remuneration, and this appears to be predicted on the 
increased size of the company', consistent with the maximisation of managerial utility. 
Dickerson et at. (1997) studied the impact of acquisitions using a large panel 
of UK quoted companies over the period 1948-1977. They found that acquiring firms 
earn. on average. returns of 2.4% lower than non acquiring firms". In addition, the 
mean annual growth rate for internal and acquisition growth is 8.20% and 1.04%, 
respectively. The results suggest that acquisitions are detrimental to shareholders 
and that Internal growth (through investment) rather than growth by acquisition has a 
more favourable effect on company profitability. Dickerson et al. (1997) conclude that 
profit maximisation in UK has been sacrificed by greater growth through acquisitions. 
' Dickerson ct at. (1997) use rate of return on assets to measure profitability. 
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3.4.2 Diversification 
Another possibility to managerial motives for acquisitions is diversification. 
Several theoretical arguments suggest that diversification has both value-enhancing 
and value-reducing effects to shareholders wealth. Acquisitions to diversify firm 
operations into other product lines or businesses have been justified in the past 
based on their ability to stabilise the firm's cash flow (Amit and Uvnat, 1988). During 
periods of an economy's booms and slumps, firms in different industries experience 
different levels of profitability and cash flows. The result of corporate acquisitions in 
bringing together firms in different industries could stabilise the volatility of the firm's 
income following the combination of statistically independent or negatively correlated 
income streams, thus leading to a reduction in risk. 
If there are market imperfections and firm diversification is of value to the 
shareholders, the performance of conglomerate firms involved in diversified 
acquisition activity should reflect earnings stabilisation. As mentioned in the prior 
section, the study by Weston and Mansinghka (1971) demonstrated that the 
performance for the conglomerate firms were higher compared to non-conglomerate 
control samples, consistent with the successful achievement of defensive 
diversification by conglomerate firms. Firms were diversifying defensively to avoid 
sales and profit instability, adverse growth development, adverse competitive shifts, 
technological obsolescence and increased uncertainty associated with their 
industries. 
However, Levy and Samat (1970,1990) contested the diversification rationale 
in the presence of perfect capital market. They argued that in this environment, such 
risk reduction will not be beneficial to shareholders since they can obtain for 
themselves all of the benefits associated with diversification by diversifying their 
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personal portfolios efficiently. Levy and Samat (1990) document that the improved 
risk-return combination achieved by the acquisition could be achieved by investors 
without the acquisition. They prove that the optimal proportion of investment after the 
acquisition is the same as the proportions which were invested in the individual 
companies prior to acquisition. Under the assumptions of a perfect capital market it is 
assume that there are no transaction or bankruptcy costs, that the borrowing and 
lending rates which investors and firms face are identical, there are no differential tax 
rates, and that all investors have homogenous expectations. Thus, investors may not 
be able to invest the proportions they want in the individual businesses, but are 
restricted to invest directly in shares of the diversifying firm only. Only in an imperfect 
capital market is firm diversification of value to shareholders because it will allow them 
to invest indirectly in securities (via diversification of the firm) which may not otherwise 
be available to them. 
Similarly, Amihud and Lev (1981) supported the view that risk reduction 
through conglomerate merger will not be beneficial to shareholders. They stated that 
conglomerate mergers are managerially motivated because risk reduction through 
diversification is plausible for managers who are striving to decrease their 
'employment risk' (risk of losing their job, professional reputation). Using a sample of 
309 US firms, classified as owner-controlled or manager-controlled, Amihud and Lev 
(1981) found that the manager-controlled firms participated in significantly more 
conglomerate acquisitions than owner-controlled firms during the time period 
analysed'. As managers own more of the share of their own firms they will more 
likely to diversify due to their greater need for personal risk reduction. Thus. Amihud 
and Lev (1981) found that managers' risk reduction actions appear to be the primary 
31 In manager-controlled firms, the managers can exercise their own discretion and free to pursue their 
own preferences since the ownership of the firm is widely dispersed across shareholders. While in 
owner-controlled firms where the ownership is concentrated, shareholders are actively participating in 
the managerial process. 
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motive for the conglomerate types of acquisitions. By contrast, Lewellen et al. (1989) 
found no evidence that managers make acquisitions to reduce firm risk as a means to 
control managers' personal wealth risk. In examining 203 acquisitions during the 
period 1963 to 1984. Lewellen et al. (1989) found that acquisition related changes in 
firm risk, as reflected In changes In the variability of the acquiring firm's share returns, 
Increased subsequent to acquisitions`. They also found the risk reducing acquisitions 
that do occur in their sample were not detrimental on shareholder wealth. 
Denis et al. (1997) examine the value of diversification on 933 US firms 
selected In 1984. They found that the value of the multiple-segment firms is 
significantly negative, and below those of equivalent single-segment firms". In 
contrast to the findings of Amihud and Lev (1981), Denis et at. (1997) observe that 
the level of diversification is negatively related to managerial share ownership. The 
finding is consistent with the predictions of the agency cost hypothesis, that if 
diversification reduces shareholder wealth, there will be a negative relation between 
the level of diversification and managerial share ownership. However. beyond the 50 
percent level of ownership. Denis et al. 's (1997) results are consistent with those of 
Amihud and Lev (1981) that as managerial ownership increases, the level of 
diversification will increase. The latter result is termed as 'diversification-control' 
hypothesis by Hubbard and Palia (1995). Under this hypothesis, managers with low 
level of share ownership obtain perquisite consumption (similar to those mentioned by 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and may indulge in non-value maximising activities. As 
the managerial ownership increases, the managers' Interest become more aligned 
with the shareholder interests, resulting in higher returns to shareholders. At 
sufficiently higher levels of managerial ownership, managers earn the private benefits 
" Acquisition-related changes in firm risk are measured by computing two ratios. The first is ratio of 
the estimated after- and before-acquisition total variance of share return. The second is the ratio of the 
estimated residual variances of share return after acquisition to the estimated residual variances before. "Sixty percent of the fuzes in the study report more than one business segment. 
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of control and may then Increase the level of diversification. In examining 172 
acquisitions between 1985-1991. Hubbard and Palia (1995) find that acquiring firms 
with ownership levels greater than 5% performed diversifying acquisitions, supporting 
the diversification-control hypothesis. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1990) advocate that when poor performance of the firm 
threatens a manager's job, he has an incentive to pursue unrelated diversification at 
which he might be better. Thus, diversification helps make the manager indispensable 
to the firm. As a result, managers may maintain a diversification strategy even if doing 
so reduces shareholder wealth. In a sample of 326 US acquisitions between 1975 
and 1987, Morck et al. (1990) found that the acquiring firms in unrelated acquisitions 
(diversification) experience systematically lower and predominantly negative 
announcement period returns. By contrast, the returns to related acquisitions have 
risen, but not significantly, over the same period. In fact, Morck et at. (1990) 
demonstrated that firms with bad managers do much worse in making conglomerate 
acquisitions than firms with good managersSO. 
Evidence by Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Servaes (1996), 
Denis et at. (1997) and Gregory (1997) document significant value losses associated 
with corporate diversification strategies. In complement to the findings by Bhagat, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1990) and Berger and Ofek (1995), Denis et at. (1997) also find 
that divestitures are common following acquisitions of diversified firms". They find 
that decreases in diversification are associated with pressures from corporate control 
events. That is, the value loss from diversification is positively related to the 
probability of a future takeover of the firm. Approximately 19 percent of the firms with 
" Morck. Shleifer and Vishny (1990) identified bad managers based on two measures, one on past share price performance, and the other on income. r Divestiture is the sale of a segment of a company (assets, a product line, or a subsidiary) to a third 
party for cash and/or securities. 
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decreases in diversification are the targets of an acquisition attempt in the year prior 
to ttio change in focus'. Thus, the agency problem responsible for firms undertaking 
value-reducing diversification can also be reduced by the market for corporate 
control, as posited by Jensen and Ruback (1983). 
Lang and Stutz (1994) document that diversified firms have lower market 
values compared to less diversified firms. Berger and Ofek (1995) provided evidence 
that the value loss for diversified firms during the period 1986-91 was due to over 
investment and cross-subsidisation that allow poor segments to drain resources from 
better performing segments. Studies by Lamont (1997) and Shin and Stulz (1998) 
have also shown strong support for cross-subsidisation of investment between 
different divisions within the same company. In examining how different parts of the 
same firm reacted to the 1986 oil price decline, Lamont (1997) found evidence that 
corporate segments are interdependent and that internal capital markets allocated 
capital within firms. The finding of over investment is consistent with the argument 
made on agency problem by Jensen (1986) and Montgomery (1994) that managers 
in a diversified firm with unused borrowing power and large free cash flow are more 
likely to invest in negative net present value projects. 
However, Morck et al. (1990) found that diversification reduces acquiring 
firms' shareholders wealth in 1980s but not in 1970s. They indicated that one of the 
reasons for the positive returns in 1970s might be the result of imperfect capital 
markets. These internal capital market arguments predict that diversified companies 
make more positive net present value investments than their segments would make 
as separate firms. Ghemawat and Khanna (1998) also suggested a number of 
" In contrast, only 6.6 percent of the firms with an increase in diversification and 8.5 percent of the funs with no change in diversification are acquisition targets. 
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potential benefits of operating different lines of business within one firm. Among them 
are greater operating efficiency by sharing common resources across businesses that 
are closely ralated to each other and potential benefits of internal capital market. 
Internal capital markets play a vital role In allocating capital when external markets 
are Imperfect. Diversified entities create value by operating Internal capital markets 
that circumvent some of the Informational problems (agency costs) associated with 
securing external financing as noted by Alchian (1969) and Williamson (1975). As a 
result of greater and cheaper Information from Internal capital market, firms can 
reallocate resources across projects more efficiently. 
Matsusaka (1993). Hubbard and Palia (1999) and Khanna and Palepu (1999) 
provided evidence that acquiring firms earned positive returns In diversifying 
acquisitions. Hubbard and Palia (1999) attribute the positive abnormal returns earned 
by 392 US diversifying acquisitions In 1960s to the benefits of internal capital market 
In the absence of well developed external capital markets. Hubbard and Palia (1999) 
argued that external capital markets were less developed in terms of company- 
specific information, such as financing and budgeting expertise, in the 1960s relative 
to the current period. As a result of internal capital market, diversified entities may be 
able to improve the financial processes of generating and allocating financial 
resources relative to the alternative of standalone businesses. The importance of 
internal capital markets in diversified firms in India was also suggested by Khanna 
and Palepu (1999)59. 
" However. Khanna and Palepu (1999) did not find evidence that the quadratic dependence of firm 




There is no general or unifying theory on the motives for corporate 
acquisitions and that there may be many motives. However, the two broad theories 
that can be regarded as the main causes of corporate acquisitions are those based 
on managerial motives or shareholder wealth maximisation. Agency problems arise 
because managers and owners (i. e. shareholders) have potentially contradictory 
goals. The shareholder's wealth maximisation theory requires that corporate 
acquisitions lead to an Increase in shareholders' value, that is, maximisation of the net 
present value of future cash flows. This will be reflected in the increased operating 
cash flow, from efficiency gains through operating at economies, adoption of more 
efficient production or organisational technology, increased utilisation of the bidder's 
management team, or an attempt by the bidder to eliminate the target's inefficient 
management. Financial motivations for acquisitions include the use of avoidance of 
bankruptcy costs, increased leverage, and decreasing cost of capital. 
Acquisitions are hypothesised to act as a disciplinary mechanism on the 
management of poorly performing firms. Among studies that provide evidence 
supporting the hypothesis are Palepu (1986), Lang et at. (1991). Kennedy and 
Ummack (1996). and Mikkelson and Partch (1997). Palepu (1986) identify that poor 
share performance prior to the bid increases the probability of targets being taken 
over. Lang et at. (1991). Servaes (1991) and Barber et al. (1995) found that the 
combined firm returns are higher when a firm with good management (higher returns) 
acquire target with bad management (lower returns). However, Holl and Pickering 
(1988). Taffler and Holl (1991) and Philippatos and Baird III (1996) find that acquiring 
firms are not financially stronger than the target firms they are bidding for. and that 
acquisitions do not bring about improved financial performance to the merged firms. 
Clark and Ofek (1994) also provide evidence that acquiring firms are not successful In 
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restructuring distressed targets. Similarly, accounting-based studies In UK by Singh 
(1975), Meeks (1977), and Cowling et al. (1980) show that target companies are 
characterised by small size rather than low profits, Indicating the weakness in 
takeover mechanism In trying to discipline unprofitable firms. Kennedy and Limmack 
(1996) found- a significant increase in CEO turnover after acquisition. By contrast, 
Matsusaka (1993) and Hubbard and Palia (1999) found that acquiring firms that had 
retained target management earned positive abnormal returns after acquisition, 
indicating that disciplinary mechanism Is not the main reason for obtaining post 
acquisition high returns. 
Conversely, managerial theories claim that managers pursue their own goals: 
growth, empire-building, power, prestige, and so on at the expense of their 
companies' shareholders. Another motive that managers pursue is to diversify the risk 
that attaches to their own human capital. Empirical studies by Donaldson (1984) and 
Shleifer and Vishny (1990) have shown that managers may undertake acquisitions of 
firms to extract higher compensation from their shareholders and increase their job 
security. Managers make themselves indispensable by acquiring assets that 
complement their own special skills. Alternatively, Amihud and Lev (1981) 
documented that if managers think they are already over invested in the company 
where their major asset, their human capital, that is their reputation is at risk, thus the 
only way to diversify this risk is to diversify the firm, often detrimental to shareholders. 
Unlike shareholder wealth maximisation theory that requires a takeover to lead to an 
increased in profitability for the combining firms, the more likely criteria according to 
managerial theory are an increase in size and related increases In managers' benefit. 
Contrary to studies by Weston and Mansinghka (1971), and Weston et al. (1972) who 
found that conglomerate firms demonstrated higher performance as compared to 
non-conglomerates, studies by Mueller (1977) and Reid (1968) found that growth 
maximisation rather than shareholder wealth maximisation was the motive for 
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conglomerate firms. Similarly, Malatesta (1983) and Firth (1991) found that acquiring 
firms suffer significant negative returns, consistent with the size-maximising 
hypothesis. Other studies by Berger and Ofek (1995), Servaes (1996), Denis et at. 
(1997), Dickerson et at. (1997) and Gregory (1997) report significant value losses 
associated with corporate diversification strategies. However, Morck et at. (1990), 
Matsusaka (1993), Hubbard and Palia (1999), Khanna and Palepu (1999) provide 
positive returns in diversifying acquisitions. They contributed the positive abnormal 
returns earned by diversifying acquisitions on 1960s and 1970s to internal capital 
market in the absence of well developed capital market. 
An acquisition is said to be in the interest of shareholders if it leads to an 
increase in the wealth for the shareholders of the target firms while bidding 
shareholders do not lose. The next chapter examines the alternative approaches to 
obtaining empirical evidence on this proposition. 
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Chapter 4 
Review of Empirical Analysis on Acquisitions 
- Market-Based Evidence- 
4.1 Chapter Description 
The current chapter centres on a discussion of one of the methods for 
evaluating the impact of corporate acquisitions on shareholder wealth, namely 
market-based studies. The first section of this chapter focuses on market-based 
evidence with special attention drawn to the pre bid performance. This section 
considers potential disciplinary aspects of takeovers. The second section examines 
the post acquisition performance based on share market data to discover whether 
acquisitions lead to wealth creation for the shareholders. The source of shareholder 
wealth creation is in the enhancement of post acquisition performance. 
4.2 Measuring Shareholders Wealth 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the fundamental objective of the business 
corporation is to increase the value of its shareholders' wealth. However, the problem 
faced by researchers is finding a method for evaluating the effect of corporate 
acquisition on shareholder wealth. There are two research approaches normally 
employed in addressing this question. One approach is to employ share price data to 
establish the distribution of gains and losses to shareholders. The other approach is 
to focus on the profitability of companies involved, using accounting and cash flow 
data. Both measures are expected to reflect post acquisition cash flows, thus it might 
be assumed that they would lead to consistent results on assessing the same sample 
of acquisitions. However, previous results on studies which have used both measures 
suggest otherwise. While a review of the literature based on the approach of 
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measuring changes in profitability using accounting data will be discussed in chapter 
5, a review of literature on the approach using security returns is discussed in the 
following sections. 
4.3 Market-Based Evidence 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, if management pursues policies of 
shareholder wealth maximisation, an acquisition might lead to an increase in wealth 
for the shareholders of the bidding firm. However, a well-functioning competitive 
acquisition market should help to ensure that the market value of target firms will be 
bid up to the 'correct' levels, that is, to the point where market values and economic 
values coincide, at which point the acquiring firm obtains no excess rate of return 
(Mandelker, 1974). Therefore, if there does exists a perfectly competitive market for 
corporate control, and if the bidders in that market behave in an economically rational 
manner, it would be expected that, in general, takeover attempts will produce wealth 
gains for the shareholders of the target firms while the bidding firm shareholders will 
neither gain nor lose. 
The common methodology employed to assess the wealth effect of acquisition 
activity is the event study approach that analyses the unexpected/or abnormal share 
price returns of relevant companies around event-specific time periods. In such an 
approach an attempt is made to estimate the difference between actual shareholder 
returns around the bid and the returns that would have been received in the absence 
of the bid. This difference, generally referred to as the abnormal return or prediction 
error, is taken as a measure of wealth creation, that is, the value-enhancing effect of 
the bid. Thus, its validity crucially relies upon two important assumptions: the first on 
stock market efficiency in evaluating the impact of the event, and second, the 
applicability of the selected benchmark from which to identify expected returns. The 
94 
capital market is assumed to be efficient in reflecting publicly available information in 
share prices (Fama, 1970). It is assumed that share prices reflect expected future 
cash flow streams, and that any revisions to these are expected to bring about a 
change in share prices, for example when an acquisition is announced. These 
revisions are assumed to be unbiasedly reflected in share prices. This means that, 
the market makes the 'best' estimate based on the information available around the 
time of the particular event, that is the takeover, to ensure that there should be no 
systematic under or overpricing of the benefits/costs of the combination. Thus, 
assuming an efficient market, examining share price changes of both the acquiring 
and the target firms around the time of the event will summarise the expected long 
term impact of the acquisition upon company performance. That is, a change in share 
prices as a result of acquisition should indicate the market's expectation of the 
economic impact of the acquisition on future cash flows. 
The second assumption underlying market price-based studies is associated 
with the measurement of the 'abnormal' price change. This residual or abnormal 
return (r) for each firm (j) and for each time period @ is the difference between its 
predicted 'normal' price return and its actual return (capital gains plus reinvested 
dividends), written as: 
ýiý = Rit -E (Rid 
where 
rit = abnormal return 
R1t = actual return 
E (RAJ = expected return 
Actual Return = [P+_D- P, -, x 100% 
Pc- l 
where 
Pt = is the security price in month 
Dr = dividends in month t 
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R, is the actual return measured during the event period and E (R1 J is the 
benchmark return expected in the absence of that event. Measuring R requires the 
calculation of share price changes and dividends paid during the event period. In 
order to take account of the influence of marketwide events on the returns of 
individual securities, the expected or 'normal' return may be predicted by a variety of 
models. The assumption is that these models provide unbiased predictor of this 
expected return. The difference between predicted and actual return will be due to 
specific events, both random events and the particular event under examination. 
Given sufficiently large sample sizes the impact of random events are assumed to be 
zero. The remaining unexplained abnormal performance could be attributed to the 
effect of a specific common event, that is, in this case, an acquisition bid. 
The models normally used in measuring the expected returns are: 
(i) Capital Asset Pricing Model 
The model, originally developed by Sharpe (1964), provides a measure of the 
risk of an individual security. It is usually written as: 
R, =R, + Qr (R,,, -R f) 
where 
R, = the expected or ex ante return on the risky asset 
R, = the rate of return on a risk-free asset 
Rm = the expected return on the market portfolio 
, Q, = the systematic risk of the individual asset or firm 
The CAPM argues that the intercept is the risk-free rate, or the rate of return 
on the minimum variance zero-beta portfolio, both of which may change over time. 
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(ii) Market Model 
The 'market model' measures a relationship between an individual share's 
return and the return on the market. This technique, introduced by Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen and Roll (1969) is generated as follows: 
Rtt = a, + 6, R.,, t + Stt 
where 
R, t = rate of return on firm i, period t 
RR, t= rate of return on market index, period t 
, 13, =measures the sensitivity of firm i to the market, 
a, = is a constant 
s = residual return with expected mean of zero 
Rx is the return during t (a day or a month) on company i's share and R is 
the share market index such as the UK's Financial Times All-Share Index, the 
American S&P Index or the Malaysian KLSE Share Index, proxing for the market. 
The model argues that the return on firm i (i. e. Rn) is linearly related to the returns on 
a market portfolio (i. e. R,, t), where a and f are assumed constant over time. The 
parameters a and ß are estimated by running a regression of Rn on Rmt over an 
appropriate estimation period. The estimated parameters are used to calculate 
normal return and the abnormal return to security i for period t is: 
ARtt = Rtt - at - 8, Rmt 
AR will be positive if the acquisition event is expected to create additional 
value for the shareholders of i, otherwise it will be zero if the acquisition is neutral. 
Fama et al. (1969) actually used a logarithm transformation of the model in 
determining when new information (share splits) is anticipated by the share market 
and reflected on average in the prices of the shares: 
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loge Rtt = at + fl, log. R,, t+ Ctt 
The log of the market index relative (log. Rmt) in the above is the rate of return 
on a portfolio of all securities in the market, and the log of the security price relative 
(log, R t) is the rate of return on an individual security. It is the most widely used 
method since the market model takes explicit account of both risk associated with the 
market and mean return. 
(iii) Index Model (Market Adjusted Return) 
This model can be thought of as an approximation to the market model where 
a= 0 and 8=1 for all firms. The predicted return for a firm for a time interval in the 
event period is just the return on the market index R,, for that time interval and does 
not adjust for risk, i. e.: 
Rit = Rmt 
(iv) Mean Adjusted Return Method 
In the mean adjusted return method, average returns are calculated over a 
period not affected by the event period. This period may be before the event period, 
after the event period, or both, but never includes the event period. The predicted 
return is simply the average return for the unaffected period for the firm: 
R, t = R, 
(v) Other Models 
Other models may include adjustment for specific characteristics, for example 
an industry variable and size variable. For instance, Franks et at. (1977) have added 
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an industry variable to the right side of the market model used in their study in order 
for the results in their study of firms in the Breweries and Distilleries sector, in order to 
control for the specific industry effect. 
loge R, = at + fl, logs Rmr + v, logs R,, + -, It 
Other studies that consider size effects as one of the variables include those 
of Franks et al. (1991), Agrawal et al. (1992), Kennedy and Limmack (1996) and 
Gregory (1997). 
The lack of consensus on the most appropriate benchmark control makes it 
difficult to compare results across studies and also introduces an element of 
uncertainty about the validity of this approach. Potential areas of sample and control 
benchmark bias, include survivorship and the aggregation of non-normal returns 
distribution (Barber and Lyons, 1997 and Kothari and Warner, 1997). 
One additional problem that is not easily resolved in measuring shareholders 
wealth is identifying the base date from which to measure the effect of an acquisition 
on shareholder returns, i. e. the event 'window'. The base date should be the latest 
share price recording prior to any discounting of the impact of takeover. Jensen and 
Ruback (1983) argue that one of the measurements relates to the identification of the 
timing of acquisition news. It would be relatively easy to measure the impact if all of 
the relevant information regarding an acquisition were to become public on the 
announcement date. The market could be assumed to adjust fully to the new 
information on that day, thus the announcement date can be used to define the event 
window. However, news of a potential acquisition is known to leak much earlier than 
the official announcement date. Thus, the expected wealth effects to the shareholders 
of target and bidding firms will be reflected by changes in the share prices of the 
respective firms around the announcement date only if it is assumed that investors do 
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not anticipate the event prior to the announcement period. Most studies have 
analysed abnormal returns from the time of the first public announcement of an 
acquisition but there are studies that have also used the completion date of an 
acquisition as the event date. For instance, Langetieg (1978) use the effective date of 
acquisition, that is, the date of final approval of the acquisition, as the event date, thus 
ignoring any prior share market response. Dodd and Ruback (1977), Schipper and 
Thompson (1983), Malatesta (1983), and et al. (1988) use the first public 
announcement of the acquisition as the event date, ignoring any leakage of 
information before that date. Dodd (1980) look at the period from the announcement 
date until the shareholders' vote, thus does not capture the entire market reaction. 
Asquith (1983) examines possible changes in value of the shareholders wealth from 
the press date (the date when the financial press first reports an acquisition bid) until 
the outcome date (the date the financial press reports the conclusion of an acquisition 
bid). Asquith argues that other studies examine partially anticipated events. 
Similarly, Jayaraman et al. (1991) argue that if the event is partially 
anticipated, the abnormal returns around the outcome announcement period measure 
only the effect of the resolution of the uncertainty regarding the exact timing of the 
announcement, the amount offered, the identity of the acquiring firm, and the number 
of bidders involved in the offer. Thus, when an event is partially anticipated, 
hypothesis about the economic impact of the acquisition may not be tested reliably by 
examining the announcement date alone. There are also others who might argue that 
the success or failure of an acquisition can only be judged in the period after the 
transaction. Analysis of security returns over longer periods after bid completion 
suggests a lack of confidence in the efficiency of the market reaction around the time 
of the bid (Ruback, 1988). It also raises questions about the suitability of share 
market-based measures of performance. Empirical work on both the pre and post will 
be discussed in the following sections. 
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4.4 Pre Bid and Bid Period Performance 
An overview of previous empirical work of pre bid and bid period acquisition 
performance on 'event' studies is summarised in Table 4.1 parts (a), (b) and (c). 
Table 4.1 (a) 
Pre bid and bid period performance from acquisitions reported `event' studies 
in US 
Author, Years Model Used and Summary of Results On Successful 
Covered and Country Sample Size Acquisitions 
Examined 
Dodd and Ruback Capital Asset Pricing Acquiring firms experience significantly 
(1977) Model (CAPM) positive returns of 2.83% in the month of 
1958 -1978 uses monthly data announcement. 
386 successful and Acquired firms obtain significant positive 
US unsuccessful tender returns of 20.6% in the same period 
offers 
Langetieg (1978) Market Model & Acquiring firms experience insignificant 
1929 - 62 Industry Index losses of -1.61 % over the time interval (-6, - 
uses monthly data 1) months before the acquisition. 
US 149 mergers Acquired firms experience significantly 
positive gains of 10.7% over the same 
period. 
Dodd (1980) Market Model Acquiring firms experience small, but 
1970 - 77 significant negative abnormal returns of - 
uses daily data 1.09% at the date of announcement, and - US 7.22% from 10 days before the first 
151 successful and announcement through 10 days after 
unsuccessful approval date. 
mergers Acquired firms obtained abnormal returns of 
13.41% at the date of announcement and 
33.96% from 10 days before the first 
announcement through 10 days after 
approval date. 
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Author, Years Model Used and Summary of Results On Successful 
Covered and Country Sample Size Acquisitions 
Examined 
Asquith (1983) Control Portfolios Acquiring firms experience no share price 
1962 - 76 (similar to Market- change while acquired firms obtained 
Adjusted Returns) significantly positive returns of 15.5% from 
US uses daily data announcement date to outcome date. 
407 successful and 
178 unsuccessful 
mergers 
Malatesta (1983) CAPM Acquiring firms earn negative average 
1969 - 74 uses monthly data dollar return of -27.65 million dollars while 
256 Acquiring and 85 acquired firms earn positive dollar returns of 
US acquired successful 19.67 million dollars over the interval -4 to 0 
mergers measured from the first announcement 
date. 
Eckbo (1983) Market Model Acquiring firms experience insignificant 
1963 - 78 uses daily data gains of 1.58% twenty days before through 
ten days after the public announcement. 
US 102 acquiring and 57 Acquired firms obtain significant positive 
acquired mergers returns of 14.08% over the same period. 
Asquith, Bruner and Control Portfolios Acquiring and acquired firms gain 
Mullins (1983) (similar to market significantly 3.48% and 20.5%, respectively, 
1963 - 79 adjusted returns) twenty days before the announcement days 
uses daily data leading to the announcement day. 
US 156 mergers 
Schipper and Market Model Acquiring firms experience positive 
Thompson (1983) uses monthly data abnormal returns of about 13% in the 
1960 - 67 55 acquisition twelve months up to and including the 
US programs acquisition program. 
Dennis and Simple Market Index Acquiring and acquired firms obtain 
McConnell (1986) (or Market-Adjusted statistically significant gains around the 
1962 - 80 Returns) date of acquisition announcement. 
Use daily data 
US - 132 mergers 
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Author, Years Model Used and Summary of Results On Successful 
Covered and Country Sample Size Acquisitions 
Examined 
Bradley, Desai and Market Model Acquiring firms experience insignificant 
Kim (1988) positive returns of 0.79% from five trading 
1963 - 84 Uses daily data days before the announcement of the first 
offer made through five trading days after 
US 236 successful the announcement of the ultimately 
tender offers successful bid. 
Acquired firms obtain significantly positive 
return of 28.07% over the corresponding 
period 
Magenheim and Market Model Acquiring firms earn significant positive 
Mueller (1988) returns of 18.4% over the time interval of (- 
1976 - 81 Uses monthly data 24, -4) months preceding the event. 
US 
78 merger firms 
Jarrell and Paulsen Market Model Acquiring firms earn significant positive 
(1989) returns of 1.29% from 20 days before to 10 
1963 -1986 Uses daily data days after the bid. 
Acquired firms obtain significant positive 
US 450 tender offers returns of 28.99% over the same period. 
Lahey and Conn Market Model Acquiring firms earn significant negative 
(1990) Mean Adjusted returns of -4.5% (market model) and -3.11 % 
1960 -1979 Model (mean adjusted return) by the month of 
Uses monthly data completion. 
US 
91 acquisitions 
Hubbard and Palia Market Model Acquiring firms earn significant cumulative 
(1995) Uses daily data abnormal returns of -0.45% from 4 days 
1985-1991 before the announcement of the acquisition 
US 354 mergers to 4 days after the announcement date [-4, 
+4]. 
Harford Market Model Acquiring firms earn significant cumulative 
(1995) Uses daily data abnormal returns of -0.6% for days -5 to +1 
relative to the announcement date. 




Covered and Country 
Examined 
Model Used and 
Sample Size 
Summary of Results On Successful 
Acquisitions 
Hubbard and Palia Value-weighted Acquiring firms in related acquisitions earn 
(1999) Market Index significant positive returns of 1.625 for days 
-5 before the announcement date to 5 days 1961 -1970 Uses daily data after the announcement date. 
US 392 Acquiring firms 
Table 4.1 (b) 
Pre bid and bid period performance from acquisitions reported `event' studies 
in UK 
Author, Years Model Used and Summary of Results On Successful 
Covered and Country Sample Size Acquisitions 
Examined 
Franks, Broyles and Two factor Model Acquired firms experience positive 
Hecht (1977) with the addition of abnormal returns averaging 26% over the 
1955 - 72 an industry index time interval of (-4, +1) months. 
UK Uses monthly data Acquiring firms obtain small positive 
abnormal returns during the same period. 
70 takeovers in 
Breweries and 
Distilleries sector 
Firth (1979) Market Model Acquiring firms experience significant 
1972 - 74 negative returns of -1.4% (offering cash 
Using monthly data consideration) and gain of 2.8% (equity 
UK consideration) on the announcement of the 
224 successful bids takeover. 
Acquired firms experience positive gains of 
around 32.9% over the twelve month period 
up to and including the bid announcement 
month. 
Firth (1980) Market Model Acquiring firms experience significant 
1969 - 75 Using monthly data negative abnormal returns of -0.30% during 
the interval (-12, -2) month, and -6.3% in UK 486 Acquiring firms month 0. 
563 Acquired firms Acquired firms experience significant 
abnormal gains of 21.0% over the period (- 
12, -2) month, and 28.1 % in the month 0. 
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Author, Years Model Used and Summary of Results On Successful 
Covered and Country Sample Size Acquisitions 
Examined 
Barnes (1984) Market Model Acquiring firms earn insignificant loss of - 
June 1974 - 0.73% in the month of announcement. 
February 1976 Uses monthly data 
UK 39 takeovers 
Dodds and Quek Market Model Acquiring firms earn insignificant negative 
(1985) returns of -0.02% in month of 
1974 -1976 monthly data announcement. 
UK 70 takeovers 
Franks and Harris Simple Market Index Acquiring firms obtain significant gains of 
(1989) (or Market Adjusted 2.4% (value-weighted basis) and 7.9% 
Returns) (equal-weighted basis) over the six-month 
1955 - 85 period (-4, +1). 
Uses monthly data Acquired firms experience significant 
UK positive total abnormal returns of about 
1,800 takeovers 25.8% (value weighting) and 29.7% (equal 
weighting) over the same period. 
Limmack (1991) Market-Adjusted Acquiring firms experience insignificant 
Return (or Index abnormal losses of -0.20% over the period 1977. - 86 Model), Market from bid month to bid outcome using 
Model, and Adjusted Adjusted Beta Model. 
UK Beta Model Acquired firms obtain an average return of 
over 30% whether measured on an equally 
Using daily and weighted or a value weighted basis over the 




Kennedy and Market Adjusted Acquiring firms experience significant gains 
Limmack (1996) Index of 4.42% and 14.77% over the interval [-60, 
-49] and [-24, -13] prior to the bid month, 1980 - 89 Uses monthly data respectively. 
Acquired firms experience significant UK 247 Acquiring negative returns of -2.80% and -6.93% 345 Acquired over the same period prior to the bid month. 
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Author, Years Model Used and Summary of Results On Successful 
Covered and Country Sample Size Acquisitions 
Examined 
Sudarsanam, Holl Market Model Acquiring firms obtain insignificant gains of 
and Salami (1996) 0.55% over the interval (-20, -1) days, but 
Uses daily data suffer a significant loss of -1.26% on 
1980 -1990 announcement day (day 0). 
429 completed Acquired firms experience significant gains 
UK acquisitions of 9.98%, and 13.96% respectively over the 
same period. 
Holl and Kyriazis Market Model Acquiring firms broke even over the period 
(1997) 2 months prior to the bid, significant loss of 
Uses daily data 1.7% for the bid month and for each of the 
1979-1989 following 2 months. 
178 takeovers Acquired firms earn 3.1% in the month prior 
UK to the bid and 21.6% during the bid month. 
Baker and Limmack Market adjusted Acquiring firms earn significant positive 
(1999) (Index) Model returns in the pre bid periods (-24 to -13 
Size-adjusted returns and -12 to -1) regardless of the control 
1977-1989 Market Model model used. However, the results vary 
slightly across models during the bid month 
UK Uses monthly data with 1 model reporting significant positive 
returns, another showing significant 
601 acquisitions negative returns and the remaining models 
reporting insignificant returns. 
Table 4.1 (c) 
Pre bid and bid period performance from acquisitions reported `event' studies 
in Malaysia 
Author, Years 
Covered and Country 
Examined 
Model Used and 
Sample Size 
Summary of Results On Successful 
Acquisitions 
Mat Nor, Fauzias Market Model Acquiring firms obtain a significant positive 
(1993) abnormal return of 10.39% over the interval 
Uses daily data [-180,0] days, and significant negative 
Jan 1977-Dec 1989 returns of -7.71% during the period [+1, 293 quoted acquiring +200] days after the announcement date Malaysia 
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Author, Years 
Covered and Country 
Examined 
Model Used and 
Sample Size 
Summary of Results On Successful 
Acquisitions 
Mohammad, Hayati Market Model Acquiring firms earn insignificant positive 
(1993) returns of 12.39% during the period [-60, -2] 
Uses daily data days prior to announcement. The 
1980 -1990 cumulative abnormal return decline from 
47 quoted acquiring day -6 to day +58 after the announcement Malaysia 6 quoted targets date. 
Acquired firms earn insignificant positive 
returns of 9.11% over the interval [-60, -2] 
days before the announcement date and 
insignificant negative returns on day 0. The 
cumulative abnormal returns insignificantly 
decline from announcement date to day +60 
after announcement date. 
Md Isa, Mansor Market Model Acquiring firms experience significant gain 
(1994) of 6.31% during the period [-50, -1] days 
Uses daily data and significant loss of -3.82% over the 
1984-1989 period [+1, +50] after the announcement 
119 quoted acquiring date. 
Malaysia 38 quoted targets 
Target firms earn significant gains of 
10.88% during the interval [-50, -1] days 
and insignificant gain of 0.17% over the 
period [+1, +50] days after the 
announcement date. 
In measuring the pre acquisition performance to shareholders, two specific 
periods are of particular importance: period prior to acquisitions (the pre bid period) 
and the bid period. 
4.4.1 Pre Bid Period 
Excess returns during the period prior to announcement has been measured 
over periods as far as five years before acquisition to identify whether bids are made 
by companies with good performance for companies with poor performance. 
Empirical work has suggested that acquiring firms may have positive share price 
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performance but the acquired firms may suffer poor returns in this period, indicating 
that acquisitions are undertaken by the more efficient companies. This evidence 
supports the view that the takeover mechanism (as discussed in the previous 
chapter) acts as a disciplinary mechanism on inefficiently performing companies and 
that acquiring companies undertake acquisitions after an extended period of superior 
performance. It is thus consistent with the hypothesis that takeovers involve a 
redeployment of capital to the more profitable firms. Examples of US studies which 
have supported this view include those by Langetieg (1978), Asquith (1983) and 
Schipper and Thompson (1983). Langetieg (1978) reports that target firms have 
significantly negative returns over the time interval (-72, -19) months while the returns 
to the acquiring firms are found to be significantly positive over the same period. The 
pre acquisition positive abnormal performance by the acquiring firm was suggested 
by Langetieg (1978) as a desire for firms to expand through acquisitions. However, 
Langetieg (1978) does not attribute the negative returns of target firms as an 
indication of an inefficient management in the acquired firm since a non-acquisition 
control firm also earns negative returns over the same time interval. Asquith (1983) 
shows that target firm's residuals decline on average while bidding firm's residuals 
increase on average prior to the announcement date for the period (-480, -20) days, 
consistent with the idea that acquisitions transfer resources from inefficient to efficient 
firms. 
Malatesta (1983), on the other hand, does not support the hypothesis that 
takeovers act as a mechanism for efficient resource allocation. The cumulative 
average abnormal dollar return over the 61 months ending with the announcement is 
-111.17 million dollars for the acquiring firms and -9.42 million dollars for the target 
firms. He concludes that his results tend to support the size-maximising hypothesis 
since the acquiring firms earn negative returns several years prior to acquisition. 
108 
Concentrating on conglomerate acquirers engaging in a series of acquisitions 
during the late 1950s and 1960s, Schipper and Thompson (1983) find that firms 
announcing acquisition programs experience positive abnormal returns beginning 
about 30 months before the announcements of the program with the last 12 months 
the most significant. The cumulative average residual from month -24 through to the 
announcement of an acquisition program is over 20%, where 21 of the 30 firms 
represented in the event time analysis had positive returns during this period. Similar 
to the suggestions made by Langetieg (1978), the positive abnormal performance of 
the acquiring firms prior to announcements might have given a firm the desire to 
expand. In examining a sample of 78 US acquiring firms for the period 1976 to 1981, 
Magenheim and Mueller (1988) find significant positive gains being earned in the two 
years prior to the announcement month. Over the time interval of [-24, -4] months 
preceding the event, acquiring firms earn significant positive returns of 18.4% in 
excess of the expected returns based on their performance over the period [-60, -25] 
months. The result obtained is consistent with other studies which indicate that 
managers of acquiring firms may undertake acquisition when their own firm is doing 
relatively well. 
In the UK, Kennedy and Limmack (1996) provide evidence that target 
companies earn significant negative returns in years two (-24, -13) and years five (- 
60, -49) prior to the bid. Acquiring firms obtained significant positive excess returns 
for the whole period commencing 60 months before the bid month, consistent with the 
hypothesis that companies undertake acquisitions during period of relatively good 
performance and that the takeover acts as a disciplinary mechanism on inefficiently 
performing targets. The latter result contrasts with those by Firth (1979,1980) and 
Franks et al. (1977) who find no significant abnormal security price behaviour 
associated with the acquiring firms prior to the bid announcement. Firth (1979) also 
shows that 58% of acquired firms earn slightly negative returns of -1.5% in the 36- 
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month period ending 12 months before the bid while Franks et al. (1977) report that 
targets earn negative returns of -10.0% relative to the industry index between months 
-40 and -15 from the announcement date. The results are consistent with the view 
that -acquired firms had poor performance prior to acquisition. However, the latter 
results contrast with that of Firth (1980) who finds no evidence that acquired firms 
being those that have suffered significantly poor performance in the four years prior to 
the bid. 
Franks and Harris (1989) investigate shareholder wealth effects of UK 
takeovers in the period 1955-1985. Although they did not report their pre bid results, 
Franks and Harris (1989) commented on the pre bid market model alpha values used 
in their study. Over the 60-month period beginning at t= -71 prior to the bid, the 
average bidder alpha is approximately 0.95 per month which indicates that bidding 
firms had good performance prior to acquisition. In examining the distribution of 
returns to shareholders of UK companies during the period 1977-1986, Limmack 
(1991) also found significant positive returns to bidders in the months prior to the 
formal announcement of the bid. The mean alpha values for all bidder companies in 
the sample was found to be 0.6. The positive pre bid abnormal return to bidders 
support the hypothesis that companies undertake acquisitions during period of good 
performance. 
4.4.2 Bid Period 
The bid period is examined to identify how the share market responds to an 
acquisition in progress. It also provides an insight into the share market's ability to 
react efficiently to changes in probability. As mentioned earlier, the expected wealth 
effects to the shareholders of target and acquiring firms will be reflected in the share 
prices of the respective firms at the announcement date if the outcome of the 
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acquisition bid is known at the time of the announcement. According to Asquith 
(1983) the change at the announcement date only contains an evaluation of the 
probability of the acquisition if the outcome is uncertain. As new information becomes 
available, subsequent changes in returns will occur between the announcement date 
and outcome date. The size and direction of these changes reflect how much 
uncertainty is present at the announcement date assess whether the share market's 
initial assessment of takeovers has been evaluated correctly. The following section 
will provide a review of the literature that investigates the behaviour of share prices 
around the announcement and outcome dates. 
In examining the share market reaction to US tender offers, Dodd and 
Ruback (1977) indicate that in the month of announcement target firms earn large 
and significant returns of 20.58% while acquiring firms achieve gains of 2.83%. The 
results indicate that acquisitions are wealth enhancing to the shareholders, although it 
appears that the gains predominantly accrue to the targets and not the bidders. Dodd 
(1980) also reports that any gains from acquisitions accrue to shareholders of the 
target firms and not to those of the acquiring firms. He reports that over the period of 
10 days before the first announcement through 10 days after approval by target firms, 
the average cumulative abnormal returns are 33.96% and -7.22% for target and 
acquiring firms respectively. In examining the effect of acquisition bid on share returns 
during the period 1962-76, Asquith (1983) found that during the period starting with 
first announcement date and continuing through the outcome date, acquiring firms 
experience negative abnormal returns while acquired firms obtained significantly 
positive returns of 15.5%60. On the announcement date, target firms had earned 
significant excess return of 6.2% while acquiring firms showed no reaction. The 
60 Interim period used in Asquith's (1983) study is defined as the period from one day after the 
announcement day until two days before the outcome day. 
III 
results obtained by Asquith (1983) indicate that market reaction to an acquisition 
occur not only at the announcement date but throughout the period from the 
announcement date to the outcome date as new information is released. The positive 
excess returns that accrue to target firms at the announcement date are reinforced 
after that date. The results are similar to those reported by Dodd and Ruback (1977) 
and Dodd (1980), with most of the gains accruing to the targets, suggesting that the 
bidding market is competitive. 
Concentrating on firms engaging in a series of acquisitions during the period 
1950-60, Schipper and Thompson (1983) hypothesise that if acquisition program is 
expected, ex ante, to provide net shareholder benefits, the present value of individual 
acquisition events should be reflected, i. e. capitalised, as soon as the entire program 
is announced or anticipated. They find that acquiring firms had positive average 
abnormal returns of about 13% in the twelve months up to and including the event 
month 0, where month 0 is the announcement of an acquisition program. The result 
supports the hypothesis that acquisition attempts made by frequent acquirers is 
profitable and that investors partially anticipate these attempts. Malatesta and 
Thompson (1986) also provide evidence that acquisition attempts made by a sample 
of frequent acquirers are partially anticipated, and are profitable investment projects 
on average. 
In measuring the wealth effect of successful acquisitions for 256 acquiring and 
85 acquired companies during the period 1969-74, Malatesta (1983) reports that 
acquiring firms earn significant negative abnormal dollar return of approximately - 
27.65 million dollars and acquired firms earn positive returns of approximately 19.67 
million dollars over the 5 months prior to and including the approval announcement [- 
4,01. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that acquisition per se increases 
acquired firms shareholders wealth but it is a negative net present value project for 
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acquiring firms. In contrast, Dennis and McConnell (1986) report that from day -6 
through day +6 of the announcement date acquiring and acquired firms obtain 
significant gains of 3.24% and 13.74%, respectively, indicating that acquisitions are 
on average value-enhancing activities for both groups of shareholders. The 
cumulative average return for the portfolio of all bids (single-bidder and multiple- 
biddcr) in the study by Bradley et at. (1988) showed that acquiring firms and target 
firms obtaining insignificant abnormal returns of 0.79% and 28.07% (significant), 
respectively, during the event period (-5, +5) where event day 0 is the day of the 
announcement of the acquisition. The latter study also provides evidence that 
competition among acquiring firms increases the returns to targets and decreases the 
returns to bidders. Bradley et al. (1988) note that successful acquisitions on average 
increase the combined value of the target and acquiring firms by 7.4%. Jarrell and 
Poulsen (1989) show that shareholders of bidders and targets received an average 
premium of 1.29% and 28.99%, respectively, measured from 20 days before to 10 
days after the bid announcement, consistent with value-maximisation by shareholders 
of target and bidders. 
Lahey and Conn (1990) find negative returns to shareholders of 91 acquiring 
firms engaged in major US acquisitions during 1960-79 regardless of the models 
used to generate returns. In the month of announcement, returns to acquiring firms 
are -2.5% (market model) and -0.5% (mean adjusted model), neither being 
significantly different from zero. Further, the acquiring firms earn significant negative 
returns of -4.5% (market model) and -3.11% (mean adjusted model) by the month of 
consummation. Hubbard and Palia (1995) also document non-positive abnormal 
returns for bidders. Over the nine-day period [-4, +4] relative to the bid 
announcement, Hubbard and Palia (1995) found that acquiring firms earn significant 
negative return of -0.45%, indicating that acquisitions are detrimental to acquiring 
firm shareholders. Harford (1999) also found that abnormal share price reaction bid 
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announcements by bidders is negative. Using market model on data for US 
corporations for the period 1977 to 1994, Harford (1999) report significant negative 
return of -0.6% for days -5 to +1 relative to the announcement date. 
In a later study by Hubbard and Palia (1999) based on a sample of 392 
diversifying acquirers during the period 1961 to 1970, they found evidence that 
conglomerate acquisition in the 1960s are wealth increasing to shareholders. Four 
measures were used in determining the abnormal returns to the acquiring firms and 
two of the measures show statistically significant abnormal returns". The acquiring 
firms earn significant positive returns of 8.06% (dollar return model) and 0.03% 
(investment return model) around the announcement date 82. 
The above bid results are fairly consistent for the shareholders of target firms 
who obtain large positive gains. The evidence on the returns to the acquiring firms is, 
however, mixed. For example Malatesta (1983) and Bradley et al. (1988) showed that 
acquiring firms obtain insignificant gains. Dodd and Ruback (1977), Dennis and 
McConnell (1986), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) and Hubbard and Palia (1999) report 
significant gains while Dodd (1980), Asquith (1983), Hubbard and Palia (1995) and 
Harford (1999) show negative returns to acquiring firms. While there are numerous 
explanations for the differences in results to the acquiring firms, one possibility stems 
in part from the different benchmark controls that individual studies have used. For 
instance, Malatesta (1983) investigated the difference in abnormal returns that arise 
using different models. He used the market model, similar to Dodd and Ruback 
61 The four measures of abnormal returns used in the study by Hubbard and Palia (1999) are the value- 
weighted market index, "percentage returns until date of last revision", "dollar return" and investment 
return". Cumulative abnormal returns using CRSP value-weighted market index are measured over the 
period [-5, +5] after the announcement date while "percentage returns" is the cumulative abnormal 
returns from 5 days before announcement date to 5 days after the date of last revision. 62 The dollar abnormal return is computed 5 days before to 5 days after announcement date, while 
"investment return" is measured as the change in bidder's equity value from 5 days before to 5 days 
after the date of the last bid deflated by the dollar acquisition price. 
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(1977), and Dodd (1980), but differing from Asquith (1983) and Langetieg (1978). 
Malatesta interpreted the estimated intercept a as a component of normal returns, 
whereas Langetieg (1978) interpreted it as a component of abnormal returns. 
Langetieg (1978) employs an index of industry returns and an index of market returns 
as explanatory variables in the forecasting model for normal returns in his study. 
Asquith (1983) studied daily returns and measured a firm's excess return relative to 
the return on a control group's performance which had approximately the same ß as 
the firm'. Malatesta found that the discrepancy between his results and those of 
Asquith (1983) and Langetieg (1978), may derive from the difference in the 
measurement of abnormal returns, specifically from the estimated intercept a 
generated from the regressions model used. Halpern (1983, p. 303) noted that 'the 
choice as to which model should be used to estimate abnormal returns is unresolved 
since it depends upon which return generating process is the appropriate description 
of reality'. 
Asquith et al. (1983) suggested that another measurement difficulties may 
arise in the methodology adopted for calculating abnormal returns if the relative size 
of two merging firms is unrelated`. If the investment in the target is small relative to 
the total value of the acquiring firm, the increase in value from the acquisition may not 
cause much change in the acquirer's share price. In their study, Asquith et al. (1983) 
reports that shareholders of acquiring firms benefit from acquisitions and suggest that 
the inconclusive findings of the earlier studies may be due to methodological 
63 All securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange and American are grouped into ten equal 
control portfolios ranked according to their betas. The observed return to the control portfolio which 
has approximately the same beta as the firms that have taken acquisition is then used as the estimate of 
the expected rate of return on asset. 
" An example given by Asquith et al. (1983) is that assuming an acquiring firm with net present value 
equal to 10% of the target firm's equity value. If both the acquiring target firms are equal in size, the 
acquiring firm should earn 10% abnormal return from acquisition. However, only 0.5% abnormal 
return would be observed if the bidder is twenty times the target size. In fact, relative large bidders' 
gains may appear statistically insignificant in this case. 
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deficiencies. Similarly, Morck et al. (1990) suggested that the return measure should 
be independent of the equity value of the acquiring firm. 
In addition to the above measurement bias a number of studies have reported 
different returns to bidders as a consequence of acquiring relatively large targets. 
Asquith et al. (1983) found that when the target firm's equity is larger than 10% of the 
bidding firm's equity, excess return to bidders is significantly positive 4.1%. However, 
when the target firm is smaller than 10%, the cumulative excess return is 1.7%. The 
resuit strengthens the view that the cumulative excess returns are significantly greater 
when the bidding firm is smaller in size than the target firm. Jarrell and Poulsen 
(1989) also provide evidence that gains to acquiring firm increase as target size 
increases relative to the size of the acquiring firm. During the period [-10, +20] of 
announcement, they find that the estimated return to bidders increases by 1.32% if 
the target firm is twice as large in size as the bidder. 
Other factors that might contribute to the conflicting findings on wealth effects 
to acquiring firm shareholders include the method of bid financing, and whether there 
are competing bidders for a target. Similar to the results found by Asquith et al. 
(1983), the returns to the acquiring firms in Jarrell and Poulsen's (1989) study are 
also significantly lower when the takeovers are financed with new equity issues than 
for offers financed with cash. The acquiring firms in Bradley et al. 's (1988) study, 
before changes in the financial and regulatory environment of the Williams 
Amendment in 1968, show a significant positive returns of 3.5% during the period 5 
days before announcement through 5 days after the announcement of successful 
bid65. During the period following the introduction of the amendment (1968-1980), 
6s Before the introduction of the Williams Amendment Act, cash tender offers were free of government 
regulation. With the introduction of the amendment in 1968, cash tender offers were brought under the Security Commissions which require bidding firms to provide information about how the acquisition 
will be financed. 
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they found that acquiring firms suffered significant losses of -2.5%, using the same 
event window [-5, +5]. Similarly, Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) found that cumulative 
average returns of acquiring firms are 2.2% lower in the 1970s and 4.4% lower in the 
1980s than in the 1960s, using the period of days [-10, +20] relative to the 
announcement date. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) also provide evidence that 
competition between alternative bidders will result in smaller returns going to the 
bidder and a larger share of the gains kept by the target. In addition, studies by 
Schipper and Thompson (1983), Asquith et al. (1983), Malatesta and Thompson 
(1986) and Bradley et al. (1988) show that acquisitions made by a sample of frequent 
acquirers might also contribute to the conflicting findings on wealth effects to 
acquiring firm shareholders. 
Different results may also be obtained from studies that deal with specific 
types of acquisitions, such as tender offers or mergers. Dodd and Ruback (1977), 
Bradley et al. (1988), and Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) are among those that study 
tender offers, while Asquith et al. (1983), Malatesta (1983), and Dennis and 
McConnell (1986) study mergers. The studies provide evidence that gains to 
acquiring firms during the bid period on average are lower in mergers than in tender 
offers. The above result is consistent with that of previous studies summarises by 
Jensen (1984) that on average acquiring firms earn 4% and 0% from tender offers 
and mergers, respectively. In addition, Morck et al. (1988) and Hubbard and Palia 
(1995) also find that the levels of managerial ownership affect the returns to the 
acquiring firms. They find that with increases in the managerial ownership stake, 
managers' interests are more compatible with those of the shareholders, resulting in 
the managers' consuming a lower level of perquisites and reporting larger returns to 
shareholders. However, the managers enjoy private benefits of control at sufficiently 
high levels of managerial ownership that they are unwilling to sell their stake in their 
financial market. Further, these benefits of control are increasing in the managerial 
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ownership stake that may lead managers to overpay in an acquisition, resulting in 
lower returns to shareholders. 
The UK experience has been similar in that the target shareholders are the 
overwhelming winners, whereas the bidder shareholders either lose or achieve no 
significant gains during bid period. Franks et al. (1977) provide evidence on the 
wealth of shareholders in the UK Breweries and Distilleries sector for the period 1955- 
72. Acquired firms experience positive abnormal returns of 26% over the time interval 
of [-4, +1] months based on the announcement date. The result suggests that 
anticipation of acquisition begins at least 3 months prior to announcement. Over the 
same period acquiring firms earn small positive returns which is sustained at least for 
the first five months after the announcement date. In contrast, Firth (1980) found 
evidence that there was no gain-no loss with regard to acquisitions in UK, with the 
gains to the target firms being offset by the losses suffered by bidders. He reported 
that acquired firms experience significant abnormal gains of 21.0% over the period [- 
12, -2] month, and 28.1% in the month 0, where month 0 is the month of 
announcement. Acquiring firms experience significant negative returns of -0.30% 
during the interval [-12, -2] month, -6.3% in the month of announcement, and overall 
negative returns of -9.1% for the period [-4, +1]. 
Barnes (1984) examined a small sample of 39 UK acquiring firms between 
June 1974 and February 1976 and conclude that gains are not realised by the 
acquiring firms. He documents that acquiring firms earn insignificant share price gains 
initially followed by substantial decreases in the share prices where the returns had 
fallen to a minimum -11.25% by month 25 subsequent to the announcements. As a 
result of later information and the outcome of the acquisition, investors tend to revise 
their expectations, leading to a decline in share prices subsequent to the acquisition. 
In examining 70 public companies during the period 1974-76, Dodds and Quek 
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(1985) also found negative adjusted returns for acquiring firm following the 
announcement of the bid. They find that acquiring firms earn insignificant negative 
returns of -0.02% in the month of announcement (month 0). Positive returns were 
however observed from month four until month 25 after announcement, a result which 
is consistent with the findings of Franks et al. (1977) but in conflict with those of Firth 
(1980) and Barnes (1984). Dodd and Quek (1985) conclude that the result is 
inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis in that the market is slow in adjusting 
to newly available information. 'The residuals did not seem to settle down to their 
market model relationship immediately after the announcement' (Dodd and Quek, 
1985, p. 291). 
Franks and Harris (1989) report that, on average, acquisitions in UK have 
been value-creating for shareholders around the acquisition announcement date. 
They examine the effects of 1800 UK acquisitions on shareholder wealth in the period 
1955 - 1985 using market model, market-adjusted returns and CAPM. They identify 
four key dates in their studies: the first approach date, the first bid date, an 
unconditional date, and the LSPD date6e. Defining month 0 as the earliest available of 
the first approach, first bid, unconditional, or LSPD dates, Franks and Harris identify 
that the value-weighted and equal-weighted target company's abnormal returns are 
25.8% and 29.7%, respectively, over the six-month period [-4, +1]. Over the same 
period, acquiring firms earn 2.4% (value-weighted basis) and 7.9% (equal-weighted 
basis), both of which are significantly greater than zero. In month 0, acquiring firms 
earn small positive abnormal returns of about 1%, while target firms earn significant 
returns of 23.3%. Franks and Harris (1989) conclude that their results are insensitive 
" The first approach date is the date the market is initially informed of merger talks. The first bid date 
is the date of the first formal bid. The unconditional date is when a sufficient proportion of shares has 
been pledged to the bidder to guarantee legal control. The LSPD date is the last date for which share 
returns are available (usually the delisting date). 
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to the choice of control return since the returns to acquiring firms are significantly 
positive for all models. 
By contrast to the above, the results reported by Limmack (1991) suggest that 
acquisitions in the UK appear to be a zero net present value investment when returns 
are measured over the period surrounding the announcement and outcome dates. He 
examines the distribution of returns to shareholders of UK companies involved in 
acquisitions during the period 1977-1986 using three models: an OLS Market Model, 
Adjusted Beta Model, and an Index Model. As with the study by Franks and Harris 
(1989), Limmack (1991) argued that the abnormal returns measured around the bid 
period are insensitive to the choice of control models. During the bid period, acquiring 
firms obtain insignificant return of -0.20%, and target firms earn a significant positive 
return of 31.38% when measured on an equally weighted basis". 
Sudarsanam et al. (1996) measure shareholders wealth changes in 429 
acquisitions during the period 1980-90. Although they observe that target 
shareholders earn a significant returns of 29.18% whereas bidders earn significant 
negative returns of -4.04% over the interval [-20, +40] days relative to the 
announcement day, they conclude that on average acquisitions are value enhancing 
activity in UK with overall returns of approximately 2% over the period [-40, +40] days. 
In determining the wealth effects of 178 UK successful takeover bids during 
the period 1979-89, Holl and Kyriazis (1997a) found that the acquiring firms broke 
even over the period 2 months prior to the bid, earned significant losses of 1.7% 
during the bid month and also in each of the following 2 months. Similar to the results 
found by Sudarsanam et al., 1996 Holl and Kyriazis (19978) reported that targets earn 
67 Bid period is defined by Linumck (1991) as the end of the month prior to the bid announcement date to the end of the month in which the outcome was announced. 
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significant gains around the bid month. Targets earn significant positive returns of 2% 
over the period 2 months prior to the bid, 21.6% over the bid month and 3.1 % over 2 
months following the bid. 
Baker and Limmack (1999) examined 601 UK acquisitions during the period 
1977 -1989 using control models based on FT All Share Index, Equally weighted 
market index, Size-matched control portfolio, Market Model (single-factor risk- 
adjusted returns), Industry-matched control portfolio, Two factor Model and Size- and 
Industry-matched control. Regardless of the control models used, acquiring firms earn 
significant positive abnormal returns during the pre bid periods from -24 to -13 and 
from -12 to -1. The bid period (month 0) reports different abnormal returns 
depending on the control models use. During the bid month, acquiring firms earn 
significant positive returns of 1.09% (value-weighted FT All Share Index), significant 
negative returns of -0.12% (two factor model) and insignificant returns for the other 
models. The results indicate that positive returns are observed when the value- 
weighted index which makes no adjustment either for size or industry factors is used 
but acquiring firms earn negative returns or break-even when size or industry effects 
are adjusted in the models. 
Thus, the question of whether acquisition in UK yields gains or losses to 
acquiring firms' shareholders remains a controversial issue. Examples of studies that 
found negative returns or no significant gains in the share prices of acquiring firms in 
the bid period include those of Firth (1980), Barnes (1984), Dodds and Quek (1985), 
Limmack (1991), Sudarsanam et al. (1996) and Holls and Kyriazis (1997). However, 
Franks and Harris (1989) found that acquisitions on average are value creating for 
shareholders around the bid month. Baker and Limmack (1999) demonstrate that 
different benchmarks can lead to different conclusions about the impact of 
acquisitions on shareholder wealth around the bid period. One of the problems in 
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calculating the overall returns to companies involved in takeover bids is to identify the 
bid period over which share prices are affected by the bid, either at the time of 
announcement or between the announcement and outcome date. 
Empirical studies on share market reaction to Malaysian acquisitions have not 
been investigated as extensively as those in the US and the UK. However, similar to 
the results found in US and UK, the results in Malaysia indicate that shareholders of 
target firms obtain large positive gains while acquiring firms earn either small or 
insignificant gains around the announcement period (Mat Nor, 1993, Mohammad, 
1993 and Md. Isa, 1994). These studies in Malaysia provide evidence that 
acquisitions are not harmful to the wealth of acquiring and target shareholders around 
the announcement date. 
Mat Nor (1993) used market model to measure the abnormal performance of 
293 acquiring firms in Malaysia during the period 1 January 1977 to 31 December 
1989. Acquiring firms earn a significant 10.39% cumulative abnormal returns during 
the period -180 days to day 0 (announcement date) but they experience significant 
negative returns immediately after announcement date". However, Mat Nor (1993, p. 
7) concludes that acquisitions in Malaysia are beneficial to acquiring firm 
shareholders since they earn 'higher cumulative average residuals than the period 
before' the acquisitions (cumulative return of 1.50% from -200 before to +200 days 
after announcement date). Mohammad (1993) use market model to examine 47 
quoted bidders and 6 quoted targets during the period 1980-19906®. The acquiring 
and target firms earn insignificant returns of 12.39% and 9.11 %, respectively, during 
the period -60 days to -2 days prior to the announcement date. The acquiring firms 
68 The acquiring firms earn significant returns of 9.21% over the interval -200 to 0 days prior to announcement date. 
69 Initially, Mohammad (1993) had 90 quoted acquirers and 16 quoted targets in her sample. Due to lack of information on the capitalisation changes, 47 quoted acquirers and 6 quoted targets were included in the final sample. 
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earn insignificant returns after the announcement date, indicating that acquisitions in 
Malaysia have no impact on the wealth of acquiring firm shareholders. Another study 
by Md Isa (1994) provides evidence that targets earn higher returns than acquiring 
firms around announcement period. In examining the effect of acquisitions on 119 
quoted bidders and 38 targets during the period January 1984 to May 1989, Md Isa 
(1994) reported that the total significant gains to bidders and targets are 2.3% and 
11.23%, respectively, over the 101-day period around the announcement date (-50, 
+50). Similar to Mat Nor (1993), Md Isa (1994) claimed that corporate acquisitions in 
Malaysia are beneficial activities, particularly to target shareholders. 
4.5 Long term Post Acquisition Performance 
So far, the focus has been on whether acquisitions appear to be associated 
with wealth gains to the shareholders of the affected companies over the bid period. 
While the market's short-term response to an acquisition announcement ought to 
provide a reasonable reliable barometer of the likely consequences of the transaction, 
there is a possibility that, with hindsight, the market assessment will turn out to be 
incorrect. Scherer (1988) has argued that the sources of takeover gains may lie 
elsewhere, and not be driven by prospective changes in cash flows after takeover. 
For example, the sharp increase in share prices that typically occurs at the time at 
which an acquisition is announced may be due, in part or full, to speculative buying by 
arbitrageurs in hopes of making a quick profit on the rapid resale of the security. It 
could also be due to other factors such as an undervaluation due to investors 
overlooking the stock or an overvaluation by those who acquire the firm (Shiller, 1989, 
p. 64). As such, the increase in share price of the firm may not reflect efficiency gains 
from acquisition but rather a market correction. Thus, a thorough empirical test 
requires not only that one demonstrate that shareholders enjoy short-term wealth 
gains at the time at which acquisition is announced, but also that, on average, the 
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hypothesised improvement in shareholders wealth is maintained after a reasonable 
amount of time has passed. 
Magenheim and Mueller (1988) also raise the issue of whether all changes in 
shareholders wealth of the acquiring firm affected by acquisition are complete by the 
date of its announcement or its completion. They suggest that further information 
about the acquisition's future consequences might reach the market long after the 
market's first knowledge of the acquisition. Therefore, Magenheim and Mueller (1988) 
suggest that in assessing the consequences of acquisition for acquiring firms it would 
be appropriate to look at the longer-run perspective of the firms. Accordingly, the next 
focus is the literature review on the post acquisition performance of the combined 
companies using the market model. The post acquisition, long term performance data 
are available only for the acquirer since the target companies are normally delisted 
shortly after the acquisition. Table 4.2 parts (a) and (b) summarises results of studies 
of post acquisition performance for acquiring firms. 
Generally, studies of share price post acquisition performance in the US and 
UK (as depicted in Table 4.2a and Table 4.2b) appear to produce consistent results 
which indicate that acquisitions are detrimental to shareholders of bidding firms. In 
summarising US studies prior to 1980, Jensen and Ruback (1983) indicate that post 
acquisition share-price performance of acquiring firms averages abnormal returns of - 
5.5% during the twelfth month after acquisition. Jensen and Ruback (1983, p. 20) 
interpret these negative post acquisition returns as 'unsettling because they are 
inconsistent with market efficiency and suggest that changes in share prices during 
acquisitions overestimate the future efficiency gains from acquisitions'. 
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Table 4.2 (al 
Statistical results of post performance from acquisitions using `event' studies 
in US 
(AII results reported are significant unless stated otherwise) 
Author, Years Model Used and Event Period Abnormal Returns 
Covered and Sample Size to Acquiring 
Country Examined Firms 
Langetieg (1978) Capital Asset Month of merger through -6.6 % 
1929 - 62 Pricing Model 12 months after the 
US (CAPM) effective date 
Uses monthly data 
149 mergers 
Asquith (1983) Control Portfolios Month of outcome -7.2% 
1962 - 76 (similar to Market- through 8 months after 
US Adjusted Returns) the outcome date 
Uses daily data 
407 successful 178 
unsuccessful 
mergers 
Malatesta (1983) CAPM Month of announcement -2.9% 
1969 - 74 Uses monthly data through 12 months after 
US 256 Acquiring and approval for entire 
85 acquired sample 
successful mergers 
Magenheim and Market Model Over the period (-3,36) -15.67% 
Mueller (1988) Uses monthly data using pre-estimated 
1976 - 81 78 acquiring firms parameters (-36, -4) 
US Over the period (-3,36) 
using the pre-estimated 
parameters (-60, -4) -42.21% 
Lahey and Conn Mean Adjusted 3 years after takeover: 
(1990) Return Mean Adjusted Return -38.6% 1960 - 79 Market Model Model 
US Uses monthly data 
91 mergers Market Model -10.2% 
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Author, Years Model Used and Event Period Abnormal Returns 
Covered and Sample Size to Acquiring 
Country Examined Firms 




Loderer and Martin 
(1992) 
1966 - 86 
us 
Agrawal, Jaffe, and 
Mandelker (1992) 
1955 - 87 
I us 



































Uses monthly data 
937 mergers 
227 tender offers 
Over the 36-month 









3 years (750 days) after 




4-5 years after 
acquisition date 
60 months (5 years) 
after takeover 
completion 
Beta-modified From five days after the 
control portfolios completion of the 
Industry adjusted acquisition until 3 years 
return following the 
Uses daily data acquisitions 
38 Acquisitions of Beta-modified Control 





Model Used and 
Sample Size 
Event Period Abnormal Returns 
to Acquiring 
Firms 
Loughran and Vijh Buy and hold 5 years following 
(1997) returns of acquirer acquisitions 
and matching firms 
1970-1989 share mergers -25.0% 
Uses yearly data 
US cash tender offers 61.7% 
947 
Table 4.2 (b) 
Statistical results of post performance from acquisitions using 'event' studies 
in UK 
(All results reported are significant unless stated otherwise) 
Author, Years Model Used and Event Period Abnormal Returns 
Covered and Sample Size to Acquiring 
Country Examined Firms 
Franks, Broyles and Market Model 40 months prior to (combined 
Hecht (1977) Uses monthly data 40 months after cumulative average 
1955 - 72 70 takeovers announcement date residuals 
UK for bidders and 
targets) 
0.052 
Firth (1979) Market Model Month of announcement - 5% 
1972 - 74 Using monthly through 24 months after 
UK data announcement date 
224 successful bids 
Firth (1980) Market Model Month of announcement - 4.8% 1969 - 75 Uses monthly data through 36 months after 
UK 486 Acquiring firms announcement 
563 Acquired firms 
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Author, Years Model Used and Event Period Abnormal Returns 
Covered and Sample Size to Acquiring 
Country Examined Firms 
Franks and Harris Index Model, Month of outcome 
(1989) Market Model, and through 24 months after 
1955-85 CAPM outcome: 
UK Uses monthly 
data Market Model -12.6% 
1800 takeovers Index Model 4.8% 
CAPM 4.5% 
Limmack (1991) Index Model, Month of bid through 24 
1977 - 86 Market Model, and months after outcome: 
UK Adjusted Betas Adjusted Betas - 4.67% 
Uses daily data 
448 Acquiring Market Model -14.96% 
462 Acquired 
Index Model - 7.43% 
Kennedy and Market Adjusted Month of bid through two Significant negative 
Limmack (1996) Index years following the bid: returns using all 
1980 - 89 Uses monthly data Market Adjusted Return control models 
UK 247 Acquiring Size Adjusted Return 
345 Acquired (with or without 
rebalancing) 
Sudarsanam, Holl Market Model Day of announcement - 3.56% 
and Salami (1996) Uses daily data through 40 days after 
1980 -1990 429 completed announcement 
UK acquisitions 
Gregory (1997) CAPM, Dimson- Month of announcement 
1984 -1992 Marsh Model, Size to 24 month of 
UK Decile Model, Multi- completion date: 
Index Model, CAPM -17.73% 
Hoare-Govett Multi- 
Index Model, and Dimson-Marsh Model -12.52% Fama and French 
Multi-Index Model Size Decile Model -11.82% 
Uses monthly data Multi-Index SML -14.29% 
452 takeovers Multi-Index Hoare- -12.03% 
Govett 





Model Used and 
Sample Size 
Event Period Abnormal Returns 
to Acquiring 
Firms 
Higson and Elliot Equally-weighted Month of announcement 0.83% 
(199R) Market Index to 3 years after (not significant) 
1975-1990 completion date 
UK Uses monthly data 
830 takeovers 
Baker and Limmack Market adjusted Bid announcement 
(1999) returns (index) month to 23 months 
1977-1989 Size-adjusted following the bid 
UK Single-factor risk 
adjusted FT All Share Index 1.02% 
(insignificant) 
Uses monthly data Equally Weighted Index -13.54% 
601 acquiring firms Size-matched control -4.78% 
portfolio 
Market Model -12.77% 
Industry-Matched 15.96% 
control portfolio 
Two factor model -16.44% 
Size and Industry- -5.79% 
matched control 
The later studies of Magenheim and Mueller (1988), Malatesta (1983), Asquith 
(1983), Franks et al. (1988), Lahey and Conn (1990), and Clark and Ofek (1994) find 
that US firms experience significantly negative abnormal returns over 1-3 years after 
acquisition. Merged firms in Agrawal et al. 's (1992) study experience negative 
performance 5 years after acquisition completion. By contrast, however, Franks et al. 
(1991), and Loderer and Martin (1992) show that post acquisition returns were not 
significantly negative. However, as discussed later, Agrawal et al. (1992) show that 
the results obtained by Franks et al. (1991) are sample specific. Loughran and Vijh 
(1997) provide evidence that the post acquisitions returns of acquiring firm are related 
to both the mode of acquisition and form of payment. 
129 
One possibility explaining the difference in results may be due to the time 
period used to estimate the market model coefficients. Mageinhem and Mueller's 
(1988) study emphasise on the sensitivity to the choice of the pre-event period to 
calculate model parameters which are then used to measure post-event 
performance70. From a sample of 78 acquiring firms in the study during the period 
1976-81, they found that acquiring firms earn large positive gains prior to the event, 
following which returns begin to drop. The post acquisition performance is measured 
against two variants of the market model, with parameters separately identified over 
two pre-event periods, months (-60, -4), and (-36, -4). Both sets of parameter 
estimates produce results which show that acquiring firms exhibit a significant decline 
in post acquisition performance. Evaluating an acquisition's effects three years 
following the announcement, however, estimates based on the thirty three month pre- 
event period [-36, -4] shows that the acquiring firms are significantly worse off (- 
42.2%) as compared to (-15.65%) if one uses the longer estimation period of the 57 
months [-60, -4]. Acquiring firms in Magenheim and Mueller's study experience 
returns during the pre-event period [-24, -4] that are 18.4% in excess of the expected 
returns using market model parameter estimates from the period month [-60, -25]. 
Thus, the choice of the pre-event period in which model parameters are estimated 
can have a significant effect on the reported magnitude of the change in performance 
following an acquisition. However, Magenheim and Mueller (1988) still conclude that 
acquiring firms earn positive abnormal returns prior to acquisition announcement, and 
that acquiring firms earn negative returns after the announcement, relative to this pre- 
event performance. 
70 Magenheim and Mueller (1988), provide evidence of how the estimate of abnormal returns to the 
acquiring firm are sensitive to the choice of time period over which the normal a and p are measured. 
The estimate mean a based on estimation period is: . 0009 [-60, -25]; . 0134 
[-60, -4]; and . 0181 
[-36, - 
4). The period with the highest return [-36, -4) observes the highest estimate mean a. These differences in the estimate of mean a may lead to a large differences in the abnormal returns from the market 
model depending on the choice -of estimation period (p. 178) 
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The importance of the a estimates is further illustrated by the results of Franks 
et al. 's (1988) study using a comprehensive sample of US and UK bidders over a 
period of thirty years, 1955-1985". In their US sample, negative post acquisition 
returns were identified for market model parameters using monthly pre bid returns 
(from six years to one year prior to the bid). When, however, the market model 
parameters were estimated using post acquisition returns data, zero post acquisition 
returns were observed. Franks et at. (1988) noted that the difference in the results 
stems from the reductions in the estimated a values from the pre acquisition (six 
through one years before the bid) to the post acquisition (three through five years 
after the bid) period. Similarly in their UK sample, the post acquisition performance in 
all-equity offers was -9.4% using the market model, but small positive returns of 4.2% 
were obtained using the capital asset pricing model. Franks et al. (1988) relate the 
contradicting results produced as evidence that post acquisition performance is 
sensitive to the benchmark used. 
Lahey and Conn (1990) use the market model and mean adjusted return 
model in their study of 91 US mergers during the period 1960-79. Three years after 
consummation, acquiring firms earn significant negative abnormal returns measured 
on both of their returns generating models (-10.20% using market model and -38.57% 
using mean adjusted return model), suggesting that the negative returns are 
insensitive to the model used to evaluate the abnormal returns. Thus, the results 
support previous studies that find acquiring firms earning significant negative post 
acquisition performance. 
Franks et al. (1991) examine the effect of post acquisition share price 
performance of acquiring firms in US in the period 1975-1984, using multi-factor 
" Malatesta (1983) also raises the question regarding the effects of the use of constrained estimation techniques. 
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benchmarks (the ten-factor and eight-portfolio benchmarks) that are designed to 
overcome what they describe as the mean-variance inefficiencies of the single-factor 
benchmark. They claim that the equally-weighted and value-weighted benchmarks do 
not remove size-related effects and these benchmarks are likely to generate negative 
performance measures for larger firms even if the actual performance of these firms 
is faUourable72. The post acquisition abnormal performance over the 36-month period 
after acquisition show a significant positive returns of 0.37% using the value-weighted 
index and significant negative returns of -0.22% using equally-weighted index model. 
Using the eight-portfolio benchmarks and ten-factor benchmarks over the same 
period insignificant returns of 0.05% and -0.08%, respectively, were observed. 
Consistent with the remarks made by Jensen and Ruback (1983), the results found 
by Franks et at. (1991) suggest that prior findings of negative post acquisition for 
bidders are more likely due to the benchmark errors than to mispricing at the time of 
announcement. 
Loderer and Martin (1992) use an industry performance index as a benchmark 
to evaluate post acquisition performance. Their results are consistent with those of 
Franks et at. (1991) in that acquiring firms do not appear to perform worse than their 
comparison benchmarks over the first five post acquisition years. On average, they 
report a negative returns during first three years post-bid but this underperformance is 
confined to less than 53% of the sample firms, and there are marginal gains during 
years four and five. 
Agrawal et al. (1992), in their study on post acquisition performance of US 
acquiring firms for the period 1955-87, show that the Franks et al. 's (1991) findings 
are specific to the 1975-84 period, and not valid across different time periods. 
72 Dimson and Marsh (1986) provide evidence that measured performance can be significantly affected by the firm size effect when examining long-run returns over several years. 
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Agrawal et at. (1992) reported significant post acquisition under-performance for 
acquisitions completed in 1950s, 1960s, and 1980s, although not for those in the 
1970s. They further suggest that the sample used by Franks et al. (1991) consists of 
a high proportion of tender offers and that the latter are largely financed by cash". 
After adjusting for firm size effect and shifts in risk parameters around the time of 
acquisition, Agrawal et al. (1992) find that shareholders of acquiring firms experience 
a statistically significant loss of about 10% over five years after the acquisition date. 
They conclude 'that the efficient-market anomaly of negative post acquisition 
performance highlighted in Jensen and Ruback (1983) is not resolved' (Agrawal et al., 
1992, p. 1618). 
Clark and Ofek (1994) provide evidence that there is a positive relation 
between the market reaction in the acquisition announcement period and the post 
acquisition performance of the firm. Their results suggested, at the very least, the 
market could accurately estimate the direction of the effect of the acquisition on the 
bidder's value. In using a sample of 38 US acquisitions of distressed firms targeted 
for restructuring between 1981 and 1988, Clark and Ofek (1994) report that acquiring 
firms obtain significantly negative beta- and industry-adjusted returns after acquiring 
distressed firms, indicating that bidders are not successful in their restructuring 
attempts". The median cumulative beta-adjusted return is -11.0% in year 1, -14.6% in 
year 2 and -42.1% in year 3, all significantly different from zero. The median industry- 
adjusted return is not significant: 2.7% in year 1, -1.1% in year 2 and -12.8% in year 
3. The industry-adjusted returns appear to be higher than beta-adjusted returns, 
" The results of Franks et al. (1991) are therefore consistent with results of earlier studies (examples, 
Bradley, Desai and Kim; and Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989) that show bids financed by cash are likely to 
produce higher returns to acquirers than those financed by equity. Similarly, Loughran and Vijh (1997) found that acquiring firms that complete cash tender offers earn significant returns of 61.7% 5 years following acquisition, while those that complete share mergers earn significant negative returns of - 25.0% over the same period. 
"The daily beta excess return is the difference between a firm's return and the return on its beta decile 
portfolio. Industry adjustment is made by subtracting the median return of all firms with the same three-digit Standard Industrial Code (SIC) from the bidder's return. 
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indicating that much of the poor post acquisition is driven by industry factors. 
Although the acquiring firms' returns are not significantly different from zero around 
the announcement date [-5, +1], this is positively related to all post performance 
measures. Clark and Ofek (1994) also emphasise the fact that their performance 
results are not sensitive to the method of measurement. The result of this study is 
important as the sample selected include those firms for which the disciplinary motive 
is strong. 
In sum, of the many event studies that examine post acquisition performance 
in US, only Loderer and Martin (1992) and Franks et al. (1991) find positive excess 
returns, and only when particular multi-factor benchmarks are used. In the latter case 
the results also appear to be sample specific. Other studies report negative post 
acquisition returns for the acquiring firms. 
Studies of post acquisition returns to bidders in UK acquisitions also produce 
a similar result to that reported for the US. Although most studies appear to report 
negative long term returns, a number have reported either zero or positive wealth 
changes. Studies carried out by Limmack (1991), Kennedy and Limmack (1996), 
Sudarsanam et al. (1996), Gregory (1997), and Baker and Limmack (1999) report 
negative post acquisition returns for the acquiring firms. Franks et al. (1977) 
concluded that acquiring firms gain in the long run from acquisition, while Franks and 
Harris (1989) provides conflicting results depending on the benchmark control used75. 
Conversely, Higson and Elliot (1998) provide evidence that there is no evidence of 
negative abnormal returns in an equal-weighted portfolio of UK acquirers, three years 
following acquisition over the period 1975-19901®. Over the period 1981-1984, 
73 Franks and Harris (1989) showed significant negative post acquisition returns when the market 
model is used, but a significant positive post acquisition returns when the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is used as a benchmark. 
76 Abnormal return is measured as the difference between the buying and holding the acquirer's shares 
at completion, against a benchmark that controls for firm size similar to that of the acquirer. 
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however, they find evidence of significant positive abnormal return during the two 
years after acquisition. Higson and Elliot (1998) conclude that post acquisition returns 
are sensitive to the observation period. 
As mentioned in the previous section, Firth (1980) found evidence that 
acquiring firms earn significant negative residuals of -6.3% in the month of the offer 
(month 0). These losses were sustained three years later [+36 month], with a 
significantly negative cumulative return of 4.8%. Similarly, Franks and Harris (1989) 
report a negative bidder post acquisition performance of -12.6% over the twenty-four 
months after unconditional date using the market-adjusted model". However, when 
measured against CAPM, the post acquisition performance of bidders match or 
slightly outperform the market in general, with a positive returns of 4.5% during the 
same period. Thus, their study highlights the problem that different benchmarks can 
lead to different conclusions about the impact of acquisitions on shareholder wealth. 
Limmack (1991) also found significantly negative excess returns to the 
acquiring firms of completed bids in the second year following the bid, -4.67% (using 
adjusted betas), -14.96% (using the market model) and -7.43% (using the index 
model). If one considers only the period surrounding the bid in Limmack's study, as 
discussed in Section 4.4.2 above, where target company gain substantially but 
acquiring company do not lose, then acquisitions are considered to be zero net 
present value investment. If the post outcome period is included in measuring the 
wealth of the shareholders, then on average acquiring companies experience 
substantial losses over a two-year period following the acquisition. Contrary to the 
results obtained when examining returns around the bid period only, acquisitions are 
negative, rather than zero, net present value investment. As noted above, the 
"Unconditional date is when the bidder has enough shares to guarantee control of the target. 
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negative post acquisition results obtained by the acquiring firm is consistent 
whichever control model was applied, thus the use of different benchmark does not 
appear to be the cause of the negative results obtained in Limmack's study. 
Kennedy and Limmack (1996) show that the returns to acquiring firms were 
not significantly different from zero in the twelve month period following the bid, 
although acquiring firms earn negative excess returns of -4.92% in the second year 
following the bid. If analysis of the wealth effect of acquisitions considers only the post 
acquisition period, it appears from their results that management actions are not 
conducted in the interest of shareholders. Similarly, Sudarsanam et al. (1996) found 
acquiring firms earned negative returns of -3.56% from day of announcement 
through 40 days after announcement. 
In a more recent study, Gregory (1997) analysed 452 UK takeovers for the 
period 1984-1992, using six benchmarks: CAPM, Dimson-Marsh risk and size 
adjusted model, a simple size control model, two multi-index models which include 
size variables, and finally a variation of the Fama-French multi-index model. The 
results from all six models show that acquiring firms earn significant negative returns 
for the month of announcement, during the announcement period and for the 24 
months following completion of takeover78. The results substantiate the results of 
Limmack's (1991) study that the use of different benchmark is not the cause of the 
negative returns obtained by the acquiring firms. Similar with the results of equity 
studies mentioned earlier, Gregory's results confirm that method of payment 
influences outcome. He concludes however that acquisition activity in UK is 'not 
compatible with shareholder wealth maximising behaviour on the part of acquiring 
firms' management' (Gregory, 1997, p. 998). 
78 The announcement period is defined as from the month of announcement up to and including month 
of completion. 
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Baker and Limmack (1999) is another study in UK that have used alternative 
controls in the measurement of acquirer's return and yet report negative pattern of 
post outcome abnormal returns. In examining acquirer's return in 601 UK acquisitions 
over the period 1977-1989, Baker and Limmack (1999) use seven benchmarks, both 
on a value-weighted and on an equally-weighted basis, together with various 
combinations of risk adjustment, size adjustment and industry adjustment79. Except 
for the market-value weighted benchmark (FT All Share Index), the other models 
exhibit significant negative abnormal returns ranging from -4.78% (based on the size- 
matched control model) to -16.44% (based on the two factor size and industry control 
model) over the period from bid month to 23 month after the bid month. However, the 
market value weighted model that makes no adjustment for size or other industry 
effects reports insignificant returns during the same period. 
A related explanation for the methodological errors involves some form of 
selection bias that may take the form of survivorship bias. Lyon et al. (1999) 
documented that mis-specification to test for long-run abnormal returns may be due to 
new listing or survivor bias. The sampled firms are traced for a long post acquisition 
period but control portfolio may include firms that have survived for only part of the 
period in question due to newly listed firms that have only begin trading or firms that 
have failed subsequent to the acquisition month. Thus, the effect of the survivorship 
bias that may arise through the selection of a benchmark portfolio of firms is to 
compare the performance of a sample of surviving firms with a control portfolio of 
surviving and non-surviving firms. Alternatively, bias may also arise if the sample 
79 One problem that might have caused different results in prior studies (example, Franks and Harris, 
1989, Limmack, 1991 and Sudarsanam et al., 1996) is that no adjustment was made for the firm size 
effect since the population of quoted firms may not be represented by either a value-weighted or the 
equal-weighted market index. Evidence in Dimson and Marsh (1986) suggest that an adjustment for 
firm size is important in studies measuring long run abnormal returns. The models used in the study by 
Baker and Limmack (1999) are FT All Share Index, Equally weighted market index, Size-matched 
control portfolio, Market Model (single-factor risk-adjusted returns), Industry-matched control 
portfolio, Two factor Model and Size- and Industry-matched control. 
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selected for analysis includes only those firms that survive a pre-determined post 
event. However, Baker and Limmack (1999) observe negative post acquisition 
returns even after controlling for potential survivorship and selection bias80. 
Another form of selection bias involves the prior period performance bias 
which implies that acquisition bids are generally made following a period of above 
average share price performance for the acquiring firm, as argued earlier by Franks 
and Harris (1989) and Limmack (1991). There is a tendency that the poor returns 
after. acquisition is a result of mean reversion of prior performance and not directly 
related to the acquisition per se. Gregory (1997) provides evidence that alpha 
estimates in his study move from being significantly positive in the period prior to 
acquisition, to being significantly negative in post acquisition period81. However, 
Gregory (1997), Higson and Elliot (1998), and Baker and Limmack (1999) 
demonstrated that the pattern of post negative returns to the acquiring firms in UK 
was not a function of the performance of sample firms prior to the event. 
4.6 Summary 
The chapter focused on reviewing the measurement of shareholders wealth 
changes using share-market data. The results of market-based studies in UK, US and 
Malaysia indicate that on average shareholders of the target company earn positive 
abnormal returns, but that there is little evidence of significant gain to bidding firms 
around the bid period. One of the issues raised in the event studies is whether share 
market evaluate the long-run effects of each acquisition around the announcement 
period or in the period long after the transaction. The market ought to be unbiased in 
80 To test the impact of survivorship bias, the control group in Baker and Limmack's (1999) study includes only firms in the same industry and in the same decile which have similar survival 
characteristics as the acquiring futns. 
" Gregory (1997) controls prior performance bias by using post acquisition data to estimate the 
appropriate model parameters. 
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valuing the benefits of acquisitions but more often than not it appears to have been 
over-optimistic in this matter. Event studies which focused on announcement period 
share returns have found that acquisitions are expected to improve performance, yet 
examinations of post acquisition performance conclude that acquisitions reduce 
wealth. 
The reported positive returns to targets and bidders around announcement 
period in most of the studies in US (Dennis and McConnell, 1986, Magenheim and 
Mueller, 1988, Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989 and Hubbard and Palia, 1999) are 
consistent with the hypothesis that acquisitions are positive net present value 
investment. However, Bradley et al. (1988) found that acquiring firms break-even 
while Malatesta (1983), Hubbard and Palia (1995) and Harford (1999) are among 
studies that show negative returns to acquiring firms around the bid period. Examples 
of event studies in UK that have found on average acquiring firms suffered either 
negative returns or no significant gains in their share prices around announcement 
period include those of Firth (1979,1980), Limmack (1991), Sudarsanam et al. (1996) 
and Holl and Kyriazis (1997). However, Franks et at. (1977), and Franks and Harris 
(1989) found that acquisitions on average are value enhancing for the bidders around 
the bid period. Baker and Limmack (1999) found conflicting results during the bid 
period depending on the benchmark used. Studies undertaken by Mat Nor (1993), Md 
Isa (1994) and Mohammad (1994) in Malaysia have reported similar results in that 
target firm shareholders earn abnormal returns while acquiring firms do not gain as 
much around announcement period. 
Evidence on the inconclusive return to acquiring firms may be influenced by 
measurement problems relating to time of acquisition news (example, announcement 
versus consummation), relative size of bidder and target firms, the form of payment, 
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as well as type of acquisition (tender offer or mergers in US), level of managerial 
share ownership in the firm, or even market inefficiency. 
In examining post-event performance, however, only Franks et at. (1991), and 
Loderer and Martin (1992) are among the many event studies in US that find positive 
excess post acquisition returns. Others, for example, Magenheim and Mueller (1988), 
Lahey and Conn (1990), Agrawal et at. (1992) and Clark and Ofek (1994) find 
negative post acquisition performance for the merged firms. Agrawal et at. (1992) 
showed that the results obtained by Franks et at. (1991) are confined to the specific 
sample of acquisitions and the time period in which they are examined (1975-84). 
Agrawal et at. (1992) finds that acquisitions are followed by significant negative 
returns over a five-year period after the effective date82. Similarly, studies that have 
examined post outcome performance in UK including Limmack (1991), Kennedy and 
Limmack (1996), Sudarsanam et at. (1996), Gregory (1997) and Baker and Limmack 
(1999) find significant post acquisition negative returns to the merged firms. Franks et 
at. (1977) concluded that UK acquiring firms in the brewry industry gain in the long 
run from acquisition, while Franks and Harris (1989) provides conflicting results 
depending on the benchmark control used. Conversely, Higson and Elliot (1998) 
conclude that post acquisition returns are sensitive to the observation period when 
they found no evidence of negative abnormal returns three years following acquisition 
over the period 1975-1990 but significant positive abnormal over the period 1981- 
1984. 
The findings of under performance after acquisition appears to contradict the 
implication of the efficient market hypothesis (Ruback, 1988). An efficient market 
demonstrates that the valuation effect on acquisition should occur on average during 
82 The former study included a large sample of tender offers for which cash was the method of 
payment. 
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the announcement period and that after a reasonable amount of time have passed, 
average post acquisition performance should be zero. If the post outcome period is 
included in measuring the shareholders wealth, then on average acquisitions in US 
and UK reduce shareholders wealth. 
One possible explanation for the negative post acquisition performance is that 
it represents a delayed market reaction to overpriced acquisitions. However if this is 
the case, then the market appears to be incapable of adjusting to this fact over time. 
Another possible interpretation of the phenomena is that the negative returns may be 
caused by methodological errors in addressing post acquisition returns to acquiring 
firms. These errors may stem in part from the choice of inappropriate models used in 
individual studies or due to some form of selection bias in the sample rather than 
being related to the acquisition per se. One problem with early studies (Franks and 
Harris, 1989, Limmack, 1991 and Sudarsanam et al., 1996) is that no adjustment was 
made for the firm size effect since the population of quoted firms may not be 
represented by either a value-weighted or the equal-weighted market index. Evidence 
in Dimson and Marsh (1986) suggest that an adjustment for firm size is important in 
studies measuring long run abnormal returns83. 
However, attempts to provide what are deemed to be more appropriate 
models by Franks et at. (1991), Agrawal et al. (1992) in US, Gregory (1997), Higson 
and Elliot (1998), and Baker and Limmack (1999) in UK have met with varying 
degrees of success as discussed in the previous section. Gregory (1997) and Baker 
and Limmack (1999), among studies in UK that have used alternative benchmarks 
and yet report negative pattern of post outcome abnormal returns. 
" Dimson and Marsh (1986) used size decile control portfolios, where each company is assigned a decile membership based upon its market capitalisation at the beginning of the year, or the risk and size 
control model. 
141 
A related explanation for the methodological errors involves some form of 
selection bias that may take the form of survivorship bias or prior period performance 
bias (Baker and Limmack, 1999). However, Baker and Limmack (1999) provide 
evidence that the negative post acquisition returns in their study are not a function of 
survivorship bias. In addition, studies by Gregory (1997), Higson and Elliot (1998), 
and Baker and Limmack (1999) demonstrate that the pattern of post negative returns 
to the acquiring firms in UK is not a function of the performance of sample firms prior 
to the event. 
What is clear from the above review is that market-based studies of takeover 
activity have not been able to answer the basic question as to whether takeovers lead 
to higher returns to shareholders as a result of improvements in corporate 
performance. The next chapter will review the empirical analysis in measuring 
shareholders wealth based on accounting and cash flow data. 
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Chapter 5 
Review of Empirical Analysis on Acquisitions 
- Accounting-Based Evidence - 
5.1 Chapter Description 
The method for examining the performance of corporate acquisition based on 
share market data was discussed at length in Chapter 4. The current chapter focuses 
on the method of evaluating the impact of corporate acquisition using accounting and 
cash flow data. 
5.2 Accounting-Based Evidence 
Prior to the advent of publicly available share price data bases and 
developments in capital model theory, analysis of takeovers generally relied on 
accounting measures of performance. Recent criticism of, and inconsistencies, in 
market-based studies have led to a reawakening of interest in accounting-based 
studiesS4. The current section will provide a review of these studies. 
Studies undertaken using accounting data have often been used to suggest 
whether 'efficiency gains' have been achieved as a result of an acquisition. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the takeover mechanism is seen as an important disciplinary 
device in ensuring efficient utilisation of the existing assets of the firm: either the least 
8° Roll (1986) and Black (1989) shown ways in which the assumption of an efficient capital market can 
be weakened. They have incorporated systematically irrational bidders into process and empire- 
building explanations. Roll and Black argued that managers overpay for targets because they are overly 
optimistic and because their interests diverge from those of their shareholders. The hubris hypothesis (overpayment) implies an inefficiency in the market for corporate control since some market 
participants (bidders) are irrational and make systematic mistakes. 
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'efficient' firms are taken over, or the possibility exists that the firms involved in 
acquisitions become as a result more profitable in the use of their combined assets. 
As argued by Utton (1974, p. 15): 
'If the success and failure of a firm in using the assets at its disposal, i. e. its 
level of efficiency, is reflected in its profitability, then changes in the composition and 
size of its assets as a result of acquisition should also show up in its profit 
performance. Hence any economies arising from acquisition would, on this argument, 
be demonstrated indirectly by the improved profitability of the merged firm'. 
However, it has been argued that the accounting-based measure used are not 
unambiguous indicators of economic performance due to, among others: differences 
in accounting policies or practices, merger versus acquisition accounting, and 
treatment of inter-group profits, that will cause a downward bias in measuring the post 
acquisition profitability (Appleyard, 1980). Moreover, the downward bias may also be 
due to the fact that the accounting based measures do not take into account or reflect 
differences in risk among different strategies (Appleyard, 1980 and Weston et al., 
1990). 
In order to assess any change in profitability as a result of a takeover it is 
normal to compare the reported post acquisition profits to the weighted average of the 
merging firms' pre bid profits. To allow for changes in profits brought about by factors 
independent of the acquisition, a comparison may be made to the performance of a 
sample of non-merging firms, or the performance of the companies' own industries. 
An important factor to be taken into consideration is that accounting figures should be 
adjusted for any change in accounting policies, to avoid bias. One way in which the 
acquiring firms may decide to change the accounting policies of the acquired firms 
after acquisition, is possibly to introduce different systems of depreciation and 
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revaluation (Singh and Whittington, 1968). The question of the effect of accounting 
policies arises due to the discretion available to accountants within any accepted 
framework of income measurement. For instance, accountants have discretion over 
the choice of depreciation provisions for fixed assets, the choice of valuing stock, the 
treatment of providing bad debts and future liabilities, the charge of research and 
development expenditures, each of which has an unequal impact on net assets. 
Thus, methodologies, which ignore such facts, may be biased. 
i 
Further, Griffiths (1986) implied that published accounts may not be a true and 
fair reflection of the company's financial position due to the creative accounting 
techniques applied by these companies on their accounts. Managers may carry out 
creative accounting techniques either to maximise the value of the firm or 
opportunistically to make the manager better off. Previous studies have shown that 
increase compensation (Healy, 1985 and Sloan, 1993) or reduce likelihood of 
management turnover (Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993) create incentives for 
opportunistic managers to pursue income-increasing accounting methods to inflate 
profits85. However, some empirical studies provide evidence that some actions 
identified as opportunism can be interpreted as occurring for efficiency reasons 
(Sweeney, 1994, and Christie and Zimmerman, 1994)86. 
Meeks (1971), Meeks and Meeks (1981) and Hughes (1993) in UK, and 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) in US argued that certain profitability measures in 
measuring post acquisition efficiency have the potential for leading to biased 
inferences. For example, when 'the rate of return on equity' or 'the rate of return on 
total net assets' are used as performance measures, a problem may arise over the 
=s Sweeny (1994) found troubled firms that are close to default on their debt obligations have incentives to take income-increasing actions in the five years before default (to avoid the costs of a breach) than do managers of firms that do not default. "Opportunism 'occurs when a manager's decision increases the manager's wealth, but does not create 
a net increase in aggregate wealth' (Christie and Zimmerman, 1994, p. 541). 
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accounting conventions used (whether the acquisition accounting or merger 
accounting method)". For example, the valuation of the acquired firm's assets in the 
post acquisition consolidated accounts may reflect the final price paid for the 
acquisition rather than the book value of the assets acquired. Generally, the purchase 
method gives rise to goodwill and the freezing of pre acquisition reserves. The bid 
price which is normally higher than the pre acquisition book value will increase the net 
assets base if goodwill is not written off immediately, resulting in higher depreciation, 
lower profits and lower ratio of net profits to net assets. Therefore, acquisition 
accounting produces a lower post acquisition profit compared to merger accounting 
and in relation to the weighted average of the pre bid profitability of the firms involved. 
The firm's profit rates may consequently reflect different accounting policies rather 
than different level of efficiency. However, Singh (1971) suggested that the extent of 
bias of such changes in asset valuation on returns is small. Given the high premium 
recorded for acquisitions in recent years the level of the bias of changes in accounting 
policies may be larger than Singh (1971) believed. In the study carried out by Meeks 
(1977) the net asset base of the combined company is adjusted by subtracting the 
increase in goodwill. 
Another difficulty in measuring post acquisition efficiency when using the rate 
of return on total assets arises in the year of acquisition (Meeks and Meeks, 1981 and 
Hughes, 1993). Meeks and Meeks (1981) calculated the rate of return on total assets 
in the year of acquisition as: 
rmy - Pqy + pry 
Y2 (Aa(r-1) + Av(y. l) + Aqy + Ay) 
"Meeks and Meeks (1981) set out a number of biases and distortions that affect particular profitability 
measures (e. g. profit-sales ratio and rate of return on equity). However, they recommended the rate of 
return on assets as a qualified indicator for averaging post acquisition efficiency. 
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where: 
rate of return on total asset for the combined firms (m) in the 
year of the acquisition (y) 
Pqy = bidders' profit after depreciation, before tax and long term 
interest in the year of acquisition (y), 
P,,, = targets' profit after depreciation, before tax and long term 
interest in the year of acquisition (y) 
A= net assets 
The 12 months profit for the target and bidder is divided by the average net 
asset for the combined firms together. Since the target was not part of the 
amalgamation at the beginning of the year, only the target firm's profit (Py) for 
whatever proportion of the year the target has been taken over should be 
incorporated in the numerator and only the target's year-end assets are included in 
the denominator. Thus, reported profit may be biased either upwards or downwards 
relative to a measure for the acquisition year which incorporated all the earnings and 
both opening and closing assets. 
Another problem cited by Meeks and Meeks (1981) is when comparing the 
profit margin on sales of the combined firms with a weighted average of the target's 
and bidder's profit margin on sales before acquisition. The post bid sales margin may 
be biased downwards in the event of vertical acquisition since some sales are 
internalised and profits on them will be recorded pre bid but not post bid. These sales 
are those which had been made to the takeover partners as an independent company 
before takeover but are now internalised (inter-company sales). Thus, a reduction in 
profit margin on sales cannot be inferred as deterioration in efficiency since the inter- 
company profits have been excluded in the numerator. 
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Despite the considerable drawbacks, however, accounting data has often 
been used in US and UK in examining the pre and the long term profitability of 
acquisitions. Empirical work on both the pre and post acquisitions using accounting 
data is discussed in the following sections. 
5.3 Pre Acquisition Performance 
Accounting data can be used for comparing the pre acquisition characteristics 
of the various groups of merging and non-merging firms: acquiring and non-acquiring, 
acquiring and acquired, acquired and non-acquired. Financial characteristics of the 
participants in corporate acquisitions are normally measured prior to acquisition to 
determine which financial variables appeared to be the most affected by the takeover. 
One approach is to compare financial characteristics of the various groups on a 
univariate basis. A second approach is to develop a multivariate model that attempts 
to classify companies into various groups based on a number of financial 
characteristics. Accounting data may also be used to develop a predictive model by 
which the likelihood of takeover could be assessed for any given firm, on the basis of 
its pre bid financial characteristics. Distinguishable features which set apart the 
acquired firms from those which are not acquired can be determined, for example 
size, liquidity, profitability, and gearing. 
For a sample of 77 companies making a single horizontal acquisition in UK 
during the period 1954-60, Singh (1971) studied the pre acquisition characteristics of 
acquired firms and compared them with those of the surviving firms, using accounting 
ratios, rate of return on capital (usually total or net assets) as measurement variables. 
Using both univariate and multivariate statistical analysis, Singh (1971) found that 
acquired firms tended to have low profitability, low growth and low valuation ratios 
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when compared with non-acquired firms88. Singh (1971) also analysed the 
characteristics of the acquiring firms and compared them with those of the acquired 
firms, and non-acquiring firms°®. He found evidence that the acquiring firms are 
significantly larger, more dynamic, higher rate of growth but less liquidity than either 
the acquired or the non-acquiring firms90. Singh (1971) also note that the acquiring 
firms were significantly more profitable than the acquired firms but with similar 
profitability to non-acquiring firms. Growth was identified as the most important 
distinguishing feature between the acquiring and non-acquiring firms whereas 
profitability was found to be the most important discriminator between the acquired 
and non-acquired firms. Thus, the result indicate that the acquiring firms possess the 
characteristics of a 'growth-minded' firm where the takeover process may actually 
encourage managers in large corporation to concentrate even more on size rather 
than profitability91. In his later study in assessing the efficiency of the takeover 
mechanism for the period 1967-70, Singh (1975) reported that the uprofitable firms 
taken over exist only for small size firms rather than the large ones. The takeover 
process was therefore seen to provide a measure of discipline for unprofitable small 
firms but not for unprofitable large firms. Singh argued that firms can reduce their 
probability of being taken over by increasing their relative size without increasing their 
rate of profit. In fact, the takeover mechanism may actually encourage large relatively 
unprofitable firms to increase their size by acquiring other companies. 
A similar study was carried out by Meeks (1977) to examine the pre 
acquisition characteristics of 233 acquiring and acquired firms during the period 1964- 
as Singh (1971) defined valuation ratio as the ratio of the stock market value of a firm's equity to the book value of its net assets. 
a9 Singh (1971) investigated the profitability of 77 horizontal acquisitions, splitting them into five industry groups and then measured the average profitability (accounting ratios) for each industry and for all industries. 
90 The acquiring firms have all the attributes of a 'growth-minded' firms - higher retention ratio, higher gearing ratio and less liquidity. 
91 A growth-minded firm 'retains a greater proportion of profits, is more highly geared and less liquid than the average non-acquiring or the average acquired firm' (Singh, 1971, p. 166). 
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1972. In common with the findings of Singh (1971), Meeks (1977) found that the 
acquiring firms are significantly bigger than the acquired firms and that the profitability 
of the acquiring firms are higher than their industry average for each of the three 
years prior to the acquisition. However, the acquired firms are said to be an 'average 
performer in terms of profitability' as compared to their industry average over the 
same period. Results reported by Meeks (1977) suggest that the takeover 
mechanism has been an imperfect disciplinarian in ensuring efficient utilisation of the 
existing assets of the firm since it 'does not appear to have singled out the 
unprofitable as victims; and small size rather than low profitability appears to have 
been the characteristic' of the acquired firms. 
Comparison of pre acquisition characteristics of acquiring, acquired and 
control group companies was also undertaken by Cosh et at. (1980) for takeovers 
made in the period 1967-69. A summary of their results are shown in Table 5.1 
Similar to the results obtained by Meeks (1977) and Singh (1971), acquiring firms are 
on average larger in size, have higher leverage ratios and faster growth rate than 
acquired firms and the control group when measured on a univariate basis92. 
Somewhat different from the result of Singh (1971), they report that there is little 
difference in the average profitability of acquiring and acquired firms. They interpret 
their findings as evidence that there may be more than one motive for acquisitions but 
that takeovers may not be an effective mechanism for resource allocation. 
92 Control group companies are those that neither acquired nor acquiring any other companies. 
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Table 5.1 
Summary of comparative characteristics of acquiring, acquired, and 
control group companies in the period immediately prior to takeover 
Variable Results 
Size AG > AD Z Others 
Profitability Others > AD; Others Z AG; AG z AD 
Profits Variability AD > Others; AD z AG 
Growth AG > AD; AG > Others ; -> 
AD 
Leverage AG > AD > Others 
Notes: 
>- connotes statistically significant and quantitatively relatively important difference between 
the group 
2- indicates statistically insignificant or quantitatively small difference 
AG - the acquiring companies 
AD - the acquired companies 
Others - the control group companies, which neither were acquired nor acquiring any other 
companies 
Source: Cosh, Hughes and Singh (1980, p. 248) 
In determining why some takeover bids give rise to acquisition while others 
do not, Holl and Pickering (1988) analyse a total of 282 UK firms over the period 
1965-76. The variables use to describe the financial characteristics of each firm are 
size (based on net assets), growth of net assets, rate of return on net assets and rate 
of return on equity assets, dividend return on equity assets, retention ratio, gearing 
ratio and liquidity ratio. One of the main findings was that acquired target companies 
tended to be smaller in size, have lower growth rates and be less profitable than their 
acquirers and also in comparison with target companies not taken over. Their result is 
consistent with the hypothesis that firms which do not perform well on either 
managerial or shareholder criteria will be taken over. However, successful bidders 
were identified as those which have faster growth, greater liquidity, higher gearing but 
do not have superior profitability to unsuccessful bidders. Thus, the result indicates 
that the influence of managerial variables (fast growth) and financial variables are the 
key to a successful takeover bid rather than shareholder profitability. Similarly, Taffler 
and Holl (1991) found little evidence that the capital market is able to exercise control 
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over allocation of capital resources. In exploring the financial performance of 55 
cases of abandoned acquisitions in UK during the period 1977-81, they find that the 
bidders do not appear to be more profitable than their targets either in successful or 
abandoned bids. Neither did the targets in abandoned bids exhibit superior pre bid 
profitability performance to targets in completed bids. 
In US, the published evidence is also mixed, although it lends little support to 
a theory of the takeover mechanism being an important disciplinary device in 
acquiring the least 'efficient'. For instance, Mueller (1980) in a study on 287 acquired 
companies (including 28 horizontal acquisitions) over the period 1962-72, found that 
the acquired companies had slightly higher pre acquisition returns on assets than 
non-merging control groups, and nearly a percentage point higher than the average 
return in their home industries. Similar to the findings by Singh (1971,1975) in UK, 
Mueller (1980) reports that acquiring firms have greater growth rates and leverage 
ratios than non-acquiring firms, indicating that acquiring firms are more aggressive 
and growth oriented than non-acquiring firms. The acquiring firms however achieved 
no difference in profitability on assets but much lower profit-to-sales ratio than that of 
the acquired companies in the year before acquisition. Acquiring firms were also 
larger in size, had greater growth rates and higher leverage ratios than the acquired 
firms and non-acquiring firms. Thus, Mueller (1980, p. 297) concludes that a possible 
motive for acquisition is 'to reduce the riskiness of the acquiring companies' debt- 
equity position and/or to allow for an expansion of debt outstanding'. 
Several studies have developed takeover target prediction models using 
publicly available financial information in identifying the characteristics of firms subject 
to takeover bids. Examples are Palepu (1986), Mork et al. (1988) and Barber et al. 
(1995) in US and Powell (1997) in UK. Knowledge of these characteristics may be 
useful in casting some light upon the motives underlying takeover and may provide a 
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basis for an investment strategy whereby firms with high estimated probabilities of 
takeovers are invested in. 
In examining a sample of 163 targets and 256 non-targets in US during the 
period 1971-1979, Palepu (1986) report that only average excess return, growth- 
resource variables and size variables give significant results93. The results indicate 
that poorer share market performance and smaller size are likely to increase a firm's 
probability of becoming a target. Further, firms with mismatch between growth and 
resources, that is, low-growth, resource-rich firms (high liquidity and low leverage) 
and high-growth, resource-poor firms (low liquidity and high leverage) are more likely 
acquisition candidate. Palepu also provide evidence that the prediction models are 
not superior to that of the stock market in predicting acquisition targets as claimed by 
earlier studies94 
Morck et at. (1988) who examined 40 hostile and 42 friendly acquisitions 
between 1981 to 1985 provide evidence that the characteristics of hostile and friendly 
targets differ significantly95. Target firms that are smaller, older, slower growth rates, 
lower Tobin's Q, more debt, and less investment than the average firms face a higher 
likelihood of a hostile takeover9'. Targets of a friendly takeover are smaller, younger, 
and have comparable Tobin's Q and growth rates to the average firm, indicating 
93 Among the variables used in Palepu's (1986) study are average excess return, return on equity, 
annual rate of change in the firm's net sales, growth-resource variables, industry variables, size 
variables, market-to-book ratio and price-earnings ratio. Average excess return and return on equity are 
used as proxy for management inefficiency. Growth-resource variable is used to determine if firms 
with a mismatch between their growth and the financial resources are likely targets. Market-to-book 
variables is to determine if firms whose market values are low compared to their book values are likely 
acquisition targets. Size variables and price-earnings variables are to determine if the likelihood of 
acquisition decreases with the size of the firm and increases with low price earning ratios, respectively. 
" Earlier studies (example Belkoui, 1978 and Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984) claimed that acquisition 
targets can be accurately predicted by models using public data six to twelve months prior to takeover 
announcements. 
9' An acquisition is classified as hostile if a target firm tried to reject the initial interest of acquiring firm in an acquisition. All other firms not considered hostile are categorised as friendly. % Morck et al. (1988) measured Tobin's Q as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the 
replacement of its tangible assets. Tobin's Q is used as a proxy for growth opportunities, quality of 
management and monopoly power. 
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characteristics of synergistic takeovers. In addition, targets of a friendly takeover have 
higher boardshare ownership than hostile targets and other firms not taken over. 
Barber et al. (1995) similarly found that the characteristics of friendly and hostile 
acquisitions differ when they examined 71 acquisitions (31 conglomerates and 40 
non-conglomerates) during the period 1 January 1963 and 31 December 1968. The 
conglomerate and non-conglomerate targets in hostile acquisitions had similar 
characteristics when both types of acquisitions had significant low Q ratios (-1.93 and 
-1.16, respectively), consistent with the hypothesis that disciplining inefficient 
management is the motivating force for hostile takeovers97. The friendly acquisitions 
on the other hand, earn significant high returns on equity but Q ratios that are not 
significantly different from non-targets. In addition, the targets of friendly acquisitions 
have low PIE ratio, indicating that the bidders reason for acquiring these targets is to 
increase their earnings per share, and not for disciplinary motives. 
In developing a model of takeover likelihood in UK, Powell (1997) examines 
411 targets and 532 non-target firms for the period 1984 to 1991. Powell (1997) 
confirms the findings of earlier studies that the characteristics of acquired firms differ 
from-those of non-acquired firms. Similar to the findings by Morck et at. (1988) and 
Barber et at. (1995), Powell (1997) also provides evidence that the characteristics of 
hostile and friendly targets differ significantly. Based on binomial models (treating 
hostile and friendly targets as a single group), he reports that liquidity, size and free 
cash flow were important determinants of takeover likelihood during the period 1984- 
91. Similar to the argument made by Jensen (1986), firms that have accumulated 
large free cash flow which are not returned to investors are the most likely targets. 
Prior performance as measured by either return on capital employed or market-to- 
book ratios show insignificant results. Based on the multinomial model (separating 
97 Q ratios in the study by Barber et al. (1995) is defined as the sum of market value of equity, the book 
value of debt and the liquidating value of preferred stock divided by the book value of total assets. 
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hostile and friendly takeovers into separate groups), Powell (1997) document that the 
larger the firm's size, the lower the firm's liquidity, the lower the firm's profitability and 
the higher the firm's market-to-book ratios, the higher the likelihood of a hostile 
takeover of a firm for the period 1984-9198. On the other hand, the likelihood of a 
friendly takeover is higher when the firm is smaller and leverage higher. The results 
indicate that inefficient management and target undervaluation hypothesis are more 
likely to be prevalent in hostile takeovers99. 
Hay and Liu (1998) provide evidence that acquiring firms with high profit rate, 
generating increasing cash flow and enjoying rising valuation ratios are more likely to 
make acquisitions. In examining the behaviour of 110 UK manufacturing firms during 
the period 1981 to 1989, Hay and Liu (1998) found positive coefficient on profit rate 
(gross post tax operating rates excluding depreciation and interest payments) and 
negative coefficients on debt/asset ratio, of 0.499 and -1.04, respectively100. The 
results indicate that a firm with high forecast of cash flow and low debt/asset ratio are 
more likely to make acquisitions, consistent with Jensen's (1986) cash flow theory 
that excess cash flows in the hands of management which are not needed to pay 
debt interest or dividend to shareholders are used to make acquisitions. A positive 
coefficient on the valuation ratio (market value) also indicates that investors are 
confident in the acquiring firms' management and likely to be favourable to the 
acquired firms' shareholders when the bid is made1 '. 
98 The accounting rate of return (ROCE) and the market value of a firm to the replacement cost of its 
assets (market-to-book ratios) are used to proxy managerial performance. It is hypothesised that firms 
with low profitability and low market-to-book ratios are likely targets. " Powell (1997) postulates that the use of the multinomial framework is superior to a binomial framework in modelling takeover likelihood. 10° Hay and Liu (1998) used profit rate as proxy for cash flow and debtlasset ratio as cash flow at the discretion of management after debt interest payment is paid for. 10' Valuation ratio is based on the ratio of market value to replacement value of assets, and market 
share. 
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In examining the relation between managerial turnover and performance, 
Mikkelson and Partch (1997) compare the performance of 200 US companies during 
an active takeover market (1984-1988) and a less active takeover market (1989- 
1993). They find that there are significantly higher frequencies of turnover among the 
lowest quartile of performers (measured by operating income scaled by assets) in the 
more active takeover period102. The rate of complete turnover of top management 
among the lowest quartile of performers is 33%, more than double the turnover rate 
among the highest quartile of performers (16%) in the active takeover years103. In the 
less active takeover period, the rate of complete turnover is 17% in the lowest quartile 
of performers and there is no significant association between the rate of senior 
management turnover and firm performance. Mikkelson and Partch (1997) conclude 
that a high level of takeover activity facilitates the replacement of managers of poorly 
performing firms and that corporate managers face less pressure to maximise value 
when the takeover activity diminishes. 
5.4 Post Acquisition Performance 
A number of studies have examined the post acquisition performance of the 
combined firm to identify whether or not corporate acquisitions provide long-run 
economic benefits. An assessment of the company performance is possible either by 
comparing the post acquisition profits of the target and bidding companies over a pre 
acquisition period with consolidated profits over a post acquisition period, or by 
comparison between merged and non-merging companies over the same period, in 
order to eliminate economic factors which would affect general profitability. A review 
102 Operating income is pre-tax operating income before deducting interest and depreciation. Assets are 
total book value of assets. 
pos Complete turnover is defined as a change in the set of individuals who hold the top three offices of 
chief executive officer, president and chair of the board. To achieve complete turnover in their study, 
no individual should be holding any of the top three offices from the beginning to the end of the 5 
years. 
of previous empirical work of post acquisition performance that uses accounting data 
is summarised in Table 5.2 (a) and (b). Similar to the results on event studies in the 
previous chapter, the outcome of the studies that use accounting data is ambiguous. 
Studies in the US, including those by Lorie and Halpern (1970) and Lev and 
Mendelker (1972) have found that merger active firms perform significantly better 
than less merger active or non-merging firms. Studies by Healy et al. (1992) and 
Jarrell (1995) have reported a significant increase in post acquisition performance of 
the merged firms. Ghosh (1998) also reported an improvement in post acquisition 
performance of merged firms, depending on the benchmark used. Ravenscraft and 
Scherer (1987), Phillippatos and Baird (1996), Denis et al. (1997) and Harford (1999) 
however, provide evidence that the merging firms are less profitable than their non- 
merging firms. Some studies in UK indicate that on average post acquisition 
accounting profitability of the acquiring companies are 'disappointing' (Singh, 1971, 
Utton, 1974, Meeks, 1977 and Dickerson et al., 1997) whilst studies by Cosh et al. 
(1980), Holl and Pickering (1988) and Manson et al. (1994) show that acquiring firm 
profitability either increased, or remained the same following acquisition. 
Table 5.2 (a) 
Summary of post acquisition performance using 'Accounting' studies in US 
Author, Sample 







Summary of Results on 
Merged Firms 
Lorie and Halpern 115 Takeovers Non-merging Average rates of return for 
(1970) Rates of return firms in same conglomerate mergers 
1955-1967 Industry higher 1 and 2 years after 
merger than average return US for large companies 
Lev and Mandelker 69 Takeovers Non-merging Net income to total assets (1972) Net income to firms in same significantly higher for 1947 -1968 total assets Industry merging firms. 
US 
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Author, Sample Sample Size Controls Summary of Results on 
Period and Country and Main Used Merged Firms 
Examined Variables 
Mueller (1980) 287 Takeovers Non-merging Pre-tax profit rates of the 
1962 - 72 Pretax profit firms in same merging firm are lower than 
on net assets Industry industry averages for all 




Ravenscraft and 471 Takeovers Non-merging Acquiring companies earn 
Scherer (1987b) Operating firms in a lower profitability as 
1975 -1977 income over specific line compared to control groups 
assets of business over the three years 1975 - 
US 1977 
Healy, Palepu and 50 Takeovers Industry Merged firms have higher 
Ruback (1992) Operating adjusted pre post bid operating cash flow 
1979 - mid-1984 cash flows and post on assets than their 
over market takeover industries. Median industry 
US value of assets performance adjusted operating returns 
for the merged firms are 
3.0% in year 1,5.3% in 
year 2,3.2% in year 3, and 
3.0% in year 4, all 
significantly different from 
zero. 
Clark and Ofek (1994) 38 acquisitions Industry Median industry adjusted 
1981 -1988 of distressed adjusted for the combined firms are 
firms targeted -0.1% in year 1, -1.5% in US for year 2, and -0.4% in year 3 
restructuring relative to the year of 
acquisition completion 





Author, Sample Sample Size Controls Summary of Results on 
Period and Country and Main Used Merged Firms 
Examined Variables 
Jarrell (1995) 130 completed Firm-specific Merged firms earn a 
1973 -1985 takeovers analyst significant post 
46 cancelled forecasts performance of -5.2% in 
US takeovers year +1, an insignificant - 
ratio of net 7.1 % in year +2. Over the 
income to longer term (average of 4- 
sales 6 years) merged firms 
experience a significant 
improvement in post 
performance of 10.9% than 
it would have been without 
the merger. 
Philippatos and Baird 71 mergers Relative to Combined firms earn lower 
111 (1996) and tender industry post acquisition 
1973-1987 offers averages performance relative to 
Ratio of their industry 
US market value 
to book value 
of total assets 
Anand and Singh 289 Industry Consolidation-oriented 
(1997) acquisitions in adjusted pre acquisitions earning higher 
1986 -1992 declining and post operating cash flow than 
industries takeover diversification-oriented 
US Operating performance acquisitions in declining 
cash flows industries. 
over market 
value of assets 
Healy, Palepu and 50 Takeovers Industry Merged firms earn 
Ruback (1997) Operating adjusted pre insignificant industry 
1979 - mid-1984 cash flows and post adjusted cash flow returns. 
over market takeover Friendly acquisitions 
US value of assets performance involving payment by 
shares in overlapping 
business earn significant 
returns. 
Hostile acquisitions 
involving cash payment in 











Summary of Results on 
Merged Firms 
Ghosh (1998) 232 takeovers Industry Median industry adjusted 
1981 -1992 Operating adjusted pre cash flow significantly 
cash flow over and post increase from pre 
US market value takeover acquisition of 3.00 to 3.10 
of assets performance in post acquisition period 
Median size and industry 
Annual size adjusted cash flow 
and Industry decreases from 1.48% 
adjusted pre three years prior to 
and post acquisition to 0.62% three 
takeover years post acquisition 
performance 
Harford (1999) 19 Industry Industry Merged firms earn 
1950 -1994 groupings adjusted pre insignificant negative 
cash flow over and post abnormal post acquisition 
US market value takeover performance of -0.7% 
of assets performance 
Cash and Merged firms earn 
Industry significant negative 
adjusted pre abnormal post acquisition 
and post performance of -0.9% 
takeover 
performance 
Table 5.2 (b) 
Summary of post acquisition performance using `Accounting' studies in UK 
Author, Sample 







Summary of Results on 
Merged Firms 
Singh (1971) 77 Takeovers Against non- 66.2% of firms experienced 
1954-1960 pre-tax merging lower adjusted profitability 
profitability on firms in same in the year of acquisition, 
UK net assets Industry 66% and 57.1 % suffered 
declines in profitability one 
year and two years, 
respectively, after 
acquisition. 
Utton (1974) 39 Takeovers Against non- 58% of the takeover 1954-1965 pre-tax merging intensive firms experience 
profitability on firms in same below median profitability UK net assets Industry both one and two years 
after takeover. 
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Author, Sample Sample Size Controls Summary of Results on 
Period and Country and Main Used Merged Firms 
Examined Variables 
Meeks (1977) 233 Takeovers Against non- Firms experience relative 
1964 -1972 rate of return merging decline in profitability from - 
on assets firms in same 5.3% in the year after 
UK Industry acquisition to a further 
decline of -7.3% seven 
years after acquisition. 
Cosh, Hughes and 290 Takeovers Against non- Significant relative 
Singh (1980) Net income on merging improvements in post 
1967 -1969 net assets firms in same acquisition profitability 
Post tax Industry or found for all takeovers for 
UK income on Industry two measures of 
equity assets averages profitability. 
Holl and Pickering 282 takeovers Matching Successful acquiring 
(1988) Rate of returns abandoned companies perform less 
1965 -1976 on net assets and actual profitability and have lower UK acquisitions financial performance than 
unsuccessful companies. 
Manson, Stark and 38 Takeovers Industry On average operating gains 
Thomas (1994) operating cash adjusted pre are significantly positive at 
1985 -1987 flow on market and post the 5% level and the gains 
value of assets performance are expected to persist for 
UK five years. 
Dickerson, Gibson 613 acquirers Against non- Company growth through 
' and Tsakalotos (1997) making 1443 acquiring acquisition will increase its 
1948 -1977 acquisitions firms profitability by 0.2% 
UK Rate of return Company growth through 
on assets internal investment will 
increase its profitability by 
6.9% 
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5.4.1 US Studies 
Earlier studies by Weston and Mesinghka (1971) found that arithmetic mean 
growth in total assets, sales, net income, earnings per share, market price was higher 
for the conglomerate firms when they were compared to non-conglomerate control 
samples, demonstrating superior performance with respect to both managerial and 
shareholders interests. Weston et at. (1972) also found that conglomerate firms for 
the period 1960-1969 were successful in Improving returns. However, Mueller (1980) 
reported that the pre-tax profit rates (either on assets, sales or equity) of the 
combined firms relative to their industries were found to be lower after acquisition 
than before for all three-profit measures, indicating a deterioration in the operating 
performance of the combined firms. Mueller (1980) also found declines in the rates of 
return on the acquiring companies' shares over the period of acquisition and three 
subsequent years, which further strengthen the conclusion that acquisitions are not 
beneficial to the acquiring firms. 
In a more recent study of the effects of US mergers of the 1950s, 1960sß and 
early 1970s, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987b) used 'line of business' in monitoring 
the performance of the acquired company after acquisition. Although their sample 
encompasses acquisitions in manufacturing firms from 1950 to 1977, post acquisition 
performance is examined only in the years 1974 to 1977, for which the line of 
business data is available. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987b) found that target firms 
were statistically more profitable, 8.18% higher than the industry average over all 
three years prior to acquisition. They measured profitability as the ratio of annual 
operating income to total end-of-period assets104. By contrast, the acquiring firms who 
had acquired profitable target firms did not fare very well after acquisition. Over the 
1" Operating income is computed before income taxes, extraordinary charges or credits, and interest charges (or income). 
three years 1975-77, the acquiring firms post acquisition profits was barely above that 
of the control group, and even in the best year 1977, it was much lower than the 
average target unit's pre acquisition level. Their results provide evidence that merging 
firms are usually less profitable than their non-merging counterparts and produces 
evidence which contradicts the theory of takeovers as an efficiency-increasing 
mechanism. 
In a further study, Philippatos and Baird III (1996) test the hypothesis that if 
firms with high performance make value increasing acquisitions, then the post 
acquisition performance should be positively related to the acquiring firm's pre 
acquisition performance1 '. They also hypothesise that if more value can be created 
from taking over poorly-performing companies, then the post acquisition performance 
of the combined firms should be negatively correlated to the target's pre acquisition 
performance. The results of an empirical investigation of 71 acquisitions completed 
from 1973 through 1987 do not however support these hypotheses. They found that 
the change in the combined firms' excess value of sales (EVS) is negatively 
correlated with the acquiring firm's pre acquisition relative EVS and not correlated 
with the acquired firm's pre acquisition performance. Except for the first post 
acquisition year, Philippatos and Baird (1996) also found that the mean and median in 
the combined firms' change in value (pV) are insignificantly positive. In fact, post 
acquisition performance falls relative to changes in industry EVS, consistent with 
earlier findings by Mueller (1980) and Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987b) that firms 
1" Post acquisition performance is defined in terms of the change in the combined firms' excess value. Excess value is the difference between the market value and the book value of the firm, and the change is measured annually from the pre acquisition period through the third year subsequent to acquisition. Excess value represents the capitalised value of the expected stream of future excess profit or loss 
arising when price differs from average cost. 
EVS - (Market Value - Book Value)/Net Sales Market value of common equity is defined as the average of the annual high and low stock prices 
multiplied by the number of common shares outstanding. Pre acquisition profitability is measured in tenons of return on total capital as follows: ROC - (Cash flow - tax)/Total Capital 
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involved in acquisitions on average do not exhibit improvement in their post 
acquisition performance. Philippatos and Baird III (1996, p. 51) conclude that 
acquisitions by well performing acquirers that does not show any improvements in 
their post acquisition performance may be driven by hubris, and acquisitions by 
poorly-performing firms may be viewed as 'a means of mitigating the factors that 
relegate them to undesirable competitive positions'. 
5.4.2 UK Studies 
As mentioned earlier in Section 5.3, Singh (1971) found that acquiring firms 
had better performance records than target firms prior to the bid. In analysing the 
profitability of the acquiring firms after takeover Singh (1971) found that in a majority 
of cases the profitability of the acquiring firms decline in the year of takeover through 
2 years after takeover. The results indicate that it is very unlikely that the takeover 
process leads to a more profitable utilisation of the existing assets of the firms. 
However, one of the limitations of Singh's study is that no tests of statistical 
significance were reported, thus leaving the possibility that the results achieved are 
due to chance. In a similar study, Utton (1974) compared the profitability of 39 
companies which were classified as intensive acquirers with that of a group of 
companies that grew through internal expansion, using the reported pre-tax profit as a 
percentage of net assets as a measure of profitability. The results obtained show that 
over the periods 1961-65 and 1966-70, the average profitability of the takeover 
intensive sample was lower than that of the internal-growth group. The average 
profitability of the takeover intensive firms fell from 13.6% to 11.5% and the control 
group from 15.4% to 14.2%. Similarly there was no indication that the takeover 
intensive firms have performed significantly better than the industry average firms. 
However, Utton (1974) had used an unadjusted pre-tax profit performance so there 
might be a downward accounting bias in his results. In addition, as argued by Hughes 
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(1993), the industrial composition of the two groups of companies in Utton's study is 
not the same so there might be bias with acquisitions occurring more frequently in 
declining industries. 
Other UK studies (Meeks, 1977, Cosh et al., 1980 and Cosh et al., 1989) 
make attempts to deal with the problem of aggregation bias by comparing post 
acquisition profit of the combined firms with their weighted average pre acquisition 
profitability, either relative to their industry average or to size- and industry-matched 
non takeover firms. These studies also adjust for accounting changes. Meeks (1977) 
uses a comprehensive sample of 233 acquiring UK quoted companies (1964 to 
1972). He compared profitability in the year of the takeover and the following seven 
years, with that of the weighted-average profitability of the firms in the three years 
prior to the takeover. He makes adjustments for accounting bias due to the 
revaluation of the merged firm and for external influences by measuring a firm's profit 
relative to its industry. Similar to the findings of Singh (1971) and Utton (1974) above, 
Meeks (1977) found that on average profitability showed a significant decline for the 
five years following the acquisition from the pre acquisition level, suggesting that 
acquisitions have a negative effect on profitability. Cosh et al. (1980) also found that 
the net income on net assets of the combined firms decline on average by a 
significant 0.25% three years after acquisition compared with five years before 
acquisition. Nevertheless, there was a larger significant decline in the profitability of 
the matched control group during the same period. Thus, the latter results provide 
evidence that the growth and profitability performance of the combined companies did 
not suffer a relative decline after acquisition, contrary to the results reported by Utton 
(1974) and Meeks (1977). However, the results in Cosh et al. 's (1980) study may also 
indicate that acquisitions occur in falling-profit industries. 
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In a study which compared the performance of companies involved in 
successful and failed bids, Holl and Pickering (1988) showed that the target and 
bidding companies that did not merge have better profitability than those that did 
merge for 3 years following acquisition. The results of univariate analysis show that 
the target and bidding companies in failed acquisitions obtain a significantly higher 
return on capital employed (4.3%) and return on equity (2.7%) than the target and 
bidding companies in successful acquisitions. Hoil and Pickering (1988) also find that 
target companies in failed acquisition have significant higher growth rate, higher 
return on capital employed, higher return on equity and retention ratio over the 3 
years following the acquisition bid compared to 3 years before the bid. The results 
indicate that acquisition does not seem to have a favourable effect on relative 
performance of the merged firms but suggest that the threat of takeover may have 
been a spur to efficiency Improvement on the part of a target company not taken over. 
In a more recent study, Dickerson et at. (1997) provide evidence that growth 
by acquisition rather than growth through internal investment has a detrimental impact 
on company profitability. In analysing the impact of acquisition on profitability of 2,941 
UK quoted companies during the period 1948-77, Dickerson et al. (1997) found that 
the mean rate of return on assets (pre-tax profit as a proportion of average net 
assets) of acquirers was significantly negative and 2.4% below that of non- 
acquirers106. They also found that on average profitability increased by almost 6.9% in 
the long run through internal growth relative to only 0.2% by acquisition growth. Thus, 
their results are consistent with previous studies above which suggest that acquisition 
has* a negative long term effect on company performance as measured by 
profitability. 
106 The acquisition has a negative effect on the rate of return even after controlling for firm and time specific effects. 
5.4.3 Cash Flow Analysis 
Unlike previous studies. Healy et al. (1992) used operating cash flow as a 
profit measuret°'. They undertook an analysis of the post acquisition cash flows and 
overall performance of the 50 largest acquisitions in the US between 1979 and 1984. 
Performance is defined as the pre tax operating cash flow returns on the market value 
of total assets1° . This measure is selected in order to avoid 
diluting the results with 
the impact of financing of the acquisition (stock versus cash) or the method of 
accounting for the transaction (pooling versus purchasing). Healy et al. (1992) report 
that the combined firms earn significantly positive median industry adjusted operating 
returns of 3% in the year after acquisition, 5.3% two years after, 3.2% three years 
after and 3% after four years, higher than their industries' returns. Only year 5 shows 
insignificant returns of 2.5% higher than the industry. The percentage of companies 
with positive industry adjusted returns in each of the 5 post acquisition years is above 
50%. The annual median return in the five post acquisition years is reported as 2.8%, 
which is about 16% larger than their industries' returns, and 73% of the industry 
adjusted cash flow returns were positive'09. They also reported that the improvement 
in post acquisition cash flow returns is not the result of cutting back on capital 
expenditures and research and development expenditures1°. 
1" Besides focusing on acquisitions, studies that use operating cash flow measure on management 
buyouts include Kaplan (1989) and Smith (1990). Kaplan (1989) presents evidence that management 
buyouts for the period between 1980 and 1986 experience post-buyout operating improvements and 
value increases. The larger median net cash flow in the fast three post-buyout years than in the last 
pre-buyout year is due to both a large increase in operating income and a decrease in capital 
expenditure. They also find that the changes in operating income and net cash flow are correlated 
(although not uniformly) with the market-adjusted returns. 
1O' Ilealy et al. (1992) defined operating cash flow as sales, minus cost of goods sold and selling and 
administrative expensm plus depreciation and goodwill expenses. Market value of assets comprise of 
market value of equity plus book value of net debt. 10' 1lealy et al. calculate the percentage increase relative to the industry as 2.81(20.5.2.8). 10 Capital outlays and research and development expenditures are determined as a percentage of the 
market value of assets at the beginning of the year, respectively. 
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In a later study, Healy et at. (1997) found that acquisitions are break-even 
investments on average, given actual premiums paid to targets. Using the same 
sample of 50 acquiring firms, Healy et at. (1997) report that the median industry 
adjusted operating returns are insignificant in years 1,3,4 and 5 after acquisition. 
The overall median annual post acquisition returns for the 5 years was insignificantly 
different from their industry returns, indicating that the acquirers did not generate any 
additional returns beyond those needed to recover the premium paid. Breaking up the 
sample into friendly (12) and hostile (14) takeovers, Healy et at. (1997) found that 
friendly acquisitions earn significant positive industry adjusted post acquisition cash 
flow returns of 3.2% while hostile takeovers earn insignificantly negative (-1.2%) 
returns"'. The results suggest that hostile acquirers had to pay higher premiums than 
friendly acquirers, thus, earn lower returns. 
In a similar study to that by Healy et al. (1992), Manson et al. (1994) 
investigated 38 UK takeovers between 1985 to 1987. The 5-year median operating 
cash flow of the acquirer is compared to the median cash flow that could be expected 
of the target and acquiring firms12. Their findings also indicate that merged firms have 
significant improvements in operating cash flow. Similar to the results in the study by 
Healy et al. (1992,1997), Manson et al. (1994) also found a strong positive relation 
between post acquisition increase in cash flow and total abnormal returns to the two 
firms during the bid. The results indicate that the stock market correctly anticipates 
and capitalises the expected improvements in cash flow from acquisition. Manson et 
al. (1994, p. 17) conclude that previous studies in UK that have used accounting data 
to estimate operating gains from takeovers 'have been subject to systematic 
'11 Healy et al. (1997) defined friendly or strategic takeovers as those transactions involving share 
payment for firms in overlapping businesses while hostile or financial takeovers as involving cash 
payments in unrelated businesses. 
U2 In contrast to that used by Healy et al. (1992), operating cash flow is defined by Manson et al. (1994) as pre-depreciation profit adjusted for changes in working capital (i. e., changes in stocks, trade debtors and non-tax prepayments less changes in creditors and non-tax, non-interest accruals. 
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measurement problems that have biased the results of the test performed away from 
finding evidence of operating gains'. 
Similarly, Clark and Ofek (1994) uses operating cash flow in analysing post 
acquisition performance to examine the effectiveness of acquisition in the 
restructuring of distressed firms. A sample of 38 US acquisitions of distressed firms 
targeted for restructuring between 1981 and 1988 were examined. Unlike Healy et al. 
(1992) and Manson et al. (1994) who employ the ratio of operating cash flow to 
market value of assets, Clark and Ofek (1994) use operating cash flow to revenues"'. 
Unlike the results for acquisitions of healthy firms studied by Healy et al. (1992), 
performance of acquiring firms that acquired distressed targets show negative returns 
in the post acquisition period. Median industry adjusted operating returns are 
insignificant -0.1% in the year after acquisition, significant -1.5% two years after, 
insignificant =0.4% three years after. The percentage of total firms with cash flow 
higher than their industry decreases from 58 percent to 29 percent between year -1 
and year +2 relative to the acquisition year, suggesting that bidders are unable to 
successfully restructure distressed targets. In identifying the factors that determine 
the success or failure of the restructuring, Clark and Ofek (1994) found that bidder 
overpayment and higher levels of post acquisition leverage for the combined firm help 
explain the poor post restructuring performance. They also provide evidence that 
bidders are more likely to earn positive post acquisition returns from restructuring 
financially distressed targets than targets that are operationally distressed. As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, the post acquisition performance using share data also show 
that the combined firms experience poor share returns following acquisition. All five- 
"' Operating cash flow is defined as earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (EBITD) 
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performance measures in the study show that acquiring firms' shareholders lose, 
indicating that the results are not sensitive to the choice of performance measures' U. 
Anand and Singh (1997) also uses ex post acquisition operating performance 
measures in examining the differences in performance outcomes between 
diversification-oriented acquisition (no overlapping business units) and consolidation- 
oriented acquisitions (overlapping business units) in US declining industries for the 
period 1986-1992"s. Similar to the method employed by Healy et al. (1992), Anand 
and Singh (1997) also used pretax operating cash flows normalised by the market 
value of assets in measuring the realised effectiveness of acquisitions1". Book values 
of debt are used to calculate the market value of assets. In constructing the pre and 
post acquisition, up to 5 years of data were used (-5 to -1, and +1 to +5) where year 0 
being the year of acquisition. Results on the normalised operating cash flow show 
that consolidation-oriented acquisitions perform better (significant 14.11%) than 
diversification-oriented acquisitions (insignificant 8.91%) in declining industries. The 
results are consistent with those of Healy et al. (1992) who also document that 
operating performance with common business units on average improve following 
acquisitions. 
Ghosh (1998) is another study in US that use similar methodology employed 
by Healy et al. (1992,1997). In examining post acquisition performance of 232 
acquiring and target firms during the period 1981 to 1992, Ghosh (1998) found an 
improvement in the combined firms post acquisition operating cash flow returns 
"` The variables used to capture post acquisition performance of combined firms are beta-adjusted and industry adjusted share returns, and changes in cash flow. Other measures include annualised return to bidder on investment in target, and qualitative variable where success=l, marginal=O, and failure=-1. "s Diversification-oriented acquisitions involve diversifying the operations of the existing firms into new markets while consolidation-oriented acquisitions involve consolidating the operations of the existing firm within their industry, that is, through horizontal acquisitions. Operating cash flows are defined as sales minus cost of goods sold and selling and administrative expenses, plus depreciation and goodwill expenses. 
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relative to the industry median"'. However, when industry and size matched firms are 
used as a benchmark, there is no evidence of cash flow returns improvement for the 
combined firms following acquisitions1'. The 3-years annual median size and industry 
adjusted returns in the pre acquisition and post acquisition period is a significant 
1.48% and insignificant 0.62%, respectively, as evidence of no improvement in the 
combined firms cash flow returns following acquisitions. 
Besides examining how market reacts to acquisition announcement by cash- 
rich US acquiring firms during the period 1977-1993, Harford (1999) also uses post 
acquisition operating performance to examine the outcome of the bid in the long run. 
The measure of operating performance used in his study is cash flow return on 
assets, similar to the measurement used by Healy et al. (1992). However, cash flow 
in his study is defined as operating cash flow to exclude income from short-term 
investments1°. The market value of total assets net of cash and short-term 
investments is used in the denominator, similar to that used by Healy et at. (1992). 
The adjusted performance of a cash-rich firm is obtained by subtracting the median 
performance of other cash-rich firms in its industry. Harford (1999) posits that the 
matching procedure used in his study, similar to Healy et al. (1992), allows for a direct 
comparison between performance of cash-rich firms that are involved in acquisitions 
and cash-rich firms that are not. The result of the regression of the adjusted post 
acquisition performance on adjusted pre acquisition performance shows that the 
adjusted post acquisition performance on all firms is negative. He further found that 
the cash-rich firms had significant negative post acquisition performance, consistent 
"' Similar to Healy et al. (1992,1997) and Anand and Singh (1994), cash flow returns are measured as 
sales minus cost of goods sold, selling and administrative expenses plus depreciation and goodwill, divided by market value of assets. "= Control firms are matched on acquiring and target firms' industry and size one year prior to 
acquisition. The same matched firms are used as a benchmark for post acquisition years. 19 Similar to the definition used by Dechow (1994), operating cash flow by Harford (1999) is 
calculated as operating income before depreciation minus interest minus taxes minus changes in non- 
cash working capital. 
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with the free cash flow hypothesis that acquisitions by cash-rich firms are value 
decreasing. 
The failure to use an appropriate benchmark in estimating post acquisition 
performance in previous studies using accounting data is further emphasised by 
Jarrell (1995). According to Jarrell, those studies supporting the theory that 
acquisitions improve long term accounting performance are limited to cases where 
such performance is measured relative to the firm's industry. That is, merged firms 
have lower profitability, but show significant improvement relative to their industries 
(examples include Cosh et al., 1980 and Healy et at., 1992 and 1997). In her study on 
130 mergers in US for the period 1973 - 85, Jarrell (1995) used an alternative method 
for measuring the benchmark that proxy for the performance of acquiring and target 
firms in the absence of the acquisition. Unlike Healy et al. (1992,1997), Clark and 
Ofek (1994) and Manson et at. (1994), who employ post acquisition industry 
performance benchmark, Jarrell (1995) incorporated as the benchmark firm-specific 
analyst forecasts of post-event performance but with the forecasts made during the 
pre bid period'20. The ratio of net income to sales is used as the performance variable 
in the study with the results indicating that takeovers improve the long term 
profitability of the combined firms. The performance of the merged firm is negative for 
the two-year period immediately following acquisition. Over the post acquisition period 
of 4 to 6 years, however, the combined firms experience a 10.9% improvement in 
performance over the predicted performance in the absence of takeover. The results 
were in contrast to those found for control portfolios of non-takeover firms and 
cancelled takeovers. The median difference between the unexpected performance of 
takeover firms and the unexpected performance for the control firms is negative in the 
120 These forecast of performance represent expert evaluations of the likely impact of the factors unique to the firm and unrestricted forecasts of expected long term performance, including those that may implicitly make the firm more or less likely to merge. 
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first 2 years and significantly positive of 15.8% over the post takeover years 4 to 6121. 
Jarrell (1995, p. 21) inferred that the results are consistent with merging firms having 
absorbed the initial costs of the takeover, then realising improvements in the long 
term performance as the firm's 'assets or operations have been efficiently 
redeployed'. 
5.5 Summary 
The first section of the chapter examines evidence relating to the comparative 
financial characteristics of target and bidding firms. Examples of studies that find 
acquiring firms are on average larger in size, have higher leverage ratios and faster 
growth rate than acquired firms include those of Singh (1971), Meeks (1977), Cosh et 
at. (1980), Holl and Pickering (1988) and Taffler and Holl (1991) in UK and Mueller 
(1980) in US. Acquired companies, on average, have lower short-term profitability 
growth records and are smaller, less dynamic, and are less highly valued than 
companies on average but they are not always less profitable. Meeks (1977), Cosh et 
al. (1980) and Taffler and Holl (1991) in UK, and Mueller (1980) in US found that 
acquiring firms are not always more profitable as compared either to companies in 
general or to target firms. The results indicate that takeovers may not be an effective 
mechanism for resource allocation. Singh (1971,1975) and Holl and Pickering (1988) 
found that acquired companies have low profitability either compared against non- 
acquired firms or against the acquiring firms. This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that firms which do not performed well will be taken over. Morck et al. 
(1988) and Mikkelson and Patch (1997) in US also provide evidence that takeover 
activity facilitates the replacement of managers of poorly performing firms. Further, 
Palepu (1986), Morck et al. (1988), Barber et al. (1995) and Powell (1997) argue that 
the smaller the size of the firm the greater the probability of becoming a target. Other 
121 The result for year 3 was not provided in the study. 
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important determinants of takeover likelihood include firms with growth-resource 
imbalance, liquidity and large free cash flow. Morck et al. (1988), Barber et al. (1995) 
and Powell (1997) also indicate that firms with low profitability and low market-to-book 
ratios are more likely to be targets in hostile takeovers. 
Most accounting-based studies both for the UK and the USA tend to lend 
support to the view that acquisitions do not result in improved performance and that 
acquisitions are non-value maximising to shareholders. Examples are Mueller (1980), 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (19870), Clark and Ofek (1994), Philappatos and Baird III 
(1996), and Denis et al. (1997) in US, whilst those in UK are Singh (1971), Utton 
(1974), Meeks (1977), Holl and Pickering (1988) and Dickerson et al. (1997). 
However, Lorie and Halpern (1970) and Lev and Mendelker (1972) in US found that 
merging firms perform significantly better than non-merging firms. Recent studies like 
Healy et al. (1992,1997), Jarrell (1995), Anand and Singh (1997) in US; and Manson 
et al. (1994) in UK using accounting and cash flow data in measuring operating 
performance provide evidence that acquisitions create value and accordingly are 
economically efficient in the long run. Ghosh (1998) who also use cash flow data 
found that combined firms improve their post acquisition cash flow returns, depending 
on the benchmark used. 
Similar to the comments made about market-based studies, a pattern of 
negative post acquisition performance in accounting based studies may be due to 
methodological errors arising through the introduction of some element of bias into 
either the chosen sample or/and the control model selected for analysis. Appleyard 
(1980) argued that the differences in accounting policies and treatment of inter-group 
profits of the acquiring and target firms in the chosen sample would cause bias in 
measuring the post acquisition profitability. Another factor that has an impact on 
measures of post acquisition performance is that related to changes in accounting 
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methods used (whether the purchase or pooling of interests method). There is a 
possible downward bias to profitability from the way in which the acquiring firm 
records goodwill and revaluation of assets arising from the purchase method. Studies 
by Healy et al. (1992,1997), Anand and Singh (1997), Ghosh (1998) in US; and 
Manson et at. (1994) in UK used cash flow rather than net profit measures to mitigate 
the impact of the financing of the acquisition and the method of accounting for the 
transactions. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the results of market-based studies in the UK and 
the USA indicate that on average target shareholders are the overwhelming winners, 
but there is less evidence for significant gains to bidding firms around the 
announcement period. Using the ex post analysis, most share price studies in UK and 
US have also produced contradictory results and have not conclusively determined 
whether takeovers produce economic gains. The post acquisition performance of the 
combined firms using accounting and cash flow data as a measure of profitability, as 
discussed in this chapter, has also provide mixed results as to whether or not 
corporate acquisitions provide economic benefit to the shareholders in the long run. 
The apparently conflicting results produced either by market-based studies or 
profitability studies highlight a fundamentally unresolved question of what is the long 
term effect of acquisitions on firm performance. All the above studies face a general 
criticism concerning the relevant benchmark of performance. When faced with this 
problem the researcher has a number of available options, either to search for and 
test alternative control models similar to that of Franks et al. (1991), Agrawal et al. 
(1992), Gregory (1997) and Baker and Limmack (1999) when using market-based 
studies, or to use an alternative research design for example by measuring operating 
performance using accounting and cash flow data (Healy et al., 1992 and 1997, 
Manson et al., 1994, Jarrell, 1995, Anand and Singh, 1997, and Ghosh, 1998). In the 
current study the latter approach is adopted and cash flow analysis is used in 
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measuring the performance of companies involved in takeover activity. An 




Research Methodology and Hypothesis (I) 
Operating Cash Flow Returns 
6.1 Chapter Description 
As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the main objective of the 
current study is to examine the post acquisition performance of Malaysian companies 
involved in acquisitions during the period 1988-1992 based on cash flow analysis. In 
addition, the study also attempts to identify the determinants of the changes in 
operating cash flow improvement, if any. 
In order to address the research objectives, the following specific tests will be 
carried out: 
a) Comparison of the level of pre acquisition performance of bidders, targets and 
their respective controls, 
b) ' To test if there is any improvement in post acquisition cash flow performance 
of Malaysian acquiring firms five (5) years after acquisition as compared to 
their pre acquisition performance and that of the control firms 
c) Examination of the potential sources of operating cash flow change, and 
d) Tests of the effect of bid characteristics of the companies involved in 
acquisition on post acquisition performance. 
Pre-tax operating cash flow returns on assets are employed in the current 
study to estimate changes in asset productivity and the potential for realising 
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economic benefits from acquisitions in Malaysia. The study constructs a pre 
acquisition measure of performance of the combined firms by consolidating 
performance data of the target and bidding firms from 4 years before the acquisition. 
Comparing a measure of the 5 years post acquisition performance with this pre 
acquisition performance provides a measure of the change in performance. The 5- 
years post acquisition period is used in the study to provide sufficient time for any 
changes in performance to be reflected in the firm's cash flow. 
Previous studies that employed cash flow analysis (Manson et al., 1994 in UK, 
Healy et al., 1992,1997 and Ghosh, 1998 in US) tend to use samples consisting of a 
small set of observations from takeover in fairly active markets'. The current study 
will investigate a sample representing a larger proportion of the population of 
takeovers in a less developed securities market, that of Malaysia during 1988-1992. 
Operating performance of 97 quoted acquiring and 117 target companies (consisting 
of 113 private, 3 public listed and 1 non-public listed targets) involved in acquisitions 
during the above period are investigated to determine whether there is any evidence 
that the Malaysian acquisitions produce operating gains after acquisitions (data and 
sample selection is discussed in Chapter 8). 
This chapter expands on this broad outline by explaining the variables use in 
calculating the operating cash flow performance and the potential sources of cash 
flow returns together with the detailed methodology used to achieve the above 
objectives. Detailed methodology on the analysis of bid characteristics of the 
companies involved in acquisition on post acquisition performance is discussed in 
Chapter 7. Included in these two chapters is a section which explicitly state the 
'u Manson et al. (1994) investigates 38 acquisitions in UK between 1985 to 1987 while Healy et al. (1992,1997) investigates 50 largest acquisitions in US between 1979 and 1984. 
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hypothesis following from the theory and provide reference to the earlier sections in 
which the arguments in support of the hypotheses are made. 
6.2 Measure of Operating Performance 
The first step in identifying the adopted methodology is to define a measure of 
operating performance. Jensen (1984) argued that the large shareholders wealth 
changes in an acquisition are derived from improved management performance and 
increased efficiency brought about by the acquisition. One of the ways in measuring 
the realised effectiveness of acquisitions is to estimate the changes in asset 
productivity following the acquisition. As asserted by Healy et at. (1997) takeover 
announcement security returns represent investor's expectation of acquisition 
benefits whereas post acquisition cash flow performance measures represent actual 
economic benefits generated by acquisitions. In addition, Rayburn (1986) and Bowen, 
Burgstahler, and Daley (1987) in US provide evidence that cash flows can 
incrementally explain abnormal stock returns. Bowen et al. (1987, p. 746) found 'that 
cash information is consistent with the information impounded in security prices and 
also has incremental explanatory power beyond that contained in accrual flows 
alone'. Thus, the primary measure of performance used in this study is the operating 
cash flow of the companies involved. The incremental operating cash flow returns 
attributable to acquisition is also used as evidence of an increase in management 
efficiency, rather than a prior undervaluation of the company. 
Earlier accounting-based studies in the UK (Singh, 1971, Meeks, 1977, Cosh 
et al. 1 980, Holl and Pickering, 1988, and Dickerson et al., 1997) and the US (Lev and 
Mandelker, 1972 and Mueller, 1980) focused on changes in net income to total assets 
as a performance measure. As explained in the previous chapter, studies that have 
used operating income to total assets to measure operating performance (for 
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example, Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987 in the US) suffer from some drawbacks 123 - 
In addition, studies that have used alternative measures, including net income to 
sales (for example, Jarrell, 1995 in the US) have a disadvantage of not measuring 
directly the productivity of assets. 
Another reason for using the cash flow measure of operating performance in 
this study is to avoid the potential earnings manipulation problem associated with 
accrual accounting measures for evaluating the effectiveness of takeover. DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo and Skinner (1994) define accruals as net income less funds from 
operations plus the changes in accounts receivables, inventories, and other current 
assets less the changes in accounts payable, taxes payable, and other current 
liabilities. Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) regarded accounting accruals, defined as 
the difference between accounting profits and cash flows, as the portion of profits 
over which manager can exercise the most discretion. As cited in Dechow (1994, 
p. 5), 'many financial analyst regard operating cash flow as a better gauge of 
corporate financial performance than net income, since it is less subject to distortion 
from differing accounting practices'124. A decrease in post event performance in an 
accrual-based performance measure might erroneously lead a researcher to believe 
that the erosion is due to the event when in fact, the firms are reporting lower income 
as result of overstated profits due to accruals in the pre-event. Barber and Lyon 
(1996, p. 398) claim that '... cash-based performance measure allows the researcher 
'u Differences in accounting policies and changes in accounting methods used (purchase or pooling interests method) might cause an upward or downward bias in measuring the post acquisition 
profitability. 
'Z` Dechow (1994) argued that over short measurement intervals, earnings is a superior summary 
measure of firm performance to realised cash flow (net cash receipts) in firms with large changes in 
operating (working capital), investment and financing activities. She stated that earnings suffer timing and matching problems over short time interval but to a lesser extent than realised cash flows. Realised cash flows have more severe timing and matching problems in a volatile environment that cause them to be a `noisy' measure of performance. Accruals are said to overcome the timing and matching problems in cash flow. 
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to ascertain whether an erosion in performance is the result of an erosion in operating 
performance or the reversal of pre-event accruals. ' 
Thus, the annual return on operating assets, defined as the ratio of annual 
cash flows from operations to operating assets, is the main measure used in the 
current study. This choice is consistent with that adopted in other similar studies 
including those of Manson et al. (1994) in UK and Healy et al. (1992,1997) in US. 
Clark and Ofek (1994) and Anand and Singh (1997) in US also tend to employ 
operating cash flow as a measure of operating performance of corporations after 
acquisitions125. In order to compare firms differing in size, operating cash flow is 
normalised by operating assets. Thus, similar to the methodology employed by Healy 
et al. (1992,1997), and Ghosh (1998) in US and Manson et at. (1994) in UK, pre-tax 
operating cash flows normalised by operating assets are used in this study. The post 
acquisition performance of the firm is calculated based on the operating cash flow 
return on operating assets (OCFROA), defined as: 
OCFROA = Operating cash flow 
Operating Assets 
= Operating cash flow 
Equity + Debt - Cash and short-term investments 
The annual return on operating assets is defined as the ratio of annual cash 
flows from operations to operating assets. This measure enables one to estimate 
changes in asset productivity as evidence of management efficiency and the realised 
economic benefits from acquisitions (after adjusting for changes in economic 
conditions). 
12' Kaplan (1989) and Smith (1990) have examined operating performance following management buyout using cash flow data. Cornett and Tehranian (1992) also use operating cash flows returns to examine the post acquisition performance of bank acquisitions. 
The variables use in calculating the operating returns are: 
6.2.1 Operating Cash Flow 
Cash flow from operating activities measure the amount of cash generated or 
used by the firm as a result of its production and sales of goods and services. A 
permanent increase in operating cash flow should lead to an increase in value. The 
cash flow measures in this study is similar to that used by Bowen, Burgstahler and 
Daley (1986) in the US and Lee (1984), Manson et al. (1994) and All and Pope (1995) 
in the UK. Cash flow is measured as profits from operations (before depreciation and 
amortisation) minus the change in accounts receivable, inventories and other current 
assets, plus the change in accounts payable, taxes payable and other current 
liabilities, tabled as in Table 6.1. 
As seen in Table 6.1, cash flow measures in the current study allows 
adjustment for depreciation, goodwill, and interest expenses, which can vary after 
acquisition due to changes in accounting treatment. The book value of plant and 
equipment, inventory and goodwill is normally written up on completion of an 
acquisition to reflect the purchase price paid for the target firm's assets when 
acquisition method is used. The write-ups lead to a subsequent increase in reported 
depreciation, cost of goods sold, and goodwill expenses, thus reduced the reported 
profit. The measure of cash flows used in the current study is, however, unaffected by 
such write-ups. 
Interest income and interest expense are excluded in computing the net profit 
from operating activities because these two items are not strictly related to a firm's 
operations. Interest expense is a function of financial leverage which is derived from 
financial assets rather than operating assets. The use of debt financing which incur 
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interest charges lowers post acquisition net income relative to share financing 
because net income is computed after deducting interest expense (the cost of debt), 
but before allowing for the cost of equity. The focus of the current study is to examine 
changes in operating performance, thus operating cash flow is a more appropriate 
measure since it is not directly affected by the financing decisions of the firm. 
Table 6.1 
. 
Operating Cash Flow 
Operating profit before tax and extraordinary items 




interest expenses (interest received) 
dividend paid (received) 
loss (gain) on disposal of assets and investments 
loss (gain) in affiliated companies 
Operating cash flow before working capital investments 
Cash flow effects of investments in working capital: 
(Increase)/Decrease in debtors 
(Increase)/Decrease in inventories 
(Increase)/Decrease in other current assets, 
excluding cash and cash equivalents 
Increase/(Decrease) in creditors 
Increase/(Decrease) in other current liabilities, 
excluding debt 
Operating Cash Flow 
The cash flows measures in this study differs slightly from that used by Healy 
et al. (1992,1997), Ghosh (1998) and Harford (1999) who define operating cash 
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flows as sales minus cost of goods sold and selling and administrative expenses, plus 
depreciation and goodwill expenses. The major difference between the definition by 
Healy et al. (1992,1997), Ghosh (1998) and Harford (1999) and the one used in the 
current study is that operating cash flow in the current study excludes changes in 
accruals and non-operating gains. In fact, Ghosh (1998) suggests that the results in 
his study might be biased since the working capital accruals that are potentially 
subject to manipulation by managers is not accounted for in his operating cash flow 
calculation 126. 
Earnings is the aggregate of cash flows and accruals (that is, earnings = cash 
flows + accruals). The types of accruals embedded in net income are current accruals 
and non-current accruals. Current accruals such as those arising from credit sales 
and unpaid expenses result in changes in a firm's current assets (inventory, debtors 
and prepaid expenses) and current liabilities (creditors and accrued liabilities). The 
non-current accruals include depreciation and deferred taxes. Information on current 
accruals can be obtained by examining changes in the firm's current assets (other 
than cash and cash equivalents) and current liabilities (other than notes payable and 
the current portion of long-term debt since these accounts represent financing flows, 
not operating flows). Adjustments were also be made to exclude non-operating items 
included in net income such as profits or losses on disposal of assets. The reason for 
excluding profits or losses on disposal of assets is partly due to the difference in the 
acquisition accounting method. Since the pooling method carries forward historical 
costs, no recognition is given to the true value of the assets acquired. The reported 
income will include fictitious gain if the acquiring company is to sell the acquired 
assets whose carrying cost is well below fair or market value. In addition, however, 
126 To test the robustness of the results, operating cash flow similar to the definition given by Healy et al. (1992) and Ghosh (1998) is also used in this study to measure the operating cash flow returns. 
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the current study is focusing on changes in "normal" operating performance which 
ought, by definition, to exclude such gains and losses. 
6.2.2 Assets 
In the current study, the book value of assets, defined as book value of 
shareholders fund and total debt less cash and marketable securities, is used to 
normalise the operating cash flow. It may be argued that it is more appropriate to use 
the market value of assets similar to the one used by Healy et al. (1992,1997) and 
Ghosh (1998), but the market value is not available for the non listed targets in this 
study. According to Healy et at. (1992,1997) and Manson et at. (1994), market value 
of assets is used because it represents market's assessment of the value of the firm's 
current and future investment opportunities. It can be considered an assessment of 
the value of the firm's competitive strategy and its deployment of human resources. 
However, market value would suffer from reflecting future expected benefits, including 
those relating to the event under investigation, because it is sensitive to changes in 
market expectations of firm performance. Since the present value of cash flow equals 
the market value of shares, changes in cash flow in one period may lead to changes 
in expectations about future cash flow (Lang et at., 1991)127. For example, the market 
may reduce market value of the firm by 10 percent when a firm's permanent cash flow 
declines by 10 percent, thus giving no effect to the measure of returns on operating 
profit to market value of assets12'. In contrast, the ratio of operating cash flow to the 
book value of assets will show an increase with improvements in cash flow. 
127 To avoid the problems incurred in using market value of assets, Lang, Stutz and Wakling (1991) use book value of assets to normalise their cash flow measures. 128 To mitigate the problem, Healy et al. (1992) exclude the change in share values of the acquiring and target firms at the acquisition announcement from the asset base in the post acquisition years. 
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To be consistent with the numerator that excludes interest income and interest 
expense, the denominator in this study should include the assets claimed by 
shareholders and interest-bearing debt less cash and short-term investments. 
Goodwill arising from acquisition is excluded from the calculation of the book value of 
assets'". However, it is not possible to exclude any revaluation of target assets upon 
acquisition. Hence, the test to be conducted is likely to be biased against the finding 
of improvement in performance. 
6.3 Expected Performance Model 
In assessing whether a sample of firms experienced any unusual changes in 
post acquisition operating cash flow returns, a model of expected performance needs 
to be identified to provide a benchmark in assessing how the target and bidder firms 
would have performed without the acquisition. A typical approach in the existing 
literature is either to use the pre bid performance of the bidder, or the post acquisition 
performance of the combined firm's industry as the performance benchmark. Barber 
and Lyon (1996) and Jarrell (1995) claimed that studies using the pre bid 
performance matching only are unsatisfactory because this 'fails to control for 
intervening macroeconomic developments, and introduces potentially significant 
measurement error (Jarrell, 1995, p. 3). Further, companies that were performing 
well prior to an acquisition might not be able to improve their performance as much as 
the low performers simply because their base rate of performance was higher. In 
addition, company performance may be a function of firm size and will therefore 
change for this reason alone following the acquisition. 
129 Goodwill is excluded from the denominator to maintain the same level of performance prior and 
after acquisition since the objective of the study is to test whether efficiency in utilising the asset has improved post acquisition and not to test whether the payment for the target is reasonable. 
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The pre bid performance-matching model is based on the hypothesis that the 
combined firms in the post acquisition period would perform exactly as the 
independent firms in the pre acquisition period if no acquisition occurs. The pre bid 
benchmark model takes the form of: 
E(P'post) = PBw, + PT wo 
where 
E(Pc, ) = Expected post performance of combined firms 
Pei We = Pre acquisition performance of bidder 
PT» = Pre acquisition performance of target 
If performance is measured as return on assets, the pre acquisition returns for 
the combined firms are weighted averages of target and bidder returns with the 
weights being the relative asset values of the two firms. Measures of post acquisition 
returns use data for the combined firms. 
On the other hand, the post acquisition industry performance benchmark 
model is based on the hypothesis that, if acquisition has no effect, the combined firms 
would perform as the non-combined firms in the industry. 
E(P ä,. c) = P'v 
where 
E(Pc, ) = Expected post performance of combined firms 
P'1r = Performance industry control portfolio 
Barber and Lyon (1996) noted that it is important to control for abnormal firm 
characteristics prior to the event when studying operating performance. A model that 
use post acquisition industry performance benchmark without any pre-event 
characteristics of firms ignores 'the history of the firm relative to the benchmark' 
(Barber and Lyon, 1996, p. 366). They demonstrate that tests can give incorrect 
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inferences if the sample of firms being studied had abnormal performance prior to the 
event and is compared to a control sample of firms experiencing normal performance. 
For example, if sample firms have experienced unusual growth in return on assets 
due to an investment of unusually profitable projects, it is reasonable to expect the 
sample firms to experience a persistence (continued) high growth of return on 
assets130. These firms, in the absence of an acquisition, would appear to have above- 
average operating performance if their performance is measured against the industry 
control portfolio. The drawback of using the post acquisition industry performance 
benchmark was also raised by Jarrell (1995, p. 4) who claimed that `the post-takeover 
industry benchmark thus erroneously attributes to the event differences in 
performance that result not from the takeover, but from factors unique to the merging 
firm(s) in that industry. This results from a type of endogeneity problem, where the 
same factors that motivate the decision to merge also affect future performance'131. 
Thus, the current study adopts a combination of the pre acquisition and post 
acquisition models mentioned above similar to that used by Healy et al. (1992), 
Manson et al. (1994), Ghosh (1998) and Harford (1999) in studying the effect of 
takeovers on long-term performance t32. Healy et at. (1992), Manson et at. (1994) and 
Harford (1999) use the performance of industry median firms as the control firm133 
However, the industry-matching model used by these studies is not adopted in the 
current study. 
uo Geroski (1988) find strong evidence that the performance (profits net of tax divided by book assets) 
of specific firms persistently stand out from that of fellow industry members for five years on average. 
In other words, success is more often firm specific than industry specific. 
"' Jarrell (1995) incorporated as the benchmark firm specific analyst forecasts of post-event 
performance but with the forecasts made during the pre-event period. Jarrell claims that specific analyst 
forecast is a more appropriate benchmark because these forecast of performance represent expert 
evaluations of the likely impact of the factors unique to the firm, including those that may implicitly 
make the firm more or less likely to merge. 
132 Clark and Ofek (1994) and Anand and Singh (1997) in US, and Dickerson et al. (1997) in UK are 
among studies that also employ post acquisition industry performance benchmark similar to that used 
by Healy et al. (1992). 
"' The matching procedure used by Healy et al. (1992), Manson et al. (1994) and Harford (1999) 
adjusts the performance of the combined firm by subtracting the median performance of other firms in 
its industry. 
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In determining a benchmark against which to measure actual performance, 
Barber and Lyon (1996) and Ghosh (1998) also suggest that control firms selected on 
the basis of industry and size are likely to serve as a better benchmarks than median 
firms from the same industry. Ghosh (1998) argued that on average larger firms are 
more profitable than smaller firms. Using industry medians as a benchmark might 
bias the results if acquiring and target firms are bigger than industry median firms. 
Jarrell (1995) and Ghosh (1998) are among previous studies that match sample firms 
to control firms with similar size134. The combined firm's performance might be worse 
than the industry if control firms are systematically larger than acquiring and target 
firms due to increasing returns on scale or decreasing costs. Meeks (1977) and 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) have acknowledged that acquisition of equally size 
units would have a larger impact on the combined firm's performance than if one 
party is much larger than the other. Therefore, the control selected in this study is that 
of non-acquiring and non-target companies in the same industrial classification as 
those of the respective companies set matched by year and size on one by one 
basis'. Size is measured by the book value of equity plus reserves plus long-term 
and short-term debt, less cash and marketable securities one year prior to 
acquisition'. The matching procedure used here allows for a direct comparison 
between the performance of firms that are engaged in acquisitions and firms that do 
not. 
"' Jarrell (1995) measured size as the market value of the firm's debt plus equity as reported by the 
value Line Investment Report during the quarter before the acquisition bid. 13s The non-target companies in this study were matched only by the same industrial classification and 
same time period due to the difficulty of obtaining the size of non-target companies from the company files at Malaysian Registrar of Companies (ROC). Data and sample selection is described in detail in Chapter 8. 
16 The classification of company size is based on book assets rather than sales or market capitalisation because sales may be affected by the state of the economy or company's performance at a particular 
point in time while market capitalisation may fluctuate as a result of changes in the market sector as 
well as macroeconomic conditions. 
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6.4 Abnormal Control Adjusted Cash Flow Returns 
The details of the adopted methodology are as follows: 
6.4.1 Prepare Pre Acquisition Consolidated Measure of Performance 
The financial data for the year in which the acquisition occurred, year 0, is 
omitted to control for any one-time costs incurred during the acquisition. A pre 
acquisition consolidated measure of operating performance for each of the four years 
prior to takeover (-4 to -1) is prepared by dividing the sum of the operating cash flows 
for the bidder and target by the asset values of the bidder and target at the beginning 
of the appropriate financial year. Since closing book values are in part a function of 
the profit or loss that is being measured in the numerator, the opening book values 
which are not affected by the performance in the year are used in the current study, 
similar to Healy et al. (1992). 
Adjustment for the differences in size for bidder and target is achieved by 
multiplying the measures of performance by the weighted average of the relative 
asset sizes of the two firms. Asset size of target and bidder in this study is measured 
by the book value of equity plus reserves plus long-term and short-term debt, less 
cash and marketable securities at the beginning of each year. 
A pre acquisition consolidated measure of operating performance for each of 
the four years prior to takeover (-4 to -1) is calculated as follows: 
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(Equation 1) 
For t= -4,..., -1 




OCF(B) . Assets + 
Asset(ß) AssecB. n 
OCFB1 + OCFTR 
Asset',, + AssetT1 
OCFm 
Assetm 
Pore 's is operating performance in the pre acquisition period, 
B and T indicate the bidder and target respectively, 
OCF is operating cash flow, 
AssetT 
Asset(B. n 
Asset is the book value of the respective companies (equity plus reserves plus debt 
less cash and short-term investments) measured at the beginning of the year and 
t is the financial year (t= -4..., -1). 
6.4.2 Calculate the Post Acquisition Measure of Operating Performance 
The post acquisition operating cash flow is calculated for each bidder for each 
of the financial years +1 to +5. A 5-year post acquisition performance is used in the 
current study due to the view that value increasing improvements in efficiency might 
materialise after several years of post acquisition period (Healy et al., 1992,1997, 
Manson et al., 1994, Jarrell, 1995, Ghosh, 1999). 
Operating cash flow returns are the actual cash flows reported by the 
combined firm in years +1 to +5 which are then deflated by the book value of assets 
191 
(equity plus reserves plus debt, less cash and short-term investments) at the 
beginning of each year. 
(Equation 2) 
For t= +1,.., +5 
Ppost,, t = OCFBR 
AssetBR 
6.4.3 Measures of Operating Performance for Control Firms 
To control for the possibility that the sample firm is likely to be influenced by 
events other than those investigated (for instance general economic factors affecting 
all firms), it is necessary to set up a control of comparable firms for each of the 
sample firms. The pro-forma control firm (hereafter control firm) was selected from the 
same industry and asset size and measured chronological times corresponding to 
those of the sample firm. The main objective of matching the time period was to make 
some allowance for the overall market effect and for possible industry effects on the 
firm's performance (that is, differences over time in general economic, political and 
regulatory influences). As mentioned earlier, it is also important to match control firm 
base on size as argued by Ghosh (1998). Since members of the two groups have 
similar characteristics (as a result of the paired selection), it is hoped that observed 
measurement differences between the groups can be attributed with reasonable 
confidence to the effect of the acquisition. 
A control firm operating cash flow returns need to be calculated for each target 
and bidder four years prior (-4 to -1) and five years after (+1 to +5) in order to provide 
appropriate benchmark performance measures for the pre and post acquisition 
performance. Before the acquisition, control firm values for the sample firms are 
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constructed by weighting the control firm by the relative asset values of the two 
sample firms at the beginning of each year. As mentioned earlier, the asset value of 
the firm is the book value of equity plus reserves and net debt (long-term debt, plus 
short-term debt, less cash and marketable securities) at the beginning of the year. 
Since the asset values for the target and bidder firms are no longer obtained 
separately in the post acquisition years, the cash flow performance of target controls 
and bidder controls are thus weighted by the relative asset value of the two firms one 
year before acquisition, that is, year -1. 
(Equation 3) 
Fort=-4,..., -1 
PC pro 13 = OCF«B) . AssetB + OCFC) 
L Asset«B) Asset(B+D sset, (T) 
Or AssetT I, t . P° 
(T) It + AssetB i,, . PC("),,, 
Asset1,, t + AssetB ,t 
(Equation 4) 
For t= +1,.., +5 
PCpost ,, c = OCFC(B) . AssetBt_, + OCF« 
L Assetc(B) Asset(B+TA., Assetcm 
Or AssetT PC m It + Asset' PC (B) ý, t 
Asset1,, t_, + Asset' , t_, 
where 
OCF is operating cash flow 











book values of assets (equity plus reserves plus 
book value of debt, less cash and short-term investments) for target and bidder at 
year t-1, respectively. 
6.4.4 Construct Control Adjusted Cash Flow Returns 
The control adjusted operating cash flow returns (APc) is obtained by 
subtracting the pre and post acquisition control firm measures of operating 
performance from the combined firms measures of operating performance for the 
respective takeover i for year t. 
(Equation 5) 
For t= -4,.., -1 
AP` I. t Pre = Pp,. It -r pro i. t 
(Equation 6) 
For t=1,..., 5 
AP` Lt p,, n = Pposc i, t - P`oo., e i. t 
where 
AP`,,, = control adjusted operating cash flow return for company i 
P,, t = operating cash flow return for the combined firm i 
PCIj = operating cash flow return for the control firm i 
The model compares each firm's performance relative to the control company 
pre acquisition period (Pyre,, - PC pre) to the performance of the combined firm relative 
to the control company in the post acquisition period (P! -P3, j). Some of the 
differences between post acquisition and pre acquisition performance may be due to 
economy wide and industry factors. Thus, matched firms are used to control for 
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economy wide and industry factors. The control adjusted performance is used to 
capture (unobserved) company specific performance factors. 
6.4.5 Calculate the Change in Control Adjusted Performance 
The mean and median of the annual control adjusted measures (APC,, t) are 
obtained over the four years prior to acquisition. Similarly, the mean and median are 
calculated for the annual control adjusted measures of operating performance over 
the five years after acquisition. The change in performance is the difference between 
the annual control adjusted performance from 4 years prior (annual AP` ,. t p,. ) and 5 
years (annual AP`,,, ), sc) post acquisition. In addition, the change in abnormal control 
adjusted cash flow return is estimated using the following regression: 
(Equation 7) 
AP`psu =a+R AP`prw + C, 
where 
APCposu = the average (or median) annual control adjusted cash flow 
returns for company i for the post acquisition years 
APCprj = the pre acquisition average (or median) annual control 
adjusted cash flow returns for the same company. 
a= is the measure of the abnormal control adjusted 
cash flow return (changes in performance caused 
by acquisition) 
P= the slope coefficient captures any correlation in cash 
flow returns between pre and post acquisition years, 
that is, the performance that would have developed 
independently of the acquisition. 
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As implied by Ghosh (1998), the advantage of using a regression analysis is 
that it avoids making an assumption that the combined firms will continue their pre 
event period of under or over performance relative to their respective control firms 
over post acquisition period. 
Any abnormal performance improvements between the pre and post 
acquisition period due to acquisitions will be captured by a. This regression is based 
on the null hypothesis that, if there is no effect of the acquisition, the post acquisition 
performance for the combined firm is exactly the same as the pre acquisition 
performance relative to the control firms. In these circumstances, alpha will equal 
zero. 
6.5 Hypotheses 
The following sections contain explanations of the hypotheses to be tested. 
6.5.1 Pre Acquisition Operating Cash Flow Performance 
As evident from the literature review, acquisitions may be viewed as a 
disciplinary mechanism on the management of poorly performing firms. Target 
companies taken over are viewed to be less profitable than target controls not taken 
over, consistent with the hypothesis that firms that do not perform well will be taken 
over. Poor performance may be due to the firm's managers deliberately pursuing 
goals that increase their personal power as explained previously, or to the firm's 
managers making poor investments and operating decisions. The origins of the 
inefficient management hypothesis stem from early work of Manne (1965) who 
viewed acquisition as a useful mechanism for encouraging managers to pursue 
wealth maximisation strategies. As noted by Alchian (1950) and Singh (1971) the 
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takeover threat, that is competition in the capital market, may force managers to 
pursue profit maximisation in order to survive, whether or not they prefer other goals. 
Kennedy and Limmack (1996) found that poor prior share price performance is a 
characteristic of UK targets, consistent with the role of takeovers in the UK as part of 
disciplinary mechanism on inefficient companies. In using the accounting rate return 
(ROCE) as a proxy to target firm managerial performance, Powell (1997) found that 
poor prior performance are likely to increase a firm's probability of becoming a 
target"'. In US, Palepu (1986) found that the poorer the share price performance 
prior to the bid, the higher the probability of targets being taken over. Servaes (1991) 
documented that more value can be created from acquiring poorly performing 
companies. Lang et al. (1989,1991), Morck et al. (1990), and Mikkelson and Partch 
(1997) also found evidence supporting the hypothesis that poorly performing firms in 
US are taken over. 
Based on these arguments, the first hypothesis can be developed. Thus, it is 
hypothesised that target firms have poor operating cash flow performance prior to 
takeover as compared to the control firms. 
Hypothesis 1- Pre Acquisition Performance of Targets Vs 
Target Controls 
Ho: Pre operating cash flow performance of target firms is no different to 
that of target controls. 
Ha: Pre operating cash flow performance of target firms is significantly 
lower than that of target controls 
"' Powell (1997) found that the characteristics of the firms taken over via a friendly bid differ from 
those of the firms taken over via a hostile bid. Size, liquidity and leverage affect the probability of a friendly takeover, whereas size, liquidity, profitability and free cash flow are important determinants of 
a hostile takeover. 
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Lang, et al. (1989) provide evidence that shareholders of well-managed 
bidders (high q) gain significantly more than shareholders of poor-managed bidders 
(low q). Their findings support Jensen's (1986) view that poorly performing firms with 
excess cash flow may waste them in unprofitable investments. In examining the 
relationship between bidders' past performance and their returns from acquisition, 
Morck et al. (1990) found that firms with good managers (identified by good firm 
performance relative to its industry) do much better in making acquisitions than firms 
with bad managers. Other empirical evidence that have indicate good performance 
for acquirers prior to acquisition include those by Magenheim and Mueller (1988), 
Bradley and Jarrell (1988), Limmack (1991) and Sudarsanam et al. (1996). 
Thus, if one expects better performing firms to make good investments, it is 
hypothesised that pre operating cash flow performance of acquiring firms is higher 
than that of the control firm. 
Hypothesis 2- Pre Acquisition Performance of Bidders Vs 
Bidder Controls 
Ho: Pre operating cash flow performance of bidding firms is no different to 
that of bidder controls. 
Ha: Pre operating cash flow performance of bidding firms is significantly 
higher than that of bidder controls 
In addition, if the takeover market attempts to reallocate resources to a most 
efficient use, theory predicts that bidders are likely to be more profitable than their 
targets. Takeovers serve as an incentive device for management to perform in the 
shareholders' interests. Otherwise, control of an acquired firm's assets will be 
transferred from a relatively inefficient management to the superior managers of the 
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acquiring firm. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1988) support Marine's 
(1965) concept of market for corporate control which suggest that more capable and 
competent executive teams tend to replace one that is less capable and competent. 
In using Tobin's q as a measure of managerial performance, Lang et al. (1989), and 
Servaes (1991) provide findings that better performing firms make better acquisitions 
and that more value can be created by taking over poorly performing companies'38 . 
They find that acquiring firms gain the most when low q targets are taken over by high 
q bidders. Their findings are interpreted as evidence that bidders gain the most in 
takeovers of poorly managed targets by well-managed bidders, consistent with the 
view that some acquisitions create wealth by making better use of target resources. In 
investigating the determinants of, and relationship between, wealth creation and bid 
resistance for a sample of 178 successful takeovers in the UK, Holl and Kyriazis 
(1997) also provide evidence that lower-valued target companies are taken over by 
13s high-valued acquiring firms. 
Thus, it is hypothesised that acquiring firms have higher pre operating cash 
flow performance than that of target firms. 
Hypothesis 3- Pre Acquisition Performance of Bidders Vs Targets 
Ho: Pre operating cash flow performance of bidding firms is no different to 
that of targets. 
Ha: Pre operating cash flow performance of bidding firms is significantly 
higher than that of target companies. 
"g Lang et al. (1989) and Servaes (1991) define Tobin's q as the ratio of the market value of the firm's 
assets to their replacement cost. "' Holl and Kyriazis (1997) use Tobin's q ratio (market value of the company at the end of the fourth 
month prior to the bid divided by the book value of equity) as a measure of managerial and financial 
performance of the target and acquiring firms. 
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6.5.2 Post Acquisition Operating Cash Flow Performance of Merged Firms 
The main aim of the study is to assess the change in operating performance 
of Malaysian companies following corporate acquisitions. Healy et al. (1992) indicated 
that operating cash flows are a valid measure of operating synergies (i. e. it reflects 
the true economic impact of the acquisition). The examination of the immediate 
market reactions to a takeover bid (as reflected in the share price returns of the 
bidders and targets around the announcement date) helps to assess the changes in 
the expectations of market participants due to the announcement of the takeover bid. 
The measurement of subsequent changes in the firms' cash flow, on the other hand, 
provides a means by which the actual effects of the bid can be determined. As 
evident from the literature review in Chapter 5, accounting based studies using cash 
flow data both for the UK (Manson et al., 1994) and the US (Healy et al., 1992 , 
Anand and Singh, 1997, and Ghosh, 1998) tend to lend support to the view that 
acquisitions improve operating performance and thus create wealth to the 
shareholders. This result does not, however, appear to be consistent with that 
observed using share price data (example Agrawal et al., 1992 and Clark and Ofek, 
1994) and accounting data (example Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987b, and Denis et 
al, 1997 in US and Dickerson et al., 1997 in UK). 
The market for corporate control is theorised to promote competition between 
management teams to exercise control over the allocation of capital resources to their 
most efficient use. The combined firms are expected to have some benefits 
transferred to them through the combination of the acquired firms' technologies, 
products and markets with the bidding firm's existing set. This expectation is in line 
with the argument set in Chapter 3 regarding the increase in shareholders' value, that 
is maximisation of the net present value of future cash flows, from corporate 
acquisition. Better utilisation of the target firm's existing revenues would result in 
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higher cash flows to the combined firms, in comparison with the pre acquisition cash 
flows. Recent studies on cash flow performance for corporate acquisitions (Manson et 
al., 1994, Healy et al., 1992,1997, Anand and Singh, 1997, and Ghosh, 1998) found 
that merged firms have significant improvements in post acquisition operating cash 
flow returns relative to their industries as evidence that takeovers are efficiency- 
increasing mechanism. However, if the changes in the structure of the acquisition 
were a result of managers maximising their own utility instead of shareholders wealth, 
no gains of any sort would be observed ex post. 
It is therefore hypothesised that post acquisition operating cash flow 
performance of the combined firms will improve as a result of acquisition: 
Hypothesis 4- Post Acquisition Operating Cash Flow Performance 
Ho: There is no significant improvement in operating cash flow 
performance of the combined firms in the first 5 years after acquisition 
relative to the years prior to the acquisition. 
Ha: There is significant improvement in operating cash flow performance of 
the combined firms in the first 5 years after acquisition relative to the 
pre acquisition years. 
6.5.3 Sources of Operating Cash Flow Returns 
This section focuses on some important components that may offer 
explanation for the changes in the operating returns after acquisition. The specific 
sources analysed in this study are: efficiency indicators such as return on sales and 
asset turnover, capital expenditure rate, asset sale rate, and cash payment for 
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expenses10. Thus, several hypotheses can be developed based on the specific 
sources analysed. 
6.5.3.1 Efficiency Indicators 
In order to identify the sources of . the post cash flow performance, 
the 
operating cash flow return on asset (OFROA) can be decomposed into operating 
return on sales and asset turnover as follows: 
OCFROA = Operating cash flow 
Operating Assets at the beginning 
of the year 
= Operating Return on Sales X Asset Turnover 
= Operating Cash Flow X Sales 
Sales Operating Assets 
Operating return on sales = Operating Cash Flow 
Sales 
Changes in the operating margin ratio or the operating return on sales 
(operating cash flow divided by sales) is one measure of how well the firm is using its 
resources to improve the firm performance. It measures how much pre-tax operating 
cash flow the company earns for each dollar of sales it makes. 
Asset turnover = Sales 
Book value of operating assets 
at the beginning of the year 
10 It would also have been useful if the current study could have examined whether the improvements 
in operating efficiency had been the cause of reduction in labour costs. However, the analysis could not be carried out due to lack of data in the financial statements of the Malaysian companies. 
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The ratio of sales to operating assets (equity plus debt less cash and 
marketable securities), or the asset turnover ratio, is the second driver of a company's 
operating cash flow return on assets. It indicates the sales dollar the company is able 
to generate for each dollar invested in assets. This ratio is used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of a firm's investment management, that is, how efficiently the available 
resources are used to produce sales. Since firms invest considerable resources in 
their assets, using them productively is critical to a firm's overall performance. 
The methodology used in measuring the operating return on sales and asset 
turnover is similar to that employed in the previous section on abnormal control 
adjusted cash flow return (equation 1-7). A measure of pre acquisition performance of 
the combined firms is constructed by consolidating performance data of the target 
and bidding firms 4 years before the acquisition. Comparing 5 years post acquisition 
performance with this pre acquisition performance provides a measure of the change 
in performance. The pre acquisition consolidated measure of performance used is the 
weighted averages of target and bidder measures, with the weights being the relative 
sizes of the two firms. As before, the size of Malaysian companies in the current study 
is based on book value (equity plus reserves plus book value of debt, less cash and 
marketable securities) at the beginning of each year. Post acquisition performance 
measures for the combined firms use data for the combined firm. Since the asset 
values for the target and bidder firms are no longer obtained separately in the post 
acquisition years, the post acquisition operating return on sales of target controls and 
bidder controls are thus weighted by the relative asset value of the two firms one year 
before acquisition (year -1). The section that follows illustrates the calculation of pre 
and post acquisition performance measure of operating return on sales for the 
combined firm and control firm. 
Pre acquisition performance measure on operating return on sales 
a) Target and bidder firms 
For t= -4,..., -1 
Pspre l. t = r OCF(e) . Asset, + Sales(B) Asset(,,, r OCFm . AssetT Salesm Asset(B, 
where 
Psw,,, t is the combined group operating return on sales in the pre acquisition period, 
OCF is operating cash flow, 
Sales(B) and Salesm represent sales for bidders and targets respectively. 
Asset CO and Asset (B) represent book values of assets (equity plus reserves plus book 
value of debt, less cash and marketable securities) at the beginning of the year for 
target and bidder, respectively. 
b) Target controls and bidder controls 
For t= -4,..., -1 
PSCpreIt = OCFC(B) . AssetB + OCFcm . AssetT r 
SalesaB) Asset(B. _ Sates cm Asset(B+ 
where 
Ps, lPre,, c is the control firm return on sales in the pre acquisition period, 
OCFC(B) and OCFcm is the operating cash flow for bidder controls and target controls, 
respectively, 
Asset m and Asset(') represent book values of operating assets (equity plus reserves 
plus debt, less cash and marketable securities) for target and bidder, respectively. 
Salesc(B) and Salescm represent sales for bidder controls and target controls 
respectively. 
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Post acquisition performance measure on operating return on sales 
a) Target and bidder firms 
For t= +1,..., +5 
PspostI, t = OCF(B) It 
Sales(B) I. t 
where 
Pspos,,, t is the post acquisition operating return on sales for the combined firm 
OCF is operating cash flow, 
Sales(e) represent sales for the combined firm in the post acquisition period 
b) Target controls and bidder controls 
Fort= +1,...., +5 
Pscpost,,, = OCFC(B) . AssetBt_, r + OCFC(T) . Assetrt_, 
l 
_ Satesc(B) Asset(B"1TA_, _, Salescm Asset<e, Tý 
where 
Ps`p,, st,, t is the control firm return on sales in the post acquisition period, 
OCFC(B) and OCF, (T) is operating cash flow for bidder controls and target controls, 
respectively, 
AssetT,, t., and AssetB,,,., represent book values of operating assets (equity plus 
reserves plus book value of debt, less cash and short-term investments) for targets 
and bidders at year t-1, respectively. 
SalesC(B) and Salescm represent sales for bidder controls and target controls 
respectively in the post acquisition period. 
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The control adjusted return on sales (APsc) is obtained by subtracting the pre 
and post acquisition control firm measures of performance from the combined firms 
measures of performance for the respective takeover i for year t (similar to equation 5 
and 6 in Section 6.4.4). The change in the operating performance is taken as the 
difference between the annual control adjusted performance from 4 years prior and 5 
years post acquisition. In addition, a second test for the change in abnormal control 
adjusted ratio is estimated by regressing the median post acquisition control adjusted 
return on sales on the pre acquisition control adjusted return. 
Thus, it is hypothesised that an efficiency-motivated management will use its 
resources to the highest level to increase its cash flow in the post acquisition period. 
Hypothesis 5- Operating Return on Sales 
Ho: There is no significant change in operating return on sales of the 
combined firms in the first 5 years after acquisition. 
Ha: There is significant increase in operating return on sales of the 
combined firms in the first 5 years after acquisition. 
The asset turnover (sales divided by operating assets) is another measure of 
how efficiently the management is using its resources to improve the performance of 
the firm. It is hypothesised that better utilisation of the target firm's existing assets 
would result in higher cash flows to the combined firms, in comparison with the pre 
acquisition cash flows, and vice versa. 
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Hypothesis 6- Asset Turnover 
Ho: There is no significant change in asset turnover of the combined firms 
in the first 5 years after acquisition. 
Ha: There is significant increase in asset turnover of the combined firms in 
the first 5 years after acquisition. 
6.5.3.2 Growth Rate in Capital Expenditure 
Post acquisition performance improvement may be related to improvement in 
post acquisition investment performance. Cowling et al. (1980) noted a number of 
acquisitions where the improvement in the post acquisition profitability was 
associated with the restructuring programmes of capital expenditure. The company's 
long-term performance might also be affected due to a reduction in capital 
expenditure. This may lead to a temporary increase in operating performance 
measures. The company might sacrifice its market share through insufficient capacity 
or by causing the company to fall behind its competitors in the adoption of new 
technology. Similar to Healy et al. (1992), the following ratio is used in the current 
study to identify whether the firm has cut back on its long-term investment by 
examining the capital expenditure rate and asset sale rate. 
Capital Expenditure Rate = Capital expenditure during the year 
Book value of assets 
at the beginning of the year 
The capital expenditure rate is measured by dividing the capital expenditure 
by the book value of assets (equity plus reserves plus debt) at the beginning of each 
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year 1". An improvement in the post acquisition years for the capital expenditure rate 
will indicate that the firm has not sacrificed its long-term investments for the sake of its 
short-term improvement. 
Asset Sale Rate (cash value) = Cash receipts from asset sales 
Book value of assets 
at the beginning of the year 
Similar to Healy et al. (1992), the asset sale rate is also employed to reflect 
changes in the combined firms' investment policies, as an addition to the measures of 
asset turnover calculated in Section 6.5.3.1. The ratio is to determine if the 
improvements in asset turnover after acquisition is due to the sale of assets with low 
turnover or otherwise. It measures the amount of cash receipts from asset sales 
generated by a dollar invested in the assets. An improvement in the cash proceeds 
from disposal of assets might indicate that the combined firms are selling poorly 
performing assets after the acquisition. The cash proceeds from asset sales may help 
to alleviate bidder's cash shortage after acquisition. In comparing the leveraged 
recapitalisation of Kroger Co. with the leveraged buyout of Safeway Stores, Dennis 
(1994) found that there was a large difference in the magnitude of asset sales in both 
companies due to different organisational structure. Kroger's asset sales of US$3.51 
million was unable to mitigate the firm's cash shortage while Safeway's US$2.3 billion 
asset sales is equivalent to the projected cash shortfall after the highly leveraged 
transactions. 
The methodology used in obtaining the investment policy measures is similar 
to that described in the previous section on operating return on sales and asset 
"' Similar to Healy et al. (1992), cash is not deducted in the denominator when calculating the book 
value of assets because unlike the ratio of OCF return, the capital expenditure rate is not measuring 
profitability. 
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turnover. Pre acquisition capital expenditure and asset sale rate of the combined 
firms are constructed by consolidating the capital expenditure and asset sale data of 
the target and bidding firms over the 4 years before the acquisition. Comparing the 5 
years post acquisition capital expenditure and asset sale rate with these pre 
acquisition measures provide a measure of the change in the investment rate. The 
pre acquisition consolidated measure of each of the investment rate is the weighted 
averages of target and bidder values, with the weights being the relative sizes of the 
two firms. Post acquisition investment rate use data for the combined firms while 
those of the control firms are weighted by the relative asset value of the bidder and 
target one year before acquisition. The section that follows illustrates the calculation 
of pre and post acquisition measure on capital expenditure (either capital expenditure 
rate or asset sale rate) for the combined firm and control firm. 
Pre acquisition performance measure on capital expenditure 
a) Target and bidder firms 
For t= -4..... .1 
PCE 
pre I, t = 
r_CEXP(B) 
. Asset, + CExpm . AssetT 
[-. 
BV(B) Asset(B, n BVm Asset(e, n 
where 
PCEpre I. e is the combined firm capital expenditure (either capital expenditure rate or 
asset sale rate) in the pre acquisition period, 
CExp(B) rate and CExpm rate are either capital expenditure or cash receipts from 
asset sales divided by the book value of assets (equity plus reserves plus debt) at the 
beginning of each year for bidders and targets, respectively 
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Asset M and Asset (B) represent book values of operating assets (equity plus reserves 
plus book value of debt, less cash and short-term investments) at the beginning of 
each year for target and bidder, respectively. 
b) Tarnet controls and bidder controls 
For t= -4,.... -1 
PcErp,,,, = 
r_CEXPC(B) 
. Assets + CExpý . AssetT 




PCECpre 13 is the control firm capital expenditure (either capital expenditure rate or asset 
sale rate) in the pre acquisition period, 
Cexp«B) rate and CexpcM rate are either capital expenditure or cash receipts from 
asset sales divided by the book value of assets (equity plus reserves plus debt) at the 
beginning of each year for bidder controls and target controls, respectively 
Asset M and Asset(') represent book values of operating assets (equity plus reserves 
plus book value of debt, less cash and short-term investments) at the beginning of 
each year for target and bidder, respectively. 
Post acquisition performance measure on capital expenditure 
a) Target and bidder firms 
For t= +1,..., +5 
Pcepost It = CExp(B) i, t 
BV(B) l, t 
where 
210 
PCE",,, is the post acquisition capital expenditure (either capital expenditure rate or 
asset sale rate) for the combined firm 
BV(B)Lt represents book values of assets for the combined firm 
b) Target controls and bidder controls 
For t= +1,..., +5 





BVG Asset(B. -rx_, 
PcE`po$t,, t is the control firm capital expenditure (either capital expenditure rate or asset 
sale rate) in the post acquisition period, 
CExpae) rate and CExpcm rate are capital expenditure (either capital expenditure rate 
or asset sale rate) divided by the book value of assets at the beginning of each year 
for bidder control and target control, respectively, 
Assetn., and Asset8t., represent book values of operating assets (equity plus reserves 
plus book value of debt, less cash and short-term investments) for target and bidder 
at year M, respectively. 
Similarly, the control adjusted capital expenditure (either capital expenditure or 
asset sale rate) is obtained by subtracting the pre and post acquisition control firm 
rate from the combined firms rate for the respective takeover i for year t (similar to 
equation 5 and 6 in Section 6.4.4). The change in the capital expenditure is taken as 
the difference between the annual control adjusted rate from 4 years prior and 5 
years post acquisition. In addition, a second test for the change in abnormal control 
adjusted rate is estimated by regressing the median post acquisition control adjusted 
rate on the median pre acquisition control adjusted rate (equation 7). 
Thus, it is hypothesised that there is an increased in capital expenditure rate 
of the combined firms 5 years after acquisition, indicating that the firm has not 
sacrificed its long-term investments for the sake of its short-term improvement. 
Hypothesis 7- Capital Expenditure Rate 
Ho: There is no significant change in capital expenditure rate of the 
combined firms in the first 5 years after acquisition. 
Ha: There is significant improvement in capital expenditure rate of the 
combined firms in the first 5 years after acquisition. 
It is hypothesised that there is an increased in cash receipts from asset sale of 
the combined firms 5 years after acquisition, indicating that the firm has sold poorly 
performing assets after the acquisition. The increase in cash proceeds is also due to 
better management's decision in disposing assets to improve cash flow after 
acquisition. 
Hypothesis 8" Asset Sale Rate (Cash Value) 
Ho: There is no significant change in the asset sale rate (cash value) of the 
combined firms in the first 5 years after acquisition. 
Ha: There is significant improvement in asset sale rate (cash value) of the 
combined firms in the first 5 years after acquisition. 
6.5.3.3 Cash Payment for Expenses 
In addition to cash flow performance, Ghosh (1998) also analyse cash 
payments for operating expenses and cash payments to suppliers to determine if the 
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improvement in the post acquisition performance had been due to cost reductions. 
Ghosh (1998) reported that the post cash flow improvement in his study was a result 
from higher sales and not from reductions in operating expenses. Similar to Ghosh 
(1998), another component analysed in this study is cash payment for expenses. Due 
to the limited access to data on purchases in this study, cash payments to suppliers 
were not analysed. Similar to Ghosh (1998), cash payment for operating expenses in 
this study is defined as operating cash flow (OCF) minus cash receipts from sales 
(sales minus changes in debtors). The ratio of cash payment for operating expenses 
is measured by dividing the cash payments for operating expenses by the opening 
book value of assets (equity plus reserves plus debt) at the beginning of each year. 
Cash payments for expenses = OCF - (Sales - Changes in Debtors) 
Book value of assets 
at the beginning of the year 
It is hypothesised that there is a decrease in cash payment expenses of the 
combined firms 5 years after acquisition, indicating that the firm has engaged in cost- 
cutting strategies to improve economic efficiency in the post acquisition period. 
Hypothesis 9- Cash payment for expenses 
Ho: There is no significant change in cash payment for operating expenses 
for the combined firms in the first 5 years after acquisition. 
Ha: There is significant decrease in cash payment for operating expenses 
for the combined firms in the first 5 years after acquisition. 
The methodology used in obtaining the ratio on cash payment for operating 
expenses is similar to that described in the previous section on other ratios. A pre 
acquisition ratio of the combined firms is constructed by consolidating cash payment 
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for operating expenses data of the target and bidding firms over the 4 years before 
the acquisition. Comparing the 5 years post acquisition ratio with this pre acquisition 
ratio provides a measure of the change in the cash payment operating expenses 
ratio. The pre acquisition consolidated measure of cash payment for operating 
expenses ratio is the weighted averages of target and bidder values, with the weights 
being the relative sizes of the two firms. The ratio of the combined firms are used in 
the post acquisition period while those of the control firms are weighted by the relative 
asset value of the bidder and target one year before acquisition. The section that 
follows illustrates the calculation of pre and post acquisition measure on cash 
payment for expenses of the combined firm and control firm. 
Pre acquisition performance measure on cash payment for expenses 
a) Target and bidder firms 
For t= -4,..., -1 
PCPE 
pre i, c = r_CPE(B) . AssetB + [_CPEm . AssetT 
BV(B) Asset(B. BVm Asset(B. n 
where 
PCPEpre 
It is the combined firm measures on cash payment operating expenses in the 
pre acquisition period, 
CPE(B) ratio and CPEm ratio are cash payment for expenses {OCF - (Sales - 
Changes in Debtors)} divided by the book value of assets (equity plus reserves plus 
debt) at the beginning of each year for bidders and targets, respectively 
Asset M and Asset (B) represent book values of operating assets (equity plus reserves 
plus book value of debt, less cash and short-term investments) at the beginning of 
each year for target and bidder, respectively. 
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b) Tarnet controls and bidder controls 
For t= -4,..., -1 
PCPEcpre 
I, t = 
[_CPEC(B) Assets + 
[CPEC(T) A ssetT 
BV, 7B) Asset<B, T BVýý Asset(e. T 
where 
PCPEcpre 
1, c is the control firm cash payment for operating expenses in the pre 
acquisition period, 
CPEag) ratio and CPEcM ratio are cash payment for operating expenses divided by 
the book value of assets (equity plus reserves plus debt) at the beginning of each 
year for bidder controls and target controls, respectively 
Asset m and Asset(") represent book values of operating assets (equity plus reserves 
plus book value of debt, less cash and short-term investments) at the beginning of 
each year for target and bidder, respectively. 
Post acquisition performance measure on capital expenditure 
a) Target and bidder firms 
For t= +1,..., +5 
PCPEpost 





post It is the post acquisition cash payment for operating expenses for the 
combined firm 
BV(6),, t represents book values of assets for the combined firm. 
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b) Target controls and bidder controls 













t is the control firm cash payment for expenses in the post acquisition period, 
CPEC(B) ratio and CPEc; M ratio are cash payment for expenses divided by the book 
value of assets (equity plus reserves plus debt) at the beginning of each year for 
bidder control and target control, respectively, 
Assetn., and Assetet_, represent book values of operating assets (equity plus reserves 
plus book value of debt, less cash and short-term investments) for target and bidder 
at year t-1, respectively. 
Similarly, the control adjusted cash payment for operating expenses ratio is 
obtained by subtracting the pre and post acquisition control firm measures of the ratio 
from the combined firms measures of the ratio for the respective takeover i for year t 
(similar to equation 5 and 6 in Section 6.4.4). The change in the ratio is taken as the 
difference between the annual control adjusted ratio from 4 years prior and 5 years 
post acquisition. In addition, a second test for the change in abnormal control 
adjusted ratio is estimated by regressing the median post acquisition control adjusted 
ratio on the pre acquisition control adjusted ratio using the regression in Section 6.4.5 
(equation 7). 
6.6 Summary 
The current chapter discussed the detailed methodology to achieve the 
objectives set out in the thesis. The main objective of this research is to determine 
whether there are improvements in post acquisition corporate performance from 
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takeovers in Malaysia during the period 1988-1992. The cash flow performance of 
acquiring and target firms will be examined in this study to test directly for changes in 
operating performance that result from acquisitions. The second objective of the study 
is to explore the sources of acquisition-related changes in cash flow performance, by 
looking at efficiency indicators such as return on sales, asset turnover, capital 
expenditure rate, asset sale rate and cash payment for operating expenses. 
Performance in the current study is measured as pre tax operating cash flow 
returns on book value of operating assets at the beginning of the year. Similar to the 
definition given by Manson et al. (1994) and Ali and Pope (1995) in the UK, operating 
cash flow is defined as profit before tax, depreciation and interest adjusted for 
changes in working capital (that is, changes in stocks, trade debtors and prepayments 
less changes in creditors and other current liabilities). Operating assets are defined 
as book value of shareholders fund and total debt less cash and marketable 
securities at the beginning of the year, similar to the definition used by Healy et al. 
(1992) and Barber and Lyon (1996). 
In order to address the research objectives, the specific research questions to 
be answered are operationalised in the form of null hypotheses. Hypotheses were 
developed in comparing the level of pre acquisition performance of bidders, targets, 
and their respective controls. Target companies taken over are viewed to be less 
profitable than target controls not taken over, consistent with the hypothesis that firms 
not performing well will be taken over (Singh, 1971 and Kennedy and Limmack, 
1996). Thus, it is hypothesised that target firm has poor operating cash flow 
performance prior to takeover as compared to the target controls. In addition, Morck 
et al. (1990), Limmack (1991) and Sudarsanam et al. (1996) are among studies that 
found firms with good performance prior to acquisition gain higher returns after 
acquisition than firms of poorly managed managers. Thus, if one expects that better 
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performing firms to make good investments, it is hypothesised that pre acquisition 
operating performance of acquiring firms is higher than that of the bidder controls. 
Further, if the takeover market attempts to reallocate resources to its most efficient 
use, it is hypothesised that acquiring firms have higher pre acquisition operating cash 
flow performance than that of target firms. 
The combined firms are expected to have higher cash flow performance in 
comparison to their pre acquisition cash flows due to some benefits transferred to 
them through the combination of the acquired firms' technologies, products and 
markets with the bidding firm's existing set. Thus, it is hypothesised that post 
acquisition operating cash flow performance of the combined firms in Malaysia will 
improve in the first 5 years after acquisition relative to the pre acquisition period. 
In addition, some important components of operating cash flow may offer 
explanation for the changes in the operating returns after acquisition. Changes in the 
operating return on sales (operating cash flow divided by sales) and asset turnover 
(sales divided by operating assets) are measures of how efficiently the management 
is using its resources to improve the firm performance. Thus, it is hypothesis that 
there are significant increase in the post acquisition operating return on sales and 
asset turnover. It is also hypothesised that there is an increase in capital expenditure 
rate (capital expenditure divided by total assets) of the combined firms 5 years after 
acquisition indicating that the firm has not sacrificed its long-term investments for the 
sake of its short-term improvement. Asset sales rate (cash receipts from asset sales 
divided by total assets) is expected to increase after the acquisition due to better 
management decision in disposing poorly performing assets to improve cash flow 
after acquisition. Cash payment for expenses ratio (cash payment for expenses 
divided by total assets) is expected to decrease as the firm engaged in cost-cutting 
strategies to improve economic efficiency. 
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The methodology used in assessing whether a sample of firms experienced 
any unusual changes in post acquisition operating cash flow returns is by identifying a 
model of expected performance to provide a benchmark in assessing how the target 
and bidder firms would have performed without the acquisition. The study constructs 
a pre acquisition performance of the combined firms by consolidating performance 
data of the target and bidding firms 4 years before the acquisition. Adjustment for the 
differences in size for bidder and target is achieved by multiplying the measures of 
the pre performance by the weighted averages of the relative sizes of the two firms. 
Post acquisition performance measures for the combined firms use data for the 
combined firm. 
A control firm operating cash flow returns need to be calculated for each target 
and bidder four years prior (-4 to -1) and five years after (+1 to +5) in order to provide 
appropriate benchmark performance measures for the pre and post acquisition 
performance. Before the acquisition, control firm operating cash flow performance are 
constructed by weighting the control firm returns by the relative asset values of bidder 
and target firms at the beginning of each year. Since the asset values for the target 
and bidder firms are no longer obtained separately in the post acquisition years, the 
cash flow performance of target controls and bidder controls are weighted by the 
relative operating asset value of the acquirer and target firms in year -1. The control 
adjusted operating performance in the pre and post period is obtained by subtracting 
the pre and post acquisition control company measures of operating performance 
from the pre and post acquisition combined firms measures of operating performance 
for the respective takeover, respectively. The change in the operating performance is 
taken as the difference between the annual control adjusted performance from 4 
years prior and 5 years post acquisition. In addition, a second test for the change in 
abnormal control adjusted performance is estimated by regressing the median post 
acquisition control adjusted operating performance on the pre acquisition control 
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adjusted performance. The constant term in the regression is interpreted as capturing 
the average abnormal operational gains from acquisitions. 
The level of abnormal operating post acquisition returns to the combined firms 
may be dependent on the characteristics of the bid itself. The following chapter 
presents the methodology and hypotheses on the effects of acquisition characteristics 
on post acquisition performance. 
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Chapter 7 
Research Methodology and Hypothesis (II) 
Effects of Acquisition Characteristics on Post Acquisition Performance 
7.1 Chapter Description 
The methodology and hypotheses in examining the post acquisition operating 
performance from acquisitions in Malaysia during the period 1988-1992 and the 
sources of acquisition related changes in cash flow performance were discussed at 
length in Chapter 6. While consideration must be given to the performance of 
constituent firms prior to acquisition and the combined entity after acquisition in 
determining the overall economic efficiency from acquisitions, it is also important to 
identify the characteristics of acquisitions that lead to superior or inferior post 
acquisition cash flow performance. The current chapter focuses on the characteristics 
of acquisitions and their relationship to the level of, and changes in, post acquisition 
operating performance. 
The differences in previous results on bidders abnormal returns could be due 
to several reasons, but none as so far confirmed to be the main cause. Several 
studies have suggested that the level of abnormal operating post acquisition returns 
to the combined firms is dependent on the characteristics of the bid itself. For 
example, Travlos (1987) and Asquith et al. (1987) analyse the impact of the form of 
payment on abnormal returns; Bradley et al. (1988) examine the impact of bidder 
competition on abnormal gains; Huang and Walkling (1987), Jarrell and Poulsen 
(1989) and Servaes (1991) analyse the impact of several offer and bid characteristic 
(the form of payment and the relative size of target and bidder) on abnormal returns; 
and Healy et al. (1997) and Ghosh (1998) examine the relation between the post 
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acquisition cash flow performance and the form of payment, the degree of business 
relatedness and the nature of acquisitions (hostile or friendly). 
The specific bid characteristics examine in the current chapter are the degree 
of business relatedness, management turnover, the relative size of targets to bidders, 
the method of payment offered, and director ownership structure. These variables are 
discussed further below. 
7.2 Business Relatedness 
Salter and Weinhold (1978) and Porter (1987) are among studies suggesting 
that firms acquire other firms with some form of relatedness, thereby creating 
efficiency through synergy. Efficiency gains involve a more effective utilisation of the 
combined firms' assets by implementing a higher valued operating strategy such as 
6more efficient management, economies of scale, improved production techniques, 
the combination of complementary resources, increased market power, the 
redeployment of assets to more profitable uses, or any number of value-creating 
mechanisms that fall under the general rubric of corporate synergy' (Bradley et al, 
1983, p. 184). Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Bradley et al. (1983) suggest that the 
increased value result from an opportunity to utilise a specialised resource that arises 
solely as a result of the acquisition. Thus, synergy usually implies that gains accrue to 
the acquiring firm through two sources: (a) improved operating efficiency based on 
economies of scale or scope; (b) some kind of skill transfers. 
Operational synergy requires overlap in the activities, products and markets of 
the combined firms. Salter and Weinhold (1978) considered businesses to be related 
if they served similar markets, use similar distribution channels, used similar 
production technologies or exploited similar scientific research. Related acquisitions 
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occur when the acquirer enters product markets requiring functional skills (example 
research and development, production, marketing and distribution) and activities 
identical to (a subset of) those already possessed by the company. Thus, if acquiring 
firms are drawn from the same industry (horizontal or vertical), the presumption is that 
operational synergies (arising from economies of scale and scope or increased 
monopoly power) are available and that shareholders of the combined firms will gain. 
Most economies of scale in a related business can be achieved through cost savings 
as a result of eliminating duplicate facilities while other functions such as personnel, 
marketing, accounting, purchasing and other functions are consolidated. Thus; when 
the scale of common activities increases, there is potential for overall costs to 
decrease leading to improved cash flow. Economies of scope arise when capacity 
utilisation is increased through the production of two or more products. By producing 
a higher quantity of outputs at a lower cost the merged firm also has the ability to 
under-price the competing firms' offers and thus increase market share. Thus, higher 
post acquisition performance can be obtained from the reduction of overheads (while 
maintaining other variables as constant) and also in some cases from price increase 
due to industry concentration or less firms operating in the market. 
Lubatkin (1987), Singh and Montgomery (1987), Shelton (1988) and Healy et 
al. (1997) are among studies that have shown that some level of product-market 
relatedness between target and bidder firms is necessary to boost post acquisition 
performance. Shelton (1988) shows that acquiring firms gain the most from related 
acquisitions, in general, and related-su p pie mentary acquisitions more specifically 112 . 
However, Jarrell (1995) failed to find evidence that post acquisition improvement is 
strongest in related acquisitions. The results of related acquisitions in Jarrell's (1995) 
"" A related-supplementary target provides the acquirer with greater access to new customers and 
markets (horizontal integration) rather than totally new assets or products, while a related- 
complementary target provides the acquirer with new products, assets, or skills for currently served 
product markets (vertical integration) rather than access to new markets. 
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study appear to be indistinguishable from that of the unrelated acquisitions. Brush 
(1996) also found improvement in the post acquisition performance for 356 US 
manufacturing firms involved in acquisitions during the period 1980 - 1984. Brush 
(1996) argued that the source of improved performance is explicitly the result of an 
operational gain due to increased opportunities for each acquired business to share 
resources and activities in the acquiring firm relative to the acquired firm. In 
examining US acquisitions with and without strategic fits between 1972 and 1990, 
Flanagan (1996) found evidence to support the hypothesis that the announcements of 
related acquisitions benefit more than the announcements of purely unrelated 
acquisitions. Similarly, Ramaswamy (1997) provides evidence that similarities in 
strategic characteristics, reflected by consistency in the resource allocation patterns 
of bidder and target firms, have a positive influence on post acquisition 
performance 143 . Despite using different samples and different measures of 
relatedness, all the above studies report larger gains in related acquisitions than in 
unrelated acquisitions. 
On the other hand, studies concerning diversification suggest that having 
different businesses under a group umbrella can also facilitate the sharing of common 
resources across businesses that are closely related to each other. Ghemawat and 
Khanna (1998) argued that different businesses are considered related to each other 
when they employ complementary resources such as technology, plants, supplier or 
customer relationships (similar distribution systems). In contrast to the insignificant 
increase of returns in related diversification, Morck et al. (1990) find that unrelated 
diversification in the 1980s reduces the returns to acquiring firms. Gregory (1997) find 
UK conglomerate takeovers (defined as those where the two-digit SIC codes differ 
14' Ramaswamy (1997) stated that acquiring and target firms in his study are considered strategically 
similar if the two firms exhibit very similar resource allocation patterns as measured across a variety of 
strategically relevant characteristics such as market coverage, marketing posture, risk propensity, 
operational efficiency and client mix. 
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between acquiring and acquired firm) are less successful than non-conglomerate 
acquisitions. In estimating the valuation effect of diversification during 1986-1991, 
Berger and Ofek (1995) also found that the value loss from diversification is smaller in 
related diversification. 
However, in re-examining the conglomerate acquisition wave in the US in 
1960s, Hubbard and Palia (1999) found that acquiring firms earned positive abnormal 
returns in diversifying acquisitions, albeit the returns are higher in related than in 
unrelated acquisitions. Matsusaka (1993) also found positive abnormal returns for US 
diversified acquisitions in the 1960s and 1970s. Hubbard and Palia (1999) contributed 
the positive abnormal returns earned by US diversifying acquisitions in 1960s to 
internal capital market in the absence of well developed external capital markets 
during that period 144 . Khanna and 
Palepu (1999) also suggested the importance of 
internal capital markets in diversified firms in India 141. They indicated that diversified 
business group may concentrate around more generalised resources that derive their 
value from basic economic conditions arising from informational imperfections 
especially in capital, labour and product markets due to the absence of 
intermediaries. Similar to the US in 1960s, India is an emerging market that has a 
variety of market failures, caused by information and agency problems associated 
with securing external financing as noted by Alchian (1950) and Williamson (1975). 
As such large diversified firms which are usually affiliated into a group may use their 
'" Hubbard and Palia (1999) argued that external capital markets were less developed in terms of 
company-specific information, such as financing and budgeting expertise, in the 1960s relative to the 
current period. Due to lack of computers, databases, analyst reports and other sources of company- 
specific information, few intermediaries such as investment bankers and mutual funds in the 1960s had 
resulted in the difficulty of raising large amounts of borrowed fund. The high information costs in 
external capital markets may be solved by combining each company into a large diversified business 
group which can act as an intermediary between individual companies and imperfect markets. As a 
result of internal capital market, diversified entities may be able to improve the financial processes of 
generating and allocating financial resources relative to the alternative of standalone businesses. 
"" However, Khanna and Palepu (1999) did not find evidence that the quadratic dependence of firm 
profitability on group diversification was due to reallocation of finance through internal capital 
markets. 
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capital to help finance target companies. A firm is expected to refocus when external 
markets in emerging markets become more efficient. When such situation exists, 
many firms can provide company specific information to the capital markets directly 
and thus bypass the firm internal capital markets for investment funds. 
The cost of external financing is much higher in developing countries such as 
Malaysia, similar to that in India, due to the lack of well developed capital market 
institutions that have an expertise in gathering company specific information. Internal 
capital markets play a vital role in allocating capital when external markets are 
imperfect. As a result of greater and cheaper information from internal capital market, 
firms can reallocate resources across projects more efficiently. 
Previous studies have categorised acquisitions into related and unrelated 
acquisitions by using techniques that were either subjective (Lubatkin, 1987, Singh 
and Montgomery, 1987, and Healy et al., 1992,1997) or objective (Morck et al., 1990, 
Berger and Ofek, 1995, Gregory, 1997 and Ghosh, 1998). Subjective categorisation 
involves the analysts appropriate judgement while objective categorisation involves 
using Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes which assumes that if two 
businesses share the same SIC they must have common input requirements and 
similar production or technology functions"'. It may be argued that it is more 
appropriate to use SIC codes but since these codes are not available in Malaysia, 
subjective categorisation is used in the current study. In examining the impact of the 
degree of business relatedness on post acquisition performance, acquisitions 
between target and acquiring firms in the current study are classified as those with 
high, medium and low (or no) business overlap (based on prod uct-ma rket), similar to 
the classification used in Healy et al. (1992,1997). A high degree of business 
16 For example, Ghosh (1998) used two-digit SIC code to identify whether the acquiring and target firms are from two different industry group. 
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relatedness refers to acquisition of companies with the same level of product-market 
relatedness between bidder and target firms. This subjective classification is made by 
identifying the line of business discussion from the combined firm's annual reports 
and the relevant Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Annual Handbook. For example, the 
takeover between Benta Plantation Bhd and Federal Oil Palm Sdn Bhd, both 
cultivates oil palm, is classified as highly related business. The combination between 
General Lumber Holdings Bhd and UMW Industries Sdn Bhd is considered as a 
medium overlap transaction because General Lumber lists sawmill and timber trading 
in their line of business while UMW Industries lists furniture manufacturing in theirs. 
Ayer Hitarn Tin Dredging Malaysia Bhd's acquisition of Daimaju Enterprise Sdn Bhd is 
classified as unrelated business transaction because the companies have no 
overlapping line of business. 
As a consequence of the possible synergistic benefits that may accrue from 
related acquisitions, it is hypothesised that acquisitions of firms with high business 
relatedness will show greater cash flow improvements than acquisitions between 
firms with medium or unrelated business. 
Hypothesis 10 - Operating Synergy 
H,: There is no significant difference in the level of abnormal operating 
post acquisition returns regardless of the degree of business overlap 
between the acquiring and target firms. 
H.: Acquiring firms that are highly related to their targets are expected to 
have higher post acquisition cash flow returns than those that are in a 
medium or unrelated business to their targets. 
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Similar to Healy et al. (1992,1997), the following regression is used in this 
study to evaluate whether post acquisition performance differs by the degree of 
business relatedness. 
(Equation 8) 
AP`posu =a+ß AP`pre, +0 MEDIUM, + `P HIGH, + Er 
where AP1,,,,,,, is the mean (median) annual control adjusted cash flow returns for 
company i from the post acquisition years 
AP'p, w is the pre acquisition mean (median) control adjusted cash flow returns for the 
same company 
HIGH is a dummy variable that is one if there is a highly overlapping business 
between the target and acquiring firms and zero otherwise 
MEDIUM is a dummy variable that is one if the target and acquiring firms are in a 
medium overlap business and zero otherwise, 
The intercept coefficient a represents post acquisition abnormal cash flow returns for 
firms that do not overlap, whereas the coefficients 0 and T show the differential post 
acquisition returns of firms in medium and high overlapping business respectively. 
7.3 Management Turnover 
In addition to the gains produced by product-market relatedness mentioned 
above, another potential source of economies of scale is management turnover. 
Porter (1987) and Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) stated that an obvious way to 
economise is by reducing redundant managerial positions especially when the 
functional backgrounds are similar. However, reducing duplication of activities and 
increase economies of scale may lead to large-scale turnover among the acquired 
firms' management. Since related acquisitions operate in common product markets, 
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the top management may be familiar with the product, market, and technical 
characteristics of the two firms (Singh and Montgomery, 1987 and Shelton, 1988). 
Similarly, Walsh (1988) suggests that the acquiring firm can afford to lose many of the 
acquired firms' top management when the acquiring company is familiar with the 
target firms' business. Walsh and Ellwood (1991), Martin and McConell (1991) and 
Mikkelson and Partch (1997) are among studies involving disciplinary bids in US that 
have reported significant increases in turnover of top management in target 
companies following takeover. Barber et al. (1995) suggested that conglomerate 
acquisitions are disciplinary as bidders subsequently removed the target firm's 
management after the acquisition. Denis and Denis (1995) document that 56 percent 
of 908 sample firms with top management dismissals involves target of some form of 
corporate activity such as a takeover or a leveraged buyout. 
Cannella and Hambrick (1993), and Krishnan et al. (1997) argued that the 
retention of the top management in unrelated acquisition seems essential since 
acquiring firms have little experience in the operation of the acquired business. In 
such cases, it is likely that the acquiring firm would take steps to retain the target's top 
management. Matsusaka (1993) and Hubbard and Palia (1999) found that both 
related and diversifying acquisitions retained target management after acquisition. 
Hubbard and Palia (1999) contributed their findings to the internal capital market 
hypothesis where the acquiring firm provided finance while target management who 
are familiar with the organisation's environment provided company-specific 
operational information. 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that there would be higher turnover in the target 
company of a related acquisition than an unrelated acquisition. 
Hypothesis 11- Management Turnover 
Ho: There is no significant difference in management turnover regardless 
of the degree of business overlap between the acquiring and target 
firms. 
H,: A target company's top management turnover is likely to be higher 
following a related acquisition than following an unrelated acquisition 
Further, transfer of skills from one firm to another is likely to result in synergy 
(Salter and Weinhold, 1979, and Singh and Montgomery, 1987). Shelton (1988) 
suggests that the potential for long-run value creation is greatest in related- 
supplementary acquisitions where the top executives of both acquiring and target 
firms share similar functional skills and common managerial premises, and are 
therefore in a good position to develop collectively and implement programs that use 
the assets of the target firms in new or more efficient ways. This is in support of 
Manne's (1965) concept of market for corporate control that more capable and 
competent executive teams will tend to replace less capable and competent teams 
and is likely to result in superior post acquisition performance. In analysing non- 
takeover related top management changes, Denis and Denis (1995) reported forced 
resignations that may be due to takeover attempts etc. are preceded by large 
significant decline in operating performance and followed by large improvements in 
performance 147 . On the other hand, acquired executive 
departure in unrelated 
acquisition has negative implications for post acquisition performance since the loss 
of substantive experience may not be recovered and also because the top 
management of acquired firms are not available to facilitate organisational integration 
(Cannella and Hambrick, 1993, and Krishnan et al., 1997). Thus, it would seem that 
1,17 Firm performance in the study by Denis and Denis (1995) is operating income before depreciation 
divided by book value of total assets. 
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the more related the acquired firm is to the acquiring firm, the more effective top 
management departure will be to the post acquisition performance. 
As a result of an adverse relationship between top management turnover and 
post acquisition performance, it is hypothesised that the higher the target's top 
management turnover in a related acquisition, the higher the post acquisition cash 
flow performance. 
Hypothesis 12 - Managerial Synergy 
Ho: There is no significant difference in the operating post acquisition 
returns due to management departure regardless of the degree of 
business overlap between the acquiring and target firms. 
Ha: There is a higher operating post acquisition returns due to 
management departure in highly related acquisitions than for unrelated 
acquisitions 
Similar to the technique employed by Cannella and Hambrick (1993), a 
regression analysis is used in examining the impact of management turnover on 
related and post acquisition performance relationship. 
(Equation 9) 
APCposu =a+R AP`prer + IF TURNOVER, +0 RELATED, + E, 
where API,,.,,, is the average (median) annual control adjusted cash flow returns for 
company i from the post acquisition years 
AP'P, is the pre acquisition average (median) control adjusted cash flow returns for 
the same company 
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TURNOVER is a dummy variable that is one if executives departure exists and zero 
otherwise, 
RELATED is a dummy variable that is one if there is a high or medium overlapping 
business between the target and acquiring firms and zero otherwise 
The intercept coefficient a represents post acquisition abnormal cash flow returns for 
firms. 
The coefficient IF and 0 show the differential post acquisition returns for firms with 
directors turnover and related acquisitions, respectively. 
7.4 Relative Size of Targets and Bidders 
The relative size is another variable that may be relevant in identifying 
changes in post acquisition performance. It is expected that as the target increases in 
size relative to that of the bidder, the impact of the acquisition would be more readily 
observed in the bidders' post acquisition performance. A number of studies have 
reported different returns to bidders as a consequence of acquiring relatively large 
targets. In the US, Asquith et al. (1983), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Loderer and 
Martin (1990), and Seth (1990) found a positive relationship between bidding firms' 
cumulative abnormal returns and the size of the target relative to the size of the 
bidder. However, Kuehn (1975) suggested that acquiring a large firm requires more 
integration effort and, additionally, may strain the post acquisition performance of the 
combined firms. Fowler and Schmidt (1989), Franks et al. (1991) and Healy et al. 
(1992) found no significant relation between relative size of bidders and targets (as 
measured by total assets) and bidder returns. Franks and Harris (1989) found no 
evidence that acquiring firms in the UK lose when targets are relatively large in 
comparison to bidders. However, Limmack (1993) found that the negative abnormal 
returns to the bidding firm shareholders are significantly worse in acquisitions where 
the targets are smaller in size relative to bidders148. 
As evident from the existing literature, studies provide contradicting results on 
the relationship between relative size and level of abnormal returns to bidding 
company shareholders. It is hypothesised in this study that if acquisitions are on 
average wealth-! ncreasi ng investments for acquiring firms, the largest positive cash 
flow performance should be observed when the target is large relative to the acquiring 
firm. 
Hypothesis 13 - Relative Size 
H,: There is no relation between post acquisition performance and relative 
size of targets to bidders 
Ha: A greater increased in positive post cash flow performance is observed 
among acquisitions involving targets that are large relative to bidders 
The relative size is identified as the target size divided by bidder size. The size 
of the target and acquiring firms is measured as the book value of the companies 
(equity plus reserves, plus debt less cash and marketable securities) at the end of the 
financial year prior to acquisition (year -1). 
The following regression is estimated to evaluate whether improvements in 
post acquisition performance is affected by the relative size of target to bidder: 
"' II. - size of target and acquiring firms is measured as the market value of each company six months 
prior to the formal announcement of the bid. Quartiles are labelled in order of increasing ratio of 
relative size of bidder to target. 
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(Equation 10) 
AP`posa =a+ß AP`pm, +0 RELSIZE + E, 
where 
APcp,, t, and APcpw are the median annual adjusted cash 
flow returns for company i in 
the post and pre acquisition years. The variable APOp,., is included in the model to 
control for pre acquisition performance. 
The intercept cc is used as the measure of the abnormal control adjusted cash flow 
return (changes in performance caused by acquisition). 
The coefficient 0 shows the differential post acquisition returns for firms with relative 
size 
The slope coefficient P captures any correlation in cash flow returns between pre and 
post acquisition years. 
RELSIZE is target size divided by bidder size. 
7.5 Method of Payment 
Financing options that are available to acquirers when making an acquisition 
include issuing shares and warrants to target shareholders, or by using cash or debt 
issue. Martin (1996) noted that the characteristic of the environment in which the 
acquisition takes place is one of the reasons that influence the method of payment in 
corporate acquisitions. He found that firms with high investment opportunities, 
measured using Tobin's q ratio, prefer to use shares to finance an acquisition 
because it gives them more discretion over the funds raised than debt financing. 
Unlike debt financing where management is monitored by the capital providers, equity 
financing reveals lower potential constraints on managers, thus giving them increased 
flexibility in their current investing and future financing plans. 
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Several other studies have focused on the role of asymmetric information on 
how the offer can provide new information to investors about the bidders' or targets' 
value. Myers and Majluf (1984) and Murphy and Nathan (1989) have contended that 
issuance of shares as a form of financing tells the market that the shares of the 
bidding firm are overvalued and hence, has a negative signalling effect on the 
acquirer's abnormal return. On the other hand, the issuance of cash is interpreted by 
investors that the shares of the bidding firm are undervalued. Since managers and 
shareholders have asymmetric information about firm value, managers can identify 
potential opportunities to transfer wealth from new investors to existing shareholders 
by issuing shares when the firm is overvalued. The market recognises this incentive 
and prevents wealth transfer, on average, by responding negatively to issue 
announcement. As a result, managers may be reluctant to raise equity to finance 
acquisitions for the fear that investors will interpret the decision as an indication that 
the firm's share is overvalued. Amihud et al. (1990, p. 606) argued that "... investors 
expect this and will, therefore, drive down the value of firms that issue new equity. 
Cash (debt) financing of acquisitions will, therefore, be preferred unless its cost to 
insiders is excessive". Bhagat and Hirshleifer (1993) also support the argument that 
one would expect the market to interpret cash offers as signal of bidding firms' shares 
being undervalued, and that share offers as signals of the share prices being too 
high. 
Huang and Walkling (1987), Travlos (1987), Franks and Harris (1989) and 
Asquith et al. (1990) are among market based studies in US that have shown that 
acquiring firms using cash to finance acquisitions perform significantly better than 
share financed acquisitions around the announcement period. Agrawal et al. (1992) 
note that post acquisition returns are lower for share than for cash financed 
acquisitions. Loughran and Vijh (1997) document a relationship between the post 
acquisition returns and form of payment. Franks et al. (1988) found that UK acquiring 
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firms using shares to finance the bid performed significantly worse than bidders who 
offered cash over the two-year period following acquisition. The Malaysian experience 
is consistent with the types of financing signalling effect in US and UK in that the 
market regards share financing as unfavourable news (Md. Isa, 1994). The positive or 
zero abnormal returns for firms financing a takeover of a public traded target with 
shares parallel a public offering of new shares (Asquith and Mullins, 1986, and 
Mikkelson and Partch, 1986). 
If the issuance of shares in acquisition financing is an anticipation of a 
performance decline, then the cash flow performance after acquisition will be lower 
for bidders who offer share exchange than those who use cash financing. In 
examining the effect of the form of financing to the ultimate success of acquisitions, 
Healy et al. (1992), however, found no significant post acquisition difference between 
transactions financed with shares, cash or a mixture of securities. Similarly, in their 
later study Healy et al. (1997) found no significant difference between post acquisition 
cash flow performance and the type of acquisition financing. On the other hand, 
Ghosh (1998) found that the post acquisition cash flow performance improved 
significantly following cash acquisitions but not for share acquisitions. Linn and 
Switzer (2000) also found that the change in operating performance of merged firms 
is significantly larger for cases in which acquiring firms make cash offers as compared 
to share offers"'. 
In examining bidder returns at the announcement of a takeover proposal when 
the target is privately held, Chang (1998), however, found evidence that bidders 
experience no abnormal return in cash offers but positive abnormal returns in share 
"' Operating performance in Linn and Switzer's (2000) study is defined as pre-tax profit before 
extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortisation charges, net interest expense and total income 
taxes divided by market value of assets. 
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offers. Chang argued that the financing of takeovers for privately held targets is 
similar to private placements of shares studied by Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and 
Smith (1993). They suggested that the positive abnormal returns reflect resolution to 
the Myers and Majluf (1984) underinvestment problem, since managers can disclose 
their private information during their negotiations with the small group of private 
placement investors. Similar to private sale of shares, share financing of privately 
held target Involves payment of shares to a single or small group of target 
shareholders (usually fewer than five). Privately held target shareholders can more 
easily assess the bidding firm's prospect and their willingness to accept shares from 
the bidders 'conveys to the market favourable information about the bidding firm, 
resulting in a positive stock price reaction to the merger proposal' (Chang 1998, p. 3). 
If the issuance of shares in acquisition financing is an anticipation of an 
improved performance, then the cash flow performance after acquisition will be higher 
for bidders who offer share exchange in private company than those who use cash 
financing in takeovers of privately held targets. Thus, it can be hypothesised that 
acquirers who use shares to finance an acquisition of privately held targets would 
have better post acquisition cash flow performance than those who use cash 
exchange. 
Hypothesis 14 - Method of Payment 
H,: There is no significant relation between the abnormal operating post 
acquisition cash flow performance and the method of payment 
H.: There is significant increase in the operating post acquisition cash flow 
performance for acquiring firms who offer share exchange over those 
who offer cash financing 
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Cash offers in the current study is defined as cash and debt exchanges, and 
share offers include shares and where a combination of cash and shares is paid. 
Multiple regression is used to examine the possible inter-relationship effects of the 
method of payment on post cash flow operating returns of the bidders. The 
dependent variable is the post acquisition operating cash flow returns while the 
method of payment is the independent variable to be included in the multiple 
regression. 
(Equation 11) 
APCPOS =a +R AP`PrW +0 CASH + Et 
where 
AP'p,, t, and APcp,, are the median annual control adjusted cash flow returns for 
company i in the post and pre acquisition years. The variable APCpref is included in the 
model to control for pre acquisition performance. 
The intercept a is used as the measure of the abnormal adjusted cash flow return 
(changes in performance caused by acquisition) not affected by cash and share 
payment. 
The slope coefficient 0 captures any correlation in cash flow returns between pre and 
posts acquisition years. 
The coefficient 0 shows the differential post acquisition returns for firms with cash 
payment. 
CASH is a dummy variable that is one if the payment is made in cash and zero 
otherwise. 
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7.6 Director Ownership 
Boards of directors are widely believed to play an important role in monitoring 
top management (Fama, 1980). Directors are supposed to supervise the actions of 
management, provide advice, and vetoing poor decisions. There have been several 
attempts to identify quantitatively the effects of shareholdings on the board of 
directors on profitability. Examples were studies carried out by Lewellen et al. (1989), 
Denis et al. (1997) and Shinn (1999) on how shareholdings by board of directors 
affect performance. In examining 203 US listed acquiring firms during the period 1963 
to 1984, Lewellen et al. (1989) found that acquiring firms earn higher abnormal share 
returns around the announcement date with higher managerial ownership. Similarly, 
Denis et al. (1997) found negative relation between the level of diversification and 
managerial share ownership, consistent with the agency cost hypothesis that as 
managers' ownership stake increase, they are less likely to adopt diversification 
strategies that reduce shareholder wealth. Shinn (1999) also support the hypothesis 
that managers with a significant ownership position in their firms may engage in 
acquisition activity that increases shareholder wealth since a greater proportion of 
their wealth is tied to changes in the value of the firm. 
The ownership of vote-carrying shares by management is motivated by the 
desire for direct monetary gain as well as the possibility of exercising control over the 
company. These differing motives may be due to the tradeoff between the agency 
costs that have given rise to the distinction between managerial alignment (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) and managerial entrenchment (Demsetz, 1983 and Morck et al. 
1988). High level of managerial shareholding encourage managers to select policies 
aligned with those of other shareholders, as managers bear direct wealth 
consequences from their decision. This converge n ce-of-i nte rest hypothesis predicts 
that market value of the management increases with management ownership. On the 
other hand, managerial entrenchment occurs when there is a possibility that 
managers with significant ownership levels may gain so much power that they are 
able to use the firm to further their own interests rather than the interests of the 
shareholders. This entrenchment hypothesis predicts that market valuation of the 
corporation will be less valuable when managed by management free from checks on 
their control. Holl and Kyriazis (1997) suggested that managerial alignment is 
associated with low levels of ownership and managerial entrenchment is associated 
with high levels of ownership. This is similar to the argument made by Stulz (1988), 
and Hubbard and Palia (1995) that there is an existence of a non-linear inverted U- 
shaped relationship (non-monotonic relationship) between managerial shareholding 
and wealth gains, where the market value of the firm first increases, then declines, as 
ownership by the board of directors rises. In using cc as proxy for voting rights 
controlled by management, Stulz (1988) argued that the value of the firm increases 
when a is low and decreases when a is large. Similarly, Morck et al. (1988) also 
found that profitability, measured by Tobin's q, is highest at moderate levels of share 
ownership by the board (over the 0 to 20% range). However, the firm performance 
declines after that point as managerial ownership concentration increases. In 
examining the relationship between managerial ownership and shareholders wealth 
(captured by abnormal market return), Hubbard and Palia (1995) also find empirical 
support for the non-monotonic relationship hypothesis that abnormal returns first 
increase, then decrease as the acquirers managerial level increases. Unlike the 
study by Mork et al. (1988), however, Hubbard and Palia (1995) did not find a positive 
relationship between performance and managerial level at more than 25%. 
Thus, the current study focuses on whether directors with significant 
shareholding plays a role in monitoring the actions of the bidding firm's management 
in producing positive post acquisition performance. It is hypothesised that there is a 
non-linear inverted U-shape relationship between managerial shareholding and 
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wealth gains. Post acquisition performance of the firm first increases as the directors' 
hold stake in the firm, then declines as ownership by the board of directors rises. Low 
levels of ownership helps to align the incentives of directors with those of 
shareholders, but managerial entrenchment may occur when there is a possibility that 
managers with high ownership level tend to use their power to further their own 
interests rather than the interests of the shareholders. 
Hypothesis 15 - Managerial Ownership 
Hý: There is no significant relation between the abnormal operating post 
acquisition cash flow performance and directors share ownership 
Ha: The post acquisition operating cash flow performance for acquiring 
firms first increases, then declines as directors own share ownership 
increases. 
Section 4(1) of Malaysian Companies Act defines directors as 'any person 
occupying the position of director of a corporation by whatever named called and 
includes a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of 
a corporation are accustomed to act and an alternate or substitute director. Division 
3A (Section 69D) of the Malaysian Companies Act 1965 defines a substantial 
shareholder as one who 'has an interest or interests in one or more voting shares in 
the company and the nominal amount of that share, or the aggregate of the nominal 
amounts of those shares is not less than five percent of the aggregate of the nominal 
amounts of all voting shares in the company'. 
Similar to the study by Holl and Kyriazis (1997), DIREC is defined as fraction 
of shares held directly by the directors and his or her immediate family owning 5 
percent or more of the firm's outstanding shares. The dependent variable is the post 
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acquisition operating cash flow returns while the percentage of directors ownership is 
the independent variable to be included in the multiple regression. 
(Equation 12) 
APOPOStl +P APcprW +0DI REC CC 
where 
AP',,,,, and APcpl are the median annual control adjusted cash flow returns for 
company i in the post and pre acquisition years. The variable APcpr., is included in the 
model to control for pre acquisition performance. 
The intercept a is used as the measure of the abnormal adjusted cash flow return 
(changes in performance caused by acquisition) not affected by directors ownership. 
The slope coefficient P captures any correlation in cash flow returns between pre and 
posts acquisition years. 
The coefficient 0 is the ownership percentage of directors 
7.7 Multivariate Analysis 
To examine the possible inter-relationship effects of acquisition characteristics 
on post acquisition operating cash flow returns more specifically, the returns of the 
combined firms are analysed using a multiple regression model. The dependent 
variable is the post acquisition operating cash flow returns. The independent variables 
reflect the acquisition characteristics (business relatedness, management turnover, 
relative size of targets to bidders, method of payment, and directors ownership). 
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(Equation 13) 
AP'post, =a+P, AP'pmj +N (HIGH)+ P3 (MEDIUM) 
+P4 (TURNOVER) + Ps (RELSIZE) +N (CASH) 
+ ß, (DIREC) + Er 
where AP'pý, rj is the average (median) annual control adjusted cash 
flow returns for 
company I from the post acquisition years 
AP'prW is the pre acquisition average (median) for the same company 
HIGH is a dummy variable that is one if there is a highly overlapping business 
between the target and acquiring firms and zero otherwise 
MEDIUM is a dummy variable that is one if the target and acquiring firms are in a 
medium overlap business and zero otherwise 
TURNOVER is a dummy variable that is given the value of one if there is target 
directors turnover and zero otherwise 
RELSIZE is the actual percentage of relative size of target to bidder 
CASH is a dummy variable that is one if the acquirer paid in cash and 0 otherwise 
DIREC is the actual percentage of directors ownership 
7.8 Summary 
The current chapter details the methodology and hypotheses on the effects of 
acquisition characteristics on post acquisition performance. Table 7.1 summarises the 
acquisition characteristics to be examined and expected direction of each explanatory 
variable on the post acquisition performance. 
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Table 7. 
Acquisition characteristics and expected direction of each 






Highly overlapping business 
between target and acquiring firm 
Target directors turnover in related 
acquisitions 
Large relative size of target to bidder 
Payment by cash 
Fraction of shares held by members 
of the board of directors owning 5% 






The next chapter describes the data collection of companies involves in 
corporate acquisition in Malaysia during the period 1988-1992. 
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Chapter 8 
Data Sources and Sample Selection 
8.1 Chapter Description 
The last 2 chapters described the research methodology and hypotheses for 
the current study. The current chapter of the study describes the data collection for 
companies involved in corporate acquisitions undertaken in Malaysia between 
January 1,1988 and December 31,1992. Samples were selected from quoted 
acquirers and quoted and non-quoted acquired targets. Selection criteria used for the 
sample and control firms are also explained. 
As far as possible, a census rather than sample analysis was attempted, 
although bids less than 50% of equity and offers for investment trusts and finance 
companies were excluded from the analysis. Data availability proved to be a problem. 
Through considerable effort, as discussed below, data was gathered on a final 
sample of 97 acquiring and 117 target companies. 
8.2 Selecting Acquirers and Targets 
The study sets out to analyse the operating performance of companies 
involved in corporate acquisitions undertaken in Malaysia during the period January 
1,1988 - December 31,1992. The sample period is selected to focus on recent 
acquisitions and also to ensure sufficient pre and post acquisition performance data. 
Initially, the analysis in the study was design to include acquisitions for a period of 
seven (7) years commencing January 1,1986. However, the pre acquisition financial 
reports for the target companies kept at the Malaysian Registrar of Companies (ROC) 
were available only from December 31,1986. In order to ensure at least two (2) years 
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of financial records (excluding year of acquisition) prior to acquisition are available for 
the target companies, the sample period began on 1 January 1988. The selected 
period was truncated on December 1992 to permit a five-year post acquisition 
analysis. The focus on a longer post acquisition performance stems from the view 
11 
that value increasing improvements in efficiency might not materialise for several 
years (Healy et al., 1992,1997, Manson et al., 1994, Jarrell, 1995, Ghosh, 1999)"'. 
Barber and Lyon (1996, p. 377) also found that expectation models that use a firm's 
lagged performance (2 or 3 years) after the event provide better results in detecting 
abnormal performance. 
In Malaysia, all acquisition proposals are required to be submitted to the 
regulatory bodies, mainly the Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) and Securities 
Commission (SC). An attempt was made to obtain a list of acquisition proposals from 
the FIC. However, in a written reply, the FIC indicated that there were no proper 
records available on acquisitions during the period investigated. As the SC was 
established in 1993 they were also unable to provide data for the period under 
investigation. Instead, information on Malaysian acquiring and target companies 
involved in acquisitions was obtained from examination of individual copies of Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange's (KLSE) monthly Investor Digests. Proposed acquisitions 
for the period under study (1988-1992) was taken from the lists of proposed 
acquisitions in the Investors Digest. 
"' Healy et al. (1992,1997), Manson et al. (1994), and Anand and Singh (1997) use five years post 
acquisition period while Ghosh (1999) report his data using 3 years post acquisition period. Jarrell 
(1995) found that combined firms experience improvement in performance over the longer term 
(represented by the average of 4-6 post acquisition years) while the combined firms did not improve 
their performance over the short term (I year). He inferred that the combined firms have to absorb the 
initial costs of the acquisition in the first year, then realising improvements in the long-term as the 
firm's assets or operations have been efficiently reorganised. 
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The initial condition for inclusion in the sample was that the acquiring firm 
must be quoted in the KLSE and acquiring more than 50.1% voting rights of targets. 
The percentage of more than 50.1% is used to justify the hold i ng-subsid iary 
relationship in producing the consolidated accounts, necessary for the combined cash 
flow data of acquiring and targets used in the current study. Section 5(1)(a) of the 
Malaysian Companies Act 1965 provides that a corporation shall be deemed to be a 
subsidiary of another corporation if that corporation: 
(i) controls the composition of the board of directors of the first-mentioned 
corporation, or 
(ii) controls more than half of the voting power of the first-mentioned 
corporation, or 
(iii) holds more than half of the issued share capital of the first-mentioned 
corporation, or 
Ov) the first-mentioned corporation is a subsidiary of any corporation which 
is that other corporation's subsidiary. 
Due to (i) above, there will be cases where a substantial shareholder holding 
less than 50.1 per cent of the issued and paid up capital of a company is in virtual 
control of the company. This happens when the remaining shares in the company are 
spread over a wide spectrum of shareholders. However, due to the difficulty of 
identifying (i) above, the ownership of the majority of shares in a company (50.1 per 
cent) is used as the criteria for control in the current study. 
Further restriction requires that a purchase price exceeding RM500,000 be 
taken into consideration. The selection of a minimum bid value, whilst somewhat 
arbitrary, is chosen to avoid the difficulty in identifying any response which could 
occur when firms acquire very small companies. Asquith et al. (1983) suggested that 
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if the investment in the target is small relative to the total value of the acquiring firm, 
the change in value from the acquisition may not cause much change either in the 
acquirers share price or other performance measures. 
Initially, a sample of 160 proposed acquisitions was identified, involving 160 
bidders and 213 targets"'. The list contained the name of acquiring and target firms, 
the percentage acquired, and the purchase price. The list was then cross-checked 
with the Annual Companies Handbook published by the KLSE and the respective 
companies' files in KLSE library to find out if the acquisition was successful. Further 
screening involved a reduction in the final sample as shown in Table 8.1.29 
acquisitions involving 33 target firms were excluded because the bid had lapsed. A 
further 39 bids, involving 13 bidders, were excluded either because the target was a 
dormant company (18 cases) or because there was insufficient accounting 
information for the target (21 cases). Since the initial requirement was based on 
acquiring firms quoted on KLSE, 3 non-listed bidders acquiring 6 targets were also 
excluded from the current study. Finally, 18 acquisitions involving financial firms & 
investment trusts were excluded because they are subject to special accounting and 
regulatory requirements. Generally, investment trusts are valued on the basis of the 
market value of their highly liquid assets such as shares and bonds. The offer price 
for such trusts are normally not based on a fixed offer price (cash or shares in the 
bidding firm) but as a percentage of net assets value for each of the target company's 
shares. Another restriction requires the acquiring firm not only to be listed in the KLSE 
at the time of acquisition but also to remain listed after the acquisition. Although this 
restriction introduces a potential survivorship bias, no bidder was in fact removed for 
this reason. 
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All the 97 acquiring companies in the final sample met the criterion. Other 
information obtained on the acquisitions from the KLSE Annual Companies Handbook 
and the respective companies'files in KLSE library included the initial announcement 
dates, the completion date, the composition of the acquiring companies by sector, the 
purchase price of the target firms, and the method of financing (cash or shares 
exchange). Names of the sample companies are provided in Appendix 1. 
88 12 1 12 
1 2 2 14 
89 18 1 18 
5 2 10 28 
90 22 1 22 
3 3 9 
1 4 4 
--- 35 
91 17 1 17 
2 2 4 
1 3 3 24 
92 14 1 14 
1 2 2 16 
TOTAL 97 117 
Note: 
Number of targets being acquired a single bidder in each year 
during the period 1988-92. 
The final sample consists of 97 acquiring and 117 target companies. As 
mentioned earlier, an acquiring firm taking over either one or more target firms 
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Table 8.2 
Number of targets being acquired by a single bidder in a year 
for 117 Bids during the period 1988-1992 
(multiple bids) in the same financial year is considered as one acquisition. The 
breakdown of the number of targets being acquired by a single bidder in a particular 
year is shown in Table 8.2. 
Frequent, or active, bidders (bidders making more than 1 bid in subsequent 
years) are not excluded from the current study. There is a possibility that acquiring 
companies that attempted a second acquisition are those whose experience of first 
acquisitions are positive and therefore undertake further acquisitions. Those bidders 
which did not make a second bid may have been companies who experienced 
difficulties associated with their first acquisition. Whether active bidders perform better 
or worse than one-time acquirer is an empirical question. However, there is a 
possibility of introducing bias in the analysis if active bidders are excluded from the 
sample. In addition, there is a practical problem of data availability. Excluding frequent 
bidders would significantly reduce the data set. The breakdown of active bidders is 
summarised in Table 8.3. 
Table 8.3 




Acquisition activities of acquiring firms for the period 1988-92 
Multiple acquisitions identified in Table 8.3 refers to the number of other 
acquisitions made by an acquiring firm in the 4-year period subsequent to the year of 
the first acquisition. As mentioned earlier, acquisition of more than one target firm in 
the same year are considered as a single bid. Out of the 97 acquisitions involving 65 
companies, 27 (41.5%) companies made more than one bid during the investigation 
period 1988-1992. Few companies engage in a large number of acquisitions, but a 
reasonable proportion in the sample undertake more than 1 acquisition. 
For preliminary analysis all 117 targets acquired were identified. The listing 
status of targets is summarised in Table 8.4. As can be seen most of these targets 
are private companies. 
Table 8.4 
Classification of Targets 
Classification No. of 
companies 
Percentage 
Public listed 3 2.56 
Non-public listed 1 0.86 
Ptivate 113 96.58 
Total 117 100 
Note: 
Companies name that end with Sendirian Berhad (Sdn. Bhd-) 
are categorised as private companies while those that end 
with Berhad (Bhd. ) are public listed companies. 
8.2.1 Composition of Companies 
A summary of the industry composition of the 97 quoted acquiring companies 
is provided in Table 8.5, using the KLSE classification for the year of acquisition. The 
highest percentage of bidders are found in the Industrial sector (52.6%), followed by 
the Property sector (27.8%). 
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Table 8 .5 
omposition of A quiring Firms 
Industry No. of companies Percentage 
Tin 4 4.1 
Oil Palm 7 7.2 
Rubber 8 8.3 
Property 27 27.8 
Industrial 51 52.6 
Total 97 100 
Note: 
The classification of companies by industry was obtained from the KLSE. 
Information of the private and non-public listed companies was obtained from 
the company files, found in the microfiche at the Malaysian Registrar of Companies 
(ROC), while those of public listed were obtained from KLSE. The companies in the 
ROC are categorised according to their business sector, as shown in Table 8.6. The 
largest percentage of companies (31.6%) is in the Property and Construction sector, 
followed by Industrial sector (27.4%). 
Table 8.6 
Composition of Acquired Firms 
Property & Construction 37 31.6 
Industrial 32 27.4 
Trading 11 9.4 
Oil Palm 11 9.4 
Hotel & Recreation 10 8.4 
Plantation 5 4.3 
Betting operation 5 4.3 
Telec3mmunication 3 2.6 
Transport 3 2.6 
Total 117 100 
Note: 
The classification of companies by sector was obtained from the 
Registrar of Companies. 
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8.2.2 Type of Acquisition and Method of Payment 
Because of the difference in the two industry classification schemes used for 
Tables 8.5 and 8.6, a subjective categorisation is used in the current study to identify 
the degree of business relatedness. This subjective classification is made by reading 
the line of business discussion in the combined firm's annual reports and the KLSE 
Annual Handbook. Acquisitions between target and acquiring firms in the current 
study are classified as those with high, medium and low (or no) business overlap, 
similar to the classification given in Healy et al. (1992,1997). Out of 117 acquisitions, 
64 were found to be highly related, 17 medium related and 36 unrelated. The 
distribution of acquisition by relatedness of the business is given in Table 8.7. 
Table 8.7 
Distribution of Acquisitions by the Type of Acquisition and the 
Method of Payment for acquisitions completed during the period 
I QRR. 1 QQ? 
Years Related Ve rsus Unre lated Method of Pavr nent 
Highly Medium Non- Total Cash Shares Tot 
related 
1988 8 2 4 14 13 1 14 
1989 11 8 9 28 20 8 28 
1990 22 1 12 35 23 12 35 
1991 13 4 7 24 19 5 24 
1992 10 2 4 16 10 6 16 
Total 64 17 36 117 85 32 117 
me: 
List of acquisitions from 1988-92 for which data are available from the KLSE 
classified by the type of acquisition and the method of payment used in acquisitions. 
The type of acquisitions between target and acquiring firms in the cuffent study are 
classified as those with high, medium and low (or no) business overlap. A high 
degree of business relatedness refers to acquisition of companies with a 
consideratle overlap of product market relatedness between bidder and target firms. 
Cash offers include cash and debt exchanges, and share offers include shares and 
where a combination of cash and shares is paid. 
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The information on the form of payment made by the acquiring firms was 
obtained from the respective companies' files at the KLSE. Cash offers include cash 
and debt exchanges, and share offers include shares and combinations of cash and 
shares. Table 8.7 also gives the breakdown on the form of payment made. 
8.2.3 Relative Size of Target to Bidders 
Relative size of target to bidders is defined as the ratio of target size to bidder 
size at the end of the financial year prior to the bid year (year -1). The size of the 
target and acquiring firms is measured as the book value of the companies (equity 
plus reserves, plus debt less cash and marketable securities) at the end of the 
financial year before acquisition (year -1). The choice of this base date was 
undertaken to avoid any potential bias caused by the bid itself. Information on the size 
of bidders is obtained from the financial statement of bidders found at the KLSE while 
those of targets are taken from the ROC. 
Table 8.8 
Relative Size of Target to Bidder for 117 Acquisitions 
Mean 278019 54286 0.412 
Median 122611 20268 0.149 
Standard 347181.2 90060.3 0.746 
Deviation 
Maximum 1783835 693219 4.028 
Minimum 5495 1267 0.103 
Note: Firm size Is defined as the book value of shares plus the book values of net 
debt (long-term debt plus short-term debt less cash and marketable 
securities) at the end of the year before acquisition (year -1). Relative size of 
the target is defined as the ratio of target size and bidder size in year -1. 
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The mean and median relative size of target is 41.2% and 14.9%, respectively 
(see Table 8.8). This size relation, similar to that reported by Healy et al. (1992), 
ensures that the targets in this study are large enough to have a significant effect on 
the bidder's performance. 
Table 8.9 shows the distribution of relative size of target to bidder. The 
majority of the companies (49.6%) in the sample have relative size between 0.11- 
0.20, followed by 11.1 % of the companies in the 0-0.05 and 0.21-0.30 range. Only 12 
targets or 10.3% of the total, are larger in size than their bidders. 
Table 8.9 
Distribution of Relative Size of Target to Bidder 
for 117 acquisitions 
Range Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
0.0-0.05 13 11.1 11.1 
0.06-0.10 7 6.0 17.1 
0.11-0.20 58 49.6 66.7 
0.21-0.30 13 11.1 77.8 
0.31-0.40 5 4.3 82.1 
0.41-0.50 2 1.7 83.8 
0.51-0.99 7 5.9 89.7 
>1.00 12 10.3 100 
Total 117 
8.2.4 Directors Ownership 
Prior to 1984, there was widespread use of nominee companies to register 
shareholdings making it difficult to discover who were the beneficial shareholders of 
many of the listed companies in Malaysia (Cheong, 1989). The new Companies 
Amendment Bill 1984 introduced into the Companies Act 1965 (Division 3A) has 
imposed obligation on shareholders to disclose their substantial interest in shares of 
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public companies so as to protect investors' interest'52 . Data on the board of 
directors 
who were affiliated with the acquiring firm were obtained from the proxy statement or 
director's report in the financial statements of the company one-year prior to 
acquisition. 
Table 8.10 reports the descriptive statistics of share ownership of directors for 
97 and 65 acquiring firms". In the sample of 97 acquiring firms, the mean combined 
stake owned by directors is 13.9% and the median stake is 10.9%. There is 
considerable variation in directors ownership within the sample, ranging from 0.04% 
to 59.7%. Similarly, the ownership of directors for the first acquisition of 65 acquiring 
firms ranges from 0.04% to 59.7%. The mean and median stake owned by these 
directors is 13.1% and 6.4%, respectively. 
Table 8.10 
Descriptive Statistics for Share Ownership of Directors for 
Acquiring Firms over the period 1988-1992 
Percentage Share 
Ownership of 




Directors for 65 
Acquiring Firms 
Mean 13.9 13.1 
Median 10.9 6.4 
Minimum 0.04 0.04 
Maximum 59.7 59.7 
Standard 15.0 15.37 
Deviation 
Note: 97 acquiring firms include bidders that made subsequent bids in the 
following year while 65 acquiring firms consist of bidders that made the 
first bid. 
"I A person is deemed to be a substantial shareholder if he has an interest in 5 per cent or more of the 
voting shares in a company (Section 691)(1) of the Malaysian Companies Act 1965). 
"' 97 acquiring firms include bidders that made subsequent bids in the following year while 65 
acquiring firms exclude those that made subsequent bids. 
257 
As shown in Table 8.11,16 (16.49%) of the 97 acquiring firms have directors 
owning less than 0.1% of the firm's outstanding shares while majority of companies 
(22.68%) have directors owning shares in the range of 0.1% to 5%. The majority of 
the 65 acquiring firms (24.62%) also have directors owning in the range of 0.1% to 
5% while 20% of the firms have directors owning less than 0.1% of the firm's 
outstanding shares. 
Table 8.11 
Distribution of Directors Ownership for Acquiring firms over the 
period 1988-1992 
Distribution of Directors Distribution of Directors 
Ownership for 97 Acquiring ownership for 65 Acquiring 
Firms Firms 
Range Frequency % Cumu- Frequency % Cumu- 
I lative % 
lative % 
Lessthan 16 16.49 16.49 13 20.0 20.0 
0.1% 
1 
0.1-5% 22 22.68 39.17 16 24.62 44.62 
5-10% 9 9.28 48.45 6 9.23 53.85 
10-15% 13 13.40 61.85 7 10.77 64.62 
15-20% 11 11.34 73.19 5 7.69 72.31 
20-25% 11 11.34 84.53 8 12.31 84.62 
25-30% 1 1.03 85.56 1 1.54 86.16 
30-35% 1 1.03 86.59 1 1.54 87.70 
35-40% 6 6.19 92.78 3 4.61 92.31 
More than 7 7.22 100 5 7.69 100 
40% 
Total 97 100 65 100 
8.2.5 Turnover of Directors 
There is no readily available comprehensive source of information on top 
management turnover for individual companies. However, information may be 
obtained on named directors of the companies. Names of target directors were 
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obtained from the proxy statement or directory of directors in the companies annual 
reports and KLSE Companies Annual Handbooks one-year prior and one-year post 
acquisition period. A company's top management team is defined as all executive 
directors and the chairman. Turnover is defined as the proportion of directors present 
at the time of acquisition who had departed by the end of the first post acquisition 
financial year. The list of names in the post acquisition period is checked against the 
pre acquisition list to determine if existing directors had left the company or new 
directors have been appointed after the acquisition. 
Being only private companies, target company in the current study normally 
have only 4-5 directors in the company. As mentioned in Chapter 7, it is hypothesised 
(HO, O) in the current study that acquisitions of firms with high business relatedness will 
show greater cash flow improvements than acquisitions between firms with medium 
or unrelated business. Thus, the sample of takeovers are subdivided into two groups, 
with Group A including targets of related acquisition, further subdivided into those 
which have and those which do not have any change of directors in the year following 
the bid. Related acquisitions include those of highly and medium related acquisitions 
as defined in Section 8.2.2. Group B includes targets of unrelated acquisition and is 
also subdivided into those which have and those which do have any change of 
directors in the same period. Table 8.12 shows the distribution of managerial turnover 
for the two groups. 
As shown in Table 8.12, both the related and unrelated acquisitions have a 
high proportion of top managerial turnover after the acquisition. The turnover of 
directors is also higher in unrelated than in related acquisitions. There are 47 (58%) 
cases of directors turnover and 34 (42%) directors retained out of 81 related 
acquisitions, while 25 (69%) cases out of 36 companies replaced directors and 11 
(31%) retained directors in unrelated acquisitions. 
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Table 8.12 
Distribution of Directors Turnover by Business Relatedness for 117 
Ridn Cnmnlatod durinn tha nariad 19813-1992 
Years Group A 
Related cquisitions 
Group B 
Unrelated A cquis tions 
Total 
Turnover Retain Total Turnover Retain Total 
1988 6 4 10 3 1 4 14 
1989 13 6 19 6 3 9 28 
1990 14 9 23 8 4 12 35 
1991 9 8 17 5 2 7 24 
1992 5 7 12 3 1 4 16 
Total 47 34 81 25 11 36 117 
Related acquisition is where there is a high or medium overlapping iine or 
business between the target and acquiring firm. 
8.3 Bidder Controls and Target Controls 
Control companies consist of firms that have not engage in acquisition activity 
during the period under study. The control selected in this study were non-acquiring 
and non-target companies in the same industrial classification as those of the 
respective companies matched by year and size on one by one basis". The 
matching procedure used here allows for a direct comparison between the 
performance of firms that are engaged in acquisitions and firms that do not. As 
mentioned earlier, the size of Malaysian companies in the study is based on book 
value (book value of shares plus reserves plus book value of debt, less cash and 
marketable securities) at the end of the financial year prior to acquisition. 
Firms are matched from pre acquisition periods and the same firms are used 
as a benchmark for both pre and post acquisition years. List of quoted companies 
"As mentioned in Chapter 6, Barber and Lyon (1995) and Ghosh (1998) suggest that control flums 
selected on the basis of industry and size are likely to serve as better benchmarks than median firms from the same industry for detecting abnormal operating performance. 
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based on industry for the period 1988-92 is obtained from the KLSE. The size of 
these companies is computed from their respective financial statements obtained 
from the KLSE Annual Handbook. The companies are ranked each year based on 
size within their respective industry. A company having similar size and in the same 
industry as the bidder is identified as the bidder control. Companies that were either 
the subject of a bid or made a bid themselves during the period of study (1988-1992) 
are excluded from the control firm. If the selected company is involved in a bid, the 
next company in the same industry having similar size as the bidder is chosen as the 
bidder control. As far as possible a company in the same industry is chosen only once 
as a bidder control'55. A total of 97 bidder controls are finally identified, one for each 
acquiring firm in the sample. 
Information on thousands of companies under different business sector is kept 
in the microfiche at ROC each year. Due to the difficulty of obtaining the size of non- 
target companies from the company microfilm at ROC, the non-target companies 
were matched to those of the respective target companies by the same industrial 
classification and same time period only. A control company to match the target is 
chosen at random from the list of companies in the same business sector as the 
target. If information on the chosen company is not available in the microfiche, 
another company is selected from the list. The process is repeated until a company in 
the same industry with sufficient financial reports (both pre and post) as the target is 
found. The matched company was neither a subject of a bid nor had made a bid itself 
during the period of study. 
The relative size of target control to bidder control and the controls to their 
respective sample firms are shown in Table 8.13. The mean and median relative size 
"' In 12 cases it was necessary to use the same control firm because there was no other company of 
similar size in the same industry. 
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of target controls to bidder controls is 20.6% and 4.6%, respectively. The relative size 
of target controls to targets is 63.0% for the mean and 25.7% for the median. On the 
other hand, the mean and median relative size of bidder controls to bidders is 110.2% 
and 98.4%. Size matching was therefore deemed to be fairly accurate for bidders, 
although less so for targets. 
Table 8.13 
Relative Size of Target Controls to Bidder Controls and to their Respective Sample 
Firms for 117 Bids Completed during the period 1988-1992 
Range 
Description 























Mean 252932 21999 0.206 0.630 1.102 
Median 124642 9241 0.046 0.257 0.984 
Standard 282653 54762 0.527 0.993 0.551 
Deviation 
Maximum 1708857 474313 3.839 5.307 3.294 
Minimum 4626 1001 0.033 0.101 0.404 
Note: Firm size is defined as the book value of shares plus the book values of net d ebt (long-term 
debt plus short -term debt, less cash and marketable securities) at the end of the year 
before acquisition (year -1). Relative size of the target is defined as the ratio of target size 
and bidder size in year -1. 
8.4 Data on Cash Flow and Asset 
Whenever possible eleven years of data on cash flow and asset are required 
for each sample and control companies, commencing 5 years prior to acquisition until 
5 years post acquisition period (inclusive the year of acquisition)". Financial reports 
on the quoted acquiring and quoted non-acquiring companies were obtained from the 
KLSE library while those on non-quoted target and non-quoted matched target 
companies were obtained from the company files at the ROC. 
'-'6 During analysis of data, year of acquisition is excluded to control for any one-time costs incurred 
during the acquisition. 
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Prior to 1997, the 'Cash Flow Statements' was not available in the financial 
statements of Malaysian companies. Instead, the presentation of Consolidated 
Statement of Changes is a statutory requirement in the Malaysian financial 
statements, as required by the 9h Schedule of the Companies Act (1965). As such, 
cash flow data (net profit before tax, adjusted for changes in working capital) required 
for the current analysis are computed each year for each company and control 
company, 4 years prior to acquisition and 5 years post acquisition period. Similarly, 
operating asset figures (book value of shares plus reserves plus book value of debt, 
less cash and marketable securities) are computed each year for the companies 
involved. Since the financial reports for the target companies kept at the ROC were 
available only from December 31,1986, some companies did not have pre acquisition 
cash flow and asset data as far as three years prior to acquisition. 
8.5 Summary 
This chapter explained data collection of companies involved in corporate 
acquisitions in Malaysia that took place between January 1,1988 and December 31, 
1992. Information on Malaysian acquiring and target companies involved in 
acquisitions was obtained from the KLSE monthly Investor Digest. Data was gathered 
on a final sample of 97 quoted acquiring and 117 target companies, comprising of 3 
quoted, I non-quoted and 113 private companies. Same number of control 
companies in the same industrial classification as those of the respective companies 
set matched by year and size on one by one basis were selected for each bidder and 
target firms. Information on the initial announcement dates, the completion date, the 
composition of the acquiring companies by sector, acquisition experience and the 
method of financing (cash or shares exchange) of the acquisitions were obtained from 
the KLSE Annual Companies Handbook and the respective companies' files in KLSE 
library. 
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Information on the quoted acquiring and non-acquiring companies needed for 
the current study were sought from the KLSE Annual Companies Handbook 1988- 
1992, the companies' annual reports and proxy statements for the respective years 
kept at KLSE. On the other hand, those on the private targets and their respective 
target controls were obtained from the microfiche at the ROC. Specifically, information 
needed include those on relative size of target to bidders, size of bidders, directors 
ownership structure and directors turnover. In addition, data on cash flow and other 
ratios needed were obtained from the respective companies' annual financial 
statements both at KLSE and ROC. 
The next stage of the current study is to analyse the data. The following 
chapters (Chapters 9 to 10) present the results of the analyses. 
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Chapter 9 
Analysis of Operating Cash Flow Returns 
9.1 Chapter Description 
This chapter describes the analysis of the performance of 97 quoted acquiring 
and 117 target companies (comprising of 113 private, 3 public listed and 1 non-public 
listed) involved in corporate acquisitions in Malaysia during the period January 1, 
1988 to December 31,1992, using cash flow data. The post acquisition performance 
of the combined firm is also examined to identify whether or not corporate 
acquisitions provide economic benefits in the long run. Performance is measured as 
pre tax operating cash flow returns on book value of total assets. Similar to the study 
undertaken by Manson et al. (1994) in the UK, cash flow in this study is defined as 
operating profits before interest, taxes and depreciation adjusted for changes in 
working capital (that is, changes in stocks, trade debtors and prepayments and 
changes in creditors and accruaIS)157 . The book value of assets, measured at 
the 
beginning of the year, is the book value of shares plus net debt (long-term debt, plus 
short-term debt, less cash and marketable securities), similar to the definition used by 
Healy et al. (1992) and Barber and Lyon (1996)". 
The relatively short time frame (1988-1992) suggests that the sample firms' 
performance may be influenced by economy or industry-wide changes. In assessing 
whether a sample of firms experience any unusual changes in post acquisition 
` Healy et al. (1992) defined operating cash flow as sales, minus cost of goods sold and selling and 
administrative expenses, plus depreciation and goodwill expenses. Gadad and Thomas (2000) used 
similar operating cash flow measures as in the current study when they examine the effects of 
divestiture on seller firm operating performance. 
'5' Healy et al. (1992) used market value of assets as the denominator. The results in the current study 
may understate the impact of improved performance to the extent that revaluation of assets at the time 
of acquisitions is included in the book value of assets post acquisition. 
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operating cash flow, a control was provided as a benchmark against which the 
sample firms can be compared. The control consists of matched non-acquiring and 
non-target companies in the same industrial classification as those of the respective 
companies, with matching based on year and size (whenever possible). The results 
for both medians and means are presented in the tables. Similar to Healy et al. 
(1992), Manson et al. (1994) and Ghosh (1998), the current study focuses on median 
measures to reduce the impact of outliers. The results based on means are however 
similar, although normally larger in absolute value. In comparing how two matched 
sample probability distributions correspond to each other, the Wilcoxon signed rank 
tests rather than Student t-tests are used. According to Barber and Lyon (1996), the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test rather than the Student t-test has more power to detect 
changes in accounting measures of performance. Mann-Whitney tests are used to 
test for the difference between means of 2 independently drawn samples. 
9.2 Cash Flow and Asset Growth Rate 
Cash flow and operating assets are the main variables used in calculating the 
operating cash flow performance of the firms involved in acquisition. The changes in 
cash flow and operating assets in the year prior to acquisition (year -1) relative to 
earlier years, and in years +1 to +5 relative to the year -1 are reported in Table 9.1. 
Table 9.1 also summarises the percentage change and control adjusted change in 
operating cash flow and book value of operating assets for 97 bids in the period 1988 
to 1992. All changes in operating cash flow and book value of assets after acquisition 
are measured from year -1, the fiscal year before the acquisition is completed. The 
mean and median change for year +1 represents the change in operating cash flow 
and book value of assets from year -1 to the first year post acquisition. The mean 
and median change for year +2 represents the change from year -1 to the second 
year post acquisition, and so on. 
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Table 9.1 
Percentage Change & Control Adjusted Change In Operating Cash Flow and Operating 
Book Value of Assets for 97 acquisitions over the period 1988 to 1992' 
Growth Period In Relation to Acquisitions 
Year -1 Year -1 Year -1 Year +1 Year +2 Year +3 Year +4 Year +5 
Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative 
PANELA to to to to to to to to 
Rate of Growth Year-4 Year-3 Year-2 Year-I Year-I Year-I Year-I Year-I 
of Cash Flow %%%%%%%% 
Median: 
Firm 71b 93 b 15 63 " 838 221 8 3528 3348 
Control 3711 5 -3 10 35b 26 
b 30 b 12 
Control Adjusted -12 36 0 74 
b job 1988 3460 3668 
Trimmean(20%) 
Firm 101c 11 qb 361 1128 1391 351 70211 7158 
Control 107 b 41 21b 12 61 8 538 68 " 238 
Control Adjusted -10 64 25 167 5711 388 6798 846 
% Positive 
Firm 66 63 55 61 64 76 80 77 
Control 71 53 48 52 57 57 60 53 




Firm 158 188 51 998 1288 1951 2751 3731 
Control 6 Job 3b 9 228 36 51 * 930 
Control Adjusted 14 11 2 70 118, 161 198" 239 
Trimmean(20%) 
Firm 35 b 341 12 138' 223' 36211 510" 750 
Control 17 b 1 8b 7b 188 38' 578 96 " 1491 
Control Adjusted 14 18 2 971 1281 205 2541 36411 
% Positive 
Firm 76 73 65 91 93 95 97 96 
Control 59 60 57 66 75 78 87 89 
Control Adjusted 61 59 52 76 75 77 77 75 
No. of 41 73 91 97 97 97 97 97 
observations 
I 
' Operating cash flow is defined as operating profit before tax and extraordinary items, adjusted for 
depreciation and goodwill and changes in working capital (that is, changes in stocks, trade debtors and 
prepayments and changes in creditors and accruals). The operating book value of assets at the 
beginning of the year is the book value of shares plus net debt less cash and marketable securities. 
Before the acquisition (year -1), cash flow and operating asset values of the combined firm are weighted 
averages of the acquirer and target values, with the weight being the relative operating asset values of 
the two firms. The values of the combined firm are used in the post acquisition period. Pro and post 
acquisition control returns are target control and bidder control values, weighted by the relative operating 
asset values of the two corresponding bidder and target firms at the beginning of the year prior to 
acquisition (year-1). Control adjusted values are computed for each firm and year as the difference 
between the firm value in that year and the value of the control firm in the same industry during that 
period. 
Significantly different from zero at the 1% level, using a two-tailed test. 
Significantly different from zero at the 5% level, using a two-tailed test. 
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All changes in operating cash flow and book value of assets prior to 
acquisition are measured from year -4 to year -1, year -3 to year -1, and so on. 
Control adjusted values are computed for each firm and year as the difference 
between the firm value in that year and the value of the control firm during that period. 
Similar to Healy et al. (1992), cash flow and asset values for the combined 
firm in years -4 to -1 are weighted averages of target and acquirer values, with the 
weights being the relative asset sizes of the two firms"g. The values of the combined 
firm are used in the post acquisition period. Both pre and post acquisition control firm 
returns are based on target control and bidder control values, weighted by the relative 
asset sizes of the two corresponding sample firms at the beginning of the year prior to 
acquisition (year -1). 
The results in the current section focus on medians and trimmeans due to 
skewness in the data. There are 10 combined firms and 6 control companies having a 
percentage rate of increase of more than 1000% in cash flow for individual 
observation in the post acquisition period. The high values for the rate of increase in 
cash flow in post acquisition years for the firm is due to either a negative or a very low 
positive cash flow in the year prior to acquisition. Where negative cash flows occurred 
in any base year the absolute value was used as denominator while the change was 
incorporated in the numerator. For example, one outlier company has operating cash 
flow of -1449 in year -1. A positive operating cash flow in year +1 of 3882 would 
have caused a growth rate of 368% by year +1. Due to the large increase in cash 
flow, results for the trimmean rather than the mean are presented in Table 9.1. 
"9 Asset size of target and bidder in the current study is measured by the book value of equity plus 
reserves plus long term and short term debt, less cash and marketable securities at the beginning of 
each year. 
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Trimmean of 20% is used to exclude 20% of data points from the top and bottom tails 
of the data. 
Panel A of Table 9.1 shows that both the median and the trimmean rate of 
growth of cash flow for the combined firm increase significantly in year -1 relative to 
the pre acquisition period (except for year -2, -1), and in all the 5 years post 
acquisition period in comparison with year -1. Wilcoxon signed rank tests are used to 
test the significance between the pre and post acquisition cash flow growth rate for 
the combined firms. The results in panel A of the table indicates a significant rate of 
increase in median cash flow for the combined firms by 63% in year +1,83% in year 
+2,221% in year +3,352% in year +4, and 334% in year +5. These results are not 
due to subsequent acquisitions by some of the firm as these have been controlled for. 
Similarly, the median and trimmean rate of increase in cash flow for the control 
companies is positive during the same period, 10%, 35%, 26%, 30%, and 12% in 
year +1 to year +5, respectively. The rate of increase in cash flow in year +2, year +3 
and year +4 are significant, using Wilcoxon signed rank test. However, the rate of 
increase is not as high as that experienced by the sample firms in post acquisition 
years. As shown in the table, the combined firms have a higher percentage of 
companies earning positive rates of growth than the control companies in all post 
acquisition period. For example, 61% of the combined firms have positive rates of 
growth in year +1 relative to only 52% positive in control companies. The proportion 
of observations with positive rates of growth is significantly different between the two 
groups at the 10% level, using Chi-square test. 
Median measured control adjusted changes in cash flow increased by 74% 
from year -1 to year +1,10% by year +2,198% by year +3,346% by year +4, and 
366% by year +5, all significantly different from zero, using the Wilcoxon-signed rank 
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test. The results demonstrate that the combined firms have significantly higher rate of 
cash flow increases than their industry counterparts. However, the rate of increase in 
cash flows does not of itself indicate that the combined firms performed better in the 
post acquisition period. As shown in Panel B, the median and trimmean operating 
asset growth rate for the firm and control companies is also significantly positive after 
acquisition. As explained earlier, trimmean rather than mean is used due to the 
skewed distribution of post acquisition growth rates. The median operating asset 
growth rate for the combined firm in years 1 to 5 are 99%, 128%, 195%, 275% and 
373%, all significantly different from zero, using the Wilcoxon test. The control 
adjusted operating assets growth rate is also significantly positive during this period, 
albeit lower than the control adjusted cash flow growth rate. The median control 
adjubted asset growth rate is 70% in year +1,118% in year +2,161% in year +3, 
198% in year +4 and 239% in year +5, all significantly different from zero, using 
Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
The period of time covered under the current study was one of a high rate of 
growth in the Malaysian economy. The results suggest that firms involved in 
takeovers were at the forefront of this growth. The results also provide evidence that 
these takeovers produced outcomes that have been identified as related to 
management interests. In the next section analyses are made as to whether the 
takeovers also provide opportunities for shareholders to benefit. 
9.3 Pre Acquisition Performance 
Before examining the post acquisition performance of the Malaysian bidders, it 
is necessary to analyse the level of performance of bidders, targets and their 
respective controls in the pre acquisition period. Table 9.2 summarises the mean and 
270 
median operating cash flow return for the targets and bidders together with their 
control adjusted returns for each of the four years prior to acquisition. 
As explained previously, operating cash flow returns for both sample and 
control companies are defined as operating profit before interest, taxes and 
depreciation adjusted for changes in working capital and deflated by the book value of 
assets at the beginning of the year. Book value of assets is defined as the book value 
of shares plus long term and short term debt, less cash and marketable securities. 
Control adjusted measures are computed for each firm and year as the difference 
between the firm measure in that year and the measure for the control company 
during that period. 
Panel A of Table 9.2 presents the results of targets, target controls and control 
adjusted operating cash flow returns for the years -4 to -1 prior to acquisition. The 
accounting data for some companies are not available in all the years prior to 
takeover but a complete pre acquisition data is available for'the full sample of 117 
targets in year -1. Panel B of the table shows results from year -4 to year -1 for 
bidders, bidder controls and control adjusted operating cash flow returns. Similarly, a 
complete pre acquisition data is available for the full sample of 97 bidders for the 
financial year prior to acquisition but not for all earlier years. 
The first hypothesis developed in the study is to determine if target firms have 
poor operating cash flow performance prior to takeover relative to their control firms. 
As mentioned in the literature, acquisitions are hypothesised to act as a disciplinary 
mechanism on the management of poorly performing firms. Marine (1965) viewed 
acquisitions as one of the means by which failing firms are returned to health while 
Alchian (1950) and Singh (1971) suggested that only those firms which maximise 
company performance will survive and those who do not will disappear or will be 
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taken over. Holl and Pickering (1988) and Kennedy and Limmack (1996) in the UK, 
Palepu (1986), Lang et al. (1991) and Mikkelson and Partch (1997) in the US found 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that firms, which do not maximise company 
performance, are taken over. However, Cowling et al. (1980) and Taffier and Holl 
(1991) did not find any evidence in UK that acquired companies are less profitable 
than target firms not taken over. 
As seen in Panel A of Table 9.2, the median control adjusted operating returns 
for target companies are all positive, 5.20% in year -4,1.88% in year -3,4.17% in 
year -2 and 5.09% in year -1. Using Mann-Whitney to test for the difference between 
medians, year -2 and year -1 are found to be significantly different from zero at the 
5% level. The median annual control adjusted operating cash flow returns for the 
period -4 to -1 is 3.83%, significantly different from zero at the I% level. The results 
indicate that, prior to the acquisition, target companies are performing better than 
companies not taken over. During the same period, 57.69% of the targets had 
operating cash flow returns higher than their controls. Thus, the null hypothesis (HOI) 
in the current study is rejected. The result contradicts the traditional economic view of 
Manne (1965), Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1988) that target firms, which 
had performed poorly prior to acquisition, will be taken over. Based on the results 
reported in Table 9.2, takeovers in Malaysia are likely to be non-disciplinary in nature 
as these takeovers involve acquisitions of private companies. 
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Table 9.2 
Pre Bid Performance of Targets and Bidders Relative to Controls 
Panel A 
Operating performance for 117 target and control firms In years prior to acquisition, 
Year Targets Control Control Adjusted Number 
relative to of 
acquisition Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean % Obser- 
%% %% %% Positive vations 
-4 4.52 5.89 6.22 -0.28 5.20 6.17 57.14 49 
-3 4.40 -0.80 1.30 -0.42 1.88 -0.38 52.27 88 
.25.54 -1.72 1.21 -3.83 4.17 b 2.11 58.18 110 




-4 to -1 4.84 3.81 1.32 -1.36 3.838 5.17 57.69 
Panel B 
Operating performance for 97 acquiring and control firms in years prior to 
acaulsition' 
Year Bidders Control Control Adjusted Number 
relative to of 
acquisition Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean % Obser- 
Positive vations 
-4 6.55 8.59 5.38 7.72 0.64 0.88 53.41 88 
-3 4.92 4.35 8.60 6.77 -0.44 b -2.42 48.96 96 
.25.74 2.88 6.59 4.25 -1.87 -1.37 43.75 96 
-1 6.44 8.74 6.84 6.77 -1.51 1.97' 47.42 97 
Average performance 
over years 
-4 to -1 5.85 6.10 6.72 6.35 -0.541 -0.261 48.28 
1 Operating performance Is defined as operating cash flow deflated by the book value of operating 
assets. Operating cash flow is operating profit before tax and extraordinary items, adjusted for 
depreciation and goodwill and changes in working capital. Operating assets at the beginning of the year 
is the book value of equity plus debt less cash and marketable securities. Control adjusted values are 
computed for each firm and year as the difference between the firm value in that year and the value of 
the control firm in the same industry during that period. 2 Statistical tests are conducted only on control adjusted figures. 
I Significantly different from zero at the I% level, using a two-tailed test. b Significantly different from zero at the 5% level, using a two-tailed test. 
" Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, using a two-tailed test. 
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Traditional economic theory also suggests that takeover bids are likely to be 
initiated by companies from the more efficient sectors of an economy"O. Thus, the 
second hypothesis (1-102) tested in the current study is whether the pre bid operating 
cash flow performance of acquiring firms is different to that of control companies. 
Panel B of Table 9.2 presents the results of bidders, bidder controls and control 
adjusted operating cash flow returns for the year -4 to year -1 prior to acquisition. As 
seen in Panel B, bidders are found to be performing worse than the control 
companies for most of the period prior to acquisition. The median performance for the 
bidder companies is lower than their controls except for year-4. During the 4-year 
period prior to acquisition (-4, -1), 51.72% of bidders have negative operating cash 
flow control adjusted returns with a significant median performance of -0.54%, using 
Mann-Whitney test. The results provide evidence that bidders are performing poorly 
relative to their control companies, thus, rejecting the second null hypothesis (1-102) in 
the study. 
The third test is of the hypothesis that acquiring firms have higher pre 
operating performance than that of target firms. If the takeover market reallocates 
resources to a most efficient use, bidders are likely to be more profitable than their 
targets. Lang et al. (1989) and Servaes (1991) provide evidence that well managed 
bidders with high q ratio created more value by taking over poorly performing 
companies with low q ratio. Holl and Kyriazis (1997) in the UK also provide evidence 
that target companies with low Tobin's q in their sample of 178 successful takeovers 
are taken over by acquiring firms with high Tobin's q"". Table 9.3 summarises the 
results of a comparison of pre acquisition operating performance of acquiring with 
target firms. The comparison here includes only those for which paired data are 
160 A number of authors have referred to the limited nature of this assumption. Refer to Limmack 
(2000) for a review of the disciplinary role of takeovers. 
161 Lang et al. (1989), Servaes (1991) and Holl and Kyriazis use Tobin's q ratio as a measure of 
managerial and financial performance of the target and acquiring firms. 
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available. A complete pre acquisition data is only available for the full sample of 117 
bids ;n year -1. 
Table 9.3 
Pre Performance of Bidders Relative to Targets 
Operating performance for 117 bids In years prior to acquisition, 
Year Bidders Targets Difference 
relative to 
acquisition Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean % Obser- 
%%%%%% Positive vations 
-4 6.85 5.97 4.52 5.89 1.72 0.08 53.06 
-3 4.31 3.39 4.40 -0.80 2.41 4.20 54.55 




-4 to -1 5.69 4.85 




5.82 11.61 -1.07 -4.20 44.44 117 
4.84 3.81 -0.41 1.04 48.90 
I Operating performance is defined as operating cash flow deflated by the booK vaiue or operating 
assets. Operating cash flow is operating profit before tax and extraordinary items, adjusted for 
depreciation and goodwill and changes in working capital. Operating assets at the beginning of the year 
is the book value of equity plus debt less cash and marketable securities. Control adjusted values are 
computed for each firm and year as the difference between the firm value in that year and the value of 
the control firm in the same industry during that period. 
2 Statistical tests are conducted only on control adjusted figures. 
As reported in Table 9.3, the operating performance of bidders is higher than 
that of targets in years -4 and -3 prior to acquisition, but lower than targets with a 
median of -1.24% and -1.07% in years -2 and -1, respectively. In none of the years 
is the difference significantly different from zero, using Mann-Whitney test. Overall, 
49% of bidders have higher performance than targets but the median performance 
over the 4-year period is a statistically insignificant -0.41 %. 
Thus, the third null hypothesis (H03) is accepted since pre operating cash flow 
performance of acquiring firms are no different to that of target companies. The result 
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is inconsistent with Manne's (1965) concept of market for corporate control which 
suggest that more capable and competent executive teams tend to replace one that is 
less capable and competent. Again, however, this disciplinary role is less likely to be 
present in agreed takeovers which is the normal characteristic of private acquisitions 
in this sample. 
The above result is similar to that reported in the studies of Singh (1971), 
Meeks (1977) and Cosh et al. (1980) for UK acquisitionS162 . For example, 
Cosh et al. 
(1980) found that for takeovers made in the period 1967-1969, acquiring firms are on 
average larger in size than acquired firms and the control firm but there is little 
difference in the average profitability of acquiring and acquired firms. In exploring the 
financial performance of 55 cases of abandoned acquisitions in UK during the period 
1977-1981, Taffler and Holl (1991) also found no evidence that the capital market is 
able to exercise control over allocation of resources to the rest of the economy. They 
found that the bidders do not appear to be more profitable than their targets either in 
successful or abandoned bids. It is important to emphasise again, however, that 
unlike these previous studies which examine public listed targets, the specific feature 
of the current sample is that it consists mainly of privately owned targets. 
9.4 Post Acquisition Performance of Combined Firms 
The next section describes the results of tests of changes in operating cash 
flow performance in the five years post acquisition. Summary statistics on operating 
"' Singh (1977) found that acquiring firms are significantly larger, more dynamic, higher rate of 
growth but less liquidity than either the acquired or the non-acquiring firms. In examining the pre 
acquisition characteristics of acquiring and acquired firms during the period 1964 - 1972, Meeks 
(1977) found that the acquired firms to be an 'average performer in terms of profitability' as compared 
to their industry average over the same period. Small size rather than low profitability seems to be the 
characteristic of the acquired firms. 
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cash flow returns for 97 combined acquiring and target firms in years surrounding 
acquisition is presented in Table 9.4163. 
Before the acquisition, the combined cash flow is calculated as the sum of 
bidder and target operating profit before interest, taxes and depreciation adjusted for 
changes in working capital divided by the sum of bidder and target book value of 
assets at the beginning of each year. Adjustment for the differences in size of bidder 
and target is achieved by multiplying the measures of performance by the weighted 
average of the relative asset sizes of the two firms'64. After the acquisition, the 
bidder's cash flow ratio that represents the actual values reported by the combined 
firms in years +1 to +5 is used. 
In order to adjust for economy wide or industry factors that may be affecting 
the cash flow returns of the combined firms, control companies cash flow returns are 
also measured during the same nine-year period. Before the acquisition, control 
companies returns are based on bidder control and target control operating cash flow 
returns, weighted by the relative asset values of the two corresponding sample firms 
at the beginning of each year. In the post acquisition years, the cash flow 
performance of target control and bidder control are weighted by the relative asset 
value of the two sample firms at the beginning of the year prior to acquisition (year - 
V65. 
163 As mentioned in chapter 8, a bidder that acquires either one or more target firms in the same year is 
considered as one acquisition. There were instances where an acquiring firm acquired more than one 
target in a year, thus, resulting in 97 acquiring and 117 target firms for acquisitions completed during 
the period 1988-1992. To test the robustness of the results, 117 combined acquiring and target firms are 
also analysed and the results are presented in Appendix 2. 
"' Asset size of target and bidder is measured by the book value of equity plus reserves plus net debt 
less cash and marketable securities at the beginning of each year. 
"" To test the sensitivity of the results, the operating performance of target control and bidder control in 
the post acquisition period are recalculated by multiplying the measure of performance by the weighted 
average of the relative asset values of the two control firms at the beginning of the year. The results are 
similar to those reported in Table 9.4 and are presented in Appendix 3. The median annual control 
adjusted performance significantly increase from -0.03% in the 4-year prior to acquisition to 2.78% in 
the post acquisition period. 
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From Table 9.4, the median operating cash flow performance for the 
combined firms ranges from 4.08% to 7.46% in the four years prior to acquisition. In 
the five years subsequent to the acquisition, operating performance of the combined 
firms tends to increase, ranging from 5.47% to 10.21%. The results of Wilcoxon 
ranked sign test indicates that the median annual pre-tax operating cash flow return 
of the combined firm is significantly higher after the acquisition. The median post 
acquisition performance over the years +1 to +5 for the combined firm is 7.56%, 
significantly higher than the median performance of 5.79% during the 4-year period 
prior to acquisition. However, there is an insignificant decrease in operating 
performance of the control companies during the same period. The median annual 
performance of the control companies during the 4-year period prior to acquisition 
and 5-year period after acquisition is 6.36% and 4.81%, respectively, a result not 
significantly different from zero"16. 
The increase in post acquisition operating performance of the combined firms 
may arise because cash flows grow faster than assets in the post acquisition period 
as explained in Section 9.2. However, it is difficult to draw conclusions from the 
median results of the combined firms because these data do not adjust for economy 
wide or industry factors that may be affecting the cash flow returns of the combined 
firms. Thus, a reported significant change may be due to factors other than the 
acquisition. To account for the impact of possible contemporaneous events, the 
control adjusted median and mean performance measures are reported in column 6 
and 7 of the table. 
'" Similarly, operating cash flow returns for 117 combined acquiring and target firms are analysed in 
years surrounding acquisition. The results in Appendix 2 are similar to the results reported above for 
the 97 combined firms. The median annual performance for the firm significantly increase from -0.3% in years prior to acquisition to 2.98% in the post acquisition period. The increased in control adjusted 
cash flow returns is reported for 63.97% of the sample relative to 49.45% in years prior to acquisition. 
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Table 9.4 
Operating performance for 97 combined acquiring and target firms In years 
surrounding acquisitions completed over the period 1988-19921 
Year relative Firm Control Control Adjusted Number 
to acquisition - 
of 
Median Mean Medi Mean Median Mean % Obser- 
%% 
an 
%%% Positive vations 
-4 7.46 7.68 4.40 4.90 3.22 2.78 60.98 41 
.34.08 3.54 7.18 5.44 -0.41 -1.90 49.32 73 
-2 5.49 5.96 6.63 3.34 -1.20 2.62 47.25 91 
-1 6.93 10.09 4.74 4.98 1.43 5.11 52.58 97 
Average annual 
performance over 
years -4 to -1 5.79 6.94 6.36 4.59 0.46 2.35 51.32 
+1 6.62 9.34 4.94 3.89 0.27 5.46 54.64 97 
+2 5.47 8.75 5.74 6.01 0.38 2.74 52.58 97 
+3 7.61 10.07 5.52 2.74 5.64 b 7.3311 63.92 97 
+4 10.21 15.35 4.22 3.99 4.211 11.360 72.16 97 
+5 8.86 11.73 4.00 3.91 4.041 7.82 b 64.95 97 
Average annual 
performance over 
years +1 to +5 7.568 11.05b 4.81 4.11 3.01' 6.94 b 61.65 
1 Operating performance in the pre acquisition period are pre-tax operating cash flow return on assets of 
target and bidder, weighted by the relative asset sizes of the two firms. Post acquisition performance 
used data of the combined firms. Pre acquisition control firm returns are target control and bidder 
control values, weighted by the relative asset values of the two corresponding sample firms at the 
beginning of each year. In the post acquisition period the weights used to compute control firm returns 
are the relaUve asset values of the acquirer and target firms in year-1. Control adjusted values are 
computed for each firm and year as the difference between the firm value in that year and the value of 
the control firm in the same industry during that period. 2 Mann-Whitney tests are conducted on median control adjusted figures 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests are used to test the significance between the pre and post acquisition 
median annual performance 
Significantly different from zero at the I% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
Statistically different from zero at the 5% probability level, using a two-tailed t-test. 
c Statistically different from zero at the 10% probability level, using a two-tailed West. 
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The median and mean cash flow returns in the post acquisition period 
significantly increase after adjusting for the control values. In the pre acquisition 
period, median control adjusted operating returns ranges from -0.41% to 3.22%, but 
they are not significantly different from zero when tested using the Mann-Whitney 
test. In addition more than 50% of the combined firm experience positive control 
adjusted returns only in year-4 and year-1, while the control companies outperform 
the combined firms in more than 50% of the cases in years -3 and -2. The median 
annual control adjusted performance over the years -4 to -1 is 0.46% and it is not 
significantly different from zero, indicating that the combined firm is not performing 
better than the control companies during the 4-year period prior to acquisition. 
However, the median control adjusted performance ranges from 0.27% to 5.64% in 
the 5 years post acquisition and they are statistically significant in years +3, +4, and 
+5. The percentage of firms with cash flow returns higher than their control 
companies also improves in post acquisition years, with more than 50% of the 
combined firms show positive control adjusted returns in all post acquisition years. 
The median annual control adjusted performance of 3.01 % over the years +1 to +5 is 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
Overall, the resulting median annual control adjusted performance for the 
sample firm increases from 0.46% in the 4-year period prior to acquisition to 3.01% in 
the 5-year post acquisition period. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used to test the 
significance between the pre and post acquisition median annual control adjusted 
returns for the combined firms. The result is significant, rejecting the fourth null 
hypothesis (H. 4) of no difference in post acquisition performance relative to years 
prior to acquisition. A positive control adjusted cash flow returns is reported for 
61.65% of the sample as compared to 51.32% in the years prior to acquisition. Thus, 
it appears that acquisitions in Malaysia do lead to improvement in firm performance in 
comparison to prior years. 
280 
In order to summarise the five annual control adjusted operating performance 
measures above into a single measure, a median annually control adjusted 
performance measure is calculated for each firm over the four years pre acquisition 
with a similar measure calculated for the five years post bid. Post acquisition median 
control adjusted operating performance is then regressed on the pre acquisition 
median control adjusted operating performance in order to incorporate the relation 
between prior and post acquisition adjusted returns'67 . The abnormal adjusted cash 
flow returns are then estimated using equation 7, previously discussed in Chapter 7 
and the results are presented in Table 9.5. Results of regressing the median control 
adjusted over the 5-year post acquisition period on the median control adjusted pre 
acquisition operating performance over the 4-year period are shown in Table 9.5 (a). 
The intercept, a, is 0.04, indicating that the combined firms obtain a significant 
increase of 4.0% per year in post acquisition period after controlling for the pre 
acquisition performance"". This analysis confirms that there is a significant increase 
in the performance of the combined firms after acquisition"'. 
In addition to the above, other separate regression tests of operating 
improvements are undertaken to identify whether the results are affected by the lack 
of full data, particularly for years -4, -3, and -2. The results shown in Table 9.5 (b) and 
(c) produce intercept items that are all significant at the 1% and 5% level. When 3- 
year, 2-year, and 1-year median control adjusted performance post acquisition is 
regressed on 2-year (year -2 to -1) median control adjusted performance pre 
acquisition, the results show that intercept items are all significant at the 10% level. 
"' Ile method used in the current study is similar to that used in studies by Healy et al. (1992), Cornett 
and Tehranian (1992), Manson et al. (1994), Ghosh (1998) and Gadad and Thomas (2000). 
'" When mean rather than median value is used for each of the 5 years of annual prior and post in the 
regression analysis, the intercept alpha also shows a significant increase of 7.0% in post acquisition 
years. 
169 When 117 combined acquiring and target firms are used for the regression, the intercept is 0.04, 
similar to the result obtained for the 97 combined firms. 
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Thus, the results are not affected by the lack of full data in the early pre acquisition 
years. 
Table 9.5 
The results of regressing median control adjusted operating performance post 
acquisition (AP'pOJ on the median control adjusted performance pre 
acquisition (AP'p,, ) for 97 combined acquiring and target firms for acquisitions 
completed over the period 1988-1992. The regression in equation 7 from 
Chapter 7 Is: 
AP'post, = cc +P AP'Prel + Ci 
a. 5-year median control adjusted performance post acquisition regressed on 
4-year median control adjusted performance pre acquisition 
AP'post I=0.04 + 0.207 APc pro 1 (3.5)' (3.0)' 
W= 0.09 F-statistic=9.17 N=97 
b. 4-year median control adjusted performance post acquisition regressed on 
4-year median control adjusted performance pre acquisition 
AP'pogi= 0.04 + 0.207 APcp,, 
(2.7)' (2.2)' 
R2= 0.05 F-statistic = 5.033 b N=97 
C. 4-year median control adjusted performance post acquisition regressed on 
2-year median control adjusted performance pre acquisition 
APcposf I=0.04 + 0.09 APc p. (2.68)' (1.37) 
R2= 0.02 F-statistic = 1.87 N=97 
APcp., and AF'c p,., are the median annual control adjusted operating cash flow returns 
in the 
post and prior acquisition period for firm L 
4 Significantly different from zero at the I% level. 
b Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
The slope coefficient P in equation 7 as shown in Table 9.5 captures the 
continuation (persistence) of pre acquisition performance of the two firms. That is, if 
there is no effect of the acquisition (a = 0), the post acquisition performance for the 
combined firm (API.. ) is exactly the same as the pre acquisition performance (APcPre) 
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relative to the control companies. Table 9.5 (a) shows that the slope coefficient, P, 
performance between the pre and post acquisition years is 0.207, and it is 
significantly different from zero. It indicates that the association of pre acquisition 
performance to post acquisition performance is low when the value of the P coefficient 
is close to zero. Manson et al. (1994) and Gadad and Thomas (2000) argued that 
slope coefficient close to zero reflects a highly competitive industry in which the pre 
acquisition control adjusted performance (APcPrG) would therefore be expected to 
steadily revert to zero as any comparative advantage is eventually eliminated. By 
contrast a slope coefficient of one would reflect an uncompetitive economy in which 
comparative advantage is retained, while an intermediate slope coefficient reflects an 
imperfectly competitive industry. The analysis is thus repeated but constrain the slope 
coefficient to be either zero or unity (assumed extreme values)"'. 
The results testing the operating gains when P in equation 7 (chapter 7) is 
either free to float (as per Table 9.5 a) or is constrained to equal either one or zero 
are shown in Table 9.6. When P is unconstrained, the intercept a is 0.04 and it is 
significantly different from zero. However, the results are different for the case when 
the slope coefficient is restricted to take the value of 1 in the equation when operating 
gains are assessed as the difference between post acquisition and pre acquisition 
performance. Similar to the results found by Manson et al. (1994), there are no 
significant increased of post acquisition operating performance when the slope 
coefficient is constrained to equal 1. On the other hand, the intercept, a (0.04), are 
essentially unchanged when P is restricted to take the value of 0 in the equation 
where operating gains are assessed by post acquisition control adjusted operating 
170 Manson et al. (1994) and Gadad and Thomas (2000) used similar regression in which P is 
unconstrained and constrained to equal either 0 or 1. 
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performance. The result indicates that there is still significant increased of operating 
performance in post acquisition period if the Malaysian economy is assumed to be 
highly competitive. The true state of the economy is likely to be in between the two 
extremes, that is, as presented by the regression using the floating beta. 
Table 9.6 
The results of estimated operating cash flow returns for 
97 combined firms where fl is unconstrained as estimated 
in equation 7 (chapter 7) and constrained to equal 1 or 0. 










11 Significantly different trom zero at the 1% level 
One of the assumptions of the linear regression model is that the residual 
variance of each observation is homoscedastic, that is they all have the same 
variance. However, if the residual is not independent of the size of any of the 
independent variables and the size of the predicted value of the dependent variable, 
the data is described as heteroscedastic and the OLS regression model is not the 
best estimates. A test for heteroscedasticity is performed by using White's (1980) 
heteroscedasticity-corrected variances and standard errors, obtained from Shazam 
(Gujarati, 1995). The results are shown in Table 9.7. The P coefficient is significant at 
the 5% confidence level compared to the 1% originally reported in Table 9.5 (a). The 
alpha value of 0.04 has the same significant level as reported earlier, thus confirming 
the post acquisition improvement after adjusting for heteroscedasticity. All further 
regression estimates reported in the current study are obtained using White's 
heteroscedastic adjustment in Shazarn. 
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Table 9.7 
Abnormal adjusted operating cash flow returns for 97 combined acquiring 
and target firms for acquisitions completed over the period 1988-1992 after 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White correction) 
(t-values in parentheses) 
Using unconstrained 0 as estimated in equation 7 (chapter 7) 
APcpO, tj= 0.04 + 0.207 APcprel (3.5)a (2.6)b 
RI = 0.09 N=97 
APý.., and APcp,., are the median annual control adjusted operating cash flow returns in the 
post and prior acquisition period for firm L 
8 Significantly different from zero at the I% level. 
b Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
There is a possibility that the improvement in the post acquisition operating 
performance reported earlier is biased by the inclusion of multiple acquisitions. 
Companies that experience positive 'performance in their first acquisition might be 
encouraged to make further acquisitions, while the ones which did not make a second 
bid may have been companies who experience difficulties with their first acquisition. 
As described in the previous chapter, out of 97 acquisitions involving 65 companies, 
38 (58%) companies made a single acquisition and 27 (42%) companies made more 
than one bid during the investigation period 1988-1992. The results for the first 
acquisition of the 65 companies are shown in Appendix 4. Similar to the results found 
earlier, the median annual control adjusted performance for the first bid acquisition 
increases from 1.15% prior to acquisition to 4.04% post acquisition, and it is 
significant at the 1% level using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. When the post 
acquisition median control adjusted operating performance is regressed on the pre 
acquisition median control adjusted performance, the intercept a is 0.05 and it is 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
The results in the current study are consistent to those found in studies by 
Healy et al. (1992) and Ghosh (1998) in US, and Manson et al. (1994) in UK. Healy et 
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al. (1992) found a significant improvement in operating pre-tax cash flow returns in 
relation to the industry in the post acquisition years"'. Ghosh (1998) also found that 
acquiring firms show significant improvement in their post acquisition operating 
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performance relative to their industries' . Similarly, Manson et al. 
(1994) found that 
there is a significant improvement in operating performance after acquisition in UK for 
acquisitions undertaken in the period 1985 to 1987. Thus, in comparable to similar UK 
and US studies using cash flow data, the results in the current study indicate that 
MaIkAysian acquisitions improve operating performance. The higher post acquisition 
operating cash flow returns to the combined firms relative to the pre acquisition 
operating cash flow returns in this section indicates that there is a better utilisation of 
the combined firm's existing resources after acquisition. 
9.5 Sources of Operating Cash Flow Returns 
This section sets out to analyse a variety of potential sources of improvement 
in cash flow returns in the post acquisition period. The specific sources analysed in 
the current study are return on sales, asset turnover, capital expenditure rate, asset 
sales rate, and cash payment for expenses. 
"' Healy et al. (1992) reported that 73% of the sample in their study have higher operating cash flow 
returns on assets than their industries in the post acquisition period. The combined firms obtained 2.8% 
median annual industry-adjusted cash flow return for years I to 5 after acquisition as compared to 0.3% 
median annual performance during the 5-year period prior to acquisition. 
" However, Ghosh (1998) found that acquiring firms did not improve their post acquisition operating 
performance relative to the performance of matched firms, where firrns are matched on acquiring and 
target firm's size and industry. 
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9.5.1 Efficiency Indicators 
The operating cash flow return on assets can be decomposed into operating 
return on sales and asset turnover. The operating return on sales is one measure of 
how well the firm is using its resources to improve the firm performance. It measures 
how much pre-tax operating cash flow the company earns for each dollar of sales it 
makes. Similarly, the asset turnover ratio indicates managerial capabilities in 
managing the firms' resources. It measures the sales dollar the company is able to 
generate for each dollar invested in assets. 
Operating return on sales in the current study is measured as operating cash 
flow divided by sales. Table 9.8 shows the result on operating return on sales for 97 
combined firms in years surrounding acquisitions that occur in Malaysia during the 
period 1988-1992. The combined firms experience a slight increase in operating 
return on sales in the post acquisition period. The median annual performance for the 
combined firms increase (not statistically significant) from 0.131 in the pre acquisition 
period to 0.145 in the post acquisition period. The control companies on the other 
hand experience a decrease in the post acquisition operating return on sales. The 
median annual returns for the control companies decline from 0.138 in the 4-year pre 
acquisition period to 0.099 over the 5-year post acquisition period, and the difference 
is significant at the 1% level, using Wilcoxon ranked sign test. 
The median annual control adjusted operating return on sales over the years 
-4 to -1 is -0.024 and it is not significantly different from zero. However, the 
combined firms outperform the control companies in all the 5 years post acquisition 
but the outpeqormance is significant only in years +3 to +5. 
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Table 9.8 
Operating Return on Sales for 97 combined acquiring and target firms In years 
surroundina acquisitions completed over the period 1988-19921 
Year, Firm Control Control Adjusted No. of 
relative to Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean % obser- 
acquisition Positive vations 
-4 0.200 0.344 0.113 0.031 0.114 b 0.313 b 63.41 41 
-3 0.112 -0.126 




years -4 0.131 0.09 
to -1 
0.146 0.368 -0.16 1b -0.495 
b 41.10 73 
0.175 0.048 -0.073 0.010 41.76 91 
0.153 0.155 0.015 0.020 52.58 97 
0.138 0.158 -0.024 -0.068 48.01 
+1 0.101 0.043 0.117 -0.015 0.050 0.095 52.58 97 
+2 0.101 0.079 0.119 -0.012 0.032 0.191 54.64 97 
+3 0.155 0.179 0.101 0.043 0.104' 0.252 67.01 97 
+4 0.197 0.295 0.075 0.136 0.124' 0.098 61.86 97 
+5 0.181 0.234 0.075 -0.041 0.093* 0.207 68.04 97 
Average annual 
performance over 
years +1 0.145 0.166c 0.099' 0.022 0.081 b 0.169a 60.82 
to +5 
Panel B: Abnormal adjusted post acquisition operating return on sales (t-values in parentheses) 
ASc,,, = 0.12 + 0.09 AScp,, R2=0.015 F-statistic=1.460 
(2.62) b (1.208) 
(2.53) b (1.02) 
AS'p,,,, and AScp., are the median annual control adjusted operating return on sales in the post and 
prior acquisition period for firm L 
t-statistics given in the second brackets were adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White correction). 
I Operating return on sales is defined as operating cash flow as a percentage of sales. Performance 
measures for the combined firm in the pro acquisition period are weighted by the relative asset sizes 
of the two firms. Post acquisition performance used data of the combined firms. Pre acquisition 
control firm returns are target control and bidder control values, weighted by the relative asset values 
of the two corresponding sample firms at the beginning of the year. In the post acquisition period the 
weights used to compute control firm returns are the relative asset values of the acquirer and target 
firms in year-1. Control adjusted values are computed for each firm and year as the difference 
between the firm value in that year and the value of the control firm during that period. 
2 Mann-Whitney tests are conducted on median control adjusted figures 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests are used to test the significance between the pre and post acquisition 
median annual performance 
I Significantly different from zero at the 11% probability level, using a two-tailed test. b Significantly different from zero at the 5% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
' Significantly different from zero at the 10% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
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The median annual control adjusted performance of 0.081 over the 5-year 
post acquisition period is significant at the 1% level using the Mann-Whitney test, 
indicating that the combined firms earn 8 cents more in cash flow than their control 
companies for each dollar of sales they make. A Wicoxon signed rank test used in 
testing the significance between the pre and post acquisition median annual control 
adjusted returns indicates that the result is significant at the 5% level. Thus, null 
hypothesis 5 (1-105) of no difference between return on sales during pre and post 
period is rejected. 
To confirm this result, the median value for the 5-year post acquisition control 
adjusted return on sales is regressed on the median of the 4-year pre acquisition 
control adjusted returns. The result of the regression is shown in Panel B of Table 
9.8. The intercept a in the cross-sectional regression of post acquisition adjusted 
operating return on sales is a significantly positive 0.12 when unconstrained P 
coefficient is used. Constraining the P to equal 1 and 0 (not reported in the table) also 
produced significantly positive alphas of 0.17 and 0.12, respectively. The results 
indicate that the post acquisition control adjusted operating return on sales has 
significantly increased regardless of assumptions about the competition level in the 
industry. Healy et al. (1992) also found that combined firms earned higher operating 
return on sales than their industry in post acquisition period. However, they did not 
contribute the increase to the acquisition itself because the median return on sales 
was also higher than that of the controls in the pre acquisition period. 
Summary statistics on asset turnover, defined as the ratio of sales to 
operating assets, are reported in Table 9.9. Using Wilcoxon ranked sign test, the 
result indicates that there is no significant improvement in the median annual asset 
turnover for the combined firm after the acquisition. The combined firm median annual 
turnover rate of 0.5144 over the 5 years post acquisition is slightly higher (not 
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significant) than the median annual rate of 0.4135 prior to acquisition. The control 
companies median annual turnover rate of 0.4408 after acquisition is slightly lower 
(not significant) than the rate of 0.4640 prior to acquisition. Overall, the median annual 
control adjusted asset turnover for the combined firms has significantly increased (at 
the 5% level) from -0.0500 over years -4 to -1 to 0.0135 over the period +1 to +5. 
The iesult indicates that the combined firms generate 1.35 cents more in sales than 
their control companies for each dollar of assets after the acquisition. 
The abnormal control adjusted change in asset turnover is also estimated 
using the regression in Section 9.4. Post acquisition median control adjusted asset 
turnover is regressed on the median pre acquisition control adjusted asset turnover to 
incorporate the relation between prior and post acquisition adjusted returns. As 
shown in panel B of Table 9.9, the intercept a in the cross-sectional regression of 
post acquisition adjusted asset turnover is 0.08, and is significantly different from zero 
when 0 is unconstrained"'. The evidence in the current study indicates that there is a 
significant improvement in the combined firms' asset turnover in the post acquisition 
period. Thus, hypothesis 6 (HO6) of no difference between asset turnover during pre 
and post period is also rejected. Healy et al. (1992) reported that the median asset 
turnover of the combined firms in their study was lower than the industry prior to 
acquisition but comparable to the industry in the post acquisition period. 
"' When P is constrained to equal 1, alpha is 0.18, significant at 1% level but alpha is 0.03 and not 
statistically significant when P is constrained to equal 0. 
290 
Table 9.9 
Asset turnover for 97 combined acquiring and target firms in years surrounding 
accuisition comoleted over the Deriod 1988-19921 
Year Firm Control Control Adjusted No. of 
relative to Obser- 
acquisition Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean % vations 
Positive 
-4 0.3117 0.5667 0.4995 0.7163 -0.1034 -0.1496 36.59 41 
-3 0.3713 0.5711 0.4833 0.9474 -0.0676' -0.3763 35.62 73 
-2 0.3996 0.6020 0.4490 0.7951 -0.0652 -0.1931c 39.56 91 
-1 0.5081 0.7923 0.4509 0.7641 0.0011 0.0283 51.55 97 
Average annual 
turnover over 
years -1 0.4135 0.6509 0.4640 0.8112 -0.0500 -0.1603 42.05 
to -4 
+1 0.5858 0.6812 0.5348 0.6957 0.0500 0.0580 55.67 97 
+2 0.5287 0.6369 0.4291 0.6396 0.0472 0.0872 56.70 97 
+3 0.5457 0.6422 0.5129 0.7578 -0.0740 -0.0525 49.48 97 
+4 0.5060 0.5886 0.5179 0.6717 0.0169 -0.0248 54.64 97 
+5 0.4939 0.5665 0.5069 0.6828 -0.0228 -0.0551 49.48 97 
Average annual 
turnover over 
years +1 0.5144 0.6560 0.4408 0.6674c 0.0135 b -0.01131- 53.20 
to +5 
Panel B: Abnormal adjusted post acquisition asset turnover (t-values in parentheses) 
AATcp. al= 0.08 + 0.364 AATcp,, R2= 0.250 F-statistic=31.70" (1.685)c (5.6)0 
(1.70)c (3.20)8 
AATcp,., , and AATI p., are the median annual control adjusted asset turnover in the post and prior 
acquisiiion period for firm J. 
t-statistics given in the second brackets were adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White correction). 
I Asset turnover ratio is the ratio of sales to book value of operating assets at the beginning of the year. 
Performance measures for the combined firm in the pre acquisition period are weighted by the relative 
asset sizes of the two firms. Post acquisition performance used data of the combined firms. Pre 
acquisition control firm returns are target control and bidder control values, weighted by the relative 
asset values of the two corresponding sample firms at the beginning of the year. In the post acquisition 
period the weights used to compute control firm returns are the relative asset values of the acquirer and 
target firms in year-1. Control adjusted values are computed for each firm and year as the difference 
between the firm value In that year and the value of the control firm during that period. 
2 Mann-Whitney tests are conducted on median control adjusted figures 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests are used to test the significance between the pre and post acquisition 
median annual performance 
' Significantly different from zero at the I% probability level, using a two-tailed test. b Significantly different from zero at the 5% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
c Significantly different from zero at the 10% probability level. 
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Thus, the results in the current study suggest that the improvements in post 
acquisition operating cash flow performance of the combined firms in Malaysia during 
the period 1988-1992 are attributable to both the increased in return on sales and 
asset turnover. Bidding firms in Malaysian acquisitions appear to make more efficient 
use of the higher level of resources available in the post acquisition period. 
9.5.2 Growth Rate In Capital Expenditure 
It is possible that the improvement in the post acquisition operating cash flow 
returns described above may be related to a reduced asset base in the combined firm 
following disposal of unnecessary assets post acquisition. Indeed one of the motives 
for the acquisition may well be to eliminate unwanted capacity. An alternative motive 
for asset disposals is to be able to report a short-term improvement in profitability. It 
is unlikely that this form of 'performance manipulation' has occurred in the sample 
under investigation, given the large increases in operating assets reported in Table 
9.1. Nevertheless, examination of changes in the capital expenditure, fixed asset 
sales rates, and disposal of fixed assets rate in year of acquisition relative to prior 
years is made to test whether a reduction in the asset base is the source of the 
perceived improvement in operating performance. 
The capital expenditure rate is measured by dividing the capital expenditure 
by the book value of assets (equity plus debt) at the beginning of each year. The 
results of capital expenditure rate for 97 combined firms in years surrounding 
acquisition are reported in Table 9.10. Using the Wilcoxon signed rank test, the 
median capital expenditure rate for the combined firms is shown to have significantly 
increased at the 1% level from 1.83% in the pre acquisition period to 4.68% after 
acquisition. The increase in capital expenditure rate after acquisition may be caused 
by asset write-offs in year of acquisition, which will be analysed later in this section. 
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Table 9.10 
Capital Expenditure Rate for 97 combined acquiring and target firms in years 
surrounding acquisition completed over the period 1988-19921 
Year Firm Control Control Adjusted Number of 
relative to Mecliaý -Mean Median Mean Median Mean % Obser- 
acquisition %%%%%% Positive vations 
-4 1.09 1.81 1.93 5.14 _1.08b -3.33 b 36.59 41 
-3 1.45 4.48 1.47 5.61 0.08 -1.13 53.42 73 
-2 1.94 6.13 2.76 5.96 0.06 0.17 51.65 91 
-1 4.14 9.21 2.04 6.44 1.63 b 2.77 61.86 97 
Average annual 
rate over years 
-4 to -1 1.83 6.14 1.97 5.92 0.10 0.22 53.31 
+1 4.79 10.6 2.37 5.51 2.30b 5.12 b 67.01 97 
+2 3.92 7.41 2.59 5.24 1.03 b 2.17' 58.76 97 
+3 4.77 8.92 3.14 5.35 0.4 1b 3.57 b 55.67 97 
+4 5.20 9.31 2.29 4.74 1.39b 4.56 b 63.92 97 
+5 5.23 8.21 2.89 5.41 0.59' 2 . 80b 55.67 
97 
Average annual 
rate over years 
+1 to +5 4.68" 8.90' 2.56 5.25 1.21 b 3.64' 75.26 
Panel B: Abnormal adjusted post acquisition capital expenditure rate (t-values in parentheses) 
ACEcp,,, = 0.03 + 0.162 ACEcp,, R2= 0.028 F-statistic=2.70 
(3.05)8 (1.66) 
(3.13)8 (1.09) 
ACEcp.,, and ACEc.,, are the median annual control adjusted capital expenditure rate in the post and 
prior acquisition period for firm L 
t-statistics given in the second brackets were adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White correction). 
I Capital expenditure rate is measured by dividing the capital expenditure by the book value of assets 
(equity plus reserves plus debt). Performance measures for the combined firm in the pre acquisition 
period are weighted by the relative asset sizes of the two firms. Post acquisition performance used data 
of the combined firms. Pre acquisition control firm returns are target control and bidder control values, 
weighted by the relative asset values of the two corresponding sample firms at the beginning of the 
year. In the post acquisition period the weights used to compute control firm returns are the relative 
asset values of the acquirer and target firms in year-1. Control adjusted values are computed for each 
firm and year as the difference between the firm value in that year and the value of the control firm 
during that period. 
2 Mann-Whitney tests are conducted on median control adjusted figures 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests are used to test the significance between the pre and post acquisition 
median annual performance 
'Significantly differentfrom zero at the 1% probability level, using a two-tailed test. b Significantly different from zero at the 5% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
'Significantly different from zero at the 10% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
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There is a concurrent increase in the median annual capital expenditure rate 
for the control companies from 1.97% to 2.56% prior and post acquisition, 
resp, actively, 'but this. increase is not statistically significant. The median control 
adjusted capital expenditure rate is 0.10% prior to acquisition and it is not significantly 
different from zero. During the 5 years post acquisition, the median control adjusted 
capital expenditure rate is 1.21 % and it is significant at the I% level using the Mann- 
Whitney tests. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test used in the analysis indicates that the 
increased in capital expenditure rate between the two periods is significant at the 5% 
level. Thus, hypothesis 7 (H07) of no difference between capital expenditure rate 
during pre and post acquisition period is rejected. The combined firms outperform the 
control companies for 75.26% of the sample in the post acquisition period as 
compared to 53.31% in the pre acquisition period, also confirming that there is a 
significant improvement in the combined firms' expenditure rate in the post acquisition 
years. 
The median value for the 5-year post acquisition adjusted capital expenditure 
rat -e is also regressed on the median of the 4-year pre acquisition adjusted rate. As 
revealed in panel B of Table 9.10, the intercept a in the cross-sectional regression of 
post acquisition adjusted capital expenditure rate is 0.03 and it is significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level when an unconstrained P is used in the regression'74 . 
The evidence in the current study indicates that there is a significant increase 
in the combined firms' capital expenditure rate after acquisition. Thus, the combined 
firm does not appear to have sacrificed its long-term investments through insufficient 
capacity or by causing the company to fall behind its competitors in the adoption of 
new investments for the sake of short-term profitability. Healy et al. (1992) found that 
"" When P is constrained to equal 1, alpha is 0.02 and it is not significant but alpha is a significant 0.03 
at the. 1% level when P is constrained to equal 0. 
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the median capital expenditure rate of the combined firms is 14.4% and 10.6% in the 
pre and post acquisition period respectively, although they were not significantly 
different from their industry level in the relevant periods. They concluded merely that 
the improvements in the post acquisition operating cash flow was not caused by 
reduced investment for the long term. 
In addition to the measures of asset turnover ratio, asset sales rates are also 
analysed to test for changes in the combined firms' investment policies. Asset sales 
rate is defined as cash receipts from asset sales divided by the book value of assets 
(equity plus debt). The results on asset sales rate are reported in Table 9.11. The 
median asset sales rate for the combined firm has significantly increased at the 1% 
level from 0.111% over the pre acquisition years -1 to -4 to 0.19% over the years +1 
to +5- During the same period, the median asset sales rate for the control companies 
have also significantly increased at the 5% level from 0.10% prior to acquisition to 
0.14% after the acquisition. The control adjusted asset sales rate is 0.00% over the 
years -4 to -1 (not significantly different from zero). Similarly, the median control 
adjusted rate of 0.03% over the 5 years post acquisition is not statistically significant. 
Using Wilcoxon signed rank test, the increase in the control adjusted asset sales rate 
of 0.03% in the post acquisition period, relative to the 0% in the pre period, is not 
significantly different from zero. Thus, hypothesis 8 (1-108) of no difference between 
asset sales rate during pre and post period is accepted. 
As a final test, the post acquisition median control adjusted asset sales rate is 
regressed on the pre acquisition median control adjusted rate. 
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Table 9.11 
Asset Sales Rate for 97 combined acquiring and target firms In years surrounding 
acquisition completed over the period 1988-19921 
Year Firm Control Control Adjusted Number 
relative of 
to Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean % Obser- 
acquisition %% %% % % Positive vations 
-4 0.07 0.45 0.16 0.74 -0.04 -0.27 43.90 41 
-3 0.10 0.39 0.09 0.36 0.01 0.03 52.05 73 
-2 0.11 1.08 0.11 1.10 0.01 -0.02 54.95 91 
-1 0.13 1.51 0.10 0.91 0.01 0.60 52.58 97 
Average annual 
rate over years 
-4 to -1 0.11 0.97 0.10 0.81 0.00 0.16 51.99 
+1 0.16 1.60 0.17 0.56 0.03 1.04' 57.73 97 
+2 0.20 1.14 0.13 0.81 0.02' 0.33 52.58 97 
+3 0.15 0.43 0.18 1.87 0.01 -1.441 52.58 97 
+4 0.20 0.78 0.10 0.48 0.04" 0.30 57.73 97 
+5 0.21 0.96 0.16 0.74 0.04 0.21 57.73 97 
Average annual 
rate over years 
+1 to +5 0.1 9a 0.98 0.14' 0.89 0.03 0.09 69.59 
Panel B: Abnormal adjusted post acquisition asset sales rate (t-values in parentheses) 
AAS'pwj= 0.001 + 0.08 AAScp,, R2=0.014 F-statistic = 1.301 
(1.58) (1.14) 
(1.61) (0.96) 
AAScp,,,, and AASc,,,, are the median annual control adjusted asset sales rate in the post and prior 
acquisition period for firm 1. 
t-statistics given in the second brackets were adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White correction). 
I Asset sales rate is defined by cash receipts from asset sales divided by the book value of assets 
(equity plus reserves plus debt). Performance measures for the combined firm in the pre acquisition 
period are weighted by the relative asset sizes of the two firms. Post acquisition performance used data 
of the combined firms. Pre acquisition control firm returns are target control and bidder control values, 
weighted by the relative asset values of the two corresponding sample firms at the beginning of the 
year. In the post acquisition period the weights used to compute control firm returns are the relative 
asset values of the acquirer and target firms in year-1. Control adjusted values are computed for each 
firm and year as the difference between the firm value in that year and the value of the control firm 
during that period. 
2 Mann-Whitney tests are conducted on median control adjusted figures 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests are used to test the significance between the pre and post acquisition 
median annual performance 
Significantly different from zero at the I% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
'Significantly different from zero at the 10% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
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As shown in panel B of Table 9.11, the intercept a in the cross-sectional 
regression of post acquisition adjusted asset sales rate is 0.001 and it is not 
significantly different from zero when an unconstrained P is used in the regression. 
Neither is the a significant when P is constrained to equal 1 or 0. 
The overall result on asset sales rate shows that there is no significant change 
in the cash proceeds from disposal of assets after acquisition for the sample of 
Malaysian firms in the current study. The result indicates that the high turnover after 
acquisition (as shown by the increase in asset turnover in section 9.5.1) is not due to 
the sale of assets. Rather the improvement in operating performance appears to have 
been achieved by a more efficient utilisation of assets in a growing firm. The effect of 
asset sales is unlikely to be significant on post acquisition performance since the 
improvement in asset sale of the combined firms is similar to that of the control 
companies. Similar result was found in the study carried out by Healy et al. (1992). In 
both the pre and post acquisition periods, the median asset sales rate for the 
combined firms in their study is 0.65%, and the results are not significantly different 
from their industry counterparts. 
Disposal of fixed assets in year of acquisition (year 0) is also examined to 
determine if the improvement in post acquisition operating cash flow returns reported 
earlier has been distorted by the sale of assets in the year of acquisition. Descriptive 
statistics on asset disposal rates are reported in Table 9.12. Asset disposal rate is 
defined as the cost of fixed assets sold in the year divided by the book value of fixed 
assets at the beginning of the year. The cost of fixed assets sold in the year is 
calculated by taking the proceeds from asset sale, adjusted for profits or losses on 
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sale of asset and adding back the accumulated depreciation charged on the asset"'. 
As shown in Table 9.12, the median asset disposal rate for the combined firm in the 
year of acquisition is 0.40%, significantly higher than year -4, year -3 and year -2 by 
0.30%, 0.27% and 0.24%, respectively. However, it is not significantly higher than the 
median asset disposal rate of 0.16% in year -1 prior to acquisition. 
Table 9.12 
Assitt Disposal Rate for 97 combined acquiring and target firms in years 
surrounding acquisition completed over the period 1988-19921 
Year Firm Control Difference Number 
relative of 
to acqui- Median Difference Median Difference Median Obser- 
sition (Mean) between (Mean) between (Mean) vations 
yearO yearO 
% relative to relative to 
prior % prior % 
years years 
-4 0.10 0.30' 0.21 0.11 -0.01 
41 
(0.56) (1.05) (0.82) (0.54)' (-0.26) 
-3 0.13 0.27' 0.12 0.20' 0.01 
73 
(0.56) (1.05) b (0.46) (0.90)" (0.09) 
-2 0.16 0.24 ' 0.15 0.17' 0.01 
91 
(0.92) (0.69) (0.55) (0.81), (0.37) 
-1 0.16 0.24 0.13 0.19a 0.03'- 97 
(2.0) (-0.39) (1.07) (0.29) (0.93) 
0 0.40 0.32 0.08 
(1.61) (1.36) (0.25) 
I Asset disposal rate is defined as the cost of fixed assets sold in the year divided by the book value of 
fixed assets at the beginning of the year. The cost of fixed assets sold in the year is calculated by taking 
the proceeds from asset sale, adjusted for profits or losses on sale of asset and adding back the 
accumulated depreciation charged on the asset. Asset disposal rate for the combined firm in the pre 
acquisition period Is weighted by the relative asset sizes of the two firms. Post acquisition asset 
disposal rate used data of the combined firms. Pre acquisition control firm rates are target control and 
bidder control values, weighted by the relative asset values of the two corresponding sample firms at 
the beginning of the year. In the post acquisition period the weights used to compute control firm returns 
are the relative asset values of the acquirer and target firms in year-1. Control adjusted values are 
computed for each firm and year as the difference between the firm value in that year and the value of 
the control firm during that period. 
I Signrficantly different from zero at the I% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
b Significantly different from zero at the 5% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
r Significantly different from zero at the 10% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
17s Depreciation on the asset being sold is detennined by taking the difference between the opening and 
closing balance in the accumulated depreciation account, plus the depreciation charged to the income 
statement for the year. 
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The control companies reported a median asset disposal rate of 0.32% in the 
year of acquisition and it is significantly higher than those reported in all the years 
prior to acquisition except for year -4. Based on the column for differences between 
the values of the combined firms and the control companies in the table, the median 
asset disposal rate for the combined firm is higher than the control companies in the 
year of acquisition by 0.08%, but it is not significantly different from zero. The result 
indicates that the increase in asset disposal rate for the combined firms in the year of 
acquisition is comparable to those of the control companies in the same period. Thus, 
the improvement in the post acquisition operating performance for the combined firms 
is not due to a reduction in the fixed asset base in the year of acquisition. 
9.5.3 Cash Operating Expenses 
Cash operating expenses ratio is another variable that may offer explanation 
for the changes in the post acquisition operating returns. An improvement in the post 
acquisition performance may be due to cost reductions. A decrease in operating cash 
expenses after acquisition might indicate that the combined firms have engaged in 
cost-cutting strategies to achieve economic efficiency. Similarly to Ghosh (1998), the 
cash expenses ratio in the current study is defined as operating cash flow minus cash 
receipts from sales (sales minus changes in debtors) divided by the opening book 
value of assets (equity plus debt). Although it is possible to infer the change in this 
item from the earlier analysis of operating performance and sales margin, a clearer 
indication is provided by examination of operating expenses separately. 
Table 9.13 
Cash Operating Expenses for 97 combined acquiring and target firms in years 
surrounding acquisition completed over the period 1988-19921 
Year Firm Control Control Adjusted No. of 
relative to Ve7ian Mean Median Mean Median Mean % Obser- 
acquisition %%%%%% Positive vations 
-4 26.39 40.91 44.96 64.62 -14.08 -23.70 36.59 
41 
-3 33.25 46.64 36.61 55.52 -8.21 -8.88 43.84 73 
-2 26.85 46.53 33.48 62.28 -6.08 -15.75 41.76 91 
-1 42.31 61.09 34.74 62.95 -0.27 -1.86 49.48 
97 
Average annual 
rate over years 
-4 to -1 32.91 50.47 36.00 61.18 -4.68 -10.71 44.04 
+1 43.74 104.69 38.30 57.40 1.45 47.30 52.58 97 
+2 41.84 55.55 30.59 52.24 3.45 3.31 54.64 97 
+3 39.86 50.00 33.78 56.67 -2.20 -6.67 46.39 97 
+4 32.90 52.60 37.42 55.74 -0.16 -3.14 49.48 97 
+5 30.86 41.93 38.64 65.22 -9.74 -23.29 44.33 97 
Average annual 
rate over years 
+1 to +5 35.05 60.96 36.54 57.45 . 0.20 3.50 61.86 
Panel B: Abnormal adjusted post acquisition cash expenses (t-values in parentheses) 
ACEcp, t, = 0.014 + 0.658 ACEc (0.396) (10.91)a 
(0.401) (5.9)8 
R2= 0.556 F-statistic = 1198 
ACErp.., and ACE' p,, , are the median control adjusted cash expenses ratio 
in the post and prior 
acquisition period for -tirm L 
t-statistics given in the second brackets were adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White correction). 
' Cash operating expenses ratio is defined as operating cash flow minus cash receipts from sales (sales 
minus changes in debtors) divided by the book value of assets (equity plus debt). Performance 
measures for the combined firm in the pre acquisition period are weighted by the relative asset sizes of 
the two firms. Post acquisition performance used data of the combined firms. Pre acquisition control firm 
returns are target control and bidder control values, weighted by the relative asset values of the two 
corresponding sample firms at the beginning of the year. In the post acquisition period the weights used 
to compute control firm returns are the relative asset values of the acquirer and target firms in year-1. 
Control adjusted values are computed for each firm and year as the difference between the firm value in 
that year and the value of the control firm during that period. 
2 Mann-Whitney tests are conducted on median control adjusted figures 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests are used to test the significance between the pre and post acquisition 
median annual performance 
'Significantly different from zero at the I% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
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The results for cash operating expenses ratio in the current study are reported 
in Table 9.13. There is an increase in the median cash operating expenses ratio for 
both the combined firm and the control companies in the 5-year post acquisition 
period. The median cash operating expenses ratio for the combined firms increased 
from 32.91% in pre acquisition period to 35.05% in the post acquisition period while 
that of the control companies increase from 36.00% to 36.54% during the same 
period. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test used in the analysis indicates that the 
increased in cash operating expenses across the two periods is not significantly 
different from zero. 
The median control adjusted cash operating expenses in both the pre and 
post acquisition period are negative, indicate that the combined firms' cash operating 
expenses are lower than the control companies. The median control adjusted cash 
operating expenses rate for the combined firm over the 4-year pre acquisition period 
is -4.68% but it is not statistically significant. The Mann-Whitney test also shows that 
the median control adjusted rate for the combined firm over the years +1 to +5 of - 
0.20% is not significantly different from zero. Although, the pre and post acquisition 
median control adjusted cash operating expenses ratio increase from -4.68% to - 
0.20%, respectively, the increase is not statistically significant. Thus, hypothesis 9 
(H. ) of no difference between cash operating expenses from pre to post acquisition 
period is accepted. 
The result seems to suggest that the level of cash operating expenses did not 
change following acquisitions. To confirm this result, post acquisition median control 
adjusted cash operating expenses rate is regressed on the pre acquisition median 
control adjusted rate. Regression results in Panel B of Table 9.13 indicate that cash 
operating expenses increase by 0.014 in post acquisition years, but that the increase 
is not significantly different from zero when unconstrained P is used in the 
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regression"". Ghosh (1998) also found no significant increase in the cash operating 
expenses ratio in the post acquisition period. 
9.6 Summary 
In summary, the results reported in the current chapter suggests that 
acquisitions in Malaysia during the period 1988-1992 provide the potential for wealth 
increases to shareholders in the long run, as seen by the significant increase in 
operating cash flow performance following acquisitions. Improvements in operating 
cash flows result from increases in return on sales (cash flow per dollar of sales) and 
asset turnover (sales per dollar of assets). Post acquisition cash flow improvements 
are not caused by the reduced investment for the long term as seen by the increase 
in the rate of capital expenditure for the combined firms in the post acquisition period. 
Neither is the improvement in post acquisition performance a result of a reduced 
asset base in the combined firm following disposal of unnecessary assets, as seen by 
the insignificant results for the change in asset sales rate and disposal of asset rate in 
the year of acquisition. The average increase in post acquisition operating cash flow 
also does not appear to be driven by cost-cutting strategies of reducing cash 
expenses. In addition, the median growth in total assets and sales (managerial 
interests) and post acquisition cash flow performance are higher for the combined 
firms relative to their control counterparts. The results demonstrate superior 
performance in line with both managerial and shareholders interest in Malaysian 
acquisitions. The results obtained also demonstrate that there are opportunities for 
operating gains to be made from takeovers, even when these are not explicitly 
disciplinary bids. It may be that improvements arise from increase economies of scale 
" The change in post acquisition cash operating expenses ratio is also not significant when 0 is 
constrained to equal I or 0. 
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or, possibly, from the substitution of objectives of shareholder wealth maximisation for 
other sub-optimal objective functions held by owner-directors. 
The following chapter provides the results of examination of the effect of 




Analysis of the Effects of Acquisition Characteristics 
on Post Acquisition Performance 
10.1 Chapter Description 
The result in Chapter 9 indicates that there is a significant increase in 
operating cash flow performance in Malaysia following acquisitions completed during 
the period 1988-1992. Several studies (Servaes, 1991, Healy et al., 1997, and 
Ghosh, 1998, among others) have suggested that the level of abnormal operating 
post acquisition returns to the combined firms is dependent on the characteristics of 
the bid. This chapter provides an analysis of the characteristics of the companies 
involved in acquisitions and their relationship to the post acquisition operating 
performance. The specific bid characteristics analysed in this chapter are business 
relatedness, management turnover, the relative size of targets to bidders, the method 
of payment offered, and components of board members ownership structure. 
It is important to emphasise that the specific feature of the current sample is 
that it consists mainly of privately owned targets. The owners of these private 
companies are in position to sell their companies at their own discretion. Fama and 
Jensen (1983) argued that acquisitions reflect a market for corporate control where 
companies compete for the right to determine the management of a target company's 
resources. However, the disciplinary role is less likely to be present in agreed bids 
between the bidders and targets in the current study. Thus, the results in the current 
sample may differ to those results in previous research in which acquisitions were 
mainly of public targets. 
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The results in Chapter 9 were based on the analysis of 97 acquiring and 117 
targets. As discussed in Chapter 8,14 bidders made multiple acquisitions in the same 
financial year. Thus, analysing bid characteristics of 117 bids might bias the results 
since the performance of acquiring firms acquiring more than one target in the same 
year is counted more than once. To avoid this potential bias, the performance of 14 
acquiring firms and 34 targets are excluded in the initial analysis. 
10.2 Business Relatedness 
One of the ways firms seek to realise synergy through economies of scale is 
by acquiring other firms with some form of relatedness to their own business. Wealth 
is expected to be created when the assets of target and bidder firms are used more 
effectively by the combined firms than by target and bidder separately. Several 
accounting based studies (Lubatkin, 1987, Singh and Montgomery, 1987, Shelton, 
1988 and Healy et. al., 1997) have shown that some level of relatedness between 
targct and acquiring firms is a characteristic that can help boost post acquisition 
performance. Using a market based methodology, Brush (1996) argued that the 
source of improvement in the post acquisition performance is the increased 
opportunities to share resources and activities in the acquiring firm. Flanagan (1996) 
and Ramaswamy (1997) also found evidence to support the hypothesis that the 
announcements of related acquisitions result in positive post acquisition performance 
while the announcements of purely unrelated acquisitions has a negative influence on 
post performance"17. 
177 Flanagan (1996) uses event study methodology to examine the returns of purely related and purely 
unrelated acquisitions for US mining and manufacturing furns between 1972-90, while Ramaswamy (1997) uses return on assets as a measure of performance. 
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Thus, the focus of the current section is to examine if the increase in post 
acquisition operating cash flow performance in Malaysia is a result of operational 
synergy obtained due to some level of relatedness between target and acquiring 
firms. Some previous studies (for example Morck et al., 1990, Berger and Ofek, 1995, 
Gregory, 1997 and Ghosh, 1998) have adopted an objective categorisation by using 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes to distinguish between related and 
unrelated acquisitions. Due to unavailable SIC codes in Malaysia, the current study 
categorised acquisitions by using subjective techniques similar to that used by Healy 
et al. (1992,1997)178. In examining the impact of the degree of business relatedness 
on post acquisition performance, acquisitions between target and acquiring firms in 
the current study are classified as those with high, medium and low (or no) business 
overlap based on product markets. As mentioned in Chapter 7, a high degree of 
business relatedness refers to acquisition of companies with a considerable overlap 
of product market relatedness between bidder and target firms. This subjective 
classification is made by reading the line of business discussion in the combined 
firm's annual reports and Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Annual Handbook. Out of 83 
acquisitions in the current study, 42 companies are identified as highly related, 16 
have medium overlap and 25 are of unrelated business. A detailed classification of 
the degree of business overlap for each of the sample transactions used in the 
current analysis is provided in Appendix 1. 
The regression model described in equation 8 (Chapter 7) is used in the 
current section to evaluate whether post acquisition performance on 83 acquisitions 
differs by the degree of business relatedness. The results are presented in Table 
10.1. As shown in Panel A of the Table, the estimated coefficient P on APcprg is 
'7' Other studies that have used subjective techniques in categorising acquisitions between degree of 
business relatedness include those by Lubatkin, 1987 and Singh and Montgomery, 1987. 
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positive and significant as reported in earlier regression in Chapter 9. However, the 
estimated intercept and coefficients on MEDIUM and HIGH are not significant, 
indicating that the degree of business overlap has no impact on the improvement of 
post acquisition performance. These results are sensitive to one extreme observation 
based on casewise diagnostics for outliers outside 3 standard deviations. The outlier 
in the initial analysis is Technology Resources Bhd. which acquired Celcom Sdn- 
Bhd, an unrelated acquisition with a high median post acquisition return of 0.33. 
Table 10.1 
Comparisons of control adjusted post acquisition performance between firms 
of different business relatedness for 83 acquisitions completed over the period 
1988-1992'. The regression as in equation 8 (Chapter 7) is: 
APp. d =a+ 8APpr., + MEDIUM, + YHIGHI + el 
Panel A: Full Sample 
(t-values in parenthesis) 
AP'postj = 0.02 + 0.17 
)b 
AP'pre I+0.02 MEDIUM + 0.04 HIGH (0.67) (2.2 (0.48) (1.5) 
(0.59) (1 . 9)b (0.55) (1.4) 
W= 0.10 F-statistic=2 . 9b N=83 
Panel B: Sample excluding outlier 
(t-va'. ues in parenthesis) 
APopost, = 0.0009 + 0.19 APc,., 
(0.038) (2.6)b 
(0.021) (2.1 )b 
R2= 0.15 F-statistic=4.4' N=82 
0.03 MEDIUM + 0.06 HIGH 
(0.9) (2 O)b 
(1.0) (2 O)b 
t-statistic given in the second bracket was adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White correction). 
IAPý,,, and APc.., are the median annual control adjusted operating cash flow returns in the 
post and prior acquisition period for firm L MEDIUM and HIGH are dummy variables that take 
the value of one if the transaction is between two firms whose product markets have medium 
and high overlap, respectively, and zero otherwise. 
2 This sample excludes one observation Identified as an influential outlier. The transaction Is 
Technology Resources Bhd. acquiring Celcorn Sdn. Bhd. 
0 Significantly different from zero at the I% level. 
b Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
The results excluding this observation are reported in Panel B of Table 10.1. 
The intercept and coefficient on MEDIUM is positive but remains insignificant 
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indicating that there is no association between firms with no or medium business 
overlap and improvement in post acquisition performance. Highly related acquisitions, 
however, have a significant effect on post acquisition performance. The P coefficient 
on highly related acquisition has the same significant level of 5% after applying 
White's heteroscedasticity adjustment in Shazam. The results indicate that acquiring 
firms experience post acquisition performance improvement of 6% in transactions 
with high business overlap. Thus, hypothesis 10 (HO10) of no difference in the level of 
post acquisition cash flow performance is rejected. 
The above result is similar to that found in studies by Singh and Montgomery 
(1987), Shelton (1988), Healy et al. (1992,1997) and Hubbard and Palia (1999) that 
acquiring firms gain the most from related acquisitions. Healy et al. (1992) recorded 
5.2% improvements in post acquisition operating cash flow returns in transactions 
with a high business overlap but none in other types of acquisitions. In another study, 
Healy et al. (1997) found that strategic acquisitions earned control adjusted 
performance. of 4.4% more than financial acquisitions, indicating that strategic 
acquisitions produced greater synergies than financial transactionS171. The current 
study also provides evidence that opportunities for creating positivepost acquisition 
operating return is greater if the line of business of target is highly related to those of 
the bidder. 
'79 Healy et al. (1997) defmed strategic acquisitions as friendly transactions that normally involved 
share payment for firms in overlapping business and financial strategy as hostile transactions that 
normally involved cash payments for firms in unrelated business. 
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10.3 Management Turnover 
Another potential source of improving post acquisition operating returns is in 
management and administration. Several accounting based studies (Salter and 
Weinhold, 1979, Singh and Montgomery, 1987, Porter, 1987, and Ravenscraft and 
Scherer, 1987) support the hypothesis that transferring management skill from one 
firm to another in a related business are likely to result in synergy. Shelton (1988) and 
Walsh (1988) suggest that the acquiring firm can afford to lose many of the acquired 
firms' top management when the acquiring company is familiar with the target firms' 
business. Walsh and Ellwood (1991), Martin and McConell (1991) and Mikkelson and 
Partch (1997) are among studies in US that have reported significant increases in 
turnover of top management in target companies following takeover. Cannella and 
Hambrick (1993), and Krishnan et al. (1997) argue that the retention of the top 
management in unrelated acquisition seems essential since acquiring firms have little 
experience in the operation of the acquired business. Baker (1992) suggested that 
early conglomerate acquisitions of US companies involved the transfer of 
management skills but retained target management when the acquisition involved 
well-performing target firms that have been managed by competent managers. Thus, 
it would seem that the more related the acquired firm is to the acquiring firm, there are 
likely more top management departures. 
The majority of target companies included in the sample are private 
companies so the disciplinary motives experienced by previous studies mentioned 
above are not likely to be found in the current study. Nevertheless, three sets of tests 
are examined here to determine whether management turnover has any effect on the 
level of post acquisition performance. The first tests whether there is higher directors 
turnover in the target company of a related acquisition than an unrelated acquisition. 
The second test examines if there is any relationship between directors turnover and 
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acquisition performance. The third stage involves analysis of the impact of both 
relatedness and director turnover on post acquisition operating performance. 
The names of top management members who were affiliated with the acquired 
firm at the time of acquisition were obtained from the proxy statement or director's 
report in the financial statements of the company. Only the directors' names were 
obtained since there is no readily available comprehensive source of information on 
senior management for individual companies. A company's top management team 
was defined as all executive directors and the chairman. The names of the directors 
were obtained for the period a year prior to acquisition to one year after the 
acquisition. Besides the difficulty of obtaining information on directors departure, the 
basis of choosing one year after acquisition is to test the direct impact of management 
turnover immediately after acquisition. Turnover is defined as the proportion of 
directors present at the time of acquisition who had departed by the end of the first 
post acquisition financial year. 
Being mainly private companies, a target company in the current study 
normally has only 4-5 directors in the company. The sample of takeovers are 
subdivided into two groups, with Group A includes targets of related acquisition while 
Group B includes targets of unrelated acquisitions. Related acquisitions include those 
of highly and medium related acquisitions. In most cases in which any target director 
was replaced, the normal pattern was that all would be replaced by the end of the first 
post acquisition year. In only 6 out of 83 cases, have targets retained a few directors 
and replacing the others with directors from the acquiring firms. All the 6 companies 
are included in the sub-sample of directors turnover. Table 10.2 shows a 
crosstabulation table presenting the frequencies of turnover and relatedness. 
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Table 10.2 
Crosstabulation of Directors Turnover by Business Relatedness for 
83 Bids Completed over the Period 1988-19921 
- Business 
Relatedness 
Directors Turnover Total 
Retained Turnover 
Unrelated Count 6 18 24 
Expected 9.5 14.5 24.0 
Count 
Related Count 27 32 59 
Expected 23.5 35.5 59.0 
Count 
Totar 33 50 83 
Chi-Square = 3.07 D. F. =I Significance = 0.080 
I Related acquisitions is when there is a high or medium overlapping line of business between 
the target and acquiring firms. Unrelated acquisitions refers to acquisition of companies with no 
overlapping line of business between bidder and target firms. 
There are 32 (54%) cases of directors turnover and 27 (46%) directors 
retained out of 59 related acquisitions, while 18 (75%) cases out of 24 companies 
replaced directors and 6 (25%) retained directors in unrelated acquisitions. The result 
shows that the Pearson Chi-Square is significant at the 10% level, indicating that the 
proportion of directors turnover is significantly higher in unrelated acquisition than 
related acquisition. Thus, the null hypothesis (1-1011) of no difference in management 
turnover regardless of the degree of business relatedness between the acquiring and 
target firms is rejected. 
To explore if there is any relationship between directors' turnover and 
performance, the sample of 83 acquisitions is divided into two groups, those with 
directors turnover and those without. Denis and Denis (1995) used similar techniques 
in their study when measuring changes in operating income surrounding 
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management changes"'. Summary statistics on control adjusted post performance 
for each group is summarised in Table 10.3. 
Table 10.3 
Control Adjusted Operating Performance Surrounding Directors Turnover for 
83 Acquisitions completed over the period 1988-1992' 
(t-values and z-scores In parentheses) 













Post Control Pro Post controt 
Acquisition Adjusted Acquisition Acquisition Adjusted 
Control Changein Control Control Changeth 
Adjusted Performance Adjusted Adjusted Performance 
Performance Performance Performance 
0.04 b 0.02 0.03 0.06' 0.09 
(2.64) (0.801) (1.16) (3.60) (1.26) 
0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 b 0.05 
b 
(1.46) (1.25) (0.71) (2.71) (2.05) 
0.33 0.48 0.74 0.35 0.64 
-0.36 -0.74 -0.17 -0.26 -0.21 -0.33 
Standard 0.17 0.12 0.19 0.17 0.12 0.17 
Deviation 
Sample 50 50 50 33 33 33 
size 
'Control adjusted operating cash flow return is the difference between the firm operating performance in 
that year and the value of the matched firm during that period. Operating performance is defined as 
operating profit before tax and extraordinary items, adjusted for depreciation and goodwill and changes 
in working capital deflated by the book value of operating assets (shares plus debt less cash and 
marketable securities) at the beginning of the year. Control adjusted change operating performance is 
measured as the change of post control adjusted operating performance from pre acquisition period. 
8 Significantly different from zero at the I% level. 
b Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
Deducting the pre acquisition control adjusted performance measure from the 
post acquisition control adjusted performance measure for each group provides a 
"' Denis and Denis (1995) measured operating income as the ratio of operating income before 
depreciation to book value of total assets. They found positive improvements in the median industry 
adjusted operating income ratio following forced resignations of top management. 
measure of improvement in performance. The median control adjusted change in 
performance for acquisitions resulting in target directors turnover is positive at 0.02, 
but this is not statistically different from zero. The median control adjusted change in 
performance for companies that retained directors is 0.05, and the increase is 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level using a Wilcoxon-Signed rank test. 
The median control adjusted change in performance for the 'retention' group (0.05) is 
also significantly higher than that for the 'turnover' group (0.02) at the 10% level, 
using a Mann-Whitney test. 
In examining if higher post acquisition performance is observed in related than 
in unrelated acquisitions after controlling for directors turnover, each sub-group is 
further divided into related and unrelated acquisitions. The results on the impact of 
directors turnover and relatedness on the change in control adjusted from pre to post 
acquisition performance is shown in Table 10.4. Related acquisitions in the 'retaining' 
group result in positive median control adjusted change in performance of 0.04, and 
this is significantly different from zero at the 5% level. However, unrelated acquisitions 
in the 'retaining' group result in negative median control adjusted change in 
performance of -0.1, and this is not statistically significant. The median control 
adjusted change in performance for the 'turnover' group in related acquisitions is 
0.02, and this is not significantly different from zero using Wilcoxon-signed rank test. 
The median control adjusted change in performance for unrelated acquisitions in the 
'retaining' group is -0.02, and it also not statistically significant. The difference in 
median control adjusted change in performance between the four groups is not 
significant, using Mann-Whitney test. This may be due to the small number of 
observations in each group. Thus, related acquisitions that retained directors produce 
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significant positive change in control adjusted performance but the improvement is 
not significantly higher than related acquisition involving directors turnover"'. 
Table 10.4 
The Impact of Directors Turnover and Relatedness on 
Adjusted Acquisition Performance for 83 Acquisitions 
period 1988-19921 
(t. values and z-scores in parentheses) 
I Turnover of Directors Retained Directors 
Related Unrelated 




Control Adjusted Control Adjusted 
Changein Changein 
Performance Performance 
Mean 0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.03 
(0.16) (1.17) (0.99) (-1.52) 
Median 0.02 -0.02 0.048 -0.1 
(1.20) (-0.54) (1.95) (-1.26) 
Maximum 0.35 0.48 0.40 0.05 
Minimum -0.74 -0.24 -0.63 -0.16 
Standard 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.08 
Deviation 
Sample 32 18 27 6 
size 
'Control adjusted operating cash flow return is the difference between the firm operating pertormance 
in that year and the value of the matched firm during that period. Operating performance is defined as 
operating profit before tax and extraordinary items, adjusted for depreciation and goodwill and changes 
in working capital deflated by the book value of operating assets (shares plus debt less cash and 
marketable securities) at the beginning of the year. Change in control adjusted operating performance 
is measured as the change of post control adjusted operating performance from pre acquisition period. 
Business relatedness is where there is a high or medium overlapping line of business between the 
target and acquiring firms. 
8 Significantly different from zero at the 5% level, two-tailed test. 
In addition to the above, a multiple regression analysis is used in examining 
the impact of management turnover and relatedness on post acquisition performance. 
"' Using covariate analysis to test the difference in means and taking into account the covariate 
bet-xe. -n each group also produced insignificant results. The dependent variable in the analysis is the 
control adjusted post acquisition and the covariate is the control adjusted pre acquisition performance. 
The independent variables are the relatedness of the acquisition and the directors turnover/retained. The 
interaction between the independent variable of relatedness and directors turnover or those being 
retained is not significant since the p value is 0.803 (t-statistics = 0.063). 
Changes in Control 
completed over the 
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The first model is a regression between related and performance for the 'turnover' 
group (Model 1). The second model is a regression between related and performance 
for the 'retaining' group (Model 2)182 . The third model (Model 
3) includes both related 
and turnover in the regression as in equation 9 (Chapter 7). 
The results of the above regressions are surnmarised in Table 10.5. Based on 
Model 1 in Table 10.5, related acquisitions have a positive coefficient of 0.049, but it 
is not statistically significant, indicating that relatedness has no impact on the post 
acquisition performance in the 'turnover' groupI83 . The result is similar 
to that shown in 
Table 10.4 where there is no difference in the change in control adjusted performance 
regardless of the relatedness of the acquisition for companies with directors turnover. 
Model 2 indicates that related acquisitions have significant impact on post acquisition 
performance in the 'retaining group". Relatedness has a coefficient of 0.058 and it is 
significant at the 5% level after applying White's adjustment for heteroscedasticity. 
The result is similar to that found in Table 10.4 where related acquisitions have a 
significant positive change in control adjusted performance. 
Model ;3 provides the test whether both relatedness and director turnover have 
any impact on post acquisition performance. Using casewise diagnostics outside 3 
standard deviations, one outlier in the initial analysis of 83 acquisitions, Technology 
Resources Bhd. which acquired Celcom Sdn. Bhd, is excluded from the analysis in 
Model 3. The results in Table 10.5 (Model 3) show that turnover of directors has no 
impact on post acquisition performance regardless of the relatedness of the line of 
business. Relatedness has a significant positive coefficient of 0.06 while turnover has 
"2 Both Model I and 2 also use the control adjusted change in performance as the dependent variable 
in the regression. 
"' Similarly, the coefficient of -0.04 is not statistically significant when the control adjusted change in 
performance is used as the dependent variable. '" When the control adjusted change in performance is used as the dependent variable in the 
regression, the coefficient is 0.07 and it is not significantly different from zero. 
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an insignificant negative coefficient of -0.011". Similar to the earlier findings on 
business relatedness in Section 10.2, Model 3 indicates that related acquisitions have 
significant positive impact on post acquisition performance, as shown by the positive 
coefficient of 0.0618". 
Table 10.5 
Regression Analysis Examining the Impact of Directors Turnover 
on Related and Control Adjusted Post Acquisition Performance for 
83 Acquisitions completed over the period 1988-1992 
The regression for Model 3 as in equation 9 (Chapter 7) is: 
APcpo,,, =a+0 APc,, +T TURNOVER, +0 RELATED, + c, 
Intercept 0.008 0.003 0.002 
(0.280) (0.064) (0.078) 
(0.208) (0.017) (0.075) 
Related 0.049 0.058 0.06 b 
(1.387) (1.151) (2.222) 





Performance 0.11 0.257 b O. Jqb 
(1.013) (2.15) (2.57) 
(0-985) (1.78)0 (1.94) 
F-Value 2.014 3.028c 4.968 
R2 0.079 0.168 0.160 
Number 50 33 182 
'The number of sample excludes one observation identified as influential outliers. The 
transaction is Technology Resources Bhd. which acquired Celcorn Sdn. Bhd- Business 
relatedness is where there is a high or medium overlapping line of business between the 
target and acquiring firms 
t-statistic given in the second bracket was adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White 
correction). 
Significantly different from zero at the I% level. b Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
c Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
"' Both relatedness and turnover produce an insignificant coefficient when the control adjusted change in performance is used as the dependent variable. 1" Related acquisitions in this section are defined as those having high and medium overlapping line of business between target and acquiring firms. 
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The overall result found in Table 10.5 indicates that regardless of the 
relatedness of the business, management turnover has no impact on the post 
acquisition performance. Thus, the null hypothesis (HO12)of no significant difference in 
the operating post acquisition returns regardless of the relatedness of the acquisition 
for directors turnover, is accepted. 
In summary, the findings in the current study indicate that the proportion of 
directors turnover is significantly higher in unrelated then related acquisitions (Table 
10.2). The results in Table 10.3 provide evidence that companies retaining directors 
have slightly higher median control adjusted change in performance than companies 
that have directors turnover. There is a significant positive control adjusted change in 
performance for related acquisitions in companies that retained directors but it is not 
significantly higher than for related acquisitions involving directors turnover (Table 
10.4). The results in Table 10.5 show that management turnover has no impact on 
post acquisition performance regardless of the degree of relatedness of the line of 
business. The results in the current study contradict the findings by Shelton (1988) 
and Walsh (1988) who suggested that superior post acquisition performance is likely 
to result when top management are replaced in related acquisitions. This may be due 
to the specific feature of the sample in the current study that consists mainly of 
acquisitions of privately owned companies in which the unique skills of previous 
directors may often be retained post acquisition regardless of the degree of business 
relatedness. Such acquisitions of private companies are unlikely to have the same 
disciplinary features as acquisitions of public quoted companies. As found earlier in 
Chapter 9, targets were experiencing higher positive returns two years prior to 
acquisition. Thus, acquiring firms in the current study might retain target's incumbent 
managers as they are* familiar with the target organisation's environment. In addition, 
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there might be a cultural or tactual reason for retaining target directors in acquisl ions 
of private companies 187 . 
10.4 Relative Size of Targets to Bidders 
The focus of this section is to examine if relative size of target to bidders have 
any impact on post acquisition performance. It is expected that as the target 
increases in size relative to that of the bidder, the impact of the acquisition would be 
more readily observed in the bidders' post acquisition performance. Difficulty in 
absorption might also has an impact on post acquisition if the size of target is large 
relative to the bidder. Previous studies (Fowler and Schmidt, 1989, Jarrell and 
Poulsen, 1989, Loderer and Martin, 1990, Franks et al., 1991, and Healy et a., 1992, 
among others) report conflicting results on the relationship between relative size and 
the level of post acquisition performance. 
The relative size in the current study is identified as the target size divided by 
bidder size. The size of the target and acquiring firms is measured as the book value 
of the companies (equity plus reserves, plus debt less cash and marketable 
securities) at the end of the financial year prior to the bid year (year -1). Table 10.6 
presents the descriptive statistics of relative size of target to bidder for the 83 bids in 
the current sample"'. Although the mean relative size of target to bidder is 47.3%, the 
median relative size is only 15.9%, indicating that the distribution is skewed. Only 9 
targets or 10.8% of the total, are larger in size than their bidder. 
"Mat is, a face-saving exercise in friendly acquisitions where target management is retained for a few 
years after acquisition. 
"' As mentioned earlier, to avoid the potential bias of analysing bid characteristics of 117 bids (as a 
result of acquiring firm acquiring more than one target in the same year), the performance of 14 
acquiring fums and 34 targets are thus excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 10.6 
Descriptive Statistics on Relative Size of Target to Bidder for 83 
Acquisitions completed over the period 1988-1992. 
Mean 244806 59133 0.473 
Median 123121 30552 0.159 
Standard 314947 74079 0.792 
Deviation 
Maximum 1783835 433117 4.03 
Minimum 5495 1267 0.100 
Relative size of target to bidder is defined as the ratio of target size and bidder size 
at the beginning of year prior to the bid year (year -1). Firm size is book value of 
shares plus the book values of net debt (long-term debt plus short-term debt, less 
cash and marketable securities) at the end of the year before acquisition (year -I). 
A regression model as described in equation 10 (Chapter 7) is used to 
evaluate whether improvements in post acquisition performance are affected by the 
relative size of target to bidder. The results on the relationship between the median 
post acquisition adjusted returns and the relative size of target to bidder are reported 
in Table 10.7. The results indicate that both the pre bid operating cash flow 
performance and the relative size of target to bidders have significant impact on post 
acquisition performance. The estimated intercept a and coefficients 0 on RELSIZE 
are significant, 3.9% and 3% respectively, indicating that the larger the relative size of 
target to bidder, the greater the post acquisition performance. Thus, hypothesis 
thirteen (HO13) of no difference in the level of post acquisition performance among 
acquisitions involving bidders and targets of similar size is rejected. 
The results in the current study contradict those reported by Healy et al. 
(1992) who found that the relative size of target to bidder did not influence the post 
acquisition cash flow performance. However, their study used a sample of relatively 
large acquisitions that are possibly without much variation in relative size. Other 
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stud,, -. s by Franks and Harris, (1989), Fowler and Schmidt (1989) and Franks et al. 
(1991) also found no evidence of a significant relationship between relative size of 
target to bidder and abnormal returns. 
Table 10.7 
Relation between median post acquisition adjusted returns and 
relative size of target to bidder for 83 combined firms over the 
period 1988-1992 
The regression as In equation 10 (Chapter 7) Is: 
APc,. t, - cc +P APcPW+ 0 RELSIZE + el 
(t-value in parenthesis) 
AP'p-u = 0.039 + 0.188 APcp. + 0.03 RELSIZE 
(i. gr (2.5)b (1.88)c 
(2 O)b (2.3)b (1.86f 
R'= 0.12 F-statistic = 5.3 a N=83 
APý,, # and APc ,j are the median annual adjusted operating cash flow returns in the post and prior acquisition period for firm L 
RELSIZE is the actual percentage of relative size of target to bidder at the end of the 
financial year prior to the bid. Size of the target and acquiring firms Is measured as 
the book value of the companies (equity plus reserves, plus net debt less cash and 
marketable securities). 
t-statistic given in the second bracket was adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White 
correction). 
I Significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
b Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
c Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
The results reported in the current study are however consistent with those 
reported by Asquith et al. (1983), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Seth (1990) and 
Loderer and Martin (1990) who found a positive relationship between bidding firms' 
cumulative abnormal security returns and the size of target relative to the bidder. 
10.5 Method of Payment 
The method of financing made by acquirers when making an acquisition is 
another factor that may explain the wealth effects of post acquisition performance. 
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Myers and Majluf (1984), Murphy and Nathan (1989) and Bhagat and Hirshleifer 
(1993) focused on the role of asymmetric information and contended that one would 
expect the market to interpret cash offers as signal of bidding firms' shares being 
undervalued, and that share offers as signals of the share prices being too high. 
Agrawal et al. (1992), Loughran and Vijh (1997), and Limmack and McGregor 
(1992) are among market-based studies that have shown that acquiring firms using 
cash to finance acquisitions perform significantly better than share financed 
acquisitions around the announcement period. Chang (1998), however, found 
evidence that bidders experience no abnormal return in cash offers but positive 
abnormal returns in share offers when the acquisition involves a privately held 
targets. Chang (1998) argued that the financing of takeovers for privately held targets 
is similar to private sale of shares, where share financing of privately held target 
involves payment of shares to a single or small group of target shareholders (usually 
fewer than five). This helps to resolve the asymmetric information problem identified 
by Myers and Majluf (1984) through the disclosure of bidding firm managers' private 
information to the small number of target shareholders. The willingness of privately 
held target shareholders to accept shares from the bidders suggest favourable 
information about the bidding firm, and is being reflected in positive abnormal returns, 
according to Chang (1998). 
If the issuance of shares in acquisition financing is an anticipation of improved 
performance, then the cash flow performance after acquisition will be higher for 
bidders who offer share exchange for a private company than those who use cash 
financing in takeovers of privately held targets. 
Acquiring firms in Malaysia have an option of issuing shares and warrants or 
issuing cash or debt to target shareholders. Cash offers in the current study are 
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defined as cash or debt exchanges, and share offers include shares and where a 
combination of cash and shares is paid. There are 60 cash financed transactions as 
compared to only 23 share (or mixed) offer'89. 
The regression as in equation 11 (Chapter 7) is used to examine the possible 
inter-relationship effects of the method of payment on post acquisition cash flow 
operating returns of 83 bids. The dependent variable is the post acquisition operating 
cash flow returns while the method of payment is the independent variable to be 
included in the multiple regression. The results are presented in Table 10.8. The 
estimated intercept (x and coefficient P on APcpre is positive and significant as reported 
in earlier regression. The coefficient on CASH is significantly negative, indicating that 
acquiring firms experience negative post acquisition performance of 5% in cash 
offers. Thus, hypothesis fourteen (14014) of no difference in the level of post cash flow 
performance is rejected. 
Table 10.8 
Comparisons of post acquisition performance between firms that made either 
cash or share payment for acquisitions completed over the period 1988-19921. 
The regression as In equation 11 (Chapter 7) Is: 
APc,,,,,, = cE +0 APcpri +0 CASH + el 
(t-values in parenthesis) 
APcPOai = 0.09 + 0.175 APcpm, - 0.06 CASH 
(3.65) a (2.34)b (-2.20)b 
(3.36)" (2.06)b (-2 . 09)b 
R2= 0.13 F-statistic=5.81 N=83 
'APý., and APr .j are the median annual control firm-adjusted operating cash flow returns in the post and prior acquisition period for firm i. CASH are dummy variables that take the 
value of one if the acquisition is paid by cash and zero otherwise. 
2 The sample excludes two public listed and one non-public listed targets 
t-statistic given in the second bracket was adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White correction). 
Significantly different from zero at the I% level. 
Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
There are only 6 cases where the financing of takeovers involve a combination of cash and shares. 
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The results found in the current study contradict those found by previous 
market-based studies (for example Agrawal et al., 1992 and Loughran and Vijh, 1997) 
that acquiring firms using cash to finance acquisitions perform significantly better than 
share finance acquisitions around the announcement period. By contrast, in 
examining acquiring firms' post acquisition cash flow performance, Healy et al. (1997) 
found that the industry adjusted cash flow returns showed significant improvement of 
4.4% when shares were used to finance the acquisitions. Linn and Switzer (2000), 
however, found that the change in operating cash flow performance is significantly 
larger for cases in which the acquiring company offered cash as compared to share 
offers. Consistent with the results reported by Chang (1998), the current study also 
finds evidence of higher post acquisition cash flow performance for bidders who offer 
share exchange over those which use cash financing. In fact, the cash financed 
acquisitions in the current study resulted in significant negative post acquisition 
performance. 
10.6 Directors Ownership 
Shareholdings by directors is a potential governance aspect that may have an 
effect on the post bid performance of the combined firms and the willingness of 
managers to make value creating or value destroying acquisitions. Conjectures have 
been made frequently in the financial economic literature that that top management 
may deliberately make corporate acquisitions for their firms that are detrimental to 
shareholder wealth. Top management are said to have indulge in non-value 
maximising transaction, such as excessive consumption of perquisites (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) or the selection of less risky investment projects (Amihud and Lev, 
1981) when they do not have a significant stake in the firm. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argued that the market value of a firm increases as management ownership 
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rises: managers bear a large share of any loss as their stake rises and are therefore 
less likely to make value reducing decisions. 
A recent study by Shinn (1999) supports the hypothesis that managers with a 
significant ownership position in their firms may engage in acquisition activity that is in 
the interest of shareholders since managerial wealth would likewise be adversely 
affected. Morck et al. (1988), Stulz (1988), Hubbard and Palia (1995), and Holl and 
Kyriazis (1997) are among studies that suggested an existence of a non-linear 
Inverted U-shaped relationship (non-monotonic relationship) between managerial 
shareholding and wealth gains, where the market value of the firm first increases, 
then declines, as ownership by the board of directors rises. 
The current section examines whether directors with significant shareholding 
play a role in monitoring the actions of the bidding firm's management in producing 
positive post acquisition performance. Similar to the studies by Morck et al. (1988), 
Hubbard and Palia (1995) and Holl and Kyriazis (1997), it is expected that there is a 
non-linear inverted U-shape relationship between directors shareholding and wealth 
gains. Due to the practical problem in gathering information on managerial ownership, 
board members ownership (similar to that used by Morck et al., 1988 and Shinn, 
1999). rather than managerial ownership (as used by Hubbard and Palia, 1995) is 
used in the current study. Data on directors who are affiliated with the acquiring firm 
are obtained from the proxy statement or director's report in the financial statements 
of the company one-year prior to acquisition. Directors' ownership positions in their 
company's ordinary shares is represented by shares held directly by the directors and 
his or her immediately family as of the proxy statement date. Similar to Morck et al. 
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(1988), percentage ownership rather than the dollar value of the stake is used in the 
current study'O. 
Table 10.9 
Descriptive Statistics for Share Ownership of Directors on 
83 Acquiring Firms for 83 combined firms over the period 
1988-1992 







Table 10.9 reports the descriptive statistics for share ownership of directors. 
The mean combined stake owned by directors is 14% and the median stake is 11 %. 
There is considerable variation in directors ownership within the sample, with the 
ownership of directors ranges from 0.1 % to 59.6%. 
A simple linear regression using equation 12 (Chapter 7) is applied to test the 
possible inter-relationship effects of directors shareholdings on the post acquisition 
control adjusted cash flow operating returns. The dependent variable is the post 
acquisition control adjusted operating cash flow returns, while the directors' 
ownership and the pre acquisition performance are the independent variable to be 
'" Shinn (1999) use both percentage ownership and market value of company shares owned when 
examining the relationship between the wealth effects of acquisition activity and the ownership and 
wealth of both the executives and board of directors of the furns. 
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included in the regression. Percentage ownership of directors (DIREC) is used in the 
regression and the results are shown in Table 10.10. The results in Table 10.10 show 
that the coefficient on DIREC is -0.001, but it is not significantly different from zero, 
Indicating that directors ownership has no impact on post acquisition performance. 
Table 10.10 
Relationship between post acquisition control adjusted performance and 
director ownership In acquisitions completed over the period 1988-1992'. 
The regression as In equation 12 (Chapter 7) is: 
APep%t, = cE +P APcPr*i +0 DIREC + el 
Full Sample 
(t-values in parenthesis) 
AP'poa I=0.05 + 0.20 APc 0.001 DIREC (3.0)' (2.6)b (-1.02) 
(2.9)8 (2.3) b (-1.16) 
R2 = 0.09 F-statistic = 3.8 b N=83 
IAPý.,, and APc,,., are the median annual control adjusted operating cash flow returns In the 
post and prior acquisition period for firm 1. DIREC are ownership percentage own by 
directors. 
t-statistic given in the second bracket was adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White correction). 
8 Significantly different from zem at the I% level. 
b Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
Demsetz and Len (1985) use a simple linear regression model similar to the 
one used in the current study and found no significant relationships between profit 
and ownership by large shareholders. Morck et al. (1988) who also used linear 
regression found no relationship between managerial ownership and shareholders 
wealth. They conclude that imposing a linear structure is inappropriate in examining 
the relationship between ownership and performance. Thus, in an attempt to 
determine whether level of shareholdings has an effect on performance, the post 
acquisition control adjusted change in operating performance is identified for different 
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levels of share ownership of directors, similar to the method used by Denis et al. 
(1997)111. 
Table 10.11 documents the relationship between directors' share ownership 
and the change in control adjusted operating cash flow returns. As defined in earlier 
sections, deducting the pre acquisition control adjusted performance measure from 
the post acquisition control adjusted performance measure for each group provides a 
measure of the change in improvement. The distributions of directors ownership 
together with the mean and median change in control adjusted operating cash flow 
returns are shown in the table. 
As with the results in Table 10.10, the results in Table 10.11 do not support the 
hypothesis that the level of directors ownership has any effect on the change in 
control adjusted performance. As seen in Table 10.11, the level of directors share 
ownership does not exhibit any observable pattern in the median change in con. trol 
adjusted performance. A two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test is applied on the 
change in control adjusted operating cash flow returns at each ownership level. Firms 
with no director ownership earn a median change in control adjusted operating cash 
flow returns of -0.13, and it is significantly different from zero at the 5% level. As the 
level of director ownership increases, the median change in performance is still 
negative except for ownership level from 10 to 15 percent where the median change 
in performance is 0.08, but it is not significantly different from zero. Thus, hypothesis 
fifteen (H,,,, ) of no significant difference in the level of abnormal operating post cash 
flow regardless of share ownership own by directors is accepted. 
"' Morck et al. (1988) and Hubard and Palia (1995), however, constructed three dununy variables for 
each level of ownership (less than 5%, between 5%-25%, and more than 25%) and used these variables 
as regressors in piecewise linear regressions. 
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Table 10.11 
Post Acquisition Change in Control Adjusted Operating Returns by 
Share Ownership of Directors for 83 combined acquiring and target 




Change in Control Adjusted Operating Performance 
Number of firms Mean Median 
None* I1 -0.118 -0.138 
0.1-5% 22 -0.04 -0.02 
5-10% 7 -0.07 -0.11 
10-15% 11 0.10 0.08 
15-20% 9 -0.04 -0.03 
20-25% 11 -0.03 -0.04 
More than 12 0.01 -0.01 
25% 
*None means that no single member of the executive or non-executive directors 
owned anv of the firm's outstandina shares. 
I Control adjusted operating performance is the difference between the firm operating 
performance in that year and the value of the matched firm during that period. Operating 
performance is defined as operating profit before tax and extraordinary items, adjusted for 
depreciation and goodwill and changes in working capital deflated by the book value of 
operating assets (shares plus debt less cash and marketable securities) at the beginning of 
the year. Change in control adjusted performance is the difference between post and pre 
control adjusted performance. 
8 Significantly different from zero at the 0.05 probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
The results in Table 10.11 do not support the hypothesis that there is a non- 
monotonic relationship between directors ownership and improvement in post 
acquisition performance. Thus, the results in the current study differ from those of 
Morck et al. (1988) who reported a positive relationship between ownership and 
performance in the 0% - 5% range, a negative relation in 5%-25% range, and a 
positive relation beyond 25%. The findings in the current study also contradict with 
those reported by Stultz (1988). Hubbard and Palia (1995) and Holl and Kyriazis 
(1997) that the firm's performance first increases, then declines as ownership by the 
board of directors rises. Hubbard and Palia (1995) report an increase in abnormal 
returns when managerial ownership increases to 5%, and then decrease thereafter. It 
should be noted that except for Morck et al. (1988) who used Tobin's Q, other studies 
mentioned above used abnormal market returns to measure performance. 
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10.7 Multiple Regression 
Table 10.12 summarises the impact of the individual acquisition characteristics 
that have been tested on post acquisition operating performance. So far the results 
show that the main determinants of cross-sectional differences in operating cash flow 
performance following acquisitions in Malaysia during the period 1988-1992 are 
relatedness, large relative size of target to bidders, and payment method. The 
characteristics that appear to have no significant effect on post acquisition 
performance are management turnover and the level of shareholding of directors in 
the acquiring firms. 
Table 10.12 
Acquisition characteristics and direction of each explanatory 
variable on the post acquisition performance 
HIGH + Highly overlapping business 
between target and acquiring firm 
[TURNOVER Target directors turnover no effect 
RELSIZE Relative size of target to bidder + 
CASH, Payment by cash 
DIREC Fraction of shares held by members no effect 
of the board of directors owning 5% 
or more of the firm's outstanding 
shares 
Table 10.13 shows the Pearson Correlation between the post acquisition 
operating cash flow return and the independent variables: pre acquisition 
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performance, directors turnover, business relatedness, method of payment, relative 
size of targets to bidders, and directors ownership. 
Table 10.13 
Pearson Correlation between post acquisition control adjusted operating cash 
flow return and the independent variables. The Independent variables are pre 
acquisition performance, directors turnover, business relatedness, method of 
payment, relative size of targets to bidders, and directors ownership 
Post Preturnover highly medium cash relative director 
related related size ownership 
Post Pearson 1.000 . 271 -. 080 . 197 -. 036 -. 258 . 207 -. 096 Perfor- Correlation 
mance 
Sig. (2- . 013 . 475 . 074 . 746 . 019 . 061 . 386 tailed) 
Pro Pearson . 271 1.000 -. 069 . 168 -. 022 -. 109 . 031 . 054 Perfor- Correlation 
mance 
Sig. (2- . 013 . 535 . 130 . 843 . 328 . 781 . 
626 
tailed) 
turnover Pearson -. 080 -. 069 1.000 -. 283 . 147 . 102 -. 052 -. 
014 
Correlation 
Sig. (2- . 475 . 535 . 010 . 185 . 359 . 642 . 
898 
tailed) 
highly Pearson . 197 . 168 -. 283 1.000 -. 481 . 095 . 069 . 063 related Correlation 
Sig. (2- . 074 . 130 . 010 . 000 . 395 . 535 . 
569 
tailed) 
medium Pearson -. 036 -. 022 . 147 -. 481 1.000 -. 029 -. 061 . 081 
related Correlation 
Sig. (2- . 746 . 843 . 185 . 000 . 792 . 583 . 
468 
tailed) 
- cash Pearson -. 258 -. 109 . 102 . 095 -. 029 1.000 -. 114 . 143 Correlation 
Sig. (2- . 019 . 328 . 359 . 395 . 792 . 305 . 196 tailed) 
relative size Pearson . 207 . 031 -. 052 . 069 -. 061 -. 114 1.000 -. 064 Correlation 
Sig. (2- . 061 . 781 . 642 . 535 . 583 . 305 . 564 tailed) 
director Pearson -. 096 . 054 -. 014 . 063 . 081 . 143 -. 064 1.000 ownership Correlation 
Sig. (2- . 386 . 626 . 898 . 569 . 468 . 196 . 564 tailed) 
No of 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
observation s 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
330 
Based on Table 10.13, the only variables that have significant correlation are 
between post acquisition performance and pre acquisition performance (5% level), 
post acquisition performance and highly related business (10% level), turnover and 
highly related (1% level), post acquisition performance and cash payment (5% level), 
and post acquisition performance and relative size of targets to bidders. 
To examine the possible inter-relationship effects of acquisition characteristics 
on post acquisition cash flow operating returns more specifically, post acquisition 
operating returns of the combined firms are analysed using a multiple regression 
model as described in equation 13 of Chapter 7. The dependent variable is the post 
acquisition control adjusted operating cash flow returns. The independent variables 
use to reflect the acquisition characteristics are business relatedness, directors 
turnover, relative size of targets to bidders, method of payment, directors ownership 
and pre acquisition performance. The results are summarised in Table 10.14. 
Table 10.14 
Relationship between post acquisition control adjusted performance and 
acquisition characteristics in acquisitions completed ovor the period 1988- 
19921. 
(t-values in parenthesis) 
APc,,,,, = 0.05 + 0.15 APcprqj +0,03MEDIUM + 0.05HIGH 
(1.35) (2.0)8 (0.61) (1.76)1 
(1.55) (1.8)8 (0.88) (1.76)1 
+ 0.004TURNOVER + 0.02 RELATIVESIZE 
(0.143) (1.53) 
(0.163) (1.20) 
-0-06 CASH - 0.0007DIREC (-2.06)4 (-0.86) 
(-2.02)8 (-0.96) 
R"ý 0.17 F-statistic = 2.611 N=83 
'APcp. 
t, 1 and APc p,,, are the median annual control adjusted operating cash flow returns in the Post and prior acquisition period for firm L MEDIUM and HIGH are where target and bidders are In medium and high overlap business, respectively, TURNOVER is target directors turnover, RELATIVE SIZE is the relative size of target to bidder, CASH is payment made in cash and DIREC Is ownership percentage own by directors. 
t-statistic given in the second bracket was adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White correction). 
Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. b Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
The results in Table 10.14 indicate that when all variables are included in the 
model, only the pre bid performance, level of relatedness, and means of payment are 
significant in explaining cross-sectional differences in performance. The degree of 
explanatory power of the model is, however, relatively low (R'=O. 17). 
10.8 Summary 
The chapter focused on analysing the effect of acquisition characteristics on 
post acquisition operating performance for 83 bids consisting of 83 public listed 
bidders acquiring 80 private, 2 public listed and 1 non-public listed targets in Malaysia 
during the period 1988-1992. The specific bid characteristics analysed are business 
relatedness, management turnover, the relative size of targets to bidders, the method 
of payment offered and board of directors ownership. 
Since the specific feature of the current sample is that it consists mainly of 
privately owned targets, the disciplinary role found in acquisitions of public listed 
targets are not expected to be found in agreed bids between the bidders and targets 
in the current study. Acquisitions of highly related business between target and 
acquiring firm, large relative size of target to bidders and payment for the acquisition 
by shares have a significant positive impact on post acquisition control adjusted 
performance. The target directors turnover and the directors share ownership do not 
have a significant effect on the post acquisition performance. However, highly related 
business between target and bidder and payment by shares are the only acquisition 
characteristics that have a significant positive impact on the post acquisition control 
adjusted performance when multiple regression is used. 
The empirical evidence in the current chapter indicates that the major source 
of synergy gains is the acquisition of product-market related targets. The improved 
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post acquisition performance in transactions with a high business overlap, not 
observed in other types of acquisitions, is explicitly the result of an operational gain 
due to increased opportunities for each acquired business to share resources and 
activities in the acquiring firm. In addition, acquisitions paid by shares are more likely 
to achieve improved post acquisition performance, possibly because target owners 
are 'tied' to the acquiring firms for the future. 
The next chapter pursues the implications of acquisition activity for 




Takeovers and Accounting Measures of Performance 
11.1 Chapter Description 
The results reported in the current study suggest that acquisitions in Malaysia 
during the period 1988-1992 lead to improvements in the long run operating cash flow 
performance. The conclusion, based on analysis of operating cash flows are contrary 
to the results reported in those studies in UK and US that have employed accounting 
data to examine improvements in operating performance. Examples of the studies are 
Singh (1971), Utton (1974), Meeks (1977), Holl and Pickering (1988) and Dickerson 
et al. (1997) in UK, whilst those in US include Mueller (1980), Ravenscraft and 
Scherer (1987b), Clark and Ofek (1994), Philappatos and Baird 111 (1996), and Denis 
et al. (1997). However, the negative post acquisition performance reported in 
accounting based studies might be affected by the acquisition accounting methods 
adopted or by the potential earnings manipulation, neither of which affects the 
measurement rules used in the current study. Thus, the main objective of the current 
chapter is to pursue the implications of acquisition activity for performance 
improvement by exploring different definitions of measurement of accounting 
performance. 
The first measure used to test the robustness of the results in Chapter 9 is to 
use operating cash flow similar to the definition given by Healy et al. (1992,1997) and 
Ghosh (1998) in measuring the operating cash flow returns. Operating cash flow in 
Chapter 9 is defined as operating profit before tax and extraordinary item, adjusted for 
depreciation, interests and goodwill and changes in working capital (that is, changes 
in stocks, trade debtors and prepayments and changes in creditors and accruals). 
The measure used in the current study differs slightly from that used by Healy et al. 
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(1992,1997), Anand and Singh (1997) and Ghosh (1998) as these authors make no 
adjustments for changes in working capital accruals that may be subjected to 
manipulation by managers (Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993 and Dechow, 
1994)192. 
Alternative measures of performance include that of operating cash flow after 
interest. Interest income and interest expense are initially excluded in computing the 
operating cash flow performance to avoid problems involved in financing issues. The 
method use to finance the acquisition, that is, by cash or shares or a combination of 
cash, shares and other securities may affect the post acquisition performance 
measures. Firms that use debt financing incur interest expense (cost of debt) which 
lower their net profit. Thus, as an alternative measure cash flow after interest is tested 
to determine whether any operating benefits are swallowed up by higher interest 
charges. 
The third measure of performance in the current chapter is based on return on 
assets (defined as net profit before tax and extraordinary item as a percentage of total 
assets). For the purpose of comparison, the definition for net profit used here is 
similar to the conventional accruals accounting based measures of performance used 
in earlier studies in UK and US (example Mueller, 1980, Singh, 1971, Meeks, 1977, 
and Dickerson et al., 1997 among others) . 
"' Ghosh (1998) admitted that the results in his study might be biased to the extent that the operating 
cash flow calculation in his study includes working capital accruals that is subjected to managers' 
manipulation. 
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11.2 Data and Methodology 
The same list of 97 listed acquiring and 117 target firms (3 public listed, 1 non- 
public listed and 113 private firms) for the period 1988-1992 used in analysing the 
operating cash flow performance of companies in Chapter 9 are used in the current 
chapter. Similarly, the same control firm is used, consisting of matched non-acquiring 
and non-target companies in the same industry as those of the respective companies, 
with matching year and size"'. Size is measured by the book value of equity plus 
reserves plus net debt, less cash and marketable securities at the end of the year 
prior to acquisition. Similar to the techniques used in measuring post acquisition cash 
flow performance in Chapter 9, frequent bidders (bidders making more than 1 bid in 
subsequent years) are also included in the current chapter. Data required for the 
current analysis are obtained from the same annual reports used in Chapter 9. 
Similar to the methodology used in the previous chapter, the combined firm 
performance prior to acquisition is calculated as the sum of the bidder and target 
performance returns multiplied by the weighted average of the relative asset values of 
the two firms. After the acquisition, the actual values are reported for the combined 
firms. Control firm returns before acquisition are calculated as the bidder control and 
target control returns weighted by the relative asset value of the two corresponding 
sample firms at the beginning of each year. In the post acquisition years, the return of 
the bidder control and target control are weighted by the relative asset value of the 
two firms at the beginning of the year prior to acquisition (year -1). 
'9' Target control private companies in the same industrial classification were matched only by year 
since it was difficult to obtain the size of non target companies. 
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11.3 Operating Cash Flow Returns 
The focus of the current section is to determine if a definition of operating cash 
flow that does not account for changes in working capital accruals affects the earlier 
findings reported in Chapter 9194. Similar to the definition used by Healy et al. (1992, 
1997), Anand and Singh (1997) and Ghosh (1998), operating cash flow in the current 
section is defined as profit before tax and extraordinary item, before depreciation, 
interest and goodwill. No adjustments for changes in working capital are made to the 
pre-tax profit. Similar to earlier methodology, the operating cash flow is scaled by 
operating assets at the beginning of the year to make comparison across time and 
across firms. Operating asset is defined as book value of shareholders fund and total 
debt less cash and marketable securities at the beginning of the year. 
Cash flow measures computed using the alternative measure of operating 
cash flow for 97 combined acquiring and target firms together with their respective 
control firms are reported in Table 11.1. The control adjusted operating performance 
is obtained by subtracting the control company measures of performance from the 
combined firm measures of performance for the respective takeover in the respective 
years. Similarly, the results for both medians and means are presented in the tables 
but emphasis is made on the former. Post acquisition performance changes for the 
combined firms can be observed by measuring the median change in operating 
performance before and after acquisitions as shown in Table 11.1. 
'" Murphy and Zirmnerman (1993) regarded working capital accruals, defined as changes in trade debtors, stocks and prepayments less changes in creditors and other current liabilities, as the portion of 
profits over which manager can exercise the most discretion. 
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Table 11.1 
Operating performance for 97 combined acquiring and target firms in years 
surroundina acquisitions completed In the period 1988-19921 
Year Firm Control Control Adjusted Number of 
relative 
to Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean % Obser- 
acquisition %%%%%% Positive vations 
-4 5.8 7.3 4.5 4.4 0.4 2.9 51.22 41 
-3 7.8 7.1 7.1 4.8 -0.1 2.3 47.95 73 
-2 P. 0 8.0 7.1 8.3 -1.8 -0.4 38.46 91 
-1 8.8 11.7 5.9 8.5 2.411 3.2b 54.64 97 
Average annual 
performance over 
years .16.8 8.9 6.2 7.0 -0.7 1.9 47.68 
to -4 
+1 8.1 11.2 7.1 7.4 1.8 3.8b 54.64 97 
+2 8.6 12.6 6.5 7.7 2 . 8b 4 . 9b 62.89 97 
+3 8.4 10.8 6.9 8.8 2.6 2.0 57.73 97 
+4 8.7 13.3 6.4 8.1 2.6c 5.2 58.76 97 
+5 8.4 10.8 6.2 9.5 1.0 1.3 56.70 97 
Average annual 
performance over 
years +1 8.4 11.71 6.6 8.3 2.3 b 3.4b 58.14 
to +5 
Panel B: Abnormal adjusted operating performance retums 
APcp., = 0.02 + 0.26 API 
(1.81 )b (3.22)8 
(2.16)b (3.46)1 
R2= 0.10 Fýstatistic=10.3a N=97 
APcp,,, and APc p,, are the median annual adjusted operating performance returns 
in the post 
and prior acquisition period for firm 1. 
t-statistics given in the second brackets were adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White correction). 
I Operating performance in the pre acquisition period is calculated as pre-tax operating cash flow 
return (profit before tax, adjusted for depreciation, interest and goodwill) on operating assets of target 
and bidder, weighted by the relative asset sizes of the two firms. Post acquisition performance used 
data of the combined firms. Pre acquisition control returns are target control and bidder control values, 
weighted by the relative operating asset values of the two corresponding bidder and target firms at the 
beginning of the years. In the post acquisition period the weights used to compute control company 
returns are the relative operating asset values of the acquirer and target firms in year-1. Control 
adjusted values are computed for each firm and year as the difference between the firm value in that 
year and the value of the control firm in the same industry during that period. 
Mann-Whitney tests are conducted on median control adjusted figures 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests are used to test the significance between the pre and post acquisition 
median annual performance 
Significantly different from zero at the 1% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
'Significantly different from zero at the 5% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
I Significantly different from zero at the 10% probability level, using a two-tailed test 
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The results obtained with the alternative measure are generally consistent 
with the findings reported earlier in Table 9.4. The results are also consistent with 
those reported by Healy et al (1992,1997) and Ghosh (1998) who found that the 
combined firms earned significant improvements in operating cash flow returns 
relative to their industries in the post acquisition period. The results in Table 11.1 
indicate that the combined firms continue to show higher post acquisition operating 
performance relative to their control firms, albeit lower than the results that include 
changes in working capital accruals in the calculation for operating cash flow. As seen 
in the table, the median annual operating performance for the combined firms and 
control companies over the years -4 to -1 is 6.8% and 6.2%, respectively, and 
neither is significantly different from zero. The median annual operating return for the 
combined and control companies for years +1 to +5 is 8.4% and 6.6%, respectively, 
but both are not significantly different from zero. The median annual control adjusted 
pre acquisition performance for years -4 to -1 is -0.7% as compared to 0.46% in 
Table 9.4. The post acquisition median annual control adjusted performance for years 
+1 to +5 is 2.3%, significantly different from zero, as compared to 3.0% (significant) in 
Table 9.4. The Wilcoxon signed rank test used to test the significance between the 
pre and post acquisition median annual control adjusted returns indicate that the 
difference is significant at the 5% level. 
In order to summarise the various annual performance measures into a single 
measure, the median control adjusted performance over the four years of pre 
acquisition is calculated for each firm with a similar measure calculated for the five 
years of post acquisition performance. Post acquisition median control adjusted 
performance s then regressed on the pre acquisition median performance in order to 
incorporate the relation between prior and post acquisition adjusted returns. Panel B 
of Table 11.1 shows the results of the regression on abnormal control adjusted 
operating returns. The intercept, a, is 0.02 (0.04 in Table 9.4), and it is significant at 
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the 5% level, indicating that the combined firms obtain a significant increase of 2.0% 
per year in the post acquisition period after controlling for the pre acquisition 
performance. The alpha value of 0.02 has the same significant level of 5% after 
performing White's (1980) heteroscedastic adjustment in Shazam. 
Thus, the evidence presented in this section indicates that the finding of post 
acquisition performance improvements is not sensitive to the choice of measurement 
of operating cash flow, that is, whether or not changes in working capital is included in 
the calculation. Acquisitions in Malaysia do lead to improved firm operating 
performance in comparison to those companies that do not merge. 
11.4 Operating Cash Flow After Interest 
The sensitivity of the result to the amount of interest charges is also evaluated 
by repeating the analysis of operating cash flow returns using an alternative measure 
after adjustment for interest expense. Operating cash flow performance after interest 
is defined as operating profit before tax and extraordinary item but after interest, 
adjusted for depreciation, goodwill and changes in working capital divided by 
operating assets. It measures operating returns to the firms shareholders and is 
calculated after deducting the returns (interest) to the creditors. Table 11.2 reports the 
results of the alternative measure of cash flow after interest in years around 
acquisition. In comparison with their pre acquisition performance, the median annual 
post acquisition performance for years +1 to +5 for the combined firm is 6.3%, which 
is not significantly higher than the median annual performance of 4.2% during the 4- 
year period prior to acquisition. 
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Table 11.2 
Operating performance for 97 combined acquiring and target firms in years 
surrounding acquisitions completed In the period 1988-19921 
Year Firm 





Control Adjusted Number 
Median Mean %Positive ofObser- 
%% vations 
-4 5.7 5.9 4.6 3.8 2.9 2.2 58.54 41 
-3 3.1 1.1 5.9 5.6 -6.8b -4.5 43.84 73 
.23.7 3.7 5.2 -1 -0.6 4.7 48.35 91 
-1 5.1 7.4 3.3 4 -0.2 3.3 49.48 97 
Average annual 
performance over 
years -1 to 4.2 4.6 5.1 2.9 -0.4 1.7 49.01 
-4 
+1 4.7 7.6 3.3 3 0.8 4.5 50.52 97 
+2 3.4 6.8 4.9 5.1 0.5 1.8 50.52 97 
+3 7.1 8.5 4.5 1.9 4.0' 6.6 b 59.79 97 
+4 7.9 10.7 4.1 3.3 3.4' 7.4 b 63.92 97 
+5 7.9 10.2 3.8 3.2 4.3' 0.07 b 65.98 97 
Average annual 
performance over 
years +1 6.3 9.71 4.3 3.3 2.5 b 5.5 58.14 
to +5 
Panel B: Abnormal adjusted operating performance returns 
APcp,, 0.04 + 0.15 APO prg (3.14)3 (2.32)b 
(3.16)2 (1.99)b 
RI = 0.05 Fýstatistic = 5.4 b N=97 
AF1p and APr p., are the median annual adjusted operating performance returns 
in the post 
and prior acquisition period for firm 1. 
t-statistics given in the second brackets were adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White correction). 
1 Operating performance in the pre acquisition period is calculated as pre-tax operating cash flow return 
(profit before tax, depreciation and goodwill, but after interest and changes in working capital) on 
operating assets of target and bidder, weighted by the relative asset sizes of the two firms. Post 
acquisition performance used data of the combined firms. Pre acquisition control returns are target 
control and bidder control values, weighted by the relative operating asset values of the two 
corresponding bidder and target firms at the beginning of the years. In the post acquisition period the 
weights used to compute control company returns are the relative operating asset values of the acquirer 
and target firms In year-1. Control adjusted values are computed for each firm and year as the 
difference between the firm value in that year and the value of the control firm in the same industry 
duringthatperiod. 
Mann-Whitney tests are conducted on median control adjusted figures 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests are used to test the significance between the pre and post acquisition 
median annual performance 
Significantly different from zero at the 1% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
Significantly different from zero at the 5% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 'Signii"icantly different from zero at the 10% probability level, using a two-tailed test 
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Similarly, there is no significant change in performance of the control 
companies from the period before to that after the acquisition. The median annual 
performance of the control companies during the 4-year period prior to acquisition is 
5.1% and in the 5-year post acquisition period is 4.3%. The median annual control 
adjusted returns in the pre acquisition period [-4 to -1] is -0.4% and it is not 
significantly different from zero. However, consistent with the evidence reported 
earlier, the combined firms show higher performance than their control companies in 
the post acquisition period. The median control adjusted performance for the 
combined firms are 4.0% in year 3,3.4% in year 4, and 4.3% in year 5, all 
significantly different from zero. More than 50% of median control adjusted returns 
are positive in all five years post acquisition period. Overall, the median annual 
control adjusted performance improves from -0.4% in pre acquisition to 2.5% in post 
acquisition period, and the increase is significant at the 5% level using Wilcoxon 
signed rank test. During the period, 58.14% of the combined firms had annual 
performance higher than that of their control companies. The benefits of the 
acquisition as a spur to performance improvement are thus supported. 
Similarly, the median value over the four years of pre acquisition adjusted 
performance is calculated for each firm with a similar measure calculated for the post 
acquisition performance. Post acquisition median performance is then regressed on 
the pre acquisition performance. As revealed in panel B of Table 11.2, the intercept a 
in the cross-sectional regression of post acquisition adjusted performance is 0.04, 
and it is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. A similar significant level of 
1% level is observed in the intercept a after adjusting for hete roscedasti city using 
White's (1980) heteroscedastic adjustment in Shazam. The evidence in the current 
study indicates that there is a significant improvement in the combined firm's 
performance in the post acquisition period. Thus, interest charges have not 
swallowed up operating benefits of the combined firms after acquisition. 
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11.5 Net Profit Returns 
Similar to previous empirical work that used accounting data (example 
Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987, Utton, 1974 and Meeks, 1977), the current section 
focused explicitly on net profit margin, rather than operating profit, as an indicator of 
possible changes in performance following acquisitions. The results summarised in 
Chapter 4 on accounting based studies found little encouragement for the hypothesis 
that acquisitions actually enhance company performance. Examples of studies 
supporting the view that acquisitions do not result in improved performance are 
Mueller (1980) and Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) in US, whilst those in UK are 
Singh (1971), Utton (1974), Meeks (1977) and Holl and Pickering (1988) and 
Dickerson et al. (1997). Only Lorie and Halpern (1970) and Lev and Mendelker 
(1972) in US have found that merging firms perform significantly better than non- 
merging firms. 
Earlier accounting based studies used some variation of the rate of capital 
(usually total or net assets) to measure company performance. Ravenscraft and 
Scherer (1987) used operating income (before deducting interest, extraordinary items 
and taxes) divided by end of fiscal year asset, while Singh (1971), Utton (1974) and 
Meeks (1977) used pre-tax profit on net assets (total fixed assets plus current assets 
less current liabilities). Return on assets in Dickerson et al. (1997) is defined as pre- 
tax profits as a proportion of the average of opening and closing net assets. Return 
on asset in the current study is defined as net profit before tax divided by total assets 
at the beginning of the year. It measures the management's ability and efficiency in 
using the firms'assets to generate profits to all providers of capital (debt plus equity). 
Similar to the methodology used earlier, pre and post acquisition profitability 
relative to that of the control firm is used to minimise the economic bias of comparing 
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the performance of firms at two different time periods. Thus, the main objective of the 
current section is to determine how the profit performance of the acquisition intensive 
firms perform after acquisition relative to the performance of firms (same size and 
industry) which did not merge. 
The results of the analysis based on net profit returns are presented in Table 
11.3. The median annual post acquisition performance for the combined firms for year 
+1 to +5 is 4.8%, but it is not significantly higher than the annual median performance 
of 3.5% during the 4-year period prior to acquisition. Similarly, there is an insignificant 
increase in net profit margin of the control companies during the same period, from 
3.0% in the pre acquisition period to 4.2% in the post acquisition period. The results 
indicate that there is no difference in performance for either the combined firms or the 
control companies from pre to post acquisition. 
The median annual control adjusted performance prior to acquisition is 0.2%, 
but this is not significantly different from zero, using Mann-Whitney test. The 
combined firms do not earn higher accounting return than the control companies prior 
to acquisition. In the post acquisition period, the median control adjusted performance 
of the combined firms slightly increase to 0.7% but the improvement is not 
significantly different from zero, using Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Thus, there is no 
indic3tion that the takeover intensive firms have performed significantly better than 
companies that have not undertaken acquisitions in the post acquisition period. 
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Table 11.3 
Performance for 97 combined acquiring and target firms in years 











Control Adjusted Number 
Median Mean % of Obser- 
%% Positive vations 
-. 1. 3.1 3.4 1.8 3.4 -0.02 -0.01 48.78 41 
.3 0.039 2.3 3.1 -1.3 -0.3 3.6 47.95 73 
-2 3.1 3.0 3.5 -4.2 -0.9 7.2 46.15 
91 




Years -1 3.5 3.9 3.0 0.3 0.2 3.7 50.33 
to -4 
+1 4.33 7.0 3.5 5.0 0.2 2.0 51.55 97 
+2 4.8 7.0 3.4 4.5 1.778 2.58 58.76 97 
+3 4.7 6.2 5.1 5.5 0.04 0.6 50.52 97 
4 5.3 7.4 4.8 4.4 1.0 3.0' 58.76 97 




+1 to +5 4.8 6.88 4.2 4.9 0.7 1.8 55.05 
Panel B: Abnormal adjusted net prorit retums 
APýýO I=0.0 1+0.02 APc p. (1.23) (0.66) 
(1.24) (0.89) 
FF = 0.005 F-statistic = 0.443 N=97 
AF",,,,, and APc,,,, are the median annual adjusted net profit returns In the post and prior acquisition 
period for firm 1. 
t-statistics given in the second brackets were adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White correction). 
Performance In the pre acquisition period is calculated as profit before tax on total assets of target 
and bidder, weighted by the relative asset sizes of the two firms. Post acquisition performance used 
data of the combined firms. Pre acquisition control returns are target control and bidder control 
values, weighted by the relative asset values of the two corresponding bidder and target firms at the 
beginning of the years. In the post acquisition period the weights used to compute control company 
returns are the relative asset values of the acquirer and target firms In year-1. Control adjusted 
values are computed for each firm and year as the difference between the firm value in that year and 
the value of the control firm in the same industry during that period. 
2 Mann-Whitney tests are conducted on median control adjusted figures 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests are used to test the significance between the pre and post acquisition 
median annual performance 
Significantly different from zero at the 10% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
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Panel B of Table 11.3 shows the results of the regression on abnormal control 
adjusted net profit returns. The intercept, cc, is 0.01 and it is not significantly different 
from zero and the result remains insignificant after performing White's (1980) 
heteroscedastic adjustment in Shazam. Thus, there is no significant change in the 
combined firms' net profit returns in the post acquisition years relative to the pre 
acquisition performance. 
The results in the current study are inconsistent with those reported by 
previous studies in UK and US using accounting data measurement (example, Singh, 
1971, Meeks, 1977, Cosh, Hughes and Singh, 1980 and Ravenscraft and Scherer, 
1987) who found that profitability performance of the combined companies decline in 
post acquisition period relative to their control firms. Even after using different rate of 
return measures, Dickerson et al. (1997) found that acquisitions are detrimental to 
company performance'95 . The results found in this section are also 
inconsistent with 
that of the earlier measures reported in the current study. The only difference 
between the measure for net profit returns in this section and the earlier measure of 
operating profit return in Section 11.3 are depreciation charges and amortisation of 
goodwill. The insignificant result on net profit returns maybe due to the increase in 
depreciation and amortisation charges after the acquisition. Examining the latter 
expenses reveals that there is an increase in both expenses after acquisition relative 
to the year prior to acquisition (year -1). The depreciation charges for the combined 
firm increase on average by 87%, 136%, 187%, 234% and 325% in year +1, year +2, 
year +3, year +4, and year +5, respectively relative to year -111,11. During the same 
period, the mean of amortisation charges for the combined firm increase by 501%, 
"' In addition to pre-tax profits as a percentage of average net assets, Dickerson et al. (1997) also used 
pre-tax profits less interest provision divided by average net assets and operating profits as a percentage 
of average net assets in measuring their rate of returns. 
'" The rate of growth of depreciation (depreciation expenses divided by operating assets) for the 
combined firm also increase on average by 18%, 18%, 12%, 14% and 6% in year +1, year +2, year +3, 
year +4, and year +5, respectively relative to year -1. Over the same period, the median values are 12%, 13%, 7%, 2% and 4% relative to year -1. 
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567%, 622%, 942%, and 981% respectively. Most companies in Malaysia carry 
positive goodwill as an asset and amortise it through the profit and loss account over 
its useful economic life as permitted by the International Accounting Standard No. 22. 
11.6 Summary 
The focus of the current chapter is to present some evidence on examining 
post acquisition performance of 97 combined firms during the period 1988-1992 by 
using three alternative measures of performance. The first measure uses the 
operating cash flow return (operating profit before tax and extraordinary item, 
adjusted for depreciation, interest and goodwill divided by operating assets) similar to 
the definition given by Healy et al. (1992,1997), Anand and Singh (1997) and Ghosh 
(1998). The other measures include return on operating cash flow net of interest 
(operating profit before tax and extraordinary item after interest and adjusted for 
changes in working capital divided by operating assets), and return on assets (net 
profit before tax and extraordinary item divided by total assets). 
Different definitions of operating cash flow performance in the current chapter 
produce similar results to the post acquisition operating cash flow performance found 
in Chapter 9, indicating that the results are not sensitive to the choice of operating 
cash flow performance measures. The results presented in this chapter suggest that 
acquisitions in Malaysia during the period 1988-1992 produced positive post 
acquisition operating improvements regardless whether changes in working capital 
are adjusted or interest deducted from pre tax operating profit before or after 
acquisitions. However, there is no difference in post acquisition performance of the 
combined firms to that of their control companies when net profit returns are used as 
the performance measures. The insignificant net profit returns relative to the earlier 
performance measure of operating profit may be due to expenses such as 
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depreciation and goodwill being deducted from pre tax profit. However, the 
Insignificant post acquisition rate of return indicates that there is no deterioration in 
the combined firms net profit returns after allowing for goodwill. This suggests that the 
acquiring firms have not overpaid the targets. The premium paid to the targets is 
Justified by the Improvement in operating performance. 
The next chapter evaluates the efficacy of the takeover mechanism on post 
acquisition performance of the acquiring firms using market-based measures. It 
specifically examines whether acquisitions produce abnormal returns around the time 
of the event (announcement to outcome date) are a function not only on the market's 
expectation of the economic impact of the acquisition on future cash flows but also for 
the price that is paid for the operating improvement. 
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Chapter 12 
Share Price Performance 
12.1 Chapter Description 
The main emphasis of this study has been the analysis of accounting based 
operating performance measures. However, to assess the consistency of alternative 
methodologies, the current chapter focuses on examination of returns to acquiring 
firm shareholders through the use of event study methodology. 
Despite concerns over the validity of alternative asset pricing models, it is 
expected that share prices should reflect the value of future cash flows. The initial 
tests are therefore designed to test whether abnormal returns to bidding companies 
reflect the capitalised value of future cash flow improvements identified in earlier 
chapters. Fama (1970) argued that the capital market is efficient in reflecting publicly 
available information in share prices. Therefore, prices ought to reflect the present 
value of expected future cash flow streams, and any revisions to these (as a result of 
acquisitions) are expected to bring about a change in share prices. Thus, the main 
aim of the current chapter is to test whether the share price changes around the time 
of the takeover (announcement to outcome date) reflects the market's expectation of 
the economic impact of the acquisition on future cash flows. A further objective of the 
current chapter is to examine if the share price changes around the time of the event 
is a function not only on the expectation of operating performance but also for the 
premium that is paid for the target. The third aim is to test whether there is any 
correlation between the long-term share price reaction, the change in post acquisition 
operating cash flow, and the premium paid for the target. 
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12.2 Data and Methodology 
The initial wealth effects of the takeover for the acquiring firm shareholders is 
measured by reviewing the share performance of the acquiring firms over an 
observation period from 5 days prior to the announcement date to 5 days after the 
outcome date. The list of 97 listed acquiring and control companies, and 117 target 
firms (3 public listed, I non-public listed and 113 private firms) for the period 1988- 
1992 used in analysing the operating cash flow performance of companies in Chapter 
9 are again used here. There are instances where an acquiring firm takes over more 
than one target on the same date in a year (with the same outcome date) and this is 
considered as one acquisition. Similar to the techniques used in measuring post 
acquisition cash flow performance, frequent bidders (bidders making more than 1 bid 
in subsequent years) are also included in the current analysis. As mentioned earlier, 
there Is a practical problem of data availability and excluding frequent bidders would 
reduce the data set considerably. 
The event study methodology used in the current analysis is similar to the 
technique developed by Fama et al. (1969). The abnormal return associated with the 
event, also known as the 'wealth effect', is a measure of the abnormal gain or loss to 
shareholders attjibutable to the event. This residual or abnormal return (AR) for each 
firm Q and for each time period @ is the difference between its predicted return and 
its actual (observed) return (capital gains plus reinvested dividends), written as: 
ARjt = Rjt - E(Rjd 
where 
ARjt =abnormal return on securityj for period t 
R, t= actual return 
E (Rj = expected return 
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The actual return is the observed return on the share (share price changes 
and dividend payments) and the expected return is a measure of the return on the 
share one would have expected had no event taken place. As discussed in Chapter 
4, the expected or'normal' return may be predicted by a variety of models such as 
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the market model and the index model. Firth 
(1980) and Bames (1980) based their analysis exclusively on the market model while 
other UK studies including Franks and Harris (1989), Limmack (1991), Gregory 
(1997) and Baker and Ummack (1999) used different models as benchmarks when 
analysing the effect of acquisitions on share price around the bid period. For example 
Franks and Harris (1989) examine the effects of 1800 UK acquisitions on shareholder 
wealth around the bid period by using the market model, simple index model and 
CAPM. 
Similarly. studies by Franks et al. (1991). Agrawal et al. (1992), Gregory 
(1997) and Baker and Limmack (1999) used different models as benchmark to 
examine the effect of long-term share price performance of acquiring firms. For 
example, Gregory (1997) employed CAPM, the Dimson and Marsh (1986) risk and 
size adjusted model. two CAPM-type models extended for size effects, the size 
adjusted model of Dimson and Marsh (1986), and the Fama and French (1996) three- 
factor model to test for the sensitivity of the results choice of control models'97 . Franks 
et al. (199 1) claimed that long-term returns are sensitive to the benchmark used. 
Previous studies in Malaysia (Mat Nor 1993, Md. Isa, 1994 and Mohammad, 
1993) used the market model to compute abnormal returns around the 
announcement period where the KLSE's Composite Index is used as the proxy for 
market returns. The difference between previous studies in Malaysia and the current 
1" For example, the abnormal return in Gregory's (1997) study when the simple size control portfolio is used is measured as company's actual return less the return on size control portfolio. 
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study lies In the computation of expected return that employs both size controls and 
controls for survivorship bias. Baker and Limmack (1999) and Lyon et al. (1999) 
stated that some form of survivorship bias might arise when a market index is used as 
the benchmark In event studies of long-run abnormal returns. They argued that the 
effent of the bias is to compare a group of surviving acquiring firms with another group 
of surviving and non-surviving firms that may have been delisted, newly listed or 
becoming target firms themselves"". Rather than using a market index, the control 
selected In this study is that of non-acquiring companies in the same industrial 
classification as those of the acquiring firms set matched by year and size. The non- 
acquiring companies are selected from those companies which survive for the entire 
period under investigation (4 years pre and 5 years post period), matched by time 
period and industrial classification. Controlling for size is undertaken as higher returns 
have been observed for the securities of smaller companies (Dimson and Marsh, 
1986). Although size is of lesser importance in studies of short event periods, 
evidence from Dimson and Marsh (1986) and Fama and French (1992) suggest that 
an adjustment for firm size is important in studies measuring long run abnormal 
returns'". 
The current analysis measures abnormal returns using a buy-and-hold returns 
approach similar to that used by Loughran and Vijh (1997), Higson and Elliot (1998) 
and Lyon et al. (1999). Abnormal returns are measured by the difference between the 
holding period returns of sample firms and control companies (chosen to control for 
size and industry effects), expressed as: 
'" However. Baker and Limmack (1999) found that the negative post abnormal returns to acquiring ruTns in their study arc not a function of survivorship bias. 1" Dimson and hftrsh (1986) used size dccile control portfolios, the risk and size control model while Fama and French (1996) used the multi-factor benchmark approach. Similar to Fama and French, Gregory (1997) also used the thrce-factor model, where the factors are the excess returns to market, the 
valuc-weighted return between high book-to-market (BNIV) firms and low BMV firms, and the difference in returns between large and small companies. However, Kennedy and Limmack (1996) and Gregory ( 1997) did not fiind size to bias their results. 
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AFý = HPRjv - HPRq 
where 
AFý is the abnormal return of firm 
HPRej Is holding period returns of acquiring firm 
HPF1q Is holding period returns of control firm 
As mentioned earlier, bidder controls are those having similar size and in the same 
Industry as the bidder. Size is defined as book value of shares plus reserves plus 
book value of debt less cash and marketable securifties'. 
The holding period returns of acquiring (HPRB) and control companies (HPRc) 
for securityj at time period tare calculated as follows: 
HP Ftex . ct =I 
where 
Pit+ Djt-Pit. s 
Pit-5 
I 
pi I= closing price for securityj at day t 
pt-I = closing price for securityj at day t-5 
Dt = gross of tax dividend for securityj at day t 
The measurement of acquisition returns in the current study is computed for 
each share using the daily data from the Bloomberg database at the KLSE library or 
obtained from the KLSE Daily Diary2o'. The announcement date or day 0 is identified 
as the date of the first press release of the takeover bid as recorded in the 
2'* Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999) matched acquiring firms with control fmw by 
their size (market value of equity) and book-to-market value while control firms in the study by Higson 
and Elliot (1998) are matched to acquiring fums by market capitalisation and assigned by size to ten 
equal dollar portfolios. 
2*' Healy et al. (1992) and Manson et al. (1994) also used daily data when measuring abnormal return 
around announcement period. 
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companies' file of the KLSE library. The completion or the outcome date is the date 
on which the offer becomes unconditional, as recorded in the company's file at the 
KLSE. 
The initial analysis measures returns for the entire bid period (from the 
announcement to the outcome date)202 . Asquith (1983) and Malatesta et al. (1985) 
suggested that the latter practice captures more completely the wealth changes 
arising from acquisition activity. According to Asquith (1983) the partially anticipated 
event or the bid outcome is known with certainty for relatively few bids at the bid 
announcement date. As new information concerning the likelihood of the bid 
succeeding becomes available, subsequent changes in returns will occur between 
the announcement date and outcome date. The holding period returns over an 
observation period, day -5 prior to the announcement date to day +5 after the 
completion date (in trading days), are estimated in the current study. Inclusion of the 
identified announcement day and the outcome date ensures that the period under 
study encompasses the period of 'uncertainty' concerning the bid outcome, and is 
more likely to capture the wealth effects of the completed bid. 
In addition to the above, the long-term share price effect of the bid is also 
examined by extending the analysis to include longer event windows. The holding 
period returns from day -5 prior to the announcement date to day +1095 days (3 
years) after the completion date is estimated to test whether there is any long-run 
share price impact of the bid. The periods tested are illustrated by means of the 
diagram in Figure 12.1. 
' Mat Nor (1993) used 200 days before and 200 days after the announcement date in measuring the 
effects of acquisitions on acquiring fimns' returns in Malaysia. On the other hand, Md Isa (1994) used 
50 days before and 50 days after the announcement date while Mohammad (1993) used 60 days before 
and 60 di)-s after the announcement date in determining the abnormal returns for the acquiring fums. 
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Flaure 12.1 
Time diagram Identifying the relevant periods within the bid-outcome and 
post acquisition period 
-5 
t2 +5 +1095days 
bid to outcome period 
long-run period 
tj =announcement date 
t2 = outcome date 
In relating the share price returns of acquiring firms around the bid period and 
expected future improvements in operations, a model is developed as follows: 
Abnormal return to 
acquiring firms shareholders paid for the target) 
The above model is based on the assumption that the abnormal return to the 
acquiring firms shareholders are a function not only of the expected future changes in 
operating cash flow but also of the premium paid for the target. The premium paid is 
computed as a return, in the form: 
Rate of premium paid = Takeover Premium 
B t-5 
where 
takeover premium is the difference between the price paid for the target and market 
value of target at time t-5, 
f (change in operating performance, premium 
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B" Is the market value of bidders at time t -5, and 
T Is the price paid for the target 
Market value of targets are not available since the targets are non-listed. 
Thus, similar to the method used by Berger and Ofek (1996,1997) and Servaes 
(1996), the market value of target is estimated using multiplier relationships. Two 
alternative valuation relationships are applied, the first based on the market value of 
the control company to the assets and the second compared to the sales of the 
controI203. To test the robustness of the results, both asset and sales multipliers are 
used In the current study. These multipliers are then applied to the target assets and 
sales, respectively in the year prior to the bid. The total value of target control is 
defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt2O4 . For example, 
consider a target firm and a target control with the following information. 
Tarqet Firm Control Firm 
Sales 20,000 100,000 
Total Assets 8,000 15,000 
Total Debt 3,000 5,000 
Market Value (at t-5) 50,000 
(market value of equity 
plus book value of debt) 
Using the asset multiplier, the market value of the target is estimated as the target's 
assets multiplied by target control market value to asset ratio, that is, 8,000 X 
(50.000115,000) = 26,667. In order to obtain market value of equity for target firms, 
2*3 BMer and Ofek (1996,1997) and Servaes (1996) defme excess value, or the gain or loss in value 
from diversification as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm's actual value to its imputed value. 
Actual value is dcrmed as market value of equity plus total book value of debt and imputed value is the 
sum of imputed value of the firm's segments. 
' The book value of debt is used since the market value of debt securities of Malaysian companies are 
not easily obtainedL 
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total debt Is deducted from the imputed market value of target, that is, 26,667 - 3,000 
= 23,667. Using the sales multiplier, the market value of the target is equal to the 
target's sales multiplied by target control market value to sales ratio, that is, 20,000 X 
(50.000/100,000) = 10,000. Similarly, the market value of equity for target firms using 
the sales multiplier Is estimated as 10,000 - 3,000 = 7,000. 
A new set of listed target controls is selected from the set of non-target 
companies In the same industrial classification as those of the respective target 
companies. set matched by year and size (as far as possible)'05. Similar to the 
technique used In selecting bidder controls, size for target control companies is 
computed from their respective financial statements obtained from the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE) Annual Handbook. The companies are ranked each year 
based on size within their respective industry. The listed company that is closest in 
size and from the same industry as the non-listed target is identified as the target 
control. None of the target controls were either the subject of a bid or made a bid 
themselves during the period of study (1988-92). A total of 117 listed target controls 
are finally identified. one for each target firm in the sample. 
The following regression is used to test whether the abnormal returns of 
acquiring firm around the bid to outcome period reflects expected improvements in 
future cash flows from operations: 
AR r ct +P CAPc +C (Equation 14) 
where 
AR = abnormal return around the bid to outcome period for takeover i 
303 Size is again measured as book value of total asset (book value of shareholders fund plus book value of debt less cash and marketable securities). 
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CAPC= change in control adjusted operating performance of the newly 
combined firm following the acquisition 
captures any correlation between AR, and CAPc. 
If there is any relationship between ARj and CAPc, P ought to be 
significantly greater than 0. 
The above regression is further extended by the inclusion of a variable to 
present the premium paid for the target, as follows: 
AR, = cc +P CAPc +ý premium paid +c (Equation 15) 
captures any correlation between AR, and the premium paid. 
If there is any relationship between AR, and the premium paid, ý ought to 
be significantly greater than 0. 
(The descriptions of the other symbols are as explained in equation 14 above) 
Substituting (AR, ) in the regression above to (AR, port) tests whether there is 
any relationship between the abnormal return to shareholders of acquiring firm post 
acquisition to that of the improvement operating cash flow returns and the premium 
paid for the target. 
cc + CAPc +ý premium paid +c (Equation 16) 
Where 
ARi pt the long-term abnormal return for takeover 
(Other symbols are as explained in equation 14). 
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12.3 Hypotheses 
12.3.1 Bid Period Return 
The results of market-based studies in US and UK indicate that on average 
shareholders of the target firms earn abnormal returns during bid period, but the 
evidence on the returns to the acquidng firms during the bid period is mixed. 
(examples include Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989, Hubbard and Palia, 1995, Harford 1999, 
Franks and Harris, 1989, Limmack 1991, and Sudarsanarn et al., 1996). Studies 
undertaken in Malaysia have reported similar results in that target firm shareholders 
earn abnormal returns while acquiring firms do not gain as much around 
announcement period (Mat Nor, 1993, Md Isa, 1994 and Mohammad, 1993). 
Given the reported improvement in post acquisition operating cash flow return 
in the current study, it is hypothesised that acquiring firms will earn significant 
abnormal returns around the bid to outcome period. 
Haothesis 16 - Retum to acguiring firms around bid to outcome igerio 
Hc,: There is no significant abnormal return to acquiring firm shareholders 
around the bid to outcome period 
Ha: There is significant abnormal return (positive or negative) accrued to 
acquiring firm shareholders around the bid to outcome period 
As mentioned earlier, the main aim of the current chapter is to examine if the 
operating cash flow improvements in Chapter 9 is able to explain acquiring firm 
shareholders abnormal share return around the bid period. In an analysis of the post 
acquisition cash flows and overall performance of the 50 largest acquisitions in the 
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US between 1979 and 1984, Healy et al. (1992) provide evidence that the change in 
share market value at acquisition announcement reflects cash flow return 
improvements in the post acquisition period. They found that positive abnormal share 
returns to shareholders of combined firms around the announcement period are 
significantly correlated with post acquisition improvement in cash flow. Manson et al. 
(1994) also found that the estimates of the operating gains from takeover are 
significantly correlated with the market's assessment of the total gain. 
Based on the above arguments, it is hypothesised that there will be a positive 
relationship between the abnormal return to shareholders of acquiring firms around 
the bid period and the change in operating cash flows. 
Hypothesis 17 -Relationship between cash flow and market performance 
HO: There is no relationship between share price reaction of acquiring firms 
around the bid period and the subsequent cash flow changes 
Ha: There is significant relationship between share price reaction of 
acquiring firms around the bid period and the subsequent cash flow 
changes 
This section also tests whether the acquiring firms share returns around the 
bid period Is a function not only of future expectation of operating performance 
changes but also of the premium that is paid for the target. As it is not possible to 
identify expected operating performance changes, the actual changes are used 
instead. Thus, it is hypothesised that there is a significant correlation between the 
share price reaction of acquiring firms around the bid period, the change in the 
operating cash flow, and the premium paid for the target. 
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Hypothesis 18 - Relationshln between cash flow. market performance 
and premium paid to target 
HO: There is no significant relationship between the share price returns for 
the acquiring firms around the bid period, the subsequent cash flow 
changes, and the premium paid for the target 
H,: There is significant relationship between the share price returns for 
acquiring firms around the bid period, the subsequent cash flow 
changes, and the premium paid for the target 
12.3.2 Long-Run Share Return 
The current study is also interested in evaluating share price returns over a 
long term period following the takeover2o. Thus, the present study also measures 
share price returns over the period -5 days prior to announcement to + 1100 days (3 
years) after the outcome date. 
Event studies that focused on share price returns around the announcement 
period, as discussed in the previous section, have found that acquisitions are 
expected to improve shareholders wealth gains. However, some of the literatures on 
post acquisition performance show some evidence of a downward drift in share 
returns for acquiring companies after takeover. Franks et al. (1988), Lahey and Conn 
(1990). Clark and Ofek (1994) and Agrawal et al. 's (1992) are among market-based 
studies in US that find significantly negative abnormal returns after acquisitions. Only 
2(* Event studies in Malaysia by Mat Nor (1993), Md Isa (1994) and Mohammad (1993) found that 
acquiring firms earned negative returns months after the announcement date. 
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Franks et al. (1991) and Loderer and Martin (1992) did not find negative post 
acquisition returns. Studies of post acquisition returns to bidders in UK acquisitions 
(for example Limmack, 1991, Kennedy and Limmack, 1996, Sudarsanarn et al., 1996, 
Gregory, 1997, and Baker and Limmack, 1999) also report long term negative post 
acquisition returns for the acquiring firms. Only Franks et al. (1989) find that acquiring 
firms in the brewry industry gain in the long run from acquisition, while Franks and 
Harris (1989) provides conflicting results depending on the benchmark control 
used2O7. 
Given the reported improvement in the post acquisition operating cash flow in 
the current study, it is hypothesised that there will be a positive relationship between 
the long term share returns (-5 days prior to the announcement to 3 years after the 
outcome date) and the change in post acquisition operating cash flow. 
HyRothesis 19 - RelationshIR between cash flow and share price performance 
HO: There is no significant relationship between long-run share returns and 
the change in post acquisition operating performance 
H,: There is significant relationship between long-run share returns and 
the change in post acquisition operating performance 
It is also hypothesised that there is a significant correlation between the long- 
run abnormal share returns of acquiring firms, the change in post acquisition 
operating cash flow and the premium paid for the target. 
"' Franks and Harris (1989) showed significant negative post acquisition returns when the market 
model is used, but a significant positive post acquisition returns when the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is used as a benchmark. 
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HypothesIs 20 - Relationship between cash flow and share price 
performance Rlus premium paid 
HO: There is no significant relationship between the long-run share price 
reaction of acquiring firms, the subsequent cash flow changes and the 
premium paid for the target 
Ha: There Is significant relationship between the long-run share price 
reaction of acquidng firms, the subsequent cash flow changes and the 
premium paid for the target 
12.4 Findings 
Both median and mean buy-and-hold returns are reported although emphasis 
is made on medians since the returns, especially long-term returns are subject to 
problems of positive skewness which may lead to negative biased t-statistics (Barber 
and Lyon, 1997 and Lyon et al., 1999). Non-parametric tests (Mann-Whitney) are 
used to test for the difference in median returns while the Student t-tests are used to 
test the mean returns. The results in Table 12.1 report the abnormal returns of 
acquiring firms and control companies for all samples, single and multiple acquisitions 
over an observation period of day -5 prior to the announcement date to day +5 after 
the completion date. The table also reports the median and mean difference between 
the returns for acquirer and matching firms over the same period. As shown in Table 
12.1 (for all sample), the acquiring firms have a median holding period return of 
11.5% (73.1% of bidders earn positive returns) over an observation period of day -5 
prior to the announcement date to day +5 after the completion date while the 
corresponding figure for their matching firms is 3.8% (59.8% of control bidders earn 
posifive returns). The mean buy-and-hold return for acquiring and control companies 
is 21.3% and 10.1%, respectively. The abnormal return is measured as the difference 
between the holding period returns of the bidder firms and the control companies. 
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Tab "e2.1 
Abnormal returns around the bld perioda 
(t-values and z-values In parenthesis) 
All Samples Sing le Acquisitions Multiple A cquisitIons 
Median Mean Percen Median Mean Percen Median Mean Percen 
-tage -tage tage 
% % Post- % % Post- % % PoSI- 
tive tIve tive, 
1. Acquiring 
firms 11.5 21.3 73. lb 8.2 13.6 76.3 11.8 20.2 71.1 
2. Bidder 
controls 3.8 10.1 59.81 2.6 6.3 55.3 7.9 12.4 62.7 
3. Difference 9A 11.2 60.8 b 8.3 7.2 57.9 9.7 13.8 62.7 b 
1-2 (1.86Y (2.1 )b (1.86)1 (1.83) b (1.72) c (2.1 )b 
4. No. of 
observations 97 97 38 38 59 59 
0 The table describes the holding period returns of 97 acquiring firms and 97 control firms 
during the period from day -5 prior to the announcement date to day +5 after the completion 
date for all samples, single acquisitions and multiple acquisitions. Multiple acquisitions are 
those companies that made more than one bid during the investigation period 1988-1992. 
Abnormal return is defined as the difference between the holding period returns of sample 
firms and bidder controls. Bidder controls are those having similar size and in the same 
industry as the bidder. 
6 Significantly different from zero at the 5% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
Significantly different from zero at the 10% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
Row 3 in Table 12.1 shows that the median and mean difference between the 
acquiring and control companies (all samples) is 9.4% and 11.2%, respectively, over 
the bid period. Both are significantly different from zero (at the 10% and 5% level, 
respectively). The proportion of acquiring firms with returns that are significantly 
higher than that of their control companies during the observed period is 60.8%, and 
this is significant at the 5% level. 
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The sample Is subdivided into single and multiple acquisitions and the results 
are consistent to those found for all samples. The results indicate that acquiring firm 
shareholders in Malaysia achieve a significant positive abnormal return over the 
announcement to outcome period. The finding differs from those reported in earlier 
Malaysian studies by Mat Nor (1993), Md Isa (1994) and Mohammad (1993), possibly 
because the analysis in the current study included both the period surrounding 
announcement and outcome date whereas the former studies confined analysis to the 
period surrounding the announcement date208. Thus, the null hypothesis 16 (H,,,,, ) of 
no significant abnormal return to acquiring firm shareholders around bid to outcome 
period is rejected. 
The next section tests whether the abnormal returns of acquiring firms around 
the bid period are a function of future expectation of operating cash flow performance 
and the premium paid for the target. The results are summarised in Table 12.2. 
Regression 1 in column I of Table 12.2 reports that the slope coefficient P on the 
change in control adjusted operating performance is 0.429 (significantly different from 
zero at the 5% level). The coefficient remain significant (at the 5% level) after White's 
(1980) adjustment for heterosced asti city. The results indicate that the market seems 
to anticipate that acquiring firms are likely to improve their future cash flows. Thus, the 
null hypothesis 17 (H.,? ) of no significant relationship between the share price 
reaction of acquiring firms around the bid period and the expectation of cash flow 
improvements is rejected. The capitalisation of expected future improvements in 
operations around the bid period is consistent with the cash flow analysis reported in 
Chapter 9. 
2' Ilic earlier Malaysian studies reported that acquiring firms earned insignificant returns during the 
announcement date, either measured at [day -1 to 0] or [day -5 to +5]. 
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Tabfe 12.2 
Relationship between the abnormal returns around bid to 
outcome period, the change In control adjusted operating 
performance, and the premium paid for the target'. 
(t-value In parentheses) 
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 
Constant 0.103 0.098 0.117 
(2.27)b (2.17)b (2.61 )b 
(2.41 )b (2.34)b (2.80)" 
Change In control 0.429 0.403 0.46 
adjusted operating 
performance 
)b (2.05 (1.94)c )b (2.23 
(2.42)b (2.41 )b (2.72)' 








R' 0.042 0.07 0.09 
F-statistics 4.1923 3.538 4.49 a 
No. of observations 97 97 97 
I Abnormal return is the difference between the holding period returns of sample firms 
and bidder controls. Holding period Is measured from day -5 prior to the 
announcement date to day +5 after the completion date. Bidder controls are those 
having similar size and In the same industry as the bidder. Change in control adjusted 
operating performance Is measured as the change of post acquisition control adjusted 
operating performance from pre acquisition period. Operating performance is defined 
as opetating cash flow deflated by the book value of operating assets (book value of 
equity plus debt less cash and marketable securities) at the beginning of the year. 
Premium return is measured as the difference between the price paid for the target 
and market value of target divided by the market value of bidders at day -5 prior to the 
announcement date plus the price paid for the target. Using asset multiplier, the 
market value of the target Is estimated as the target's assets multiplied by target 
control market value to asset ratio. Using sales multiplier, the market value of the 
target is estimated as the target's sales multiplied by target control market value to 
sales ratio. 
t-statistics given In the second brackets were adjusted for hetemscedasticity (White 
correction). 
Significantly different from zero at the 1% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
Significantly different from zero at the 5% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
Significantly different from zero at the 10% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
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The findings in the current study is also consistent to that found by Healy et al. 
(1992) and Manson et al. (1994) who provide evidence of significant correlation 
between abnormal returns of combined firms around acquisitions and acquisition 
Induced changes In cash flows. 
Regressions 2 and 3 in column 2 and 3 of Table 12.2 includes the two version 
of the variable representing the premium paid for the target using asset and sales 
multipliers, respectively. The results in column 2 of Table 12.2 report that the slope 
coefficient on the change in operating cash flow is 0.403 and the coefficient on 
premium paid using asset multiplier is 0.07, and that both are statistically significant at 
the 10% level. Both the coefficients remain significant (at the 5% level) after White's 
(1980) adjustment for heteroscedasticity. Similarly, the results in column 3 show that, 
when sales multiplier is used in measuring market value of target, both the coefficient 
on the change in operating performance and the premium paid are statistically 
significant'". Thus, the null hypothesis 18 (H,,,, ) of no significant relationship between 
the share returns and the subsequent cash flow changes and the premium paid for 
the target is rejected. The results imply that the share price reaction of the acquiring 
firms over the bid to outcome period reflects both the expected future improvement in 
operating cash flow and the premium paid for the target. 
The long-run abnormal returns to acquiring firms over the period -5 days prior 
to announcement date to +1100 days (3 years) after the outcome date are 
summarised in Table 12.3. The overall sample of 97 acquiring firms (column A) has a 
median buy-and-hold return of 57.8% (78.4% of the bidders earn positive returns) 
compared to 66.8% (86.6% positive abnormal returns) for their control companies 
2" An insignificant result is observed when the change in operating cash flow improvement is regressed 
on the premium paid to the targets indicating that the two variables are not related. 
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over the same period, and both are not significantly different from zero. The mean 
buy-and-hold return over the same period is 99.0% and 96.2% for acquiring firms and 
control companies, respectively. 
Table 12.3 
Abnormal returns In post acquisition perloda 







Median Mean Percen Median Mean Percen Median Mean Percen 
-tage -tage tage 
% % Post- % % Post- % % Post- 
tive tive tive 
1. Acquiring 
firms 57.8 99.0 78.46 53.5 94.2 81.1 66.4 95.8 79.76 
2. Bidder 
controls 66.8 96.2 86.66 81.3 95.8 89.1 66.8 86.7 84.76 
3. Difference -10.4 2.9 46.4 1.8 -1.7 51.1 -9.6 6.1 45.8 
1-2 (-0.86) (0.39) (0.416) (-0.62) (-0.48) (0.52) 








'The table describes the holding period returns of 97 acquiring firms and 97 control firms 
during the period from day -5 prior to the announcement date to day +1100 after the 
completion date. Multiple acquisitions are those companies that made more than one bid 
during the Investigation period 1988-1992. Abnormal return is the difference between the 
holding period returns of sample firms and bidder controls. Bidder controls are those having 
similar size and in the same industry as the bidder. 
I Significantly different from zero at the 10% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
The long-run abnormal return of the acquiring firms is measured as the 
difference between the holding period returns of acquiring firms and control 
companies. The median return difference between the acquiring and control firms is - 
10.4%, and it Is not significantly different from zero. Only 46.4% of acquiring firms 
earn a higher return than the relevant control. The single acquisition sample (Column 
B) and multiple acquisition sample (Column C) also report insignificant long-run 
abnormal returns for the acquiring firms. The results indicate that the acquiring firms 
In Malaysia experience no difference in abnormal returns to that of control companies 
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in post acquisition period. The results are inconsistent with those of UK studies 
(example, Firth, 1980, Franks and Harris, 1989, Limmack, 1991, Gregory, 1997, and 
Baker and Limmack, 1999) and in US (Franks and Harris, 1989 and Agrawal et al., 
1992) that document a pattern of long-run negative post bid returns to shareholders of 
acquiring firms. 
Table 12.4 
Relationship between the long-run abnormal returns, the change In 
control adjusted operating cash flow performance, and the premium 
paid for the target'. 
(t. value In narentheses) 
Regression I Regression 2 
0.098 0.171 
Constant (0.384) (0.669) 
(0.391) (0.667) 
-0.245 -0.038 Change In control adjusted (-0.209) (-0.033) 
operating performance (-0.401) (-0.075) 
0.236 
Premium (asset multiplier) (0.991) 
(1.481) 
0.031 
Premium (sales multiplier) (1.48) 
(1.78) 
R2 0.011 0.023 
F-statistics 0.501 1.107 
No. of observations 97 97 
I Abnormal return Is the difference between the holding period returns of sample firms 
and bidder controls. Holding period is measured from day -5 prior to the 
announcement date to day +1100 after the completion date. Bidder controls are those 
having similar size and in the same industry as the bidder. Change in control adjusted 
operating performance is measured as the change of post acquisition control adjusted 
operating performance from pre acquisition period. Operating performance is defined 
as operating cash flow deflated by the book value of operating assets (book value of 
equity plus debt less cash and marketable securities) at the beginning of the year. 
Premium return is measured as the difference between the price paid for the target 
and market value of target divided by the market value of bidders at day -5 prior to the 
announcement date plus the price paid for the target. Using asset multiplier, the 
market value of the target is estimated as the target's assets multiplied by target 
control market value to asset ratio. Using sales multiplier, the market value of the 
target Is estimated as the targers sales multiplied by target control market value to 
sales ratio. 
t-statistics given In the second brackets were adjusted for heteroscedasticity 
(White correction). 
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Examination of the relationship between the share price reaction of acquiring 
firms post acquisition, the change in post acquisition operating cash flow, and the 
premium paid for the target produce the results as shown in Table 12.4. The results in 
column 2 and 3 of the table indicate that there is no significant relationship between 
the post acquisition abnormal returns, the change in post acquisition operating cash 
flow returns, and the premium paid for the target. The results in column 1 of Table 
12.4 show that the slope coefficient on the change in operating cash flow (-0.245) and 
the coefficient on premium paid (0.236), but neither are statistically significant when 
asset multiplier is used in measuring market value of target. Similarly when using 
sales multiplier in measuring market value of target, the results in column 2 show that 
the coefficients on the change in operating performance and on the premium paid are 
not statistically significant. Thus, the null hypothesis 20 (H, 20) of no significant 
relationship between long-run abnormal returns, the change in operating 
performance, and the premium paid for the target is accepted. 
The insignificant post acquisition abnormal returns 3 years after the outcome 
date is similar to the results found using the accounting rate of return in Chapter 11, 
but is inconsistent with the improvement in operating cash flows reported in Chapter 
9. The post acquisition abnormal return is regressed on the change in the control 
adjusted accounting rate of return with the results summarised in Table 12.5. The 
coefficient on the change in net profit is 0.682 and it is significantly different from zero 
at the 5% level. The result indicates that there is a positive relationship between the 
post acquisition abnormal returns and the accounting rate of return. 
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Table 12.5 
Relationship between the abnormal returns post acquisition 
period and the change In control adjusted net profit performancel. 
The regression equation used Is: 





Change In control adjusted (2.01)8 
operating performance (2.61)1 
R2 0.041 
F-statistics 4.0331 
No. of observations 97 
I Abnormal return Is the difference between the holding period retums of sample firms 
and bidder controls. Holding period is measured from day -5 prior to the 
announcement date to day +1100 after the completion date. Bidder controls are those 
having similar size and in the same Industry as the bidder. Change in control adjusted 
net profit return Is measured as the change of post acquisition control adjusted net 
profit from pre acquisition period. Net profit return Is defined as profit before tax 
deflated by the total assets at the beginning of the year. 
t-statistics given in the second brackets were adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White 
correction). 
0 Significantly different from zero at the 5% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
12.5 Summary 
The current chapter examines whether the acquiring firm shareholder wealth 
changes over the announcement to outcome period is a function on expectation of 
operating performance and the premium paid for the target. Acquiring firm abnormal 
return is measured as the excess of the buy-and-hold return to the acquiring firm over 
that of its control firms (matched by similar size and industry). The results provide 
evidence that acquiring firms earn significant positive returns relative to their control 
companies over an observation period of day -5 prior to the announcement date to 
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day +5 after the completion date. There is also a significant positive correlation 
between the share price returns of the acquiring firms around acquisitions, the 
change In post acquisition cash flow and the premium paid for the target. The results 
indicate that the share price changes at the announcement period are not only related 
to the expectations of subsequent cash flow improvement but also to the premium 
paid to the targets. Essentially, there is a greater likelihood for bidders to pay higher 
premium to the targets if they expect higher returns from the increased opportunities 
to share resources and activities as a result of the acquisitions. The significant 
positive coefficient on the premium paid to the targets found in the study is consistent 
with this view. 
In analysing the long-run share price returns, the result show that there is an 
insignificant post acquisition returns to acquiring firms in Malaysian acquisitions over 
the period -5 days prior to announcement date to +1100 days (3 years) after the bid 
completion. The insignificant post abnormal returns 3 years after the outcome date is 
inconsistent with some studies reported in UK and US that found long-run negative 
returns for the acquiring firms. However, the result found in this study is consistent 
with the efficient market hypothesis. There is also no significant correlation between 
the share price reaction of acquiring firms in the post acquisition period, the change in 
operating cash flow, and the premium paid for the target. However, there is a 
significant positive correlation between the share price reaction of acquiring firms in 
the post acquisition period, and the change in the accounting rate of return. Since 
returns are aggregated over long periods, observed post acquisition abnormal returns 
may have been caused by omitted factors in the experimental design as claimed by a 
number of previous studies (for example Loughran and Vijh, 1997, Gregory, 1997, 
Lyon et al., 1999 and Baker and Limmack, 2000). 
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Based on the Impression made when examining returns around the bid to 
outcome period, the overall results suggest that acquisitions are positive net present 
value Investment decisions in Malaysia. The acquiring firms have not overpaid for 
targets and the premium paid to the targets is justified by the improvement in 
operating performance. 
The following chapter provides the summary and conclusion to the thesis. 
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Chapter 13 
Summary and Conclusions 
13.1 Chapter Description 
This final chapter contains an overall view of the thesis and summarises the 
main empirical findings in this study. Implications of the study will then be presented. 
Lastly, the limitations of the research and some areas for further research will also be 
identified. 
13.2 Study Overview 
It is important to identify whether acquisition activity provides economic 
benefits, as suggested by value maximising theory, or economic losses as suggested 
by managerial theories. From the point of view of individual shareholder it is also 
important to Identify whether actions taken by directors are likely to be in the best 
interest of the owners rather than serving the interest of the manager. Jensen (1984) 
argued that shareholders wealth increases in takeover situations are derived from 
improved operating performance and increased efficiency. As a result of the 
redeployment of capital to more efficient use through takeover activity, gains would be 
observed ex posf (Manson et al., 1994). 
Recent research observed in a number of countries with developed capital 
markets, Including the US and the UK, have produced inconclusive evidence on the 
presence of gains to bidding company shareholders and indeed to the existence of 
net wealth gains. Thus, the thesis is more concerned with identifying whether 
takeovers In Malaysia lead to an improvement in corporate performance rather than 
with Identifying the distribution of wealth changes, if any. The specific method of 
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analysis selected is to assess whether operational gains arise, using operating cash 
flow to measure operating performance of Malaysian companies involved in takeover 
activity between 1988-1992. 
Before undertaking any empirical investigation, it is first important to provide 
an understanding of the Malaysian environment that may influence corporate 
acquisitions in the country. Factors such as the history and economic background of 
the country, the financial market, the regulatory policies and agencies and the 
development of acquisition activities in the country that may affect acquisition activity 
are discussed in Chapter 2. The next stage involves reviewing the theoretical analysis 
of motives on acquisitions including shareholder wealth maximisation and 
management wealth maximisation theories, which are presented in Chapter 3. These 
theories are used to explain why companies make corporate acquisitions and also to 
predict possible outcome in terms of post acquisition performance. Chapter 4 and 5 
discussed the methods for evaluating the impact of corporate acquisitions on 
shareholder wealth, namely the market-based and accounting-based studies, 
respectively. This step is vital in providing a framework for the empirical investigation, 
identifying the main research findings in previous studies as well as deciding on the 
appropriate research methodology and procedure to be undertaken in this study. 
Chapter 6 explicitly outlines the variables use in calculating the operating cash 
flow performance and the sources of cash flow returns together with the detailed 
methodology and hypotheses to achieve the objectives set out in the study. Operating 
cash flow returns on book value of assets (book value of shareholders fund and total 
debts less cash and marketable securities) are employed in the current study to 
estimate changes in asset productivity and the realised economic benefits from 
acquisitions In Malaysia. The measure of operating cash flow is profit before tax, 
depreciation and interest adjusted for changes in working capital. Chapter 7 focuses 
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on the methodology and hypotheses of the bid characteristics and their effect on post 
acquisition operating performance while Chapter 8 describes the data selection 
procedure. 
The findings of the thesis are found in Chapters 9-12. Chapter 9 presents 
results on changes In operating cash flow and some of its components including 
return on sales, asset turnover, capital expenditure and cash flow from operating 
expenses. The empirical evidences on the effect of acquisition characteristics on post 
acquisition operating performance are provided in Chapter 10. Chapter 11 presents 
some evidence on examining post acquisition performance of Malaysian companies 
Involved In takeovers by using alternative measures of performance. Empirical 
evidence on whether the acquiring firms wealth changes around announcement to 
outcome period Is a function on expectation of the change in operating performance 
Improvement and the premium paid for the improvement are provided in Chapter 12. 
Finally, the current chapter (Chapter 13) concludes the whole thesis where 
summaries of the overall write-ups, the major findings, the limitations of this thesis, 
and the direction of future research are provided. 
13.3 Findings 
This section summarises the major findings of the research based on the 
specific objectives outlined in Chapter 1. Both univariate and multivariate analyses 
were undertaken to test the developed null hypotheses The former involves both 
parametric and non-parametric tests but emphasis is given on the non-parametric 
tests to reduce the impact of outliers. The parametric related sample Mest and its 
non-parametric version, the Wilcoxon signed rank tests are used to test for matched 
sample probability distributions. For independently drawn samples, the parametric 
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two independent sample t-test and the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test are 
used. 
13.3.1 Pre Acquisition Performance 
The first objective of the thesis is to analyse the level of pre acquisition 
operating performance of bidders, targets and their respective controls and the 
results are discussed at length in Section 9.3. The empirical evidence in Malaysia 
during the period 1988-1992 indicates that target companies perform significantly 
better than non-acquired companies over the 4-year period prior to acquisition. The 
result contradicts the traditional economic view of Manne (1965), Fama and Jensen 
(1983) and Jensen (1988) that target firms, which had performed poorly prior to 
acquisition, will be taken over. During the same period there was no evidence of 
superior performance by bidders relative to their control companies prior to the 
acquisition. The median annual control adjusted performance (the difference between 
the firm value and the value of the control firm in the same industry) is significantly 
negative over the 4-year period prior to acquisition, indicating that bidders are 
performing poorly relative to their control companies. Again the results contradict 
traditional economic theory which suggests that takeover bids are likely to be initiated 
by companies from the more efficient sectors of an economy. Section 9.3 also 
provides evidence that the operating performance of bidders is not significantly 
different to that of targets over the 4-year period prior to acquisition. The result is 
again inconsistent with Manne's (1965) concept of market for corporate control which 
suggest that more capable and competent executive teams tend to replace those that 
are less capable and competent. Based on the results in the current study, 
acquisitions in Malaysia appear to be non-d isci pli nary in nature, consistent with the 
characteristics of private acquisitions in the sample. 
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13.3.2 Post Acquisition Performance 
The second objective of the thesis is to determine if there is any improvement 
in post acquisition cash flow performance of Malaysian acquiring firms five (5) years 
after acquisition as compared to their four (4) years pre acquisition performance. The 
results in Section 9.2 demonstrate that the combined firms have significantly higher 
rate of growth in cash flows than their industry counterparts. However, the rate of 
increase in cash flows does not of itself indicate that the combined firms operating 
performance improved in the post acquisition period. The rates of growth in operating 
assets are also found to be significantly positive in the post acquisition period. The 
period of time covered in the current study was one of a high rate of growth in the 
Malaysian economy. The results suggest that firms involved in takeovers were at the 
forefront of this growth. The results also provide evidence that these takeovers 
produced outcomes that have been identified as potentially related to management 
interests. In examining the post acquisition operating cash flow returns, the results 
suggest that takeovers in Malaysia also provided opportunities for shareholders to 
benefit. Despite the non-disciplinary motives, the results in Section 9.4 provide 
evidence that acquisitions in Malaysia during the period 1988-1992 lead to operating 
cash flow improvements in the long run. The post acquisition median control adjusted 
operating performance for the combined firms is significantly higher than their 
performance during the 4-year period prior to acquisition. Post acquisition median 
control adjusted operating performance is then regressed on the pre acquisition 
operating performance and the intercept indicates that the combined firms obtain a 
significant increase of 4.0% per year in post acquisition period. The improvement in 
post acquisition operating cash flow returns are consistent with the results reported by 
Healy et al. (1992) and Ghosh (1998) for US acquisitions, and by Manson et al. 
(1994) for UK acquisitions. 
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To test the robustness of the results, Chapter 11 pursue the implications of 
acquisition activity for performance improvement by exploring different definitions for 
measuring accounting performance. The first measure uses the operating cash flow 
return (operating profit before tax and extraordinary item, adjusted for depreciation, 
interest and"goodwill divided by operating assets) similar to the definition given by 
Healy et al. (1992,1997) and Ghosh (1998) who make no adjustments for changes in 
working accruals. The second measure includes return on operating cash flow net of 
interest (operating profit before tax and extraordinary item adjusted for interest and 
changes in working capital divided by operating assets). The third measure is based 
on return on assets (net profit before tax and extraordinary item divided by total 
assets), similar to the conventional accruals accounting based measures of 
performance used in earlier studies in UK and US (example Muller, 1980, Singh, 
1971, Meeks, 1977 and Dickerson et al., 1977). The different definition of operating 
cash flow performance measures produce similar results, that is, acquisitions in 
Malaysia during the period 1988-1992 earn positive post acquisition operating 
improvements regardless whether changes in working capital are adjusted for or 
interest deducted from pre tax operating profit before or after acquisitions. However, 
when net profit returns are used as the performance measures, there is no evidence 
that the acquiring firms perform significantly better than companies that have not 
undertaken acquisitions in the post acquisition period. The insignificant post 
acquisition rate of return indicates that there is no deterioration in the combined firms 
net profit returns after allowing for goodwill and additional depreciation. The acquiring 
firms have not overpaid for the targets. The premium paid to the targets is justified in 
producing improvement in operating performance. 
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13.3.3 Sources of Operating Cash Flow Performance 
The third objective is to explore the sources of operating cash flow that might 
offer explanation for the changes in the operating returns after acquisition and the 
results are discussed in Section 9.5. Analysis of the components of operating cash 
flow Indicates that Improvements in post takeover performance are driven both by an 
increase in asset productivity and also by the higher level of operating cash flow per 
unit of sales. Changes in the operating margin ratio or the operating return on sales 
(operating cash flow divided by sales) improved post acquisition. The combined firms 
earn 8.1 cents more in cash flow than their control companies for each dollar of sales 
they make. Similarly, the median annual control adjusted asset turnover (sales 
divided by total assets) significantly increased over the 5 year period relative to 4 
years prior to acquisition. The overall result on asset sale rate (cash receipts from 
asset sales divided by the book value of assets) shows that there is no significant 
change in the cash proceeds from disposal of assets after acquisition. The result 
indicates that the high asset turnover after acquisition is not due to the sale of assets. 
Thus, acquiring firms in Malaysia appear to make more efficient use of the higher 
level of resources available in the post acquisition period. Capital expenditure rate 
(capital expenditure divided by book value of assets) is also significantly higher than 
that of the control companies in the post acquisition period, indicating that the 
combined firm has not sacrificed its long term investments for the sake of short term 
profitability. The average increase in post operating cash flow also does not appear to 
be driven by cost-cutting strategies of reducing cash expenses. There was no 
significant increase in cash operating expenses ratio (cash flow minus cash receipts 
from sales divided by book value of assets) in the post acquisition period. 
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13.3.4 Effect of Bid Characteristics on Post Acquisition Performance 
To accomplish the fourth objective of the thesis, Chapter 10 focused on 
analysing the effect of acquisition characteristics on post acquisition operating 
performance for 83 bids consisting of 83 public listed bidders acquiring 80 private, 2 
public listed and I non-public listed targets In Malaysia during the period 1988- 
1992210. The specific bid characteristics analysed are business relatedness, 
management turnover, the relative size of targets to bidders, the method of payment 
offered and board of directors ownership. 
Since the specific feature of the current sample is that it consists mainly of 
privately owned targets, the characteristics of disciplinary bids found in acquisitions of 
public listed targets were not expected in agreed bids between the bidders and 
targets in the current study. Section 10.3 investigates whether changes in senior 
management of the target company following the acquisition have any impact on post 
acquisition performance. The increase in performance is significantly higher in the 
sub-sample in which all target directors were retained than in the sub-sample of 
acquisitions in which the target directors were replaced. As the results indicate the 
expected relationship between replacement of senior management and performance 
improvements, relating to disciplinary takeovers as identified in early studies 
(example Denis and Denis, 1995, Martin and McConell and Kennedy and Limmack, 
1996), is not observed in the current sample. Rather it appears that, if anything, 
retention of existing management is more likely to lead to performance improvement. 
Further analysis shows that replacement of target management has no impact on 
post acquisition performance regardless of the relatedness line of business. The 
210 14 bidders made multiple acquisitions in the same financial year, thus, analysing bid characteristics 
of 117 bids (97 acquiring and 117 targets) might bias the results since the performance of acquiring 
more than one target in the same year is counted more than once. 
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results contradicts the findings by Shelton (1988) and Walsh (1988) who suggested 
that superior post acquisition performance is likely to result when top management 
are replaced in related acquisitions. The latter findings in the thesis reinforce the 
unique characteristics of the data set used in the current analysis of acquisitions of 
privately owned Malaysian companies in which unique skills of previous directors may 
often be retained post acquisition regardless of the business relatedness. 
Acquisitions between target and acquiring firms in the thesis are classified as 
those with high, medium and low (or no) business overlap based on product markets. 
The results in Section 10.2 indicate that highly related acquisitions have a significant 
effect on post acquisition performance while there is no association between firms 
with no or medium business overlap and changes in post acquisition performance. 
The results of examining if relative size of target to bidders have any impact 
on post acquisition performance are provided in Section 10.4. The relative size in the 
thesis Is identified as the target size divided by bidder size. The size of target and 
bidder is measured as the book value of the companies (equity plus reserves, plus 
debt less cash and marketable securities) at the end of the financial year prior to the 
bid year (year -1). The results in Section 10.4 indicate that the relative size of target 
to bidders have significant impact on post acquisition performance, indicating that the 
larger the relative size of target to bidder, the greater the post acquisition 
performance. 
Section 10.5 provides the results on the inter-relationship effects of the 
method of payment on post acquisition performance. Cash offers in the thesis are 
defined as cash or debt exchanges, and share offers include shares and where a 
combination of cash and shares is paid. Consistent to the results found by Chang 
(1998) who examined bidder returns at the announcement date when the target is 
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privately held, the current study also find evidence that acquiring firms using shares to 
finance the acquisitions perform significantly better than those who use cash 
financing. The results in the current study contradict those found in previous market 
based studies (for example Agrawal et al., 1992 and Lughran and Vijh, 1997) when 
the target are public listed companies. 
Section 10.6 examines whether directors with significant shareholding play a 
role in monitoring the actions of the bidding firm's management in producing positive 
post acquisition performance. Directors' ownership positions of their company's 
ordinary shares are measured as shares held directly by the directors and his or her 
immediate family one-year prior to acquisition. The results in the current study do not 
support the hypothesis that the level of directors ownership has any effect on the post 
acquisition performance. The findings in the current study also contradict with those 
reported by Stulz (1988), Hubbard and Palia (1995) and Holl and Kyriazis (1997) that 
there is a non-monotonic relationship between directors ownership and improvement 
in post acquisition performance, where the performance of the firm first increases, 
then declines, as ownership of the board of directors rises. 
In summary, acquisitions of highly related business between target and 
acquiring firm, large relative size of target to bidders and payment for the acquisition 
by shares have a significant positive impact on post acquisition control adjusted 
performance. The target directors turnover and the directors share ownership do not 
have a significant effect on the post acquisition performance. In fact, acquirers who 
make no immediate change to the management team of the target company following 
the acquisition achieve a greater increase in post acquisition performance, reinforcing 
the view that this sample does not consist of disciplinary acquisitions. However, highly 
related business between target and bidder and payment by shares are the only 
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significant acquisition characteristics that have a significant positive impact on the 
post acquisition control adjusted performance when multiple regression is used. 
13.3.5 Share Price Performance 
Fama (1970) argued that the capital market is efficient in reflecting publicly 
available information in share prices, that is, prices ought to reflect the present value 
of expected future cash flow streams. Thus, Chapter 12 examines whether the share 
price changes around the time of the takeover (announcement to outcome date) 
reflects the market's expectation of changes in operating performance and also the 
premium that Is paid to target firms. Acquiring firm abnormal return is measured as 
the excess of the buy-and-hold return to the acquiring form over its control firms 
(matched by similar size and industry). Actual changes in operating performance is 
used to proxy expected changes as it is impossible to identify the latter. 
The results in Section 12.4 indicate that acquiring firms earn significant 
positive returns relative to their control companies over an observation period of day - 
5 prior to the announcement date to day +5 after the completion date. The Section 
also provides empirical evidence that there is a significant positive correlation 
between the share price market improvement around acquisitions, the change in post 
acquisition cash flows, and the premium paid for the target. However, the current 
study finds that there is insignificant post acquisition return to acquiring firms over the 
period ending 3 years after the bid completion. There is also no significant correlation 
between the post acquisition abnormal returns, the change in post acquisition cash 
flows, and the premium paid for the operating improvement. There is, however, a 
significant positive correlation between the post acquisition abnormal returns and the 
change in accounting rate of return. 
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13.4 ImplIcations of the Study 
The findings obtained in this paper have obvious implications not only to 
management and shareholders but also to policy makers, as to whether acquisitions 
should be actively encouraged or discouraged. Acquisition activity is beneficial to the 
economy if corporate managers act In the best interests of the firm's shareholders to 
maximise value. that is. maximisation of the net present value of future cash flow. The 
findings In the thesis not only show that there are improvements in post acquisition 
operating cash flow but also offer explanation as to what components causes the 
cash flow Improvements. The Improvements in the post acquisition operating 
performance in the current thesis are primarily a result of increased asset productivity. 
These Improvements are not achieved at the expense of the long term viability of the 
combined firms, as they are also accompanied by an increase in the level of capital 
investment. Neither is the improvement in post acquisition performance a result of a 
reduced asset base in the combined firm following disposal of unnecessary assets, as 
seen by the insignificant results for the change in asset sale rate and disposal of 
asset rate In the year of acquisition. The average increase in post acquisition 
operating cash flow also does not appear to be driven by cost-cutting strategies of 
reducing cash expenses. In addition, the median growth in total assets and sales 
(managerial interests) and post acquisition cash flow performance are higher for the 
combined firms relative to their control counterparts. The results demonstrate superior 
performance with respect to both managerial and shareholders interest in Malaysian 
acquisitions. 
The empirical evidence in the thesis indicates that the major source of 
operating gains is the acquisition of companies with a high overlap of product market 
relatedness between the bidder and target firms. The improved post acquisition 
performance In transactions with a high business overlap but not in other types of 
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acquisitions Is explicitly the result of an operational gain due to increased 
opportunities for each acquired business to share resources and activities in the 
acquiring firm. In addition, acquisitions paid by shares are more likely to achieve 
Improved post acquisition performance. It may be that target owners are 'tied' to the 
acquiring firms for the future. Acquirers who make no immediate change to the 
amnagement team of the target company following the acquisition also achieve a 
greater Increase In post acquisition performance. 
Managers who anticipate the cash flow improvements will pay a premium to 
acquire the targets. The significant positive correlation between the share price 
market revaluation of acquiring firms around acquisitions, the change in post 
acquisition cash flows, and the premium paid for the operating improvement found in 
the results is consistent with this view. The findings can also be viewed as evidence 
that cash flow data and market value data can capture real economic phenomena 
which explain a substantial proportion of the market's reaction to takeovers around 
the announcement period. 
Analysis of the change in accounting earnings following the acquisition 
suggests that there Is no increase in control adjusted profitability. Any improvement in 
operating cash flows appears to have been offset by the high level of accruals, 
including the charge for goodwill amortisation. Amortisation of goodwill reflects the 
premium paid for the target. Taken together with the absence of a significant pattern 
of long-run abnormal security returns, this result is consistent with the view that the 
premium paid for the target reflects (or anticipates) the improved operating cash flows 
achieved following acquisition. The net wealth benefits from the improved 
performance however, are obtained by the target company shareholders. 
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The majority of target companies that are included in the sample are private 
companies and are therefore much more likely to be entering into voluntary 
combinations with their acquirer than Is often the case in other countries. As such the 
results found are not necessarily similar to those of the relative performance 
hypothesised for companies involved In disciplinary takeovers. Despite the non- 
disciplinary motives, the current thesis provides evidence that 97 quoted acquiring 
and 117 target Malaysian companies Involved in acquisitions over the period January 
1.1988 to December 31.1992 produce significant operating cash flow improvements 
following acquisitions. Generally, there seem to be reasonable grounds for arguing 
that acquisition activities In Malaysia should be encouraged, as evidence from the 
present study that acquisitions lead to maximisation of shareholders wealth. However, 
as the majority of target companies in the thesis were previously privately owned 
businesses, researchers and policy makers should be wary before generalising from 
these results. 
13.5 Limitations of the Study 
The results of this study should be considered with knowledge of its limitation. 
Collecting full Information on listed acquiring and private target firms and their controls 
were relatively time consuming, and was found to be the most difficult task in 
conducting this research. Data availability especially for non-listed targets and their 
controls proved to be a problem. Annual reports for the non-listed companies are kept 
on microfiche at the Kuala Lumpur Registrar of Companies (ROC). Since the annual 
reports kept at the ROC were available only from December 31,1986, some of these 
companies did not have pre bid cash flow and asset data as far as three years prior to 
acquisition. The period of study covered under the current study (1988-1992) was 
one of a high rate of growth in the Malaysian economy. If the study had been 
extended to several years prior to 1988. the number of companies involved in the 
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sample could have been greater and would have involved years of economic 
slowdown during 1985 to 1987. Such data was not. however. available. 
Another limitation to the present study is the matching procedure adopted to 
select control companies that have not engaged in acquisition during the period under 
study. In theory. the matching procedures used seem efficient in selecting the 'same 
size* controls as the sample firms. However. it is not always possible to obtain the 
appropriate matched firms that have exactly the same size as the sample firms. 
13.6 Suggestions for Further Research 
To obtain a greater understanding of the findings presented in the thesis, 
several areas of future research can be conducted. One approach is to use case 
analysis by examining a few of the companies in greater detail to have better insights 
to the actual motives of acquisitions. In the current thesis, operating cash flow 
performance Improves on average. A number of the sample firms experience 
negative post acquisition returns. Business techniques and managerial reasons may 
have caused the differences in results among these companies. The findings of these 
case studies nfight explain these variations in post acquisition cash flow changes and 
should compliment the results found in the current thesis. 
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Operating C2sh flow returns for 117 combined acquiring and target firms in years 
surroundint! acoulsitions comnleted In the veriod 1988-19921 
Year Firm Control Control Adjusted No. of 
relative to 
acquisi- 'Mcdlan 51can Median Mean Aledian Alean % Obser- 
lion % % % % % % Positive vations 
4 7.46 7.86 4.78 5.52 2.28 2.34 63.27 49 
.3 4.48 4AS 8.62 6.21 -1.42 -2.14 46.59 88 
-2 5.41 515 6.40 3.75 -1.64 1.50 44.55 110 
.16.19 8.48 4.74 5.22 0.08 3.26 50.43 117 
Average annual 
perfomance over 
years -4 5.76 6.35 6.61 5.06 -0.30 1.30 49A5 
to -1 
+1 6.83 10.51 5.78 4.58 0.26 5.93 b 52.14 117 
+2 4.67 7.96 5.28 5.98 0.28 1.98 51.28 117 
+3 7.61 9.92 5.34 336 5.67 b 6.57" 63.25 117 
+4 8.69 12.62 3.89 3.80 4.211 8.82" 74.36 117 
+5 9.86 11.89 4.32 5.57 3.89" 6.32 b 66.67 117 
Average annua. ' 
performance over 
years 
+1 to +5 7.35" 10.58' 4.78 4.66 2.981 5.92b 63.97 
Panel B: Abnormal adjusted post acquisition operating cash flow returns (t-valucs in parentheses) 
A? ýý, - 0.04 + 0107 APcp,, R"- 0.094 F-statistic = 11.991 
(4.01)1 (3.46) * 
(4-03)" (3.5 1)' 
APý.. and Arp., am the median annual control adjusted operating returns in the post and prior acquisition 
pefiod for fium i. 
I-statistics given in the second brackets were adjusted for hctcrosccdasticity (White correction). 
'Operating performance in the pre acquisition period are pre-tax operating cash flow return on assets of target and 
bidder. weighted by the relative asset sizes of the two firms. Post acquisition performance used data of the 
combined firrm Pre acquisition control firm returns are target control and bidder control values, weighted by the 
relative asset values of the two corresponding sample firms at the beginning of the years. In the post acquisition 
period the weights used to compute control firm returns are the relative asset values of the acquirer and target firms 
in year-1. Control adjusted values are computed for each firm and year as the difference between the firm value in 
that year and the value of the control firm in the same industry during that period. 
Mann-NNIfitney tests are conducted on median control adjusted f igurcs 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests are used to test the significance between the pre and post acquisition median annual 
pcrformance 
: Significantly different from zero at the 1% probability level, using a two-tailed test. 
Statistically different from zero at the 5% probability level, using a two-tailed west. 
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Operating cash flow returns for 97 combined acquiring and target firms in years 
surrounding acquisition completed In the period 1988-1992 (using asset values of the 
control firms as welp-hted averaed 
Year Firm Control Control Adjusted Number 
rtlative of 
to acquisi- ISledian Mean Median Mean Median Mean % Obser- 
tion %% % % %% Positive vations 
-4 7.46 7.68 2.91 4.83 3.30 2.85 60.98 41 





years -4 to 5.79 6.94 
.1 
+1 6.62 9.34 
+2 5.47 8.75 
+3 7.61 10.07 
+4 10.21 15.35 
6.84 5.06 -1.13 0.90 45.05 91 
5.70 6.84 1.33 3.25 51.55 97 
6.60 5.97 -0.03 0.97 50.00 
5.58 4.62 0.82 4.72 52.58 97 
5.87 6.50 -0.71 2.25 49.48 97 
5.47 3.30 4.06' 6.77 b 60.82 97 
4.19 4.79 4.5 1 10.56' 68.04 97 
+5 8.86 11.73 3.85 5.47 4.08' 6.26' 68.04 97 
Average annual 
perrormance over 
years +1 to 7.56 11.05' 5.20 4.94 2.78' 6.1 lb 59.79 
+5 
Panel B: Abnormal adjusted post acquisition operating cash flow returns (t-values in parentheses) 
AFIP,., - 0.03 + 0.26 APc,,, R2- 0.13 F-statistic-14.38" 
(2.68)' (3.79) " 
(2.89)* (3.85)4 
AP'... and AF'p, , arc the median annual control adjusted operating returns in the post and prior acquisition 
period for f irm 1. 
I-statistics given in the second brackets were adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White correction). 
'Operating performance in the pre acquisition period arc pre-tax operating cash flow return on assets of target and bidder, weighted by the relative asset sizes of the two firms. Post acquisition pcrfom=cc used data of the 
combined firms. Pre acquisition control firm returns are target control and bidder control values, weighted by the 
relative asset values of the two corresponding sample firms at the beginning of the years. In the post acquisition 
period the wcighu used to compute control firm returns are the relative asset values of the controlfims at the beginning of the year. Control adjusted values are computed for each firm and year as the difference between the firm value in that year and the value of the control firm in the same industry during that period. Mann-Ulfitney tests are conducted on median control adjusted figures Wilcoxon signed rank tests are used to test the significance between the pre and post acquisition median annual 
performance 
: Significantly different from zero at the 1% probability level, using a two-tailed test. Statistically different from zero at the 5% probability level, using a two-tailed t-tcst. 
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Appendix 4 
Operating cash flow returns for the first acquisition of the 65 combined 1"Irms in years 
surrounding acquisition completed in the period 1988-19921 
Year Firm Control Control Adjusted Number of 
relative 
to acquisi- Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean % Positive Obser- 
tion %%%%%% vations 
4 5.72 5.82 2.70 5.09 2.71 0.73 53.85 26 
-3 3.23 3.54 4.74 3.64 0.92 -0.10 52.08 48 
-2 5.59 5.53 3.58 2.46 1.90 3.07 55.74 61 
-1 6.93 6.81 4.99 5.82 0.38 0.99 52.31 65 
Average annual 
performance over 
years -4 to 5.60 5.51 4.01 4.18 1.15 1.33 53.50 
-1 
+1 6.83 10.34 4.31 1.40 2.42 7.96 b 63.08 65 
+2 5.47 9.16 4.22 4.37 2.72 4.48 56.92 65 
+3 7.35 9.07 5.44 2.84 5.64b 8.22 b 66.15 65 
+4 10.30 12.04 4.03 2.83 5.63' 9.20' 75.38 65 
+5 10.49 10.51 2.33 1.93 6.16" 8.58 b 70.77 65 Average annual 
performance over 
years +1 to 7.56 b 10.22 b 4.03 3.28 4.04" 7.5" 64.62 +5 
Pancl B: Abnormal adjusted post acquisition operating cash flow returns (t-values in parentheses) AP'P,,,, = 0.05 + 0.28 AlIc.., R, - O. lo F-statistic=7.2811 (3.11)6 (2.8) " 
(3.24)" (2.99)e 
All'..,, and AF",,., are the mcdian annual control adjusted operating returns in the post and prior acquisition period for firm i. 
t-statistics given in the second brackets were adjusted for heterosccdasticity (White correction). 
I Operating performance in the pre acquisition period are pre-tax operating cash flow return on assets of target and bidder, weighted by the relative asset sizes of the two firms. Post acquisition performance used data of the combined firms. Pre acquisition control firm returns arc target control and bidder control values, weighted by the 
relative asset values of the two corresponding sample firms at the beginning of the years. In the post acquisition 
period the weights used to compute control firm returns are the relative asset values of the acquirer and target firms in year-1. Control adjusted values are computed for each firm and year as the difference between the firm value in that year and the value of the control firm in the same industry during that period. 
Mann-Whitncy tests are conducted on median control adjusted figures 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests are used to test the significance between the pre and post acquisition median annual 
pei furmance 
: Significantly different from zero at the 1% probability level, using a two-tailcd test. 
Statistically different from zero at the 5% probability level, using a two-tailed West. 
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